Dunkirk 1940

  At around 0630hrs, German motorcycle troops had begun ordering civilians out of the village of Beaurains, warning them of the risk of heavy fighting in the area. Realising that the Germans intended to take Arras, the Chantrel family and others turned instead to the road south towards Mercatel. By 0645hrs, Madame Pruvost saw tanks heading rapidly towards Agny. By 0650hrs, the first refugees passed on the information to the men of 70 Brigade.

  At 0700hrs, Colonel Swinburne gave orders for his men to begin the march. At intervals of 25 metres between sections, 100 metres between platoons and 400 metres between companies they would move tactically, leapfrogging by companies as they headed via Mercatel, Ficheux and Beaumetz to Saulty and the transport would operate a shuttle service, collecting the head of the column in each run. Even as they set out, German air activity was heavy. The confused orders had left 10DLI in Lattre but 11DLI had lost its HQ company which they assumed was still heading for Thelus, the original rendezvous. Two more companies were at Ficheux having rested there for the night. By now, the brigade was spread over a considerable area and a flight of Fairey Battles were seen attacking ground targets somewhere to the north, flown – although they didn’t know it – by air force reservists from the Northumberland area.

  German Panzer Kampfwagen II.

  In Albert, runners came to Colonel Clay with news that German tanks and motorcycles had been seen. One brought a report of 30 in one direction, another of 20 on the other side. Almost at once, tanks and armoured cars were advancing from all sides, appearing to have encircled the town already. The left forward company barricaded itself in a nearby house and held out as enemy artillery began to systematically destroy the building until the final few survivors surrendered. According to the historian Gregory Blaxland, ‘the situation had become forlorn within two minutes of its developing.’4 It was no wonder since another administrative error somewhere along the line had not corrected the problem at Clery – they had been issued the wrong ammunition. Two companies, caught as they attempted to get back onto their transport, were gunned down with barely a chance to fire back. Others took cover where they could and fought on, but neither the anti-tank rifles nor the guns made any impression.

  By 0730hrs, tanks had reached the main square and Clay gave orders for his men to try to fight their way out to a rendezvous in the woods outside town, where around 250 later gathered. Separating them into small groups of around 20 men each, he told them to escape as best they could but with only two maps in the entire battalion, it was a long shot. Eventually, around 70 men under Captain Newbery reached Boulogne, many of them men who had become separated in the move from Clery days before. The rest were either killed or captured. The German war diary speaks of having encountered ‘a troop of English artillery without ammunition on a field exercise’.5 As Rolf Hertenstein, newly commissioned as a lieutenant in the 4th Panzer regiment of 2nd Panzer Division, later recalled, ‘the British didn’t even have their live ammunition ready! They had only blanks, because they hadn’t expected us to advance so fast.’6

  0800–0900hrs

  To the north, 70 Brigade continued their move. At around 0830hrs, Colonel John Bramwell and the remaining elements of 11DLI were waiting in Wancourt for the transport to return when German tanks suddenly appeared. With no more than small arms available, the fight was short but vicious and Bramwell and his men surrendered only after hand-to-hand fighting in the village street. Reports of enemy tanks had by now reached Colonel Swinburne but he dismissed them as ‘doubtful’. To the west, 137 Brigade was inching its way towards Rouxmesnil Junction outside Dieppe, held up by ‘considerable rail congestion.’

  By 0900hrs, all resistance in Albert ended. A desperate attempt by Lieutenant Brown to reach 36 Brigade HQ on a hijacked motorcycle failed but an engineer officer managed it in a stolen car. In their isolated pocket of resistance, the 6th RWK and 5th Buffs made ready; the only signs of the enemy were the three men dressed as pilots and a young woman carrying a small suitcase stopped by local villagers and handed over to the British, who passed them on to HQ.7

  0900–1000hrs

  At just after 0900hrs, Colonel Swinburne ordered Second Lieutenant Stordy to take two sections by truck to secure the right flank at the junction of the road to Ficheux. Taking a Bren and a Boys rifle, Stordy set out in the lead truck and took up position around the home of the Cagin family on the junction of the Bucquoy and Ficheux roads. At the same time, Lieutenant MacGregor was tasked with a reconnaissance towards Saulty and there he made contact with the left company of the Buffs.

  Although the excellent 25pdr field gun was in service, many artillery units were equipped with the 18/25pdr gun, the venerable 18pdr of First World War fame re-bored to take the new ammunition. Those guns available to the Lines of Communication troops often lacked any sights and were supplied from repair depots.

  With everything apparently going to plan, Swinburne then set out in an 8cwt truck escorted by Second Lieutenant Cohen and three men to establish contact with brigade HQ, just three kilometres away at Barly. Behind him, seven trucks carrying HQ company and the AMPC and RAOC men followed along the road towards Ficheux. About 0915hrs, as the trucks drew near the Darras farm, machine guns of the 3rd Company, 8th Motorised Battalion of 8th Panzer Division opened up from their ambush.

  Private Ross, in one of the trucks behind Swinburne, recalled:

  Troops train with the .55in Boys Anti-Tank rifle. Virtually useless against tank armour, very few men trained to use the weapon and all feared its notorious recoil.

  We’d only travelled a short distance when we came under heavy machine gun fire. Our driver was killed and the lorry left the road after it had just passed in front of a farm, where there was a stable. One of our vehicles was on fire. Another with the water tank headed towards the fields. The enemy fire was coming from the South West … QSM Swordy, our oldest NCO, set up some defensive positions [but] we only had rifles and a single anti-tank weapon. As we had some casualties leaving the lorry, I received the order to set up a first aid post. I went behind the stable when all of a sudden, a fire broke out. There were a number of pigs with their skin on fire who were running in all directions. I then decided to take the wounded to the other side of the road towards a cattle trough. Piper Eadie and myself improvised a stretcher and carried those who couldn’t walk to this new position.

  Nearby, Private Malcolm Armstrong had also been in the convoy:

  In my vehicle [39-year-old Private Arthur] Todhunter had been shot in the head. I was at the rear of the vehicle crouching down and shouting to him to get out which he couldn’t do as he was already dead. There was panic everywhere. I went round to the left and saw a small tank approaching. We were given the order to fix bayonets to attack. Surprised, I noticed that the cannon turned towards me but I escaped death when he changed direction, fired and one of the other lads fell. With Private Albert Foster, who was killed later, we advanced along the side of the Pronier Farm. I was going to go in when a bullet or something similar struck my rifle and I dropped it. As I bent down to pick it up I was again saved when something just missed me. I then ran to an area behind this building and saw a dozen of my comrades mown down by machine gun fire. I quickly lay down behind them and was wounded by mortar fire. I put on a field dressing and, as there were Germans everywhere, I surrendered.8

  A sketch of the position of 1st Battalion Tyneside Scottish on 20 May 1940.

  Sketch map of actions, 20 May 1940.

  The opening fusillade had hit the windscreen and engine of Swinburne’s vehicle and set it on fire. Cut off from his battalion, he began making his way forward in the hope of reaching brigade HQ but found himself surrounded. He was eventually captured two nights later in the village of Avesnes-les-Comtes. Two men of the 11DLI he had found during his escape had been killed by fire from a French armoured column on the 21st.

  Behind him, his battalion was in chaos. German infantry, tanks and armoured cars were closing in from all sides. In open ground, without cover or heavy w
eapons, the Tyneside Scottish stood little chance. The battle quickly deteriorated into a series of individual engagements. Company Sergeant Major Baggs later recalled that within minutes he had fourteen killed and six wounded as he and his men were caught in the open by enfilade fire. After struggling into the scant cover of the railway embankment, the Germans were able to bring up two tanks and blasted them out of their position. With no other option, Baggs surrendered.

  Elsewhere, the Tynesiders were determined to go down fighting. At the Pronier Farm, Provost Sergeant Dick Chambers was seen to charge an enemy tank and was killed as he tried to fire through the slits in the turret. Company Sergeant Major Newton calmly strolled around his men’s positions describing how ‘interesting’ the situation had become and how he had been wounded in this same area in the first war. Company Sergeant Majors Morris and Parmenter both took over Boys rifles whose crews had been killed and kept up what fire they could until they too were overrun. Lance Corporal Laidler carried with him regimental bagpipes that had been used in action at La Boiselle on 1 July 1916 when the pipers had led the attack, only to be gunned down. A junior NCO, only recently promoted, was heard giving textbook fire direction commands for targets just yards away – completely unnecessary but with a great effect of maintaining discipline – whilst two new recruits, wounded and manning a roadblock, refused to accept treatment and remained at their posts until overrun.

  As fighting continued through the morning, exhausted men were seen to fall asleep even under fire. It was a one-sided battle, all the more so when a number of the Lewis guns that had been hurriedly issued on the Canal du Nord were found to be marked ‘DP’ – for drill purposes only and incapable of firing a shot. Despite these handicaps, though, Private James Laidler and his comrades of Recruit Company were determined to prove themselves. In a day of doomed courage, theirs was a story that epitomised the plight facing the digging divisions. ‘Their ammunition expended’, the Tynesider’s’ history records:

  a section of recruits with under eight weeks’ training calmly obeyed the order to fix bayonets and meet the attack of an enemy AFV that was approaching them – a futile but heroic gesture. Surrender never occurred to them.9

  In all, four Military Crosses, one Distinguished Conduct Medal, four Military Medals and twenty Mentions in Despatches were won but they came at a high price – reports vary, but estimates suggest that no more than 80 men escaped death or capture and that most of those captured surrendered only after being wounded.

  Nearby, 11DLI had also been hit badly by both Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division and SS Totenkopf and had almost entirely been killed or captured. A wounded sergeant managed to reach 10th battalion in Lattre to warn them and report that the 11th were now heading towards Hauteville. Colonel Marley of the 10th set out to make contact but, by sheer chance, was held up by a flock of sheep long enough for a message from HQ to reach him – Hauteville was in German hands. There was nothing Marley could do but try to gather together as many stragglers and survivors as he could. By the time night fell, of two battalions, ‘C’ Company of the 10th and the 140 AMPC men, just 233 all ranks had been accounted for.10

  An artist’s impression of fighting in an unspecified French town.

  1000–1100hrs

  Fighting raged around Ficheux all morning but elsewhere things remained relatively calm. At 1000hrs, HQ 12th Division put yet another call through to Arras but could find neither information nor orders. The decision was made by Petre’s remaining staff to hand control over to Brigadier Wyatt, now redundant after his 37 Brigade had become hopelessly lost. Although Wyatt took command at 1030hrs, his first and most pressing need was to find anyone to issue orders to – it would be another twenty-four hours before contact could be made with the scattered remnants of the division and before some units received their first clear instructions for nearly four days.

  At the moment, the German push was directed south of Arras, leaving 69 Brigade unscathed in their positions to the north east of the city. With almost nothing now in their path, the panzers pushed on towards the sea. Only three isolated pockets of resistance remained.

  1100–1200hrs

  Outside Amiens, Colonel Gethen and the 7th Royal Sussex remained stranded and the Colonel himself, possibly as a result of his injuries the day before, was becoming increasingly erratic. Just before 1100hrs, refugees reported that the Germans were just 5 miles away. When Sergeant Doidge reported this to the Colonel, he angrily replied: ‘Don’t talk rot, the Germans are not even 40 miles away’ and went out to tell the guards that they ‘could not trust a Frenchman’ and that ‘Jerry was 100 miles away.’11 Not convinced, Doidge did as he was told.

  From their positions outside Doullens, 36 Brigade had watched as German bombing became increasingly heavy throughout the morning. A gunner officer had reached them at 0930hrs with news of the loss of their sister battalion at Albert and a few lorries had managed to travel the Albert–Doullens road but none had thought to stop to warn the Quartermaster of the 6RWK, who was distributing rations when German troops found him.

  In reply to the German attacks, a flight of RAF Blenheims are reported by some sources to have appeared overhead, trying to bomb concentrations of tanks reported earlier but who, by now, had moved on. (Georges had ordered a maximum effort by bombers but Ellis, however, notes that the only RAF raid of that day took place at around 1830hrs, so the flight overhead is likely to have been French aircraft or possibly misidentified German planes returning from a raid.) They were seen as a welcome reminder that 36 Brigade was not entirely alone, although they were certainly beginning to feel that way as the flood of panicked French troops through their positions continued. None could be persuaded to stay and in the end it was easier to simply let them through. At La Herliere, a woman was seen to tear down a propaganda poster in full sight of the fleeing troops. ‘We will be victorious’ it had read, ‘because we are the stronger.’12

  Still on their trains, 137 Brigade finally learned their destination was now Bethune. As news came through that the Amiens line was threatened, an alert railway worker had redirected the train carrying Brigade HQ and the West Yorkshires on to the coastal route towards Boulogne as it steamed through Abbeville. Behind them, though, bombing had hit the water replenishment facilities near Eu and the rest of the convoy was quite literally running out of steam as it fell farther and farther back. There was still a long way to go.

  1200–1300hrs

  It was a hot day, one of many. For Fred Clapham of the DLI, one abiding memory is of the discomfort this brought to any movement:

  [W]e were all wearing army issue woollen ‘long johns’ [and] our crotches were all sore with constant rubbing of the garments and perspiration. Consequently we were, after a few days, all marching with our legs as far apart as we could, officers included, and really looking at the blokes in front it must have looked quite comical.13

  With the sun at its hottest, for the tired men of 36 Brigade any movement became an effort as they sat and waited. At noon, Brigadier Roupell visited the Buffs. There was little real information he could give them but, painfully aware of the fate of one of his battalions already, gave orders for them to retreat as soon as their position appeared untenable and to head for St Pol, 20 miles to the north.

  The Buffs were hit first. Even as Roupell left just after midday, the Germans laid down a barrage of artillery fire in front of them, following it with sustained machine gun fire. Close behind it came motorcycles and armoured cars and by 1230hrs, attacks were coming in from both the east and the south as elements of 1st, 2nd and 6th Panzer Divisions all slammed into 36 Brigade. Almost immediately, the two forward companies were overwhelmed.

  The Kents were hit soon afterwards. Roupell had asked them to hold as long as possible to give the Buffs time to disengage but by 1230hrs, tanks and infantry were already moving towards them in extended line. Without any means of communicating other than using runners, individual company commanders were left to guess at what might be happening. As the
Germans pushed into gaps in the line, even runners had little chance of making it through. The two battalions fought on alone, neither knowing what the other was doing.

  At around 1300hrs, the Buffs were ordered to pull back, but German infiltration by now made it almost impossible for units to communicate. One despatch rider from the left flank at La Herliere, for example, made the ten-mile journey into Doullens after having two bikes shot out from underneath him, narrowly dodging three tanks and killing two Germans with his revolver.14 Perhaps unsurprisingly, many messages did not get through to everyone and among those failing to make it was that to withdraw. Lone pockets of the Buffs held out, it was later found, for up to two hours, but with one Boys rifle for every 2 miles of front, there was little they could do but harass the enemy and delay the inevitable.15 Nevertheless, their defiance had not gone unnoticed. The German war diary notes that ‘ground could only be gained slowly and with continual fighting against an enemy who defended himself stubbornly.’

  Meanwhile, to the south, General Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Division had taken Amiens with so little difficulty that he took time out to visit the cathedral before deciding to push on to the sea. In the city, the Germans discovered four American volunteer ambulance drivers, Jack Clement, George King and Gregory Wait under the leadership of Donald Q. Coster of Montreal. All four men had paid their own expenses in order to work for the Red Cross in France and had made a last-minute dash into Amiens to try to evacuate the wounded but were now sheltering in the cellars of the Chateaudun Hospital as it took a direct hit in one of the many raids that morning. Now all was quiet. ‘I can’t tell you what an eerie feeling it was – this utter silence after an hour of inferno,’ Coster later wrote: