by Tim Lynch
Even his harshest critics could not deny Gort’s personal bravery. He had won his VC as a young battalion commander with the Guards at Bourlon Wood and had traded on this throughout his career. Now, with the prospect of battle looming, he eagerly rushed forward to meet it. Unfortunately, Gort had never commanded any formation larger than a brigade and his lack of experience at his current level, along with his obedient Guards background, meant that he was happy to yield to the French High Command on all important matters. General Spears, Churchill’s representative in France, later recalled that as early as November 1939 the French had been happy with Gort’s appointment:
The impression I received was that the British Commander-in-Chief was willing and anxious to please, and doing everything he was told. No-one quite said so, but I felt the French regarded Gort as a sort of friendly and jovial battalion commander.7
Accordingly, Gort was happy to comply with the plan to move the Allied forces forward into Belgium and to meet the Germans along the Dyle line. Even had he not been, his right of appeal to the British government would have been severely affected by the problems at home. Now, the whole Anglo-French front left their prepared positions and swung into Belgium, the right of the line hinging at the town of Sedan near the Ardennes. Watching from home, General Sir Henry Karslake, another victim of Hore-Belisha’s cuts, noted the movements on a map set up in his study. Quietly, he took down the map. His son, Basil, notes his reaction:
A British artillery unit enters Belgium.
‘The war is over’, he said. ‘Gort and Gamelin have committed the one strategical error that even the most junior officer is impressed on avoiding; they have brought their fighting line parallel to their Lines of Communication. If the Germans attack here,’ he pointed at Sedan on the general map of France that lay on his desk, ‘and manage to thrust their way westwards, they will cut off the fighting troops from their supplies … I can understand Gort making such an error; he is just spoiling for a fight, to wave his sword and win another VC, but I am surprised at Gamelin.’8
For the Anglo-French plan to be effective, speed was essential and all emphasis was on getting the men into position as quickly as possible, even at the risk of travelling in daylight. Captain Sir Basil Bartlett, serving as a Field Security Officer, was on the Belgian border watching British troops move forward:
They were travelling at a good speed, but were too closely spaced, I thought. They’d suffer heavily if the Germans took it into their heads to bomb them. There are so far no reports of sabotage on the route.9
A few days later, on the 14th, Bartlett’s diary noted ‘the weather remains brilliantly fine. The Germans are allowing the BEF to move into its battle positions almost without interference.’10 Elsewhere, a staff officer of the British Air Forces France wrote on 13 May that a ‘strange, and I feel, very suspicious feature, has been the extraordinary lack of any German bombing of the BEF and the French armies in their advance through Belgium during the last four days. It looks almost as if the Germans want us where we are going.’11 Intent on completing the advance, Gort and his staff simply took advantage of the lack of air opposition and chose not to question it.
British troops are welcomed into Belgium, 11/12 May 1940.
Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), the German plan for the conquest of the west, called for an attack by Army Group B into the Netherlands and Belgium in what appeared at first to be almost a replay of their 1914 campaign with only slight modifications – indeed panzer expert General Heinz Guderian had condemned it as such when it was first presented. Copies of the original plans had fallen into Allied hands a few months earlier when a German plane had crashed and the wreckage was discovered by Allied troops. It seemed to confirm the idea that this war would be a carbon copy of the last one. The Allied reaction and troop movements to counter what was then seen as an imminent threat was carried out in full view of German reconnaissance planes and confirmed what they already suspected would happen. The new plan called for something different.
German troops inspect an abandoned French tank.
The attack on Belgium has been described as ‘the matador’s cloak’. Army Group B, with 30 divisions, three of them armoured and two motorised, was intended to draw the bulk of the Allied armies away from their prepared positions and into Belgium. Once the Allied move was complete, Army Group A under von Runstedt would make its move. With 45 of the best equipped divisions in the German Army, including seven armoured and three mechanised, von Runstedt could call on almost 2,000 tanks to put into action what Erich von Manstein described as a ‘revolving door’. As the Allies left their positions, the true attack would come through the Ardennes and across the river Meuse to thrust across France, sever the Lines of Communication and destroy the Allies in detail in a pocket along the coast. To achieve success, von Manstein told his men they must be across the Meuse by the 13th at the latest.
Having planned to extend his left flank too far forward, Gamelin had also heavily reinforced his right by placing 39 divisions and 10 tank battalions behind the allegedly impregnable Maginot Line and its existing garrison of 10 divisions, now faced with the 19 infantry divisions of General Leeb’s Army Group C and ready for the unlikely scenario of an attack via Switzerland. This left very little with which to guard his centre. Along a 100-mile stretch of border opposite the Belgian Ardennes, Gamelin placed just ten weak divisions of the 9th Army under General Andre Sorap, of which only one was ready for front line duty. Three light cavalry divisions, each with one armoured and one horsed brigade provided a screen in front of them. Even Sorap had complained about the poor state of his forces and in particular the very poor discipline among his men – conscripts demoralised by a dangerous combination of boredom and bad living conditions.
German paratroopers meet with a ‘Brandenburger’ Special Forces agent during the invasion of the Low Countries. The work of such agents created a widespread fear of fifth columnists.
A JU 87 Stuka formation. The lack of air attacks on the advancing Allies was noticed but disregarded. In fact, the Germans chose not to bomb the Allied convoys to encourage them to move into the trap being set for them.
The Ardennes had been dismissed as impenetrable to tanks despite their having long been the route of invading armies, a misunderstanding of Petain’s actual assessment that the Ardennes were ‘impenetrable provided special dispositions are made there’.12 A system of emplaced positions covering the area could make it extremely difficult to move forces through the forests and valleys but with no liaison between the French and the Belgians in the preceding months both thought that the other had the matter in hand. Despite information gathered by sources including Swiss Intelligence that their plan lay there, Gamelin had decreed that the Germans would not attack through the area. Even if they managed it, he said, it would take at least ten days – ample time for the French to react.
At the same time as Army Group B’s attack to the north got under way and drew the world’s attention, the tanks of Army Group A rolled across the Luxembourg border. The Luftwaffe deliberately remained absent from the skies over the Ardennes to avoid highlighting the advancing army and its route. There were no journalists with the troops as trucks carrying fuel and relief crews drove alongside the tank columns, changing crews and refuelling on the move to maintain momentum. Nothing to indicate that behind the reconnaissance troops stretched a 250km queue of over 41,000 vehicles. Here and there isolated Belgian units fought back. At the village of Bodange, a single company of Chasseurs Ardennais held up the 1st Panzer Division for six hours but they were only a thin screen, not a defence line. By the afternoon of 12 May, Guderian was making plans to cross the Meuse at Sedan.
JU 87 Stuka attacks.
German artist’s impression of a river crossing in France.
The attack was to begin at 1600hrs on the 13th. The Germans were seriously short of artillery with only a third the number the French had opposing them and each German gun was limited to around a dozen shells, the remainder stuck in th
e traffic jam along the narrow roads behind them. Instead, the attack would be preceded by a massive aerial bombardment. The bombing began at 0800hrs and was followed by wave after wave of aircraft. Sedan was only a ten minute flight for the Stukas operating from a forward airstrip at Bastogne under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen, nephew of the Red Baron. With orders to target any enemy positions they could find, they returned again and again in the ‘rolling raid’ Guderian had requested.
Despite the devastating effect of the raids, the French were in strong bunkers and their heavy batteries had escaped the worst of it. From their positions they were able to prevent the German infantry from crossing the river in assault boats by artillery and machine-gun fire. Then, near Wadelincourt and acting on his own initiative, Sturmpionier Walter Rubarth led a small group across using the shelter of a ruined bridge and began systematically working their way along the line of defences. After destroying the first bunker, they raised a swastika flag over it as a signal to their comrades. Taking out the first line they then moved back to the second line trenches, by now finding Frenchmen assuming that the Germans were across in force and surrendering to them without a fight. As the breach opened, more troops crossed.13 By 1900hrs, panic was spreading through the French defenders, stories reached HQ of tanks already across the river, although in reality it would take another twelve hours before pontoon bridges could be built to get them across. As more Germans crossed the river, the defenders broke and ran. In some places officers and NCOs tried to stem the rout only to have their entire unit flow around them and escape. Others claimed to have had orders to retreat but few could say where these orders had come from.
The German bridgehead was tenuous. Their tanks could not yet cross, and their artillery was low on ammunition. A counterattack could still hold them. Pushing ahead, Colonel Hermann Balck of the 1st Motorised Regiment ordered his men to keep attacking French positions in the dark. Aware of the risks of being cut off, Balck also knew the importance of keeping the French off balance. It was then that General Huntziger, the French commander of the Sedan sector, made a fatal decision. At 2030hrs he ordered the heavy gun batteries to withdraw. The 3rd North African Infantry Division, the best troops he had available to him, were told to move away from the Sedan area. These two movements were seen as confirmation that the battle was lost and the panic spread even further. Pockets of resistance continued but soon afterward Balck signalled, 1st Panzer Division’s HQ: ‘Schützenregiment 1 has at 22.40 taken high hill just to the north of Cheveuges. Last enemy blockhouse is in our hands. Complete breakthrough.’14 The Sedan front had collapsed.
When the news reached Gamelin in the early hours of the 14th, he broke down in tears. The attack in the north had worked perfectly. In their eagerness to meet it, neither Gamelin nor Gort had thought to leave behind a reserve. Nothing now stood between the Germans and the sea. Except three divisions of untrained labour troops.
NOTES
1 See Lynch, Silent Skies: Gliders at War Pen & Sword 2008
2 Collier, 1940: The World in Flames London: Penguin 1980 p74
3 Ibid p74
4 Ibid p76
5 Blaxland p69
6 Sebag-Montefiore p60
7 Spears p56
8 Karslake p53–4
9 Captain Sir Basil Bartlett, My First War London: Chatto & Windus 1940 p48
10 Ibid p57
11 The Diary of a Staff Officer London: Methuen & Co 1941 p9
12 Glover p31
13 See Brian Moynihan, Forgotten Soldiers London: Quercus 2007
14 Sebag-Montefiore p94
Chapter Seven
‘More gallantly than advisedly’
News of the German invasion of Belgium was met calmly by the men of the L of C. In Rennes, Sergeant Brown’s diary mentions in passing the news that the Germans had attacked and records that he and a party from the KOYLI attended a BEF concert that evening, although supper was poor. As yet, the war seemed so remote that it was not until the 12th that orders came down for everyone to draw a steel helmet and respirator from stores. For Brigadier Beauman, the first news came not from GHQ but via a servant who had heard about it on the BBC news. The main change in his work was that the skeleton rear HQ at Arras and its attached units were now to be incorporated into his district as another sub-area under the control of Colonel Usher and guards at vulnerable points were to be stepped up. GHQ, he wote, ‘had never contemplated that the L of C area would have any tactical importance in case of active operations’ and so when Gort and his staff followed the BEF into Belgium, Arras simply became another base area.1
Two days after the battle began and eager not to miss the fun, 46th Division’s commander, Major-General Harry ‘Squeak’ Curtis, contacted Gort by phone and in Richard Holmes’ words, ‘more gallantly than advisedly’ offered the services of his division as a combat ready force. The enthusiastic and extroverted former 60th Rifleman’s description of his men as ready for action was duly noted.
Paul Reynaud, French Premier from 21 March to 16 June 1940, Reynaud telephoned Churchill on 15 May. In tears he told Churchill that the battle was already lost.
The German advance through Sedan had been so successful and fast-moving that General Henri Giraud, who had only just replaced Corap as commander of the French 9th Army, was captured accidentally by a field kitchen detachment of the 11th Panzer Regiment who found him hiding in a shed where they were about to set up their cookers.2 Taken by surprise at their own progress, von Runstedt, on direct orders from Hitler himself, called a temporary halt on the 16th along the line of the river Oise to allow his infantry a chance to catch up with the tanks fearing that any setback on the southern front could be an encouragement to the already fragile French political leadership and increase their resolve to stay in the fight.
By then, though, the French Prime Minister Reynaud had declared the war lost. The breakthrough at Sedan signalled a collapse in the collective French will. Even far away in Brittany, Brigadier Gawthorpe’s liaison officer:
… a tough, experienced officer of a French Colonial regiment, said on hearing over the Paris radio that the Germans had struck at Sedan, ‘Sedan, c’est fini.’ How right he was and how significant of the atmosphere in France.3
In a telephone call to Churchill at 0730hrs on the 15th, a tearful Reynaud told him that the Germans had broken the front at Sedan and ‘were pouring through in great numbers with tanks and armoured cars … We are defeated; we have lost the battle.’4 Churchill Immediately flew to France to discuss the situation. In a famous encounter with Gamelin, he recalled how he had asked in his indifferent French ‘“Ou est la masse de manoeuvre?” General Gamelin turned to me and, with a shake of his head and a shrug, said: “Aucune.”’5 Churchill declared himself ‘dumbfounded’ that there were no strategic reserves available but Gort was as guilty as Gamelin in that respect. Blinded by their own preconceptions of how the war would play out, the BEF and the French armies had been drawn into the German trap and now their entire southern flank was wide open.
Through French sources Beauman began to hear disturbing reports about the situation around Sedan. ‘I could not as yet conceive that there was any serious threat to my district, but to be on the safe side I decided to form a mobile reserve consisting of one infantry battalion with small detachments of artillery and engineers.’6 The 7th Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment (7RWK) of 36th Infantry Brigade, 12th Division were chosen for the task. ‘This came as rather a shock,’ wrote Captain Newbury, commanding the battalion’s ‘A’ Company, ‘the bn being untrained and short of many LMGs [Light Machine Guns] – ATRs [Anti-Tank Rifles] – mortars – signalling apparatus and entirely without carriers.’7 Having been relieved of their guard duties by another 36 Brigade unit, the 5th Buffs, the battalion were placed on thirty minutes notice to move from the area around Fleury-sur-Somme, although they would not actually receive any transport until the following morning. Beauman had decided that the trucks currently held in storage would simply fall intact
into enemy hands if he did nothing to protect the L of C. So 37 3-ton lorries arrived at around 1030hrs to take his new ‘flying column’ to a new position at Quevauvilliers where they were joined by four 25-pounder guns that had been returned from 51st Division for servicing and were now manned by gunners taken from the General Base Depot at Forges. A section of sappers from 218 Army Troop Company Royal Engineers from Dieppe completed the new formation. The remainder of the brigade, the 5th Buffs and 6th RWK, were now told that they were detached from the division and placed under the command of GHQ. They would be given their orders soon.
Mobile troops. Equipped with trucks from supply depots, Beauman formed the West Kents into a ‘flying column’ to respond to the speed of the German advance.
As 7RWK’s column moved, Beauman was summoned urgently to Arras and told that a large armoured force was heading west towards Cambrai. There were no French reserves available and the decision had been made to form a defensive line with whatever was to hand. The first step would be to concentrate the three labour divisions north of the Somme in the hope of slowing the Germans and allowing the BEF to move troops to its southern flank. In the meantime, Beauman was to follow the plan originally devised to have the Northern District of the L of C take over the area of the Franco-Belgian border as troops under GHQ command moved forward. He now had to find a protection force for thirteen as yet incomplete airfields as well as dozens more HQ buildings and installations against sabotage and parachute attack.
On his way back to Rouen, Beauman was called into the HQ of the 2nd French Region at Amiens to check the latest news. His French counterpart assured him that the situation was under control and there was no real cause for concern. As they spoke, Beauman glanced out of the window. Outside, French staff officers were hurling packs of secret documents onto a bonfire in the garden. ‘They evidently did not share his complacency.’8 Worried, Beauman began to plan his defence of his over-extended command.