A more important factor in Harold’s actions may have been the personal knowledge of William and of Norman tactics that he gained during his visit to Normandy in 1064. There he had witnessed at first hand the mobile tactics of the Norman knights, when he accompanied Duke William on his Breton expedition. He had seen how William could rapidly move his cavalry from place to place, ravage wide areas of territory, and swiftly pursue enemies. He had also seen castles used as refuges, from whence raids could be sent out to subdue the surrounding countryside. If the Normans were able to advance inland from Hastings to more open country in Kent or Hampshire, they would become a major threat. They could exploit the mobility of their cavalry to plunder widely and live off the land, easily outmanoeuvring the less mobile English infantry and throwing up castles to preserve their communications and provide fortified refuges behind them. This last point was a particular threat because by these means the Normans could establish footholds in a territory rather than merely raiding it and moving on like the Vikings had done. Indeed, these were the very tactics pursued by the Normans later in their march on London and during their subsequent subjugation of England.14
It was probably this knowledge, rather than a desire to catch William unawares or to preserve the family lands, which persuaded Harold of the need for haste in advancing into Sussex. He had to contain the Normans in Sussex and in the peninsula on which Hastings stood, in order to prevent them taking full advantage of their mobility. Once he had the Normans bottled up there, he could build up his forces against them, while simultaneously cutting off their supplies and preventing their raids on Sussex. Thus he moved the forces he had gathered rapidly in order to block a Norman break-out and at the same time summoned a fleet to destroy their ships and cut off their retreat. Harold intended to deal with William as thoroughly as he had Harald of Norway and his actions were directed to that end.15
King Harold ordered his army to meet at the ‘hoary apple tree’, a local Sussex landmark obviously well known to the English. Indeed it may have lain on the boundary of Harold’s own estate at Whatlington, just over a mile from the battle site. If Harold did intend to trap William’s forces then this would explain why he apparently sent a messenger to treat with William. The intention behind this would be to stall William at Hastings until Harold’s army and fleet arrived to trap him. We need not believe the exact words put into the mouth of the messenger by William of Poitiers, although interestingly the emphasis he places on the gift of the kingdom to Harold by the dying Edward, reflects English traditional practice. The gist of Harold’s message, that William should leave England before he was destroyed, is probably accurate enough. Duke William could not back out now without a loss of prestige of incalculable consequence, and he therefore rejected Harold’s ultimatum. According to William of Poitiers, Duke William is supposed to have made a challenge to single combat, which was ignored by Harold. This challenge probably represents a literary device which has no foundation in truth, although Harold’s refusal of such a challenge would reflect English tradition, which found trial by combat an alien concept. In a sense, William’s rejection of Harold’s ultimatum reflected the fact that his position was improving in that he would soon be trapped with no alternative but to fight. Therefore, he was able to set aside the earlier doubts, which had plagued him after Harold’s victory over the Norwegians.16
King Harold’s army emerged from its march through the Sussex Weald probably in the late afternoon of 13 October. Harold had achieved his primary purpose by interposing his army between the Normans and the more open country beyond the peninsula on which Hastings stood. He could now build up his own forces and watch the Normans become weaker before attacking at the time of his choosing. Warned by their scouts, the Normans withdrew their foragers back to their camp near Hastings. William was obviously more wary of Harold’s military reputation than later historians, or the result of the battle, would appear to admit. He clearly feared a sudden attack by Harold, possibly during the hours of darkness, and had his troops armed and stood to throughout the night, expecting an assault which never came as Harold did not yet intend to attack.17
As dawn of 14 October approached, the situation was close to crisis point, and we must establish the intentions of the two commanders. King Harold, as we have seen, probably intended to contain the Normans until he could destroy their fleet and bring superior force to bear on them. This may seem rather cautious but it is likely that he had lost a large number of his most seasoned troops at Stamford Bridge and, additionally perhaps, not all his troops had yet arrived on the field. He could afford to wait before he sought battle until he was confident of victory, or until the Normans were starved into surrender. On the other hand, William could not afford to wait at all. He was now trapped at Hastings, unable to forage for supplies and faced with the prospect of his line of retreat and reinforcement being cut, either by an English fleet or by bad weather, which was increasingly likely at this time of year. Therefore, he had to attack Harold soon. If he did not, he would certainly be defeated. It was a simple matter of survival. This is reflected in the exhortatory speech placed in William’s mouth by his biographer William of Poitiers, which emphasizes that there was no way of escape. The situation effectively resolved any doubts he or his followers had about their expedition.
At this stage, King Harold must have been aware that his cornered opponent would be likely to strike back, and he would have accepted this risk to his plans, yet the Chronicle states that William came against him by ‘surprise’.18 The reason for this seems fairly clear. William had maintained his troops on stand-by throughout the night in preparation for a possible night assault by Harold. Therefore, when dawn broke, at around 5.30 a.m., it was a relatively easy task for William to assemble them in battle array and advance on King Harold’s force soon afterwards. On the other hand, the English had arrived late the previous day, after a three-day march from London through the Weald. They were tired and in need of rest, so they probably camped round the ‘hoary apple tree’ on Caldbec Hill and slept soundly through the night. Later fanciful Anglo-Norman accounts of the English army’s overnight celebrations can safely be dismissed as the excuses of hindsight. Consequently, at daybreak, when warned of the Norman army’s approach, some time was needed to draw up the English army in battle formation. As a result, King Harold’s force was surprised in the sense that his army was not drawn up in battle array, as recorded in Chronicle D. This scenario could also explain the statement in Chronicle E that not all the army had arrived, since the activity of an army being drawn up might appear, to an observer, to be the arrival of reinforcements.19
In spite of his surprise, Harold apparently still had sufficient time to assemble the bulk of his troops and move them forward to take up position on Senlac Ridge half a mile in front of Caldbec Hill. There they arrayed themselves on foot, around Harold’s personal standard of a warrior embroidered in gold thread, in the traditional English defensive formation known as the shield wall. The position on Senlac Ridge was undoubtedly the best defensive position in the area, as Harold was probably aware either from reconnaissance the previous evening, or more likely from his own local knowledge. It should be remembered that Sussex was Harold’s native county, that he owned estates at nearby Whatlington and Crowhurst, and that the army had been ordered to meet at the well-known ‘hoary apple tree’ on Caldbec Hill. All this suggests that Harold had detailed local knowledge of the area, or at least that someone in his following had such knowledge. It is unlikely that Harold had made no plans to deal with a Norman attack, as his strategy of containment would eventually have provoked such. Therefore, he had probably always intended to occupy Senlac Ridge in such circumstances, although this situation arose much earlier than he anticipated.20
The swift Norman advance failed to prevent the English army from manning a good defensive position, although it may have resulted in their not being drawn up entirely as Harold wished. In particular, the stationing of the more highly trained and experienced h
uscarls to bolster the less experienced fyrd men may not have been completed at points along the ridge. This would certainly help to explain events during the battle. The huscarls of the king and earls were trained and disciplined household warriors ready to serve at short notice. The fyrd was a select call-up of less well-trained and disciplined ‘reservists’, although these were still well-equipped thegns and freemen rather than peasants or rustics. Another important fact was that the English had already fought a very bloody battle in which they had lost many of their best men. The details of English losses at Stamford Bridge are unknown, but are likely to have fallen more heavily on the élite huscarls, who would probably have spearheaded the attack. However, these deficiencies in the English army were compensated for by the strength of their position and the resolution in defence of King Harold. Another positive factor for the English was that morale must have been high, given their recent resounding victory over Harald of Norway, and King Harold’s reputation for success. In terms of numbers, the English army probably numbered around 7,000 men. If we accept that not all Harold’s troops had arrived, then there is the possibility that the number was initially lower than this but that it increased during the day as others arrived.21
The Normans had the disadvantage of facing an enemy in a very strong position, which they had to attack uphill and over heavy ground and which they could not outflank. This negated the effect of their cavalry which would lose its customary momentum and mobility in such circumstances. Although Norman morale was probably not as high as that of the English, they were emboldened by the iron determination of Duke William, and the firm knowledge that only victory could save them. William’s reported address to his troops includes both a stirring call to arms and a stark portrayal of their fate should they fail to win. They also had the advantage of a more balanced force, consisting of infantry, cavalry and archers, with a more consistent level of training and experience. Their strength was probably also around 7,000 men.22
As a result of these various factors, the opposing armies were fairly evenly matched when the battle commenced at 9.00 a.m. It began with the Normans launching missiles against the English position and following this up with an infantry attack, which was met by a shower of English missiles. These caused losses among the Norman infantry and their attack quickly faltered. Next, the Norman knights advanced against the English line, engaging them at close quarters. The English infantry maintained their position and, in turn, inflicted considerable casualties on the Normans, particularly with their battle-axes. William of Poitiers places great emphasis on these ‘murderous axes . . . which could easily find a way through the shields and other defences’. This close-quarter fight raged furiously until gradually the ferocity of the English defence took its toll. The Breton troops on the Norman left wing panicked and broke under the English assault. The collapse of its left wing caused confusion and fear to spread through the whole Norman army, fanned by a rumour that Duke William himself had fallen. William of Poitiers’ statement that ‘almost the whole ducal army falls away’ makes it clear that this was a major disaster for the Normans.23
As the Normans fell back a part of the English forces advanced from their hilltop position in pursuit of what appeared to be the routed enemy. Unfortunately, we have no account of this incident from the English side and cannot establish the full background to it. It may have been a breach of discipline by members of the fyrd, who broke ranks without orders to pursue what appeared to be a defeated enemy. Alternatively, it may have been an official counter-attack, ordered by King Harold in an attempt to finish the battle. If we accept that Harold had been forced to array his troops in haste, then the former is a strong possibility. A large group of fyrd men on the English right, with perhaps too few of the more disciplined huscarls in support, could have broken ranks in this way. On the other hand, if the Bayeux Tapestry is correct in showing the deaths of Harold’s brothers, Gyrth and Leofwine, in what looks like an isolated group, possibly at this stage of the battle, then perhaps it was a major counter-attack intended to finish off the Normans. However, William of Poitiers’ statement that Harold’s brothers ‘were found lying beside him’ at the end of the battle must cast doubt on the validity of any judgements based solely on the positioning of this particular scene in the Tapestry. The Bayeux Tapestry is known to rearrange scenes out of sequence for convenience or dramatic effect – the scene depicting King Edward’s funeral procession, for example, is placed before that of his death. Although we will probably never know for sure what was the cause of this English attack – and the balance of probability favours an undisciplined charge – the consequences of the action are clear.24
The initial impact of this English advance, whether planned or not, fell on the Breton contingent on the Norman left flank, which was severely handled and may indeed have been knocked out of the battle for a time. However, Duke William was able to intervene, and managed to halt the retreat of his ‘own troops’, the Norman cavalry of the centre. They turned and wheeled round, cutting off those English who had routed their left wing. The latter were surrounded and overwhelmed by the recovered Normans, and are probably shown in the Tapestry as the small group of Englishmen isolated on a hill.25
Although this crisis has been seen as the decisive point of the battle, the fighting did not end here but continued until late in the afternoon, suggesting that it cannot have been so conclusive. Instead, the damage inflicted on William’s left wing and the losses from Harold’s forces appear, in effect, to have cancelled each other out. In other circumstances, of course, it could well have been the decisive point for Harold and the English: if William had failed to rally his own knights, the whole Norman army might have collapsed as William of Poitiers himself admits; if Harold had undertaken a full counter-attack, he could possibly have gained the victory. King Harold has been censured for this failure but it should be remembered that the army he now commanded was not the same force which had destroyed Harald of Norway. It had been weakened by its losses in that earlier battle, particularly among the élite huscarls, and it may also have been understrength. This was the crucial legacy of the hard-won victory of Stamford Bridge. It meant that Harold could not afford to take the risks involved in leaving his prepared defensive position to mount a counter-attack. Instead, he wisely held the bulk of his men back on their ridge rather than risk an encounter with William’s cavalry in the open. The fate of those English who did break ranks suggests that Harold was correct in not taking this risk. The usual intention in medieval warfare was to avoid risk unless the odds were very much in favour, and this was probably not how Harold saw things at this point.26
After this confused episode, which may have occurred about midday, both sides would have required time to rest and reform. The English appear to have regrouped successfully, perhaps drawing in their flanks to fill the gaps left in the right of their line. William of Poitiers confirms that, in spite of its losses, the English army ‘seemed no less’ and remained ‘densely massed’. The Normans also probably regrouped and rebuilt their left wing, perhaps taking the opportunity to underpin it with Norman knights. Thereafter, the contest was resumed. The Normans returned to the assault and again the opposing forces fought each other furiously, but the Frenchmen gained little in comparison to their mounting losses. William of Poitiers speaks of the Normans ‘realising . . . they could not overcome an enemy . . . standing so firm’.27
In an attempt to repeat the earlier unintentional breach in English ranks, caused by the rush of some in pursuit of fleeing Normans, William now ordered a series of feigned retreats. This part of the Norman account has been disputed by many, but such a tactic, in which a group retreats to draw the enemy out of position then turns to catch them unawares in the open, appears to have been performed quite often during this period. It was most likely carried out by small units of highly trained knights, who had the skills to perform such a complex manoeuvre. This strategem did succeed in drawing forward further small groups of the less disciplined Engli
sh fyrd, who were surrounded and killed, but it still failed to make any significant impact on the English main body, which remained ‘a formidable force’.28
It must by now have been late afternoon. King Harold’s forces still held their position on Senlac Ridge, ‘as though rooted to the soil’, and the Normans were still trapped. If this deadlock remained until nightfall, then William was beaten – Harold could expect reinforcements, William could not, and the next day would surely bring Norman defeat and destruction, or ignominious surrender. The northern earls were marching south with reinforcements and the English fleet was preparing to cut off William’s escape route. William was now desperate and threw everything he had left into one final throw, combining archers, infantry and cavalry. The archers perhaps fired into the English army from the flanks, as illustrated by their appearance in the Bayeux Tapestry’s borders. This last assault had all the ferocity of Norman desperation, as they literally fought for their lives, and the language used by William of Poitiers reflects this increasing tempo, as they ‘shot, smote and peirced’. As a result, there first appears, according to Poitiers, a weakening on the English side, which he attributes to nothing more than fortune’s favour. A curious hiatus appears in his narrative at this point, as he digresses to write about the deeds of William during the fight and omits entirely what was the crux of the whole battle – the death of King Harold. This is an uncharacteristic lapse in Poitiers’ otherwise fulsome account, and deserves fuller consideration than it has received.29
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