Ammianus’ account of the day of the battle begins:
But on dawn of that day which is numbered in the calendar as the fifth before the Ides of August (the 09th) the army began its march with extreme haste, leaving all its baggage and packs near the walls of Hadrianopolis with a suitable guard of legions; for the treasury, and the imperial dignity besides, with the (praetorian) prefect and the emperor’s council, were kept within the circuit of the walls.
So, according to Ammianus, Valens led his army out of the Roman camp at dawn. The sun rose at approximately 6.00 am at the location of Adrianople (now modern Edirne in north-west Turkey) on 9 August and the army must have been up and ready for the march at least several hours before hand. Valens led the army out in ‘extreme haste’. Why? The probability was because Valens did not want the army marching for too long in the very hot temperatures that were likely to occur within a very short time of the sun rising. The temperatures in that region of Turkey regularly reach 40 Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit) during the summer months and marching more than a few miles after 6.00 am would have proved extremely uncomfortable, by midday it would have been almost unbearable, especially if the troops had limited access to water. It’s unlikely that Valens’ haste was due to the concern that the Goths would up camp and move off towards Nike; it’s inconceivable that the Goths had not been under constant observation by the scouts, and regular reports about the Goths would have flown back to Adrianople during the night and early morning.
Does Valens leaving the city in haste explain why he left without the baggage train? This is a very important question and a vital clue as to the possible intention of Valens on that day, and one that has been surprisingly overlooked by other commentators of the battle. There are several possible reasons for Valens leaving Adrianople without the baggage train. The most obvious was that the baggage train would have slowed the army down too much, especially if the army was going to be marching over rough terrain rather than going by road. The next reason, and one I believe was Valens’ main reason for leaving the baggage train behind, was that the Gothic camp must have been close enough to Adrianople to both march to and then return back the same day. The problem with the first reason is that why on earth would an army march to engage in battle without taking food, water and other essential supplies, including the spare weapons and armour, that the baggage would have been carrying? It just does not make any sense. But what if, despite Ammianus’ claims, Valens did not intend fighting a battle at all? What if he intended doing exactly what Fritigern had suggested in the secret letter that was discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. Valens was marching to the Gothic encampment in a show of force in order to impress upon the Goths behind the wagons that it was in their best interest to enter into an agreement with the Romans. It was entirely possible that Valens was marching his army to Fritigern’s camp in order to enter into negotiations with Fritigern, and then once the negotiations were completed taking refreshment with the now compliant Goths before returning back to Adrianople before nightfall. There can be no other explanation why Valens, who, whilst not in the same league militarily as his brother Valentinian, and was an experienced and competent military commander, would march with practically his entire army in the blazing heat without taking its baggage train. Taking this evidence into account the only conclusion can be that Valens did not expect to fight a battle that day, something that may well have clouded his tactical judgement once the army had deployed.
Another clue to Valens’ intentions was Ammianus’ claim that the army had left the baggage and its packs guarded by several legions in their camp near to the walls of Adrianople, whilst the treasury and the imperial council were placed within the walls of the city itself. Valens obviously did not feel the need to place everything behind the walls of Adrianople, and felt secure enough to leave part of his army behind in the camp outside the walls. And the part of the army that was left behind may well have proved crucial to the battle itself had Valens really intended to fight on that day. If I am correct in believing that Valens’ army contained ten legions then a ‘suitable guard’ would, I feel, be at the most four of those legions. It may well be that a similar number of auxiliary troops were also left behind in the camp. This would have meant that Valens in all probability marched towards the Goths with an army comprised of six legions, six auxiliary units and cavalry of various types. This would equate to Valens leaving Adrianople and marching to the Gothic encampment with approximately 18,000 infantry and possibly 3,000–6,000 cavalry.
Taking the size of the army into account then raised the question of how long the length of the column was as it marched towards the Gothic camp. Sources that give details of how a Roman marching column was formed are rare. From the information we do have is that the column size would be determined by the width of any road the troops would have been travelling on. The width of an average Roman road was approximately 18ft. If we presume there was a gap of 3ft between each infantry file, which just about allows six men to march abreast along the average road. If we say there were 1,000 infantry tasked with scouting at the head of the column, and a similar number protecting the rear of the column, that would have meant that there were 16,000 infantry remaining marching along the road. Each of the six files of infantry would have comprised of almost 2,666 men. If we say that the gap between each row of the file was 6ft then that would have meant that the infantry marching along the road would have been in a column approximately 16,000 feet long. This is just over three miles. We then have to add in the two scouting infantry groups, who were probably much more dispersed, so say add another mile to the infantry total. We also have to figure in the cavalry who also would have been travelling with the column. If we say there were 5,000 cavalry present, who were divided to the front, right flank, rear and in the column itself (as Ammianus implies the column was formed, see below), then we could say that there were 500 cavalry scouting in the front, 500 protecting the rear, 2,000 protecting the right flank and the remaining 2,000 imbedded in the column itself. If we say that a maximum of four cavalrymen could ride along the same road, and they needed a depth of 15ft, and they were divided 500 to the front of the column, 500 to the rear 2,000 to the right flank and the rest within the column itself, then we have an extra column depth of approximately 2 miles. If we add an extra mile for the cavalry who were scouting in front and those protecting the rear of the column this gives us a grand total for the length of the column of at least seven to eight miles. Increasing or decreasing the width of the column would of course have reduced or increased the depth, so if the column were eight men wide then we were probably looking at it being approximately 4 miles long, a four man wide column nearer 10 to 12 miles long. The implications of the length of the column will be discussed below.
Ammianus’ text then continues:
So, after hastening a long distance over rough ground, whilst the hot day was advancing towards noon, finally at the eighth hour they saw the wagons of the enemy, which as a report of the scouts had declared, were arranged in the form of a perfect circle.
As I have stated above, the Romans must surely have known exactly where the wagon laager was because scouts would have kept it under constant observation. Also, the Gothic envoy that Fritigern had despatched the previous day must have been escorted by Roman troops to ensure that they were not attacked by mistake. This is a clear indication that the Goths cannot have been more than maximum of half a day’s ride away, because the Gothic envoy and those that accompanied him were able to reach Adrianople, have a meeting with Valens and then return back to their encampment all within the same day.
According to Ammianus, Valens and his army marched ‘a long distance over rough ground’, Zosimus claimed that the army was also in ‘complete disarray’.3 Donnelly questions Rolfe’s translation of Ammianus at this point, believing that the Latin text ‘viarum spatiis conflagosis’ means nothing more than that the troops were quickly manoeuvring over rough terrain, not travelling a ‘long distance over rough
ground’, something that I have come to agree with. It was of course possible that the army was in disarray when it left Adrianople and marched towards Fritigern’s camp: it would have been unable to keep in a tight formation due to the nature of terrain it was travelling through, if it were indeed not travelling by road and instead travelling over rough ground. And this is another important point to note, why did Valens travel across the rough terrain? Could the army not have taken roads to reach the Goths? It may be that the roads from Adrianople did not offer a way of getting to the Goths quickly, or it could be that the roads the Roman army was taking took it across rough terrain, or the roads themselves were little more than trails?
Ammianus stated it was ‘whilst the hot day was advancing towards noon’ when the wagons of the Goths were sighted. And Rolfe’s translation adds that it was ‘at the eighth hour’ when the Romans actually arrived at the Gothic wagons. The ‘eighth hour’ would be approximately 1.00 pm at that time of the year in the Roman method of time keeping. The Roman day was split into twelve daylight hours, the length of which varied depending on whether it was winter or summer. So, the army would have calculated the time in Summer Hours on 9 August. This would have meant that the army had been marching for at least six hours before sighting the Gothic camp, which I cannot believe because it would have meant that there was no chance for the army to march back to Adrianople before nightfall once it had reached the camp. Rolfe’s translation has been called into question at this point; why mention noon and then the ‘eighth hour’ as being when the Gothic camp was seen? I am inclined to believe that the Gothic camp was actually seen by the Roman scouts at a distance of 8 miles into the march, as Blockley has suggested. The scouts may have been a mile or so ahead of the column, and the wagons may have been several miles further in the distance, giving the distance of the wagons from Adrianople at twelve miles. Most modern commentators place the Gothic camp at between eight and fifteen miles from Adrianople. Only one ancient account gives an actual distance for the Gothic camp, the ‘Consularia Constantiopolitana’ which states that it was at a distance of ‘the twelfth milestone’ (an indication the Gothic encampment was near a road?). Ammianus may have indicated in Book XXXI, 12, 3 that the Goths were fifteen miles from Adrianople and heading south-east towards Nike, but that was when Valens was already en route to Adrianople from Melanthias, and the Goths must have moved on several miles before Valens arrived and pitched his camp outside the walls of Adrianople. A Roman mile was approximately 1,617 yards, which would make the distance to the twelfth milestone approximately eleven modern International Miles. I am happy to go with the Gothic camp being a maximum of twelve miles away from Adrianople as being the middle ground between the lowest and highest figures given for the location of the battlefield. This would have been an easy distance for the Gothic envoys mentioned in the previous chapter to have travelled to Adrianople and back to their camp within a single day if on horseback, or even by foot if travelling by road. It should also have been a very easy distance to cover by a Roman army in a matter of hours under normal circumstances. As stated in Chapter Nine, Vegetius stated that a Roman army could travel twenty miles in five Summer Hours, and other sources give comparable rates of travel.4 Whether this was by road or not is a good question, as undoubtedly travelling by road was going to be much quicker than travelling over rough ground, especially if taking along a baggage train. But as we know, Valens did not take the baggage train along with the army, so the rate of march must have been quicker even if they were travelling over broken terrain. Taking this into account, if the Gothic camp was at a distance of eight to twelve miles from Adrianople, and was seen by the Roman scouts at a distance of eight miles at noon, this would have meant that Valens’ army was travelling at a speed of only approximately 1.33/1.5 miles an hour instead of the average of 4 miles an hour when it sighted the wagons, a very slow rate of march indeed. Either the ground Valens was travelling over was extremely rough, or he and his army were travelling extremely slowly. Or, Valens was travelling by a route that was longer but which would have been from a direction the Goths were not expecting. Logic would suggest the most direct route was taken as Valens was stated by most accounts as wanting to get to the Gothic camp as quickly as possible. But if this were true then how does this again explain the fact that the Goths the following day reached Adrianople in less than four hours, yet Valens took at least seven hours to reach those same wagons? There are several possible explanations for this. The first one, and completely overlooked by other commentators of the battle, is that Valens’ army was marching in a column at least eight miles long. The head of the column would have arrived at the Gothic encampment at least three, perhaps three and a half hours after leaving Adrianople, if the column was travelling at a speed of between 2 to 4 miles per hour. It would have started to form up into the usual Roman battle formation (see below and also Chapter Fifteen) and this would have taken between three and four hours because that would have been the length of time it would have taken for the rear of the column to have reached the wagons. This fits the evidence, it took seven hours for the entire Roman army to reach the wagons and then deploy into battle formation, it did not take seven hours just to travel to the encampment, and then the troops deployed in to the battle formation.
The other possible reason for the delay in reaching the wagons, and which would fit in with Ammianus’ account, was that Valens took a longer route, one which he considered was the best to take to ensure the Goths were not going to be aware of his arrival. If this is so then it’s my view that this longer route was achieved by the army following the course of the Tonzos River north before turning north-east. This will be fully explored below.
Although the army may initially have not travelled by road, later in Ammianus’ text there is an indication that the army undertook the last stage of their journey by road, which may have speeded up the travel somewhat, and may have led to a doubling in the rate of the marching armies’ speed. This could explain why the last hour of the journey to the wagons only took an hour, which brought the rate of march back up to 4 miles an hour, the usual rate by road.
Ammianus stated that the Roman scouts reported that when the wagons were sighted they were arranged in a ‘perfect circle’.5 Some, such as Donnelly and McDowell, have chosen to dispute this, stating that the estimated number of 5,000 Gothic wagons that may have been present, taking into account the minimum number of Gothic warriors and their families etc would have taken up a vast area if arranged in a circle. Donnelly believes instead that the wagons were arranged in a semi-circle forming a barrier, whilst McDowell has them in lines, like a barricade. I believe both are wrong. I see no issue with the wagons forming a circle, the pioneers travelling across the ‘boundless wastes’ of America formed their wagons in protective circles, it appears the natural thing to do. Whilst Donnelly calculated that the wagon circle would have had to have been at least 1,700m or 5,600 ft in circumference if 5,000 wagons were present, this is only a diameter of 1,800 ft or 540m. This is based on a hollow circle made up of just one ring of wagons. However, as shown in diagrams 2–5 the wagons could have been formed up in either spiral-like formation or of concentric circles to cut down on the diameter, or even several such circles could have been formed, one next to the other.
Map 1: Edirne (Adrianople) with distances to probable battlefield locations.
Diagram 1: Gothic wagon laager in single ring.
Diagram 2: Gothic wagon laager in concentric rings.
Diagram 3: Gothic wagon laager in spiral formation
Diagram 4: Gothic wagon laager in group formation
Diagram 5: Roman deployment in front of Goth wagons with direction of Gothic cavalry attacks displayed
Where the Gothic wagons in relation to Adrianople were is unfortunately unknown. However see Chapter Fourteen where I discuss possible locations for the site of the battlefield.
Going back to the text of Ammianus he stated-
And while the barbarian soldiers,
according to their custom, uttered savage and dismal howls, the Roman leaders (‘duces’) so drew up their line of battle that the cavalry on the right wing were first pushed forward, whilst the greater part of the infantry waited in reserve. But the left wing of the horsemen (which was formed with the greatest difficulty, since very many of them were still scattered along the roads) was hastening to the spot at swift pace, and whilst that same wing was being extended, still without interruption, the barbarians were terrified by the awful din, the hiss of whirring arrows and the menacing clash of shields …
As discussed above, Valens’ army was marching in a column, probably with mounted scouts at the front and rear, with outriders to the flanks. The cavalry would normally be at the head of the column behind the scouts and also riding by either side of the column, protecting the flanks of the infantry and the baggage train. The infantry would have followed behind, then the baggage train, and finally the ‘light infantry’, along with the rest of the cavalry, protecting the rear of the column. This is advocated by Vegetius and also in Arrian’s ‘Array against the Alans’.6 It is also easier to deploy in the ‘typical’ Roman battle formation when marching in this manner, i.e. with cavalry on the wings and infantry forming in the centre. This would have been achieved by the cavalry on the right flank moving forward and to the right to form the right wing of the army, the infantry then moving forward and to the right to then start forming the centre, with the cavalry on the column’s left flank moving forward and to the left to create the left wing, the light troops coming forward to screen the deployment and prevent the deployment being disrupted by the enemy. However, from the text it appears that the cavalry that was supposed to form the left wing was actually imbedded with the infantry in the main column and not on the flank as would normally have been the case – ‘But the left wing of the horsemen, (which was formed with the greatest difficulty, since very many of them were still scattered along the roads) was hastening to the spot at a swift pace.’ From this we note several points, the first and most important, and often overlooked by others, was that the army was now travelling by ‘roads’ at this juncture. This may have a bearing on where to look for the battle site for archaeologists for they can now narrow the site down to an area that had roads at a distance of 8 to 12 miles from Adrianople at that date. The column does not appear to have marched with the cavalry protecting the left flank, as Ammianus notes it was travelling along the roads, presumably with the rest of the infantry in the column. One possible reason for this was that there was no need for the cavalry to be covering the left flank as the left flank was being protected by something else, perhaps a natural feature. What natural feature could protect the flank of a marching army from attack? A steep ridge or rugged mountains might be able to, there are many such features in that region (Google Earth is a very good resource and using it shows exactly what the terrain looks like around Edirne today). The most logical natural defence near Adrianople would have been the Tonzos River known in Roman times as the Hebrus. The Tonzos River lies to the west of modern Edirne (Adrianople) and it flows north and then north-west into Bulgaria. Any Goths in the area would have been unable to mount an attack across the river without them being in the full view of any Roman army travelling along its east bank, and those troops would have had ample time to form up and repulse any such attack before the Goths could cross over. If Valens was not taking a route directly towards the Goths then the evidence points to the army travelling along the east bank of the Tonzos before taking a road north-east towards the battlefield because that would be the most plausible explanation for the left wing cavalry being in the column with the infantry. Travelling along the river would also have allowed the troops to take water directly from it.
Eagles in the Dust Page 10