Whereas enemies of the state would be totally disarmed, and ordinary persons would be required to prove “need” to obtain a permit to carry a firearm, members of the Nazi elite would need no permits of any kind: “The position of the NSDAP in the German state is taken into account in that those political leaders and leaders of the SA, SS, NSKK [National Socialist Motor Corps (Nationalsocialistisches Kraftfahrkorps)] and Hitler Youth with a certain rank who have been granted the right to carry firearms by the competent party office do not in addition need a police permit to carry firearms or acquire small firearms.”
The German states could not impose other restrictions, the explanation continued, “because pursuant to the First Decree on the New Order of the Reich of February 2, 1934, laws of the Länder [states] in general require the consent of the competent Reich minister.” (Following the virtual abolition of the states, that decree required all state laws to be approved by the Reich.6) However, state laws might continue to “be useful to prohibit Gypsies or persons wandering like Gypsies from owning weapons, until this matter has been settled for the Reich with a Reich law.” For uniformity, state laws regulating slashing or thrusting weapons would be inoperative, except with respect to Gypsies.
It is noteworthy that Frick’s 1937 draft would have barred Jews from high-level positions within the firearms industry but would not have officially prohibited Jews from firearm possession. Gypsies were the only ethnic group prohibited from firearm ownership, but all “enemies of the state” were as well, a category into which the Gestapo placed Jews, not to mention political dissidents.
Although Jews were still formally not yet prohibited from firearms possession, in March 1937 the Gestapo proscribed issuance of hunting licenses to Jews because they were considered enemies of the state.7 All hunting permits held by Jews were revoked.8 Jews neither could be trusted with arms nor should share in the Reich’s natural resources.
Frick’s draft was sent only to the Reich ministries—the legislature (Reichstag) no longer functioned—which included mostly political, police, and military agencies. The Reich forest supervisor and Prussian land forest supervisor opposed the proposed ban on hollow-point .22-caliber rimfire ammunition, noting: “Hollow-point, grooved or similarly made small-caliber cartridges are extremely useful for hunters to shoot rabbits and to keep the hunting grounds free of small predators.” They continued: “During the quiet hunting season, many hunters carry the small-caliber [.22 rimfire] in their three-barrel gun and under the proposed amendment of the law would no longer be able to use the hollow-point bullets that are much more efficient for hunting purposes. They would be forced to use the normal small-caliber bullets which are entirely insufficient and must be regarded as inappropriate for a hunter.”9
The public had no idea what decrees Nazi officials were discussing behind closed doors, but the forest supervisors’ opposition was the only objection made to the proposed new Firearms Law by a ministerial agency with a view of a segment of the public. Perhaps the regime feared use of this ammunition by “enemies of the state.”
Registration of supposed enemies of the state continued apace. A June 1937 directive assigned an SS division known as “Referat II, 112, Judaism” to focus on the complete registration of Jews in the Jewish Registry. The design and implementation of the registry was entrusted to Adolf Eichmann, who would later coordinate the extermination of Jews in the Holocaust.10
Specific supposed enemies of the state continued to be rounded up. On July 1, 1937, Lutheran pastor Martin Niemöller, a founder of the Confessing Church and opponent of the Nazification of the Protestant churches, was arrested and would be incarcerated in prison and concentration camps until 1945. Bella Fromm, the Berlin Jewish socialite whose meeting with Hitler at a reception mentioned in a previous chapter made her wish she had her revolver, wrote in her diary: “They’ve arrested Pastor Niemoeller, charging him with subversive activity! They dare anything, knowing there is no armed minority strong enough to oppose their most outrageous acts. It is true that Niemoeller was of the opposition, but it was not a political opposition. Merely an opposition to the encroachment of the state on the Christian faith.”11
This statement exemplifies the ongoing purge from society of all enemies of National Socialism, as Frick repeatedly stated in his explanations of proposed revisions to the firearms laws. Had a large number of Germans been like Bella Fromm—armed and willing to transcend any Jewish–Christian dichotomies—perhaps there might have been an “armed minority” or, more than that, a minority strong enough to oppose the regime. Niemöller would capture this disunity among groups oppressed by Nazism in the poem he composed at the end of the war:
First they came for the Communists, and I didn’t speak up, because I wasn’t a Communist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I didn’t speak up, because I wasn’t a Jew.
Then they came for the Catholics, and I didn’t speak up, because I was a Protestant.
Then they came for me, and by that time there was no one left to speak up for me.12
The poem presents a partial explanation of how the Nazi regime was able to achieve total power by exploiting divisions in society. Anti-Hitler conspirator Hans Bernd Gisevius would later write:
Niemoeller’s incarceration removed the last personality around whom any sort of civilian revolt movement might have gathered.
From the day the dictatorship began, the practicality of individual actions had seemed highly dubious, but a popular movement from below had seemed quite possible. For a time a general strike or other action by the disbanded labor unions appeared quite likely, but this likelihood turned out to be wrong. Thereupon, the resisters all turned their eyes to the Church.13
According to Gisevius, the chance for a popular opposition movement thus ended, and thereafter only a revolt from above could succeed. However, “[t]he ‘sole bearers of arms in the nation’ looked on idly as this enslavement of the nation took place. They ‘kept out’ of the struggle.” He was referring to the military, adding: “From 1934 on, these ‘sole bearers of arms in the nation’ had by their passivity abetted the growth of Nazi totalitarianism.”14 With the capitulation of the Wehrmacht to Hitler’s will, the last potential force to resist evaporated.
This capitulation was complete by early 1938, when scandals weakened the German High Command, and Hitler both appointed his own selections and assumed the office of the War Ministry. In January, when Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg sought Hitler’s blessings to remarry, the führer consented and even attended the ceremony. Berlin police president Helldorf, however, had information that Blomberg’s wife had been convicted as a prostitute and had posed for pornographic photos that had been widely sold in Berlin. A Czech Jew had supposedly been her partner. Helldorf then took his evidence to Hermann Göring, who coveted Blomberg’s power and so informed Hitler.15 An enraged Hitler was able to use the scandal to depose Blomberg and assert total power over the Wehrmacht.
By December 18, 1937, Interior Minister Frick had feedback “from the Reich agencies and the deputy of the führer” and enclosed a semifinal draft of the proposed revisions to the Firearms Law. Unless objections were received within three weeks, noted Frick, “I will assume that all pertinent agencies agree with this draft to the Weapons Law and will submit it to the Reich cabinet for adoption by circulation because I do not consider it necessary for the cabinet to debate this draft.”16
Wilhelm Keitel—just appointed by Hitler as Reich minister of war and commander in chief of the Wehrmacht in the wake of the Blomberg scandal—requested that the draft state that “[w]ar materials may be acquired only with approval of the Reich Minister of War or an agency designated by him.”17 This would ensure that citizens could not obtain permits to acquire military firearms, such as ordinary Mauser bolt-action rifles.
Meanwhile, a less orderly form of firearms prohibition and antiSemitism was taking place outside of Germany. In Rumania, Jewish lawyers were beaten by non-Jewish lawyers, and “in one district au
thorities were ordered to issue no more firearms permits to Jews, who were ordered to surrender arms already in their possession.”18 A newly installed military dictatorship declared its power to conduct house searches and censor the press, and “a proclamation further order[ed] the surrender of all arms and ammunition in private possession.”19
In Germany, however, legal forms remained important. Final changes to the draft law were made, and at last, on February 9, 1938, Frick submitted it for final approval by the Reich cabinet by way of circulation and without debate. Not only had the legislature and legislative debate ceased to function, the cabinet apparently engaged in little debate—especially when, as here, “all of the Reich ministries and the Deputy of the Führer have given their approval to the draft.”20 “The specialist for the Weapons Law at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, senior official Dr. Hoche,” urged that the circulation process be speeded up and kept to a minimum.21
A minor scrambling for an interpretation by Nazi bureaucrats took place at the last minute. A memorandum was inserted into the record that “officials and employees of the security service of the Reich Chancery do not need a firearm license. It is sufficient if they carry a certificate of their agency…. The specialist at the Reich Ministry of the Interior, Dr. Hoche, senior official, agreed with this interpretation.”22
The Nazi Party itself wanted more than just a file memorandum when it came to an ambiguity regarding who must be “personally reliable” in the firearms industry—a code word for political reliability. A party official noted that “both the commercial and the technical manager of the operation need to be personally reliable,” that the Interior Ministry “specialist” (Dr. Hoche) “agreed to change the statement of reasons to read that all persons concerned need to be reliable,” and that the revision must “be made before the draft is submitted to the Führer and Reich Chancellor.”23
Dr. Hoche immediately changed the explanation of the draft to reflect this adjustment. “He said that the intention was not to issue a permit to manufacture firearms and ammunition if either the requestor or the person contemplated as commercial or technical manager of the operation was reliable, but that of course all three would have to be reliable.”24
The draft was now final, and Frick announced: “None of the Reich Ministers has filed an objection against the proposal submitted to the members of the Reich Government…by way of circulation. The Führer and the Reich Chancellor has approved it and the following is herewith adopted.”25 It was decreed and signed by Hitler and Frick pursuant to the Enabling Act passed in 1933, which stemmed from the provision of the Weimar Constitution allowing rule by decree. Indeed, the Reichstag, the legislative body, passed only seven laws during the entire Third Reich (1933–45).26 The official publication date of the Weapons Law was March 13, 1938.27
The new Weapons Law was enacted only four days after the Anschluss of Austria, in which a triumphant Hitler returned to his homeland to occupy it. The repression was immediate. Victor Klemperer wrote in his diary: “Some time before the occupation of Austria there were careful investigations (books and periodicals) on behalf of the Gestapo as to who among the Austrian professors and writers had published anti-Fascist work. These people were immediately arrested.”28 Austrian police records on firearm owners would have been another obvious source for Gestapo investigation.
As adopted, the Hitler–Frick Weapons Law combined many elements of the 1928 law with National Socialist innovations. A license was required to manufacture, assemble, or repair firearms and ammunition and even to reload cartridges. “A license shall not be granted if the applicant, or the persons intended to become the commercial or technical managers of the operation of the trade, or any one of them, is a Jew.”29 Firms with licenses under the 1928 law had to comply with this provision within a year, or the license would be revoked.30
A license was also required to sell firearms as a trade. Again, Jews were excluded.31 Trade in firearms was prohibited at annual fairs, shooting competitions, and other events.32 This would have included traditionally popular events such as shooting festivals and gun shows.
Acquisition of a handgun required a Waffenerwerbschein (license to obtain a weapon).33 That stipulation did not apply to transfer of a handgun to a shooting range licensed by the police for sole use at the range. Exempt from the law’s provisions were “authorities of the Reich,” various government entities, and “departments and their subdivisions of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party designated by the deputy of the Führer.”34
Carrying a firearm required a Waffenschein (license to carry a weapon). The issuing authority had complete discretion to limit the validity of the license to a specific occasion or locality.35 The decree further provided:
Licenses to obtain or to carry firearms shall only be issued to persons whose reliability is not in doubt, and only after proving a need for them.
Issuance shall especially be denied to:…
Gypsies, and to persons wandering around like gypsies;
Persons for whom police surveillance has been declared admissible, or upon whom the loss of civil rights has been imposed, for the duration of the police surveillance or the loss of civil rights;
Persons who have been convicted of treason or high treason, or against whom facts are under consideration that justify the assumption that they are acting in a manner inimical to the state….
Persons who have received final sentence to a punishment of deprivation of liberty for more than two weeks…for resistance to the authorities of the state.36
It is noteworthy that, on the face of the law, Jews were not named as automatically disqualified. Gypsies were the only ethnic group that did not qualify. It might be that the Nazi leadership did not feel confident of the support of enough Germans to disarm Jews at this time. Many Jewish men had fought in the Great War and had retained their sidearms.37 This reluctance would change later that year.
For officially supplied firearms, a license to acquire or carry firearms was not required of members of the armed forces, the police, “members of the SS reserve groups, and the SS Totenkopfverbände [Skull and Crossbones units],”38 as well as the following: “lower echelon leaders of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party, from local group leaders upwards; of the SA, the SS, and the National Socialist Motor Corps from Sturmführer upwards as well as the Hitlerjugend from Bannführer upwards, to whom the Deputy of the Führer or an office designated by him, granted the right to carry firearms.”39
Possession of any kind of weapon could be prohibited where “in individual cases a person who has acted in an inimical manner toward the state, or it is to be feared that he will endanger the public security.”40 Such cases could include any opponent of Nazism or simply any disfavored person. No compensation would be paid for the confiscation.
It was forbidden to manufacture or possess “firearms that are adapted for folding or telescoping, shortening, or rapid disassembly beyond the generally usual extent for hunting and sporting purposes.” Firearms with silencers or spotlights were prohibited. Also, .22-caliber rimfire cartridges with hollow-point bullets were outlawed.41
The penalty for willfully or negligently violating the provisions of the law related to the carrying of a firearm was up to three years imprisonment and a fine.42 A fine and indeterminate imprisonment was imposed on anyone who violated other provisions of the law or implementing regulations.43
The primary Hitler–Frick innovations to the 1928 Weimar law were the exclusion of Jews from firearms businesses and the extension of the exceptions to the requirements for licenses to obtain and to carry firearms to include various National Socialist entities, including party members and members of military and police organizations. Although the 1938 law no longer required an acquisition license for rifles and shotguns, but only for handguns, any person could be prohibited from possession of any firearm based on the broad discretion of authorities to determine that a person was “acting in a manner inimical to the state” or had been sente
nced “for resistance to the authorities of the state,”44 or “it is to be feared that he will endanger the public security.”45 The Weimar law had provided for compensation for a confiscated firearm, whereas the Nazi law prohibited compensation. An innovation of the 1938 law was to ban .22-caliber rimfire cartridges with hollow-point bullets, which were used mostly for small-game hunting but could be lethal to humans.
The major features of the Weimar law were retained as particularly suitable for Nazism’s goals: the requirement of licenses to make and sell firearms, including record keeping on transferees and police powers to inspect such records; the requirements of licenses to obtain and to carry weapons and of the retention by police of the identities of and information on such licensees; the provision that “licenses to obtain or to carry firearms shall be issued only to persons whose reliability is not in doubt, and only after proving a need for them”; the denial of licenses to “persons for whom police surveillance has been declared admissible” or who presumably “are acting in a manner inimical to the state”; the prohibition on possession of any weapon by a person “who has acted in an inimical manner toward the state, or it is to be feared that he will endanger the public security”; and the prohibition on firearms with certain features not generally used “for hunting and sporting purposes.”
Again following the Weimar law, the Hitler–Frick law directed the Reich minister of the interior to issue implementing regulations.46 Pursuant to that power, on March 19, 1938, Frick promulgated extensive regulations governing the manufacture, sale, acquisition, and carrying of firearms.47 The regulations began by entrusting the higher administrative authority in the hands of the presidents of the governments or highest officials in the various states, except that in Berlin the power was in the hands of the police chief.48
Gun Control in the Third Reich Page 17