by Tim Lynch
The force reached St Etienne at around 0200hrs the next morning and was accommodated in an infantry base depot where the men were put to work in the local ammunition dump and preparing defences. They were joined the next day by the last of the rearguard company and news reached them that the battalion transport had been located. For the next few days the battalion worked at various sites around Rouen, a routine only broken when Captain Stell and eleven men in two trucks, equipped with three days rations, drove up to Dieppe to collect the battalion’s drums from the 2/7th after their rescue of the band instruments. Hearing that the train was still at Chepy, they borrowed a Bren gun and anti-tank rifle and set out to see what could be recovered.
A Bren gun team in action.
Arriving at Chepy, Captain Stell found that M. Pruvot had continued his work and the train was now at Le Treport. Masses of paper showed where it had been and shattered boxes lay around, smashed with ‘pickaxes and choppers’. Moving to Le Treport, the train was located in a goods yard and as much equipment as possible was recovered. Pausing for a meal with the 2/7th and to return the weapons, Stell’s group then set out after the rest of the battalion.
Whilst they had been away, the battalion had been moved yet again, this time to Bruz, just south of Rennes, to re-equip and to undertake intensive training at the Boozer Infantry Base Depot. One of their first tasks on arrival was to improvise a footbath in the bed of a 15cwt truck so the men could soak their blistered feet. Proper washing facilities were not available and water supplies to the camp barely existent, causing problems for arriving stragglers who reached the camp filthy and sometimes infested with fleas and ticks picked up while sheltering in woods and barns. ‘Physically’, the War Diary notes, ‘this battalion was in a poor way.’
The first week of June saw them slowly recovering and able to make arrangements to carry out weapons training with the Bren and the anti-tank rifle – which, as the diarist dryly notes, was ‘the first time that the men of this unit had been given this opportunity’. On the 6th, Llewellyn was told that the battalion would soon be required in an operational role and that he should be prepared to move at short notice. Beauman, now promoted to acting Major-General, had given his ‘A’ Brigade to the 51st Highland Division and the Dukes, together with the 2/4th KOYLI and the improvised 4th Provisional Battalion (better known to all as ‘Symes Battalion’) were now their replacements in the Beauman Division.
At 1010hrs on the morning of 7 June, Llewellyn was told to have his men at Bruz station by 1030hrs and, remarkably, managed to get them together and to the station by 1050hrs, only to then wait until 1410hrs for the train to depart. The battalion transport had been sent to Rennes for loading but it was discovered that the loaded wagons were too high to pass under local bridges. They were again unloaded and sent on by road. For the Dukes and the KOYLI following behind, it was an eerie echo of the same journey just over two weeks before as they passed along the same line, finally reaching their destination at Louviers twenty-four hours after leaving Bruz.
Once again, chaos reigned. The battalion were now back to within a few miles of the camp at St Etienne but seemingly no better organised than when they left at the end of May. Transport arrived with some stores but not the additional Bren guns and anti-tank rifles they had been promised and which were included in the paperwork that came with the vehicles. The Dukes detrained as instructed at Louviers and began to prepare a meal. A few small scale maps were issued that were of little tactical use but at least gave the men an idea of where they were. Where they were, they soon found out, was in the wrong place. When the train carrying the 2/4th KOYLI arrived, it was discovered that the Dukes should, in fact, have been sent further along the line to Pont de l’Arche, a few miles further downstream on the river Seine towards Rouen itself. The KOYLI had been assigned the defence of bridges around nearby Les Andelys but by a fortunate coincidence, Llewellyn knew the area around there anyway – he had spent his honeymoon there and had walked the hills nearby. That helped to clinch the deal. The 2/4th agreed to push on and leave Les Andelys to the Dukes.
The German advance was in full swing and the panzer divisions were bearing down on Rouen. Weygand, in a highly charged meeting with Altmayer and Marshall-Cornwall, had dramatically claimed that if the Germans crossed the Seine he would advise the French government to surrender, declaring the coming fight to be:
… the decisive battle of the war! Every man must fight in his place! Every tank must be a fortress! Everyone must be in the attack! We must tear them apart with our teeth like a dog!4
Altmayer is said to have given Marshall-Cornwall a sympathetic look. Both men knew that the temperamental and aging Weygand was barely holding on to his command and had already lost control of the battle.
Earlier that day, reports had reached HQ Beauman Division of an incident at Forges-les-Eaux when, at 1000hrs, a column of tanks with French markings approached a British checkpoint. The troops had been warned that French tanks were operating in front of them and cheered as they passed through the roadblock, which had been left partially open to allow infantry the withdraw through it:
These tanks were captured French tanks manned by Germans. As soon as they had passed through they closed their turrets, turned around and annihilated the posts with MG fire. This enabled further large enemy AFV formations and mechanised infantry to pour through.5
The incident highlighted how thin Beauman’s defensive screen actually was. By 1500hrs Beauman ordered ‘B’ Brigade to make for ferries across the Seine downstream from Rouen at Duclair and Caudebec and for ‘C’ Brigade to head for Pont de l’Arche. The newly arrived Dukes, KOYLI and Symes Battalions would hold the river line as the others withdrew.
German cyclists. Using bicycles, German infantry were able to advance rapidly to support their tanks.
German troops operate a makeshift ferry to cross the Seine.
Riders of a reconnaissance squadron crossing a river.
Map of action around Les Andelys.
The Dukes were asked to take up positions around two bridges, one at St Pierre du Vouvray and another at Les Andelys, where the river curves in a long bend through hilly, rolling country. To the Dukes’ left would be the KOYLI, to their right a mixed French force. The twelve-mile front assigned to them was a pre-war tourist destination where people came to enjoy the river. As such it was filled with potential crossing points and ‘it was very soon realised that the enormous area of country to guard against infiltrations by portable bridge or boats from all company flanks was impossibly large.’6 All along the front were riverside villages linked to islands in the river, heavily wooded banks and boats and punts ‘abounded everywhere’.
The first bombs had fallen on Les Andelys at around 1100hrs on that Saturday morning and an exodus of the population had begun. As Colonel Llewellyn began his reconnaissance at around 1830hrs, another heavy bombing raid struck the area and a four-horse wagon filled with refugees and their belongings took a direct hit just yards from his car. Pressing on, he established contact with the KOYLI and with the strong French garrison at Gaillon. The iron and concrete suspension bridge at St Pierre was covered by a French 75mm gun as well as ‘C’ Company of the Dukes, and a mass of refugees had begun to accumulate in the area, hoping for protection. At Les Andelys, ‘B’ Company had established its positions on both sides of the town bridge, itself already prepared for demolition. At Heudebouville, HQ Company stood in reserve and were patrolling the riverbanks. Alongside them, No19 Platoon, formerly designated as the anti-tank platoon, were dug in near a railway bridge in support of a detachment of French engineers with a small calibre gun. The platoon had just two LMGs and one anti-tank rifle available to cover its objective.
That evening, the enemy were still 45 miles away but their commander, General von Manstein, was determined to strike before the defence line could be completed and ordered the spearhead units of his divisions to push on as fast as possible, 6th Division to Les Andelys, 46th Division towards Vernon and the Pont
de L’Arche. ‘This was an extraordinary feat to expect,’ he later wrote:
… from troops who had been engaged in a running fight with the enemy for four days past, but there happen to be moments in war when a senior commander must impose the most severe demands if he is to avoid flinging away an opportunity for which his troops may have to fight all the harder later on.7
By the following morning, his men were approaching the river. The air raids that had set Les Andelys ablaze had, to von Manstein’s annoyance, simply served to announce the approach of his men and put the defenders on their guard so the crossing was likely to be harder than he had hoped.
On the morning of the 9th, the battalion intelligence officer, Lieutenant Cooper, had gone to HQ to request maps, only to be told there were none to be had. He was also told that the KOYLI had been attacked by tanks and were even now holding their ground. With this news, it was decided to withdraw across the bridges and make ready to blow them. Out of the blue, a British armoured detachment of one tank and two machine guns arrived at St Pierre, adding significantly to the firepower available; but Colonel Llewellyn was concerned to find instructions to withdraw to Bernay via Neuberg after dark under the codename ‘Nora’. Despite No19 Platoon reporting the presence of growing numbers of Germans on the opposite bank, no attack had yet been made and Llewellyn saw no good reason to suddenly pull back 12 miles. As the Adjutant attempted to contact HQ using the telephone at Fontaine Bellenger, he found his call answered in German and ‘several suspicious looking individuals in the village were arrested.’8 Concerned about fifth columnists, Llewellyn decided to ignore the order. He then managed, with difficulty, to track down the local French commander and explained his decision. ‘He thanked me with great cordiality’ and told Llewellyn that French infantry and artillery support were on their way to relieve pressure of the Dukes’ flanks at Venables. A relieved Llewellyn returned to find orders from British HQ to stay put.
German troops take shelter during an artillery barrage.
Approaching from the north was the German 6th Infantry Division, its advance led by the mounted cavalry of 1st Reconnaissance Squadron led by the aristocratic Oberleutnant Georg Freiherr von Boeselager.9 Early on the morning of 9 June, he received surprise orders: ‘Division has reached the Seine ahead of schedule – Reconnaissance Section will form a bridgehead against Les Andelys for the division to follow across.’ By 0715hrs he had formed a forward troop in vehicles with orders for the mounted squadron to follow behind.10
Even in the early hours, the weather was oppressively close and humid as his saddlesore men mounted their horses and followed the heavily laden personnel and supply lorries. By midday, the unit was in the village of Saussay, where his men went in search of a watering trough but found instead 40 French soldiers hiding in a barn. Taking their surrender, the Germans simply pointed the prisoners in the direction of the infantry follow up and left them to make their own way into captivity. Then, maintaining an advance of over 5 miles per hour, the unit rode via Clery towards Les Andelys. The bridge there was already blown but a small force was sent ahead to try to seize another eight kilometres upstream of the river at Courcelles before it could be blown. As they approached, it too exploded. ‘All of a sudden, a violent explosion. Broken masonry rains down and the air pressure shatters windows all around. We are too late.’
The rest of Boeselager’s men now assembled on the Bouaffles–Vezillon road, just off the Dukes’ right flank. ‘B’ Company and the French troops had been under mortar and machine gun fire for some time from tanks and infantry on the north bank where the fire was so accurate that all but one of ‘B’ Company’s LMGs were knocked out in the barrage and the ensuing air attack, leaving speculation that enemy troops were already directing it from riverside cottages. There was no choice now but to pull back to a line across the main road at Bernieres. Across the river, refugee traffic stacked up as the crossing points were destroyed and the German advance slowed as they tried to force their way through the crowds. Then, according to German reports, the French opened up with machine gun and artillery fire indiscriminately. In terror, civilians ran towards the Germans, crying ‘heil Hitler’ and taking shelter alongside the troops.
German troops advance as French POWs are marched to the rear.
Oberleutenant von Boeselager then seized the initiative when, after scouting 500 metres below Courcelles, he found a crossing point: ‘Everybody in my command listen! Non-swimmers stay back!’ then, with Leutnant Meier and twelve men, all loaded down with rifles, ammunition, flare pistols and their personal equipment, he began to swim the river. Three men were lost in the crossing as the current swept them away but the rest quickly established themselves on the muddy bank as the non-swimmers provided covering fire.
As the group took control of the far bank, an engineer truck arrived with inflatable rafts and 60 men were sent across along with an anti-tank gun. By the time von Manstein arrived, the crossing was well under way at three points. Satisfied, the general set off to check on the progress of the battle at Pont de l’Arche where, unknowingly, the entire German 46th Division were pitted against just one battalion of their British counterparts. ‘One or two difficulties did crop up in the case of 46 Division, however’, noted von Manstein later:
First of all, it had moved off three hours later than was expected. By the time I returned to it after visiting 6 Division it had lost all contact with its reconnaissance battalion, and the latter, wherever else it might be, was certainly not at the Seine, like that of 6 Division. There was nothing for it but to suggest to the commander of 46 Division that he meet me early that evening at Vernon, his crossing place. He might, I added, at least bring his missing reconnaissance battalion along with him.11
Across the river, von Boeselager had taken a small group forward towards Villiers and ambushed a French motor column with grenades and machine guns, sending the French racing for the cover of ditches. Although a small force, the infiltration served to highlight how vulnerable the Les Andelys salient had become. Throughout the night, three French counterattacks failed to dislodge von Boeselager’s men.
The Dukes had been bemused by the arrival during the night of French cavalrymen armed with sabres and were not surprised when, at 1400hrs, they rode away. Just one French officer and six of his men seemed determined to make a fight of it and stayed. By now, they knew that German troops were across the river behind them and that it was only a matter of time. Second Lieutenant Reynolds and six men fought with an LMG until their position was finally overrun and by then, Llewellyn had decided that it was time to pull back to a position around Venables to prevent ‘B’ Company being surrounded from both north and south. Between them, ‘B’ and ‘C’ Companies had a front of just 2 miles but their move had been observed and no sooner had they taken up position than a heavy mortar attack began.
Llewellyn had been summoned to attend a conference at the French HQ at Chateau du Hazy at 1630hrs and left Captain Stell with clear instructions about how to employ the reserve if necessary. Reports from along the battalion front indicated that they were holding but under pressure, especially at the outposts at Andé, to the west of the sector. Llewellyn duly reported at 1630hrs and found Colonel Diggle, commander of Beauman’s ‘C’ Brigade already there, his AMPC battalions being deployed to the left of the KOYLI in the same sector. It was not until 1700hrs, however, that General Malliard arrived and then, after listening to Llewellyn’s assessment and request for support, ‘carefully explained’ that he was in command of the 5e Brigade de Cavalerie and responsible for Sub Sector East. This line ended at Fontaine Bellenger. ‘C’ Company and No19 Platoon were therefore not his problem but that of Sub Sector Centre. With implacable Gallic logic, Malliard insisted that if Llewellyn wanted help for his beleaguered company, he should apply to Lieutenant-Colonel Watteau at his HQ in the school of St Cyr-du-Vaudreuil, around 10 miles to the north. As Beauman’s after action report explained:
Beauman Division mobile column in Normandy.
Llewellyn left the meeting with ‘grave misgivings’. He had been asked to use his reserve ‘D’ Company to extend the line at Les Grands Villiers with the promise that a French detachment would reinforce ‘B’ and ‘D’ Companies but also with the news that the local commander did not consider HQ and ‘C’ Company to be his problem. ‘This appeared a strange piece of tactics’ noted the war diary, ‘as the French, like ourselves, were being outflanked’13 – and Llewellyn was unwilling to run the risk of having his battalion literally cut in half. His reluctance was later criticised by Malliard, who complained of ‘worrying apathy’ on the part of the British who, he claimed, ‘could only be kept in the battle with difficulty’.14 By the time he got back, though, the orders were no longer valid. ‘A’ and ‘B’ Companies were pinned down by mortar fire and holding off determined infantry attacks. Gradually, they disengaged and pulled back along the line of the railway at the base of the peninsula. ‘D’ Company’s commander, Captain Stell, had been badly wounded during a reconnaissance for the move to Les Grands Villiers when he found the village already occupied. His companion was killed as they came under heavy fire. It was only that evening as the battalion truck was driving the Colonel to visit a position that they saw a body lying at the side of the road and found Stell trying to crawl back to his men.