by A R Azzam
languages: Arabs, Bedouins, Kurds, Turks, Persians and Egyptians. Saladin
boasted that on its march its dust darkened the sun. The army was estimated
to be at least 30,000,^ at least twice if not three times the size of Guy's army.
At the head of the right wing was Taqi ul-Din, Saladin's nephew, and a man
Icnown for his tremendous physical courage. It was Taqi ul-Din who, dur-
ing the defeat at Mont Gisard, had sent his son to charge Baldwin's army,
and when his son had returned had ordered to him to charge again, only to
be slain. Now Saladin entrusted his nephew with perhaps the most c^fiBcult
task, which was to command the right wing of his army, since in military
tacdcs it was often this wing which took the offensive while the left wing
acted in a defensive manner.
In fact the person commanding Saladin's left wing was no less formid-
able, for it was none other than Keukburi, who was married to Saladin's
sister. Keukburi - 'blue wolf in Turldsh - was a son of the governor of Irbil,
who had been a loyal servant of the Zengids. Keukburi had led the right
wing of the Aleppan-Mosuli forces which had been defeated by Saladin at
Tell al-Sultan, but he had shifted sides and it was he who had encouraged
Saladin to cross the Euphrates. There was no doubting his military prowess
- Imad al-Din al-Isfahani described him as a lion who heads straight for
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the target - but Keukburi was also a devoted patron of learning and the
builder of many madrasas and sufi hospices in Irbil. And Saladin's army was
strengthened not just by military succour, for riding alongside him were
some of the leading religious scholars and madrasa professors. There could
be no greater symbol of the alliance between the religious scholars and the
military than the sight of the Shafii Saladin riding at the head of his army
accompanied by Muwaffaq al-Din Ibn Qudama, the Hanbali legist and stu-
dent of Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani. There had been a time when the Shafiis and
the Hanbalis had mocked and fought each other in the streets of Baghdad,
but now the soldier and the scholar rode side by side. And as Saladin's army
marched, Muwaffaq al-Din's nephew, Abd al-Ghani, stood aside and made
a public reading of the The Profession of Faith^ a work of the Hanbalite
scholar Ibn Batta.^ It was the same work that was read out when Shirkuh
and Saladin rode on their Egyptian campaign.
For Saladin, however, the size of the army meant that he needed to fight
a decisive battle, for he was not certain that he could assemble such a force
again, and therein lay the challenge. He had told Ibn Shaddad, 'If I were to
die, it is very unlikely that these soldiers would ever come together again'.
And these words were not meant to be immodest. Rather they were a real-
isation of the dogged effort which had been involved to bring together such
a large army, and the fragility and ease with which it could disperse. Saladin
Icnew that as long as Guy held his position at Saffuriya, with its well-watered
gardens, he could continue to defy him until Saladin's army dispersed. In
order to achieve victory Saladin needed to bring Guy's army out into the
parched lands of Galilee, between the coast and Lake Tiberias, across the
waterless plain and then defeat it. For Guy to be victorious, he simply had
to hold firm.
On 26 June 1187 Saladin set out, and after two days marching the army
made camp at al-Qahwani, a marshy area between Lake Tiberias and the
rivers Jordan and Yarmuk. Saladin then climbed westwards from the Jordan
to Kafr Sabt, from where he could threaten both Saffiariyya, where Guy held
his army in a defensive position, and Tiberias. It seemed that Saladin was
determined to fight and on 1 July he challenged the Franks, but Guy
refused to take the bait, leaving Saladin with no choice but to return to Kafr
Sabt. It was clear that for a batde to take place Saladin needed to force the
Franks out into the open; he now split his army and on 2 July attacked
Tiberias. King Guy's actions on the eve of the batde of Hattin and his
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SALAD I N
reaction to Saladin's attack on Tiberias are well known, but their inter-
pretation has continued to occupy historians. The traditional account relates
how Saladin, in order to force the Christian army to leave Saffiiriya, had set
a trap which the chivalrous Icnights found hard to resist. Saladin decided
that he would lay siege to Tiberias, where Raymond's wife was based, in the
hope that the Christians would advance to the aid of a damsel in distress
and fall into his trap. Leaving Taqi ul-Din and Keukburi in charge of the
mass of the army, Saladin personally led the attack on Tiberias. The initial
onslaught was successful, including the collapse of one of the city towers.
Rapidly a breach was made and the Muslim forces poured into the city.
Raymond's wife, Eschiva, took reflige in the citadel and sent an urgent
appeal to her husband, who was with Guy at Saflfuriya. Saladin was aware
that Guy's scouts were watching the attack on Tiberias from the hills and it
was his intention to allow the news to reach Guy. One of the fundamental
laws of the kingdom stated that the king had an obligation to go to the aid
of one of his vassals if he were threatened by a Muslim attack.^ This was
undoubtedly a noble idea - chivalrous and romantic - but this was not a war
fought by troubadours but by batde-hardened veterans like Raymond and
Reynald. To march across the Galilean plains in the heat of summer was
highly risky, and to confront the Muslim army in open battie went against
the most fundamental military strategy on which the Prankish states had
been built. Guy was certainly aware of this; four years previously he had
shown the discipline that was needed when he had refused to accept
Saladin's challenge and had consequently forced him to disband his army in
frustration.
Deliberations in the Franks' camp
Guy now assembled his leading counsellors to listen to their opinion. Every-
one present, from barons to Icnights, gathered, for they knew what was at
stake. Hundreds of men crowded into and around the Idng's tent, which
was illuminated by torchlight. Above the babble of voices, Raymond's could
be heard. He spoke with confidence: Saladin's attack on Tiberias was a bait
to trap them but the Christian army should not fall into it, even though it
was his own wife who was trapped in the citadel. If Tiberias were to fall,
then this would lead to the disbanding of the Muslim armies, who would
return to Mosul and Aleppo and Egypt. What falls today can be reconquered
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tomorrow. As for his wife's safety, he was not concerned, for such was
Saladin's renown for gallantry that he would never harm a woman. But if
the entire military strength of the kingdom marched into the waterless
plateau that separated Saffuriyah from Tiberias, then they would risk a dis-
aster of enormous magnitude. Raymond's speech was powerful and his
voice rose in confidence as he found that others - even those who felt he
was a traitor - were listening intently. Silence followed after he had spoken,
until Guy announced that Raymond had spoken the truth and that there
would be no march to Tiberias. Instead, the army would remain in
Saffuriyah until Saladin disbanded his army. There was nothing further to
add, and the Franks retired to their tents.
That night Guy of Lusignan changed his mind, and so sealed the fate
of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. Two men had remained behind in the
tent when the rest had slipped off into the night: Reynald of Chatillon
and Gerard of Ridefort. Both hated Raymond with a vengeance and were
convinced he was a traitor. A few weeks earlier, Gerard had witnessed his
Templars being slain by Muslim forces who had ridden through Raymond's
lands with his blessing, and he seethed with anger and rage. The traditional
accounts relate how the two men bullied Guy and won him over to their
argument; why, they asked, was Raymond so confident in leaving his wife as
a prisoner with Saladin, unless he was already in league with him? Could
Guy not see that Raymond aspired to the throne, and that the best way to
do that was to humiliate Guy in the eyes of his own people - showing how
the king of Jerusalem was unable to come to the rescue of a city which lay
barely 16 kilometres (10 miles) away? In this way historians have argued
that a weak and cowardly Idng was made to change his mind. Except that
Guy was not as weak or cowardly as his detractors have made him out to be;
he had led an army once and would lead armies again, and when so much
was at stake it seems unlikely he would simply bow to the bullying of two
men and embark on such a risky campaign, no matter how powerfial they
were. So why did Guy change his mind? There was one further subject
which is often overlooked but which undoubtedly was mentioned late in
that fateful night, and to understand this more fully we need to return to
Henry II and the fortune he had amassed in the east. We have seen earlier
how the patriarch Heraclius had failed to convince Henry to take up the
Cross, and although there was a good chance that the king of England
would recall his money, Guy persuaded the master of the Templars to open
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his part of Hemy's eastern account. This was the first time that Henry's
money was touched and it was a sensational event, because people had been
waiting for it for 15 years on both sides of the sea.^ The news was bound
to reach Henry, and when it did it was expected that his anger would be
terrible. To pacify him, Guy ordered that the soldiers hired with English
money fight under the English flag. But it was clear to Guy, as it was to
Gerard of Ridefort, that Henry's wrath could only be cooled by a spectacular
triumph. We will never Icnow what took place in that tent during that
fateflil night, but when dawn broke, on 3 July 1189, trumpeters were sent
throughout the camp to issue new orders: the army was going to march to
Tiberias. Drowsy men woke up in confusion, which quicldy turned into
anger. What could have happened to change the Idng's mind?
The march to Tiberias
Saladin was at dawn prayers just outside the walls of Tiberias when messen-
gers arrived bearing the news that the Christian army was on the march.
The news surprised him, for though he had hoped that Guy would take the
bait, he had not expected it. He immediately mounted his horse and rode
the 10 kilometres (6 miles) to Kafr Sabt where his army was stationed.
There he was greeted by Taqi ul-Din and Keukburi, who confirmed the
news: Guy was indeed on the march. They had already sent out light forces
to harass the Franks, though not in large enough numbers to prevent them
from marching or to suspect that a trap lay ahead. From the high ground
of Kafr Sabt Saladin could watch the Christian army on the move. It was
in three columns: Raymond of Tripoli was at its head; the Idng Guy of
Lusignan was in the centre, accompanied by the True Cross; and at the rear
was Balian of Ibelin, who rode with the most experienced knights and the
Templars, for this was the position of greatest danger since it was a common
tactic among the Muslims to try to cut off the rearguard from the rest of
the army. The formation dictated that the infantiy, including the archers
and crossbowmen, protect the cavalry, who stood ready to drive back the
Muslims with controlled charges. Discipline was imperative as this defensive
shield marched. From Kafr Sabt the Christian army appeared as no more
than a dust cloud in the distance, but Saladin was in no doubt about the
significance of what was occurring. Turning to his two commanders, he
declared that today the outcome of the holy war would be decided.
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The problem of writing about the battle of Hattiii is that we Icnow the
outcome. In that sense the tortured prelude appears as an omen for a
tragedy which was about to befall the Latin Kingdom. Bad omens and
portents were said to have been everywhere - the horses refused to drink
before setting out, a crazed Muslim woman was seen by many laying a curse
on the Christian army, and so on - but ominous omens are recalled only
after the event. The reality was that the Christians did not believe they were
going to be defeated. They certainly did not believe their action was sui-
cidal, and it is important to tiy to understand in the heat of the events that
followed what their strategy may have been. By mid-morning the Christian
army had been marching for five or six hours, and most of the soldiers were
suffering terribly from thirst and exhaustion. They had turned eastwards
into Wadi Rummanah and were close to Mount Turan, where there was a
vital spring of water. At this stage we begin to understand a bit more about
Guy's strategy.® The Idng loiew that the Muslim army was holding the high
ground, but he also knew that beyond Mount Turan a valley opened up,
which could be used as a battiefield. If he could tempt the Muslim army
down from the high ground and charge them, he would pin them against
the ridge and that would mean that victory would be his. If Saladin did not
take up the challenge and come down from the ridge, then Guy would
return to the water spring of Turan until either the Muslims descended to
fight or their army disbanded. The decision to march was not as suicidal
as it may have first appeared, but it was very risl
be higher: Guy had calculated that the day would be decided on the out-
come of a battle. In doing so, and in underestimating Saladin's forces, he
miscalculated terribly.
From Turan Tiberias was still 14 kilometres (9 miles) away and half the
day was gone. Although Guy could not have realised the full extent of
Saladin's army, which was gathered on the ridge, by noon he was begin-
ning to sense it, as the attacks on the Christian army became relentiess.
News reached Raymond, who was leading the vanguard, that the rearguard
had been slowed down to crawl. It was clear that the army would not
reach Tiberias before ni
ghtfall and at this point a decision was made - with
Raymond apparently the instigator - that the army should swing left down
a track to the springs at Hattin, which lay no more than 6 Idlometres
(4 miles) away. From there the army could reach Lake Tiberias the next day.
This required the army to march down a slope, which, though by no means
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challenging, would have made it more difBcult to keep in formation. At this
stage the army was spread out over at least 2 kilometres miles), with
the rearguard being subjected to constant attacks by Saladin's left wing
under the command of Keukburi.
From the hills to the south Saladin had a clear view of the movements of
the Christian army. He immediately spotted the change of direction and he
acted to counter the new strategy. It was crucial to try to outflank the
Franks and surround them and thereby drive them into the desert and away
from the spring, and this task was given to Taqi ul-Din's division. Raymond
of Tripoli, who was commanding the vanguard, realised what was happen-
ing and urged speed, lest the army be blocked from reaching the spring by
Taqi ul-Din, but it was too late. And on that move the battle was decided
and the fate of the Latin Kingdom was sealed. Saladin then ordered
Keukburi to attack Guy's army and a relendess wave of coloured banners
and flashing steel® now descended from the slopes. The shrill battlecries,
drumbeats and the clanging of cymbals, ratdes and gongs were accompa-
nied by the echo of a thousand 'Allahu Alcbars'. It was a critical time, for
not only did Taqi ul-Din need to prevent Raymond from marching down
the slope to Hattin but the right wing had to be strong enough to prevent
the Christians from cutting their way out again. At the same time Keukburi
was ordered to prevent the Christian army from retreating at any cost.
Furiously and frantically the Templars charged at Keukburi, hoping to make
a breakthrough, but the left wing held firm. Once the two wings had suc-
ceeded in outflanking the Christian army and Saladin was able to hold the
ridge with his Egyptian forces, the Franks were surrounded in the open
desert with no water. It was a terrible situation; if the Franks were to remain