Dunkirk 1940

  Although quickly deciding that the French had lost control of the battle and describing a meeting with Altmayer and the French Commander in Chief Weygand marked by Weygand becoming ‘hysterical’ and ‘screaming’ that positions should be held to the last, with men fighting with their teeth if necessary, it seems odd that Marshall-Cornwall then goes on to criticise Beauman for not taking this same suicidal attitude, especially since he says he was there to avoid British troops being ‘imperilled unnecessarily’ and, in any case, did not regard Beauman’s men as fighting troops. His account is filled with similar apparent contradictions, stating for example, that the 51st Division was ‘not under my orders, but I felt that it was under my wing’13 – an odd comment given that he had been sent specifically to guard its interests but perhaps one seemingly calculated to distance himself from the division’s eventual fate. Equally, he wrote to Evans that his own ‘personal feeling and advice to you’ was that Evans must be prepared to sacrifice some of his men ‘to bolster up the French’, even though this would involve Evans deploying his men in ‘an illegitimate role, but I feel this must be accepted.’14

  For their part, it seems that Generals Beauman, Fortune and Evans had little respect for Marshall-Cornwall or his abilities. Other than brief visits to the front as part of his staff officer duties, Marshall-Cornwall had no combat experience and had never commanded a formation in action. Beauman, for example, describes a ‘stormy interview’ at French Army HQ with Marshall-Cornwall:

  This officer had during his service held a long series of staff and military attaché appointments. As a result his knowledge of the handling and management of troops was not based on much personal experience and he appeared to think that they could be moved about like chess pieces regardless of fatigue and the state of their equipment.15

  After threatening to report Beauman to the War Office, the matter was settled by General Altmayer, who ‘proved much more reasonable’. Marshall-Cornwall himself refers to an incident in which General Evans ‘explained to me forcibly’ that his tanks were in need of maintenance before they could undertake further action – although accepting Evans was ‘right to do so’. It is clear from both his own memoirs and from other accounts at the time that he could contribute little more than an extra level of confusion to the situation and was either powerless or unwilling to countermand French orders for fear of the potential impact on his career rather than his duties to the British troops whose fate he would determine. In his rather self-congratulatory memoirs, he dismisses Karslake as ‘the fifth wheel on the coach’ but, this being the case, he himself became the sixth wheel. What was really needed now was a driver, but that chance had been missed.

  NOTES

  1 Chapman, G. Why France Collapsed 1968 p186

  2 Karslake p94

  3 Blaxland p355

  4 Correspondence between Lord Hankey and General Ironside March 1940. WO 208/92

  5 Karslake p91

  6 Glover p151

  7 Karslake p93

  8 Marshall-Cornwall, J. Wars and Rumours of Wars 1984 p139

  9 Beauman, A.B. Then a Soldier 1960 p91

  10 Marshall-Cornwall p92

  11 Ibid p94

  12 Ibid p156. See also WO216/116

  13 Ibid p147

  14 Ibid p152

  15 Beauman p166

  Chapter Twelve

  ‘Houses covered in rambler roses’

  After a few days rest, the men of the 2/7th DWR had largely recovered. They had mounted anti-aircraft defences around the camp and now were ordered to begin setting up roadblocks along the coast road. The Dukes were under the command of ‘Beauforce’ and deployed as divisional troops with the task of holding the line of the river Bethune, linking with the 2/4th KOYLI around Arques-la-Bataille. The KOYLI in turn were in contact with the 2/6th Dukes further inland but the two battalions were ordered back to Rennes by train on the 26th. Just before leaving the KOYLI handed over their motor transport to the 2/7th to add to that already provided by HQ L of C to create mobile patrols to try to cover the numerous side roads along Beauman’s 57-mile front. From their camp on the hillside, the Dukes had a grandstand view of the sporadic bombing raids on the harbour and, whilst they were not attacked, the threat remained. Watching a heavy raid one day soon after their arrival, a batman suggested that his officer might like him to fetch a brandy. Asked why, the man replied ‘I think it might do us both good sir.’1

  With no sign of the expected German attack, the battalion continued to reorganise, moving men from HQ Company to strengthen the rifle companies. On 29 May a reconnaissance party under Captain Gerrard went forward and made its way back to the abandoned train, reporting that whilst much of the battalion’s luggage had been ransacked, its band instruments were still safe. Immediately, Colonel Taylor approached Brigadier Beauman. ‘[T]hey were loath to leave without their band instruments which had been left in the train,’ wrote Beauman later. ‘The country was by that time infested by German patrols but I agreed a rescue attempt.’ At 2300hrs, Taylor held a meeting to organise the recovery party. ‘This was very difficult as everyone wanted to go.’2 Finding that the officers’ luggage had been looted, probably by French civilians, the party had more luck in finding the men’s greatcoats and packs and, of course, the instruments. On the 30th, the battalion ‘marched triumphantly back to Dieppe with its band at its head.’3 A delighted Bandmaster Doyle was then given permission to beat retreat in the town square.

  Over the coming week, the battalion laid mines on the coast road and sent out patrols but despite a sense of a gathering storm, there was little sign of enemy ground troops approaching. On 5 June, the newly formed ‘A’ Brigade of the now official Beauman Division moved up to the line of the river Bresle to mop up an enemy infiltration into the Haute Forêt d’Eu in support of the 51st Highland Division, but that night word came back that enemy tanks had broken through. Reports came in of German airborne troop landings but ‘the only addition to the game register was a German parachutist who was shot whilst descending but not seriously wounded.’4 Leading a patrol towards Eu on the 7th, nineteen-year-old Second Lieutenant Tom Birkhead was killed, the battalion’s second combat casualty. That night, Taylor assumed command of all Dieppe’s defences and decided that the evidence that the enemy were on the move and already across the Somme forced him to withdraw his forward companies from their exposed positions east of the town and around the grass aerodrome. Although their positions were sufficient to repel a raid, the main defences lay along the line of the river and the docks. That night, they withdrew. The landing strip was ploughed and any stores too heavy to move were destroyed.

  Sketch map of Dieppe.

  The 51st Highland Division was nearing exhaustion after the Germans launched their new offensive, ‘Operation Red’, on 5 June. Dunkirk had fallen the day before and now attention turned to the south with a massive attack across the Somme. Around Abbeville there had been heavy fighting against 154th Brigade of the 51st. The 7th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had evacuated their remaining fit or lightly wounded men from their position in just four trucks, losing over 500 men as their isolated companies fought on after being surrounded for up to 48 hours before finally running out of ammunition. Although they yielded some ground, the Division had held firm despite the odds stacked against them. Having been given the impression that Marshall-Cornwall was acting in the role of corps commander, General Fortune wrote asking for permission to fall back to the Bresle if necessary. Marshall-Cornwall passed on the request to Altmayer, who was finally persuaded to agree although it went against Weygand’s ‘last man, last round’ orders. Beauman then offered the 51st his ‘A’ Brigade as support and sent them forward to the Bresle, leaving the Dukes to garrison Dieppe. The move lost Beauman a third of his force, but also meant he was able to hand over responsibility for 10 miles of front to General Fortune. Together, the two men discussed the possibility of a retreat along the coast to Le Havre but were worried about the ease with which they could be flanke
d by German armour.

  Regardless of the true facts around events, Weygand was already furious that the 51st had given any ground at all and, speaking to Churchill’s representative General Spears, accused them of trying to make for the ports. He even managed to persuade the American Ambassador in Paris to tell Washington that the only breakthrough had come in the British sector and that ‘the single British division in France, supported by the only British armoured force, had run from the Somme back to the Bresle.’5 In fact, Rommel’s tanks had broken through the French line as well but Weygand’s claims would now make it impossible for Churchill to negotiate the extraction of the 51st without further international criticism.

  General Victor Fortune. Criticised by the French as ‘General Misfortune’, the commander of the 51st Highland Division was placed by the War Cabinet in the impossible position of having to obey French commands as a political sop despite realising very quickly that the Division would be trapped as a result.

  Marshall-Cornwall then contacted London to report that French orders were placing British troops at pointless risk and asked that if the division could not be withdrawn, then two more divisions should be sent as soon as possible to reinforce them. Although the 1st Canadian Division was making ready in England, there was little hope of immediate relief. At worst, Dill thought, the division could be evacuated across the beaches but the potential political damage of withdrawing them now far outweighed their military value later. Nevertheless, Marshall-Cornwall argued that the division should be withdrawn from the control of the French and allowed to act independently to get their men to the lower Seine. His liaison officer was refused permission to cross the river by French troops and another was captured by a German patrol as he attempted to reach Fortune, who had already made the decision to send his guns towards Rouen.

  It is unclear what Weygand’s plans really were. The official British history records that by now the French Tenth Army Headquarters had moved south and all communication with their IX Corps had been broken. General Fortune was ‘out of touch with everyone’ due to the loss of his codes and much of his signals equipment. His only information so far about German progress had reached him when a dispatch rider arrived during the morning of the 9th with a message from Colonel R.B. Butler at the British garrison of Le Havre; he had been told by the French Admiral of the port that the enemy had entered Rouen on the 9th. On hearing this, General Fortune saw the IX Corps commander, who agreed that their withdrawal must now be changed from the direction of Rouen to Le Havre. Marshall-Cornwall, who appears by this stage to have turned his attention towards the defence of the Seine at Weygand’s request, reported to London that the 51st had crossed the line of the Bethune and that ‘its withdrawal via Havre now seems the only chance.’6

  The War Office then contacted the British Liaison Mission at General Weygand’s headquarters with a report that ‘Admiral commanding Havre had given orders to 51st Division to withdraw to that place. He has also asked for ships to evacuate approximately 60,000 French and 25,000 British from Havre to Trouville, Caen and Cherbourg. Is this in conformity with General Weygand’s plan?’ Dill had understood that the intention was to direct withdrawal on the lower Seine on either side of Rouen and this still seemed the most sensible move. Meanwhile, Fortune made contact via a dispatch rider sent to Le Havre who telephoned from there. ‘I am now out of touch with everyone owing to the fact that I am not in possession of the recent code. All communications to me should be in clear or French code.’ This was followed by a report of:

  A German soldier watches as Rouen burns.

  … Ninth Corps including 31 and 40 Divisions and two weak cavalry divisions moving west to Le Havre 51 Division on sea. Sending rearguard to reinforce French on line Fécamp–Lillebonne … My speed depends on French movement about 20 kilos a day. Tomorrow morning line should be Dieppe. Essential that air delay enemy movement mostly A.F.V. to south on Saint Saens–Bolbec road also his infantry advance from east. Air support requested to prevent unrestrained bombing. Naval support along coast also of great moral support. If enemy break through French or cut me off from Le Havre will attempt pivot on one of northern ports or in hope of evacuating a few men from behind bridgehead. My rearguard assisting French Fécamp–Lillebonne has orders to drive on Le Havre to attempt embarkation of as many men as possible.

  As a result, by the night of the 9th the War Office knew that the 51st was withdrawing to Le Havre and the French Admiral there was asking for ships to be sent for evacuation.7

  General Weygand, though, still clung to the belief that the IX Corps could carry out the plan to reach Rouen and next day signalled:

  Orders of General Weygand dated 10 June. Fall back on the Seine below Caudebec inclusive. Protect your front in the direction Gournay–Rouen by occupying defensive position behind anti-tank obstacles. In cooperation with Admiral Le Havre reinforce bridgehead Fécamp–Lillebonne. Higher authority will prepare means of crossing [the Seine].8

  The signal was sent via the Admiralty and the War Office with a request that it might be passed to the 51st Division for delivery to the commander of the IX Corps – itself demonstrating how little control Weygand now had of the situation if he had to rely on London to relay messages to his own troops in his own country. By that point, though, the Germans were within 20 miles of the city whilst Fortune faced a 45-mile journey. It was clearly hopeless.

  In Tenth Army, Ihler believed it would take his men four days to reach Rouen by foot and it was now certain that the Germans would reach it first. The only possible route left for evacuation was therefore via Le Havre, 60 miles away. Fortune had the means to do it in twenty-four hours using his motor transport but he was all too aware that the French could not keep up. Gathering his men together, Fortune told them:

  Gentlemen I know you would not wish to desert our French comrades. We could be back at Le Havre in two bounds. But they have no transport. They have only their feet to carry them. We shall have to fight our way back with them step by step.9

  As Fortune took the agonising decision to lead his men into almost certain defeat rather than abandon the French, he was already being made a scapegoat at Weygand’s HQ. The French demands for ‘défense à l’outrance’ was a dramatic gesture but no more than that. Without any effective control of their men, the French generals lost thousands of brave and loyal troops in countless last stands made irrelevant because their outposts could not provide mutual fire support and were simply surrounded to be mopped up later. In his desperation to keep the French in the war Churchill turned a blind eye to their incompetence and by refusing to accept Ironside’s decision to appoint a single commander when he might have had a role, Dill allowed a situation in which Fortune was placed in the impossible position of being likely to find himself damned by his superiors if he saved his men but gave the Anglophobes in France more grounds for complaint, yet still providing them with ammunition to claim that it was he who had given way. In that light, it is hard to disagree with historians who claim that Weygand’s action during this entire period were motivated by pure malice rather than any military sense; but pettiness was not solely a French vice. A measure of the state of Anglo-French relations by this time comes in General Spears’ account of deliberately prolonging a telephone conversation with Weygand because he knew he was desperate to use the lavatory.10

  Even in better circumstances, IX Corps was in no condition to complete the move. Before they were issued, Weygand’s orders were out of date and he was ordering his army to withdraw into an area already under German control. Fortune and Ihler began to arrange the move to Le Havre, placing Brigadier A.C.L. Stanley Clarke in command of a screening force which, as it was formed at Arques la Bataille, was to be known as ‘Arkforce’. He was to take under his command the remnants of 154 Brigade and ‘A’ Brigade together with elements of other battalions badly hit earlier, two French battalions and some 75-mm guns already on the position. General Fortune’s orders added: ‘Should it be apparent that enemy attack fro
m the south or east on the IX Corps has made any organised evacuation from Havre impossible you will withdraw and evacuate at Havre as many of your force as you can, destroying all material and taking off such material as can be carried.’11

  That night, the Corps began its retreat. The transport for the 51st passed through the Dukes by midnight on 8/9 June and the bridges behind them were blown, leaving a small fox terrier on the other side trying to get home. German probing attacks began to test the defences the following afternoon but suffered heavy casualties doing so. Brigaded alongside the 4th Seaforths and the 2nd Black Watch, the Dukes fell back along the coast until the night of 10/11th when they reached the village of Petit Appeville and found transport waiting for them. Following minor roads to reduce the risk of ambush, they arrived at dawn at the coastal town of Veules-les-Roses. ‘The village, well named, looked very beautiful with most of the houses covered in rambler roses’ wrote Taylor.12 It did not look like a potential battlefield.

  Unknown to the Dukes, ‘Arkforce’ were moving into position to cover the approaches to Le Havre between Fecamp and Bolbec, a front of around 20 miles; but at 1100hrs, a message reached Fortune that German tanks had already cut between him and Arkforce, a radio operator just having time to get the message out before being captured. Further reports indicated that panzers were at the coast near Cany. The closest port was still Dieppe but it was believed – wrongly – that the harbour was out of action and unusable. That left the fishing ports along the coast and, in particular, the port of St Valery-en-Caux, 18 miles from Fortune’s HQ. Signalling ahead, Fortune warned the naval detachments at Le Havre of his intentions and explained he had rations for two days. After jettisoning as much kit from their transports as possible, the division began to speed up its move.