An increasingly sulky Qaddafi did not hesitate to take his frustrations out on the populace, admonishing it for its poor performance. In a speech in October 1971 in the coastal town of Sabratha, he complained:
We have ascertained that even under the revolutionary regime nobody is doing anything except for the sake of remuneration, and that nothing is performed, no mission accomplished, save in exchange for some reward … There will have to be a real change of heart among the Libyans: the revolution of 1 September was only a beginning.38
Qaddafi became so disenchanted with his revolutionary experience that it became increasingly common for him to withdraw to his family home in Sirte or to his beloved desert for long stints of contemplation. In a particularly serious episode in 1972, after yet another quarrel with the RCC, Qaddafi announced his resignation and stormed off to Egypt with his family in tow, telling President Sadat, ‘I came to reside here as a normal citizen.’39 Despite this assertion, the Libyan leader spent his time in Egypt giving lectures, touring factories, and meeting intellectuals. After fifteen days, the impetuous Qaddafi returned to Libya where, at an RCC meeting, his fellow revolutionaries, who were confused by events, informed him that they accepted his resignation. Qaddafi retorted: ‘Unfortunately you were not elected so I cannot give you my resignation. You are imposing yourself on the people by the force of a Kalashnikov.’40 When some RCC members reminded Qaddafi that he had not been elected either, he responded: ‘I have popular support and I will give my resignation directly to the people.’41
It was therefore agreed that Qaddafi would put his resignation to the masses at a specially convened meeting at Zawara, to the west of Tripoli, to mark the anniversary of the birthday of the Prophet on 16 April 1973. However, when the time came, the RCC was in for a shock.
The beginnings of ‘Qaddafism’
From a stage erected in the centre of this unprepossessing coastal town, Qaddafi made a speech that was to change the course of Libyan history. After dramatically declaring that the revolution was in mortal danger, and after attacking the Libyan people for their laziness and lack of revolutionary zeal, he announced not his resignation, but the launch of a cultural or ‘Popular Revolution’. The audience was stunned. So too was the RCC, which clearly had no idea that its leader was about to spring this on it; Jalloud was flabbergasted.42
But Qaddafi's fellow revolutionaries, who had had the carpet pulled from under their feet, could do little about the situation. As a group, they were not strong or united enough to do anything to stop Qaddafi. More importantly, for all their exasperation, most still had an overriding sense of loyalty to their leader, even though this was the clearest sign yet that he was leaving them far behind. Indeed, this speech – which was to serve as a blueprint for the rest of his four decades in power – represented the real beginnings of the intense personalization of politics that was to characterize Libya under the endlessly eccentric Qaddafi. Such was the force of the Leader's personality that those around him had no choice but to follow.
Sweeping away the existing political structures, the Colonel declared a new five-point programme that would mobilize Libya's citizens and save his cherished revolution. This programme advocated: a) the repeal of all existing laws and their replace---ment by revolutionary enactments; b) the weeding out of all anti-revolutionary elements by taking appropriate measures against ‘perverts and deviators’; c) the staging of an administrative revolution to destroy all forms of bourgeoisie and bureaucracy; d) the arming of the people to create a people's militia that could protect the revolution; and e) the staging of a cultural revolution to get rid of all imported poisonous ideas that are contrary to the Qu'ran.
The plan was to be enacted through popular committees that were to be formed by ‘every village, town, college, factory and school’. The members of these committees were to be elected directly by the people and were to run everything from schools to companies to government offices. This was essentially an attack on the administration and was meant to weed out the last vestiges of the old bureaucracy, including local mayors and managers, university administrators and members of local municipal councils, who were all forced out of their posts. It was to be a complete purge of anyone deemed to be ‘obstructing the path to revolutionary progress’. As Qaddafi told students at Benghazi University, ‘Trample under your feet any bourgeois bureaucrat who closes the doors of government offices in your face … Tear up all the imported books which do not express Arabism, Islam, socialism and progress. Burn and destroy all curricula that do not express the truth.’43
By August 1973, there were over 2,000 such committees in operation. Some of the more zealous among them took their work seriously: acting on their recommendations, the police arrested between three and four hundred regime opponents, including communists, Ba'athists, members of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party).44 However, predictably enough, others used their new positions to settle old scores and pursue their own interests. Moreover, the impractical nature of this system and the inexperience of those elected to the committees soon showed, resulting in further bureaucratic chaos – yet another feature of Qaddafi's revolution that was to endure. By mid-1973, the country's bureaucratic structures had nearly doubled in size and had become both a means for social advancement and, importantly, a mechanism for the new regime to control activity at every level of society.45
Meanwhile the regime began recruiting for a people's militia that would augment the army. This militia – which was open to both men and women – managed to enlist some 40,000 recruits during its first year.46 Its members received training, uniforms and weapons, but no pay, and their function was mainly to guard buildings and to man checkpoints and border points. However, they could be mobilized at a time of crisis. More importantly, the militarization of society in this way served to create a loyal force that could serve as a counterbalance to the armed forces, if need be.
The five-point plan clearly marked an extension of some of the concepts of ‘people power’ that had already characterized the rhetoric of the first years after the coup. However, it was also a reflection of Qaddafi's realization that, if the masses were not going to come on board, he would have to impose his revolution by force. As he asserted, he was ready to ‘take people to paradise in chains’.47
So it was that, from this point forward, the Libyan revolution came to be equated with what can only be described as ‘Qaddafism’. Indeed, the popular or cultural revolution was based on Qaddafi's unique and personal vision that he had been developing during his periods of quiet contemplation in the desert. This vision was the Third Universal Theory, which came to serve as the ideological underpinning of his revolutionary state. He first announced this theory in May 1973, a month after his Zawara speech, at an international conference for Arab and European youth. With a characteristic lack of modesty, Qaddafi told his audience that his new theory would be based upon ‘universal truth’ and that it would ‘serve all humanity’.
The theory was essentially a new ‘middle way’ to replace both communism and capitalism. The Colonel shunned both systems, arguing that capitalism had transformed society into a circus that had handed over the reins to the individual without any restraints, while ‘godless’ communism had turned humans into sheep because of its claim to solve economic problems by the total abolition of private property.48 His theory was an alternative for the Third World and would enable the weak to fight back against the strong. It was also a reflection of Qaddafi's belief that the answers to society's problems lay in Islam. As he explained in his speech to the youth forum, ‘The Third Theory or ideology … is an ideology which calls for mankind to return to the Kingdom of God … When we speak about the Third Universal Theory we stress that it is not made by man nor is it a philosophy, but it is based on truth … truth is firm and unchangeable.’49
Yet for all the heady talk of new concepts and universal truths, the essence of the theory appears to have been socialism with an Islamic flavour. Qad
dafi believed that socialism was inherent in Islam, that both abhorred exploitation of the weak by the strong, and that both had a respect for justice. As he declared, ‘Islam provides for the realisation of justice and equity; it does not allow any rich person to use his wealth as a tool of oppression nor to exploit people … Islam stands against poverty, and firmly stands by the side of the working classes.’50
For Qaddafi this was a theory that could resist the imperialism of the two dominating political-ideological systems, and that could ensure the protection of individuals in societies in the developing world. Yet while this theory may have been clear to Qaddafi, it is doubtful whether the masses – whose lives it sought to transform – were able to fully grasp its meaning. Even the educated found the theory utterly confusing; one Libyan studying in the UK at the time recalled: ‘We didn't understand a word of it.’51 Mansour Kikhia, Qaddafi's foreign minister between 1972 and 1973, who was abducted on a visit to Cairo in 1993, recalled:
Whenever new intellectuals arrived Qadhafi would tell me to invite them to visit him. Then as we talked he would take notes. He would ask them how to remedy this or that problem. The trouble for him was that he couldn't digest their ideas. He didn't have a basic scientific approach. When he himself offered an opinion, he came out with immature and confused analyses, such as were later to form the basis of his Third Universal Theory.52
Moreover, there was nothing particularly new in the theory. The erudite Mohamed Heikal commented: ‘As one who has lived through the experience of Nasser's revolution I am still puzzled by the Third Theory. It reminds me of something Nasser once said to his companions: “Don't invent electricity; somebody had done that already … Our task is to learn to use it, not to re-invent it.” ’53 Bona Malwal, the Sudanese minister for information and culture, visited Libya in 1974. During his stay, the Libyan leader spent two days trying to convince him to apply the theory to Sudan, but Malwal concluded, ‘I didn't find an original idea in it.’54 Rather it was a mish-mash of confused ideas and concepts, wrapped up in a fervent anti-imperialism and a simplistic belief that Islam and social justice could make the Arabs great again.
Yet the importance of the Third Universal Theory was that it was something that could lift Qaddafi and his revolution above and beyond the local. Qaddafi always believed he was a thinker of world-class calibre, and for him this theory was proof of that – so much so that he embarked upon a mass publicity campaign aimed at spreading his ideas on an international scale. He invited Muslims and thinkers from around the world to conferences in Libya, where he and his RCC members would expound on his theory and on his revolution.55 He also took his ideas on touring roadshows. In Cairo, in the summer of 1973, he enraged Egyptian intellectuals and President Sadat by calling on them to carry out their own cultural revolution, and condemning them for the fact that they permitted bars, nightclubs, alcohol and gambling: ‘How can a drunk make progress in society? How can a drunk battle in Sinai against the enemy?’56 It also emerged in 1974 that the very day after Qaddafi had offered to allocate $3 billion over five years to raise production levels in Egyptian factories, Jalloud had demanded that, for such funds to be agreed, Egypt must commit itself to the Third Universal Theory and the popular revolution.57
In his bid to publicize his new ideology, Qaddafi made some very curious alliances. One of the strangest was his dalliance with a hippy group called the Children of God (COG). The Children of God were led by an American preacher, Moses David, who, according to his daughter, had started to receive ‘special revelations’ about Qaddafi in 1971. Moses David seems to have come to the conclusion that Qaddafi was someone special, who ‘may either be the Antichrist himself, or … is preparing the way for the Antichrist. But it is God-ordained, and it's obvious God has predicted it.’58 The group decided that it should assist Qaddafi in whatever way was necessary, and in his writings Moses David heaped praise upon the Colonel, his Third Universal Theory and his ‘Godly Socialism’.
Qaddafi's links to this group certainly came as a surprise to members of the RCC. Al-Meheishi recalled how, during the opening in March 1972 of the Tripoli International Fair, he noticed the presence of ‘girls wearing gypsy clothes with unkempt hair’ who were carrying leaflets and musical instruments.59 When Al-Meheishi asked who the girls were, he was told they were ‘the girls of Allah’. Some of these women approached him while he was visiting the stall of the USA and told him they were friends of Qaddafi. According to Al-Meheishi, ‘they started singing a song in which the word Qaddafi was repeated so many times’.
When Al-Meheishi questioned the Leader about the wisdom of befriending such a group, Qaddafi's motives were abundantly clear. He replied: ‘they promote my name in Europe through their songs’.60 It took until 1975 and a month-long stay in Tripoli for Moses David to cotton onto the fact that Qaddafi was only interested in the group for what it could do to promote his revolution. His daughter recounts:
Dad spent about a month in Libya, but things weren't going the way he thought they would. He had taken with him a troupe of girls and started an FF [flirty fishing] ministry61 among some military leaders and Qadahfi's personal staff. But Qadahfi was not interested in prostitution – the Koran forbids it – even though his officers were. Rather, the Libyan wanted only to make use of the ten thousand COG disciples who were distributing literature around the world … But Moses David was not interested – he was in over his head, and he knew it. He realized that Qadahfi could crush him like a bug if he wished.62
Yet it was not just cult groups like the Children of God who heralded Qaddafi and his new revolutionary spirit. The young leader also found popularity among other parts of the developing world. He visited Pakistan for the 1974 Islamic summit and was reportedly received like a hero. Yet all this international notoriety was clearly going to his head. According to Al-Meheishi,
After Qaddafi's return from Lahore, I noted that he wasn't the man I knew. He started saying repeatedly that he was no longer the chairman of the Revolutionary Council but that he was the leader of the world, especially the Islamic world. He started rejecting the idea that he was the head of Libya only … After that he stopped receiving ambassadors and stopped receiving heads of state in the airport.63
It was not long after his return from Pakistan that he was to immortalize his thinking in his most famous work, the Green Book.
The Green Book and the Jamahiriyah
The Green Book, the first part of which was published in 1975, was Qaddafi's attempt to bring his revolutionary thoughts into a single written treatise. Divided into three parts – the first dealing with politics, the second with economics and the third with social issues – it is a kind of handbook for society that lays out Qaddafi's utopian, but hopelessly simplistic, vision of the ideal form of governance. The basic thrust of the text is that, in order for true democracy to flourish, state institutions should be abolished and society should take charge of its own problems and rule itself in a ‘stateless society’.
Given the enormity of the subject matter, one might expect the Green Book to be a hefty tome, requiring hours of study. Yet it is not a big book. In fact, it is remarkably slim. As Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci once rather condescendingly told Qaddafi during an interview, ‘Oh yes I have read it! It doesn't take very long. A quarter of an hour, tops. It's so tiny. My powder compact is bigger than your little green book.’64 Qaddafi appears not to have taken offence at Fallaci's comment, replying: ‘You sound like Sadat. He says it sits on the palm of your hand.’65 Even one of the Libyan regime's most fervent ideologues, Rajoub Bu Dabbous, once described it as ‘A summary of a book that hasn't been written yet.’66
What the Green Book lacks in size it does not make up for in coherence. It is not an easy read: it is repetitive and packed with heavily laboured examples that do little to clarify the ideas (or rather the germs of ideas) that they are supposed to illustrate. Certain passages are baffling or just downright bizarre, such as that included in the part of the book about ‘sport, ho
rsemanship and shows’, in which Qaddafi declares:
Sport is like praying, eating, and the feeling of warmth and coolness. It is stupid for crowds to enter a restaurant just to look at a person or a group of persons eating; it is stupid for people to let a person or a group of persons get warmed or enjoy ventilation on their behalf. It is equally illogical for the society to allow an individual or a team to monopolize sports while the people as a whole pay the costs of such a monopoly for the benefit of one person or a team.67
The first, and arguably most important, part of the Green Book, entitled ‘The Solution of the Problem of Democracy’, is hardly more sophisticated in its intellectual approach. It is based primarily around the notion that parliaments and political parties are obstacles to true democracy because, by their very nature, they involve the surrendering of individual sovereignty to whoever is elected. All forms of representation are rejected; parliaments are dismissed as ‘a misrepresentation of the people’ and political parties are ‘the modern dictatorial instrument of governing’.68 Qaddafi declares, too, that the parliamentary system cannot be called true democracy, because a political party may win an election with 51 per cent of the vote, leaving the other 49 per cent of voters ruled by a party they do not support. This, for him, is the antithesis of what it means to be democratic.
Libya - The Rise and Fall of Qaddafi Page 9