by A R Azzam
Instead of praise, Saladin received a reprimand for adopting the caliph's
name - al-Nasir - as his own. Afi:er all, Saladin was icily reminded, had he
not conquered Jerusalem under the banner of the caliph? Baghdad's rebuke
drove Saladin to a rare display of anger: 'As for the claim of the caliph that
I conquered Jerusalem with his army and under his banners - where were
they?' Saladin's anger was echoed by al-Adil and Taqi ul-Din, although al-
Qadi al-Fadil urged restraint towards Baghdad. But it was abundantiy clear
that even the recapture of Jerusalem could not compensate in the caliph's
view for the spread of Saladin's influence.^ Indeed, when news reached
Baghdad of the fall of Jerusalem, the reaction of one of the caliph's advisers
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SALAD I N
tells us all that we need to Icnow: 'This man [Saladin] thinks he will over-
turn the Abbasid dynasty'.
Saladin was soothed by the arrival of his brother al-Adil and his son
al-Afdal, but the weather was as grim as the mood, and snow was in the air.
Saladin had ordered warships to sail from Beirut to drive the Prankish ships
into harbour but on 30 December Conrad launched a daring assault which
transformed the siege dramatically. Using the full force of the naval support
that Tyre offered him, Conrad surprised the Muslim fleet and caused great
destruction. Saladin had lost control of the sea. In the meantime his amirs
were becoming increasingly restless; it was so late in the year, they needed
to return to their lands. Seeing his army disintegrate before him, Saladin
had no choice but to disband and retire for the winter. He himself was
exhausted physically and mentally, and his ill health was plaguing him
increasingly to the point where he was a shadow of the man that had been
victorious at Hattin just a few months earlier. Taqi ul-Din left with the
troops of Mosul and Sinjar;^ al-Adil departed for Egypt; and Saladin's son
al-Zahir left for Aleppo. The siege engines that could not be moved were
destroyed and Saladin moved south of Acre, where he remained in camp
until spring. The only amirs of note who remained with him during the win-
ter were Izz al-Din Jurdik and Isa al-Haldcari, both of whom he knew from
his days in Egypt. During the winter months, relations with the caliph
further deteriorated, following a tragic incident during the pilgrimage. Ibn
al-Muqaddam, who had been the first to invite Saladin to Damascus after
Nur al-Din's death, had led the Syrian pilgrims to Mecca that year and it
appears that he insisted on raising Saladin's standard at Mount Arafat, only
to clash with Iraqi pilgrims who wished to tear it down. Ibn al-Muqaddam
was wounded and died of his wounds shortly after. What should have
been a peaceful religious ritual now flirther added to the tension between
Damascus and Baghdad.
Tyre had not fallen - the only blemish in an otherwise remarkable year.
But how serious this blemish would be was too early to tell. Saladin had
achieved all that he had promised: the Prankish army had been destroyed,
the Kingdom of Jerusalem wiped out and Jerusalem recaptured. Saladin
hoped that Tyre would fall to him in the following spring, but deep down
he feared it may not. And more alarming news reached him in the form of
a letter from the German emperor, Prederick Barbarossa, who had taken the
Cross as soon as he had heard of the calamity of Hattin and who promised
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13: T H E ARRIVAL OF R I C H A R D
to unleash the full force of the German race to regain Jerusalem. Saladin
could now no longer be in any doubt that a dark cloud was approaching,
which threatened to destroy all that he had achieved. The arrival of Imad al-
Din Zengi of Sinjar with troops in May 1188 gave him some hope. To some
extent Saladin was wary of the Zengids, who had grudgingly sent forces but
who remained bitter, and he certainly had not forgotten the trouble they
had caused him. However, Saladin was careful to extend as much hospital-
ity and grace as needed to soothe this raw nei-ve. He came out to greet
Imad al-Din Zengi personally, and both men dismounted from their horses
to emphasise equality of rank. Imad al-Din was presented with gifts and
delicacies - delicious apricots had arrived from Damascus - and he was
seated next to Saladin, who went as far as to spread a satin cloth for him to
walk on. No expense was spared to keep the Muslim alliance together.
With Tyre holding out, Saladin turned his attention towards Antioch,
the capture of which was of immense significance since it would block the
land route for any crusader armies. With Imad al-Din Zengi commanding
his right wing, Saladin swept towards the north. In July 1188 Tartus fell,
to be followed by Latakia, but the attack on Antioch never came. Saladin
himself wanted to attack and lay siege, but he could not convince the
Zengid Imad al-Din, who saw no benefit in helping the Ayyubid Saladin.
After all, the fall of Antioch would leave Saladin more powerful than before;
its survival was no threat to his own lands and there was no reason for him
to show an excess of zeal.^ To the great frustration of al-Qadi al-Fadil Saladin
turned back. As for the Zengid-Ayyubid rivalry, it seemed that victory in the
holy war was not in itself enough to setde old scores.® The anti-climax of
Antioch was partly reUeved when news reached Saladin that Kerak, the bas-
tion of Reynald of Chatillon, had fallen to al-Adil, and in January 1189 the
castle of Kaukab also fell. But Tyre continued to resist and in addition there
was an acute shortage of money and many of the amirs avoided Saladin lest
he ask for money. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani wrote in April 1189 from Damascus
to al-Qadi al-Fadil, who was in Egypt, complaining about the situation. Al-
Qadi al-Fadi replied claiming that in comparison to Egypt, Damascus' prob-
lems were like a drop in the ocean. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani's financial situation
itself was not in a healthy state and at one stage he contemplated leaving
Saladin to seek his fortune elsewhere. The fact that Saladin's eulogist-in-
chief could have thought, even if only half seriously, of abandoning him
shows something of the extent of the problems that were to be faced.®
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SALAD I N
The siege of Acre
When Saladin had brought Guy to the walls of Ascalon to negotiate for the
city's surrender, the Icing had been mocked and abused by the city's defend-
ers. From the moment that he had appeared in Palestine and had managed
to win the heart of Sybil and thereby inherit the Kingdom of Jerusalem, it
seems that Guy was vilified by all. The native Franks of Outremer resented
this newcomer and even Baldwin IV had vainly attempted to dissolve his
sister's marriage to him. Guy's vacillation at Hattin had opened him to
charges of cowardice and wealoiess, and with the collapse of the royal tent
it seemed that he had made his final mediocre contribution to the unfold-
ing drama. But there was more to Guy than it seems anyone expected', and
he now emerged from the shadows of shame. Saladin had released him on
the prom
ise that he would not fight against him, but Guy had been quick
to find a cleric who absolved him from his oath. He then marched to Tyre
and demanded entry into his city, only to be rebuffed brusquely by Conrad,
who had no intention of handing over his gain. Guy found the city gates as
closed to him as they had been to Saladin. But Guy was, if nothing else,
dogged, and when Christian reinforcements began arriving in the Holy
Land he assembled a patchwork force and marched on Acre. It was a march
of folly - one based on a land of sublime ignorance which reckoned not
the cost of an action, merely its appeal.^ Clearly Guy remained as foolish
as'ever; this time, however, fortune quite remarkably would favour him. As
Tyerman concludes, Guy's was a desperate adventure that avoided destruc-
tion only because of Saladin's caution.
In fact Saladin had a very good reason to be cautious, for though he
received news of Guy's march with incredulity, he was more concerned with
the German storm that was gathering on the horizon. When the news of the
disaster at Hattin reached Europe, the shock was profound. Pope Urban III
had died of grief when he had heard about the calamity, while Henry II,
who had promised on so many occasions to take up the Cross, was dumb-
struck and did not speak a word for four days. It was the knights of
Germany who were the first to respond. The first German pilgrims to take
the Cross did so in December 1187 and they were followed three months
later by the emperor, who had written defiantly to Saladin. So great was the
response that no fleet could be found to carry the crusaders. It is estimated
that by May 1189 more than 50,000 had set out from Germany. And
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13: T H E ARRIVAL O F R I C H A R D
behind the Germans it was rumoured that the kings of France and England
were meeting to put aside their differences and take up the Cross to avenge
Jerusalem.
With the arrival of the spring of 1189 troops began to return to fortify
Saladin, and among the first to arrive were Shirkuh's grandson and Ibn
al-Muqaddam's son. In April Saladin secured a success when Beaufort fell.
Beaufort had belonged to Reginald of Sidon and when, after Hattin, Saladin
had besieged it, Reginald had pleaded for a three-month period of relief,
following which he promised to hand over the castle. To the astonish-
ment of his advisers, Saladin agreed to Reginald's request. But soon it
became obvious that Reginald had tricked Saladin, so when he returned
to ask for more respite he discovered that there was a limit to Saladin's
generosity and he was imprisoned in Damascus. Now, when Beaufort
finally fell, Reginald was released. Meanwhile the force that Guy led, which
was besieging Acre, was being strengthened daily. Ludwig of Thuringia,
who had landed in Tyre, succeeded in reconciling Guy with Conrad, who
now marched with him to join the siege, though Conrad refused to
aclmowledge Guy as Idng. Daily, Christian forces added weight to the
besiegers; thousands of French and Italian crusaders poured in and they
were strengthened by a strong force of Templars under Gerard of Ridefort,
who had been released by Saladin on the vow that he would not fight
against him but who had subsequently taken the view that vows made to
infidels were not valid. However, Gerard's vow was not forgotten by the
Muslims, so when he was captured, following an attack on Acre, he was
put to death. It was increasingly clear that Saladin should have attacked
Guy before he reached Acre. Instead he was more concerned with the
approaching German Crusade and did not wish to commit too many men
to Acre, so it was not until the autumn that he was able to focus his full
force on relieving Acre. In the meantime, in August 1189,, Guy took advan-
tage of Saladin's distraction to launch an assault on the city, which would
have fallen to him but for the timely arrival of a Muslim relief force. This
was followed by Saladin at the head of the army, and was strengthened with
the arrival of Taqi ul-Din and Keukburi, as well as by troops from Mosul
and Sinjar.
-Finally, when the Muslim army had gathered, Saladin could act. He
hoped that the Franks would come out and attack but they refused to and
instead felt strong enough to tighten their blockade of Acre. For two days
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SALAD I N
the Muslim army attacked and the fighting was severe. This was the first
field action since the battle of Hattin, but the Franks remained solid in
the face of the assaults. Saladin anxiously monitored the attacks closely and
Ibn Shaddad noted that for those two days he barely touched food. In the
meantime the Prankish forces were increasing at an alarming rate and by
October 1189 they numbered 100,000 as more and more crusaders poured
in. Imad al-Din al-Isfahani noted that they were swarming like ants and had
deepened their trenches so that it had become impossible to attack them.
The fighting continued, though the morale of the Muslim army was increas-
ingly low; they had been on horseback for 50 days and it was time to
regroup. Despite the increased strain which affected his health, Saladin rode
out daily, determined to fight. 'They will not do anything', he complained
to Ibn Shaddad, 'unless I am riding with them and watching how they act.'
He had personally suffered losses with the death of his nephew as well as his
dear friend and fellow Kurd Isa al-Hakkari, who had been instrumental in
his appointment as vizier in Egypt and who had led him and Shirkuh in
prayer. Although Saladin was strengthened by the arrival of al-Adil from
Egypt at the head of fresh troops, the winter weather closed in and any
chance of serious fighting ended.
The sight of so many crusaders arriving added to Saladin's disillusion-
ment. He knew if he did not act quickly it would be too late and so he dis-
patched Ibn Shaddad north with letters to Mosul, Sinjar and Irbil, as well as
to the caliph in Baghdad, pointing out the difference between the zeal of
the German crusaders and the lukewarm response of the Muslims. He also
sent a message to his brother Tughtekin in Yemen, requesting men, and
wrote to Qyzyl-Arslan, the Lord of Hamadan. Shortly after, the caliph's
response came: instead of men Saladin simply received a note authorising
him to borrow 20,000 dinars from merchants and charge the loan to
Baghdad. It was a derisory amount and Saladin, who was spending up to
20,000 dinars a day, did not take the money. Perhaps his mind went back
to the time when the Shiite Patimid caliph al-Adid had given him one mil-
lion dinars to defend Damietta. Ibn Shaddad, as was his wont, phrased the
turning down of the money diplomatically: 'The sultan', he wrote, 'begged
to decline the money order and the burden it imposed.' It is difficult, as
Lyons and Jackson write, not to conclude that relations were so strained
between Baghdad and Saladin that the caliph's gift was intended as a diplo-
matic insult.'
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To tighten the siege of Acre, the Franics had construct
ed mobile siege
engine towers, which loomed over the city. So alarmed was the garrison that
they had begun to negotiate surrender terms, and in April 1190 swimmers
brought Saladin the grave news that the city was in danger. Saladin tried to
relieve the pressure on the garrison and sent out urgent calls for troops.
Although the immediate danger to Acre passed, the news that the German
crusade was marching through Asia Minor sent shock-waves across the
Muslim world. In Homs and Hama orders were issued that grain should
be stored, and even as far as Alexandria and Damietta fortifications were
strengthened. Saladin, meanwhile, remained gloomy. He wrote that the
Franldsh command of the sea meant that when one Frank was Idlled at least
a thousand came to replace him. When news arrived that the Germans had
made peace with Kilij Arslan, which allowed them safe passage, the situation
became critical, so Saladin dispatched forces northward, headed by Taqi
ul-Din. 'Kilij Ai'slan was maldng a show of hostility to the emperor', wrote
Ibn Shaddad, 'but the truth of the matter was that he had reached a secret
understanding with him . . . He sent guides with him to show him the way.'
Not surprisingly, Barbarossa's death came as a relief, and his younger son,
the Duke of Swabia, now took over the command of the army, which
rapidly disintegrated. Nevertheless the German approach had forced Saladin
on the defensive, and it was not until November 1190, when the threat
had passed, that he was joined by al-Zahir and Taqi ul-Din. Fierce fighting
followed - the fiercest action since Hattin - but the Muslims were unable to
dislodge the Franks or relieve the pressure on Acre. However, the fighting
did offer-glimpses of Saladin's character. On one occasion a number
of Franldsh prisoners were captured and Saladin's young sons asked to
be allowed to kill them, but he refused, lest they should acquire a taste of
blood. On another, a three-month-old baby was stolen from the Franldsh
camp and - such was Saladin's reputation - the Franks advised the mother
to go and plead with Saladin, for they informed her he was a merciful man.
She was bought to him by his guards and he quicldy found out that the baby
had been sold in the slave market. He then ordered that the baby should