Germany would soon be defenceless, as Hindenburg, Seeckt and the upper hierarchy fully recognised. Optimistic notions of retaining what the Allies now forbade had to be abandoned; only through subterfuge could much be saved. Seeckt, appointed as Chairman of the Preparatory Commission of the Peacetime Army and the Commander-in-Chief designate, had as his primary task the removal of German soldiers from the Baltic States and, as a desirable corollary, the elimination of Freikorps’ power. It was he who at once persuaded von der Goltz to withdraw from Riga, making it clear how tenuous was the future but also striking a wounding blow at those like Guderian whose loyalties were torn between military obedience and patriotism.
All at once everything Guderian held dear was demolished and emotions, such as can hardly be imagined by anybody with a grain of patriotism who has not suffered the ignominy of sudden defeat, were aroused. Every letter to Gretel tells of a kind of desperation and almost unbearable personal inner tension that is fundamental to an understanding of his subsequent career. On 14th May he had recorded astonishment at what he called the ‘beer-calmness’ of the East Prussians at the revelation of the peace terms and their apparently supine acceptance of their implications. ‘If we accept this peace we are finished as we may be if we don’t. Therefore I am for doing nothing. The Entente can then seize by force what it wants. We shall see how far they get for they can do no more than destroy us. If we only still had the army, our proud, beautiful army, such an ignominy would not have been possible’. But already he knew that the existing German forces in the Baltic States, with the notable exception of the Iron Division, were fading away because ‘… they will not fight for the Fatherland, only the land they would be settled on’. He was disgusted. On 6th July he heard they must withdraw from Riga and that same day had received a realistic letter of reproof from a worried Gretel:
‘I can understand your rage at this shameful treaty’, she wrote, ‘and yet a few people cannot alter things, their sacrifice is in vain. The Fatherland will need you later on, the moment has not come … nothing can be achieved now that the peace has been signed and the conditions accepted by this criminal government. So you will have no backing for your campaign in the Baltic States …’
The letter was intended to calm him but he rarely paid much attention to her political advice – sound though it was on this occasion. On the 12th he passionately replied:
‘You write that our work here is hopeless. That may be so. But who can judge whether some small success may yet materialise out of these struggles? … The enemy resolves to destroy us. So be it. The English can certainly force us to leave the country and with it cut the only connection we still have with Russia … The enemy now has the power to impose his will … in spite of that: show strength and never give in …
‘Salvation can only come from within us. We ourselves have to see to it that the shameful peace cannot be implemented, that our proud army does not disappear and that, at least, an attempt is made to save its honour. We will try to put into practice the solemn promises we carelessly made earlier. You well know the “Wacht am Rhein” and the old Prussian march: “As long as a drop of blood flows, a fist the sword draws … May the day be dark, may the sun shine bright, I am a Prussian and Prussian I will be”. The day now is gloomy. Everything depends now on keeping the oath … Everybody who still has the smallest sense of honour must say: I will help.
‘Believe me, my darling, above all I would love to return to you and the children … I am not acting recklessly. I have given this step very careful thought.
‘An officer can do nothing more in Germany. According to the Peace Treaty the General Staff is to be abandoned. It is questionable whether the next independent German government will, in general, still keep reactionary officers. Nevertheless, one cannot expect an old Prussian Officer to serve under criminals. I would therefore resign my commission. Where shall I go? Do we receive a well-earned pension? … Shall I perhaps lead, under French control, a so-called “company” of continuously mutineering policemen and adorn my hat with the black, red, golden cockade of shame? You cannot expect that of me – at least not now when all the possibilities have yet to be exhausted and I have not yet become a miserable scoundrel.’
Towards the end of July, Guderian (who for most of this time had acted as 1st Staff Officer of the Iron Division in the absence of the actual la) wrote a memorandum for Bischoff. It is difficult to translate into English in all its original force, for Guderian composed with an elaborate – and at times dramatic – style. It began by summarising the deteriorating political situation, reflecting Seeckt’s earlier aims, continued with views that were his own and divergent from official policy: ‘Germany is then surrounded at her borders by Entente states. Industry and commerce are subject to supervision by the Entente. An upsurge and strengthening of the German Empire is excluded.
‘Therefore the question arises, how to keep a way open to Russia through the Baltic?
‘The Division has not abandoned the plan to establish a bridge between Germany and Russia, even though the policy with Latvia has been wrecked. It has made contact with [White] Russian units in Mitau in order to achieve an association with the Russians.
‘Two political alternatives are offered by the Russians. One sees them joining the Entente as the best and right way. This view is predominant in Lieven’s battalion and is, therefore, English orientated. The larger part of this battalion has, in the meantime, been taken to Reval for action on the Northern Front.
‘The Regiment of Graf Keller, which is led by Bermondt, represents the other view. This Regiment is German orientated. Colonel Bermondt considers the German Empire strong enough to help the Russians in their endeavours, particularly as an alliance with Russia is of the greatest significance and would free Germany from encirclement. Important German authorities, like High Command North and Zegrost, support the Division. Even if they were not convinced of the hope for the plan they nevertheless thought it should be tried.* In this they were supported by the 2nd General Staff officer, Hauptmann Guderian, who personally went to High Command North at Bartenstein.
‘The German Empire does not suffer pecuniary damage by handing over war material [to the Russians] as, according to the Peace Treaty, the largest part of it has to be given to the Entente for destruction.
‘If the Division remains in the Baltic States against the orders of the Government it should naturally make itself recognisable as Russian troops.
‘The transfer depends primarily upon its being financed by the Russians … The Division has forbidden a preliminary transfer of individual formations. Only through a complete transfer can the rightful demands be met … If individual officers and men go over they do so at their own peril … The Entente insists on the speediest evacuation of the Baltic States which has been emphasised emphatically at various discussions … The English fear a reorganisation of Germany in the Baltic States and, simultaneously, the nullification of the Versailles Treaty. The Higher Command has already issued orders for an evacuation …’
This document deeply impressed Bischoff because it represented his own ideas. Yet its bias was hardly that of the dispassionate staff officer sent by Seeckt to restrain the Iron Division. Guderian’s personal preferences show through along with the political notions which disturbed so many German officers of his persuasion. Bischoff remarked that he had no desire to ask the ‘so-called Weimar Coalition’ Government for anything impossible. ‘Even if the Government is unable to identify itself openly with us … it does not mean that in reality it has to work against us or make our work impossible’. But, Micawber-like, he, Guderian and the rest waited for something to turn up in their favour even after the first orders for a phased withdrawal were received. August 23rd was the day set for the first departures.
‘I travelled with Hauptmann Guderian’, wrote Bischoff, ‘… still hoping that perhaps a counter order might yet arrive. As I stood in front of the t roops, and saw misgivings in their eyes whether it really was in earnest
and the hope that it was not, all doubts and misgivings fell from me. I was convinced that the whole division would stand behind me.’
He refused to order entrainment and called upon the troops to remain. There was a display of wild enthusiasm and a torchlight procession in celebration.
This was the awful moment of climax after a period of terrible anxiety for Guderian. On 26th July he had replied to a letter in which Gretel had complained of his seeming indifference to her and the children. ‘I need peace and quiet in a deep wood – away from work to become calmer, to be rid of these emotional upsets … The emotions stir one’s nerves until one feels raving mad. You must cure me once more – as I know you will in a few days and twist me round your little finger.’ But in the same letter he had asked, ‘Where is there a man who dares to commit a single satisfactory deed?’ His memorandum and personal pleading had warned those at Bartenstein that he did not wholeheartedly support Seeckt although Seeckt at that moment was suffering a heart attack which, temporarily, put him out of action. On 27th August he had written to Gretel about his feelings on 23rd August. ‘My dearest little woman’ – and told her again of the torture he was enduring. ‘I had to make the most difficult decision of my life and take a step fraught with consequence. May God grant us success. We acted for the best, for our country and our people.’ He concluded: ‘Matters are on a razor’s edge and I am nearly at my wit’s ends. It is desperate with us. The morale of the troops is good – almost as in 1914.’ He had flung his career into the melting pot and opted to stay with an organisation which did not have first call upon his loyalty. It could have been an irredeemable turning point in his life had not his masters at Bartenstein also been tom by identical conflicts of conscience. The Great German General Staff now demonstrated its compassion and its appreciation of a young staff officer whose abilities it valued highly*: it preemptorily recalled him to Bartenstein and prevented him from going near the Iron Division again. It – probably Oberst Heye, who in a few years would become C-in-C – tried to provide time for Guderian’s inner storm to subside and the impulsive facet of his nature – that side which rebelled against injustice and against harm to the interests of the soldiers he respected – to be subjugated once more to the discipline of the Staff Corps. But his involvement with politics and his susceptibility to the lures of extremist factions marked an important stage in his development. Within the rules of the Prussian disciplinary code he had carried an argument up to and then beyond the point of decision: he had disobeyed, had so nearly been destroyed and yet had survived. It had been painful and yet it indicated the feasibility of breaking rules providing the cause seemed just.
The parting of the ways had come between the established army that Seeckt was restoring, and the freebooters of the Freikorps who were to prolong their resistance and become transfigured into the forces that are recognisable as the vanguard of the Nazis. In Bartenstein, Guderian obstinately chanced his arm and continued the struggle on behalf of the Iron Division. But its lonely stand in the Baltic was as hopeless as Gretel originally said. Although on the 27th he had written pessimistically that he could not expect to remain in a General Staff which had been reduced to 120 officers or expect a place in the Frontier Force, on the 31st optimism reasserted itself and led him to the bitter end: ‘Up to date the movement in Kurland has gone in such a way that it will produce the results desired by the troops. It means, therefore, permission for settlers, fighting Bolshevism and the continuing existence of a national force capable of improvement. It would be welcome if Graf Goltz were to remain at the head of the corps. He is an excellent man with good soldiers, has tremendous diplomatic qualities and is of a high-minded disposition.’ This letter was just another illustration of a blind spot in his outlook, an inability to foresee or evaluate political factors, which time was not to cure. If on 15th September he could encourage Bischoff on the lines that ‘… the Government, Reichs Defence Ministry and Foreign Office would not abandon the Iron Division and the other troops in the Baltic States’ that unrealistic persuasion was soon undermined along with his own position. He had believed what he had been told and had failed to examine political forces. Freikorps ‘numbers were dwindling as the disenchanted drifted home and their opponents increased in such strength that military defeat became inevitable. In October the German forces were beaten in battle. Thereafter further official support for the Freikorps, even clandestinely given, was pointless.
At the end of September Guderian had been put out of harm’s way, or as he wrote to Gretel, ‘… please remember that I am just now plunged into loneliness’. They posted him to a place of relative political innocuity – with Reichswehr Brigade 10 in Hanover. Then, in January 1920, he was given what was, maybe, an essential respite from General Staff work and sent to rejoin his old 10th Jäger Battalion at Goslar as a company commander. The future he regarded gloomily, recording in Panzer Leader that he had left the General Staff ‘… in circumstances not of the happiest’. He was distinctly under a cloud in fact! He had sampled the heady wine of ideological nationalism, found it tempting but then had it dashed from his lips. He had been retained as part of the sober and respectable officer corps whose task it was to restore the stability of an old and trusted order to Germany, and thus he was diverted from the self-destruction upon which the Freikorps was bent. This withdrawal from hot political contacts was effective if not absolute. There is little doubt that his removal from the General Staff post inflicted a severe and memorable shock. Under conditions of moderate political pressure in the future he would react like a Pavlovian-conditioned animal and seem to resist positive political commitment by assuming an attitude of military propriety. Yet Guderian always retained a proneness to subversive intervention into matters which he judged to be of overriding importance. This he would justify as the ultimate interpretation of Prussian discipline’s inner meaning, but it was a proclivity of which ill-disposed colleagues in the future became increasingly wary. Nor did he quite forgive Seeckt for his part in sanctioning the withdrawal from the Baltic States – even though he paid lip-service to the fundamental tenets of Seecktian political behaviour. Not long after the Second World War Guderian gave the Americans a character sketch of Seeckt which, in one way, was more revealing of himself than it was of the subject. Seeckt, he said, ‘… was alert, reflective, cool and an almost timid person’. The italics are mine because it is a judgement, so far as I am aware, which is unique, somewhat different to Guderian’s subsequent assessment that Seeckt was ‘coldly calculating’. It was at variance with the consensus of opinion among German generals – those like Manstein, Guderian’s old classmate at the War Academy who had served under Seeckt in war and peace, when he wrote of ‘… the inner fire that inspired him and the iron will which made him a leader of men’.
Seeckt was the new Commander-in-Chief and faced with the formidable task of rebuilding an army that was deep in politics at a time when a weak Government was threatened with serious internal disorders. He recovered from his heart attack in sufficient time to meet the first major challenge to his intention of steering the Army out of politics, a challenge which came, not unexpectedly, from the remnants of the Freikorps, homeward-bound in hostile mood from the Baltic with the ambitious von der Goltz in their midst. Officially they had been abolished though many were still in the Baltic, and for years they were to reappear in various forms. Men such as von der Goltz were not easily denied. In March 1920 the long-feared coup took place when elements of the Freikorps converged on Berlin and appeared in several other cities in response to a putsch initiated by a politically inept civil servant called Wolfgang Kapp. Backed by Ludendorff, the Freikorps, and those who still looked upon them as the salvation of Germany, put heavy pressure upon the Government and formed a puppet regime of their own in Berlin. Seeckt refused the request of the Government to use the Reichswehr against the Freikorps saying, ‘Would you force a battle at the Brandenburg Tor between troops who a year and a half ago were fighting shoulder to shoulder against the
enemy?’ Instead he took indefinite leave and thereby emphasised his professed determination to keep the Army out of politics. Into his place Kapp put von der Goltz, but it was all a charade. A General Strike called by the real Government quickly brought about the collapse of Kapp, with his ramshackle organisation, and Seeckt was able to return to the work of reconstruction with a strengthened hand.
There was little bloodshed as a result of the Kapp putsch even though the Freikorps marched on Berlin and made its presence felt in various other parts of Germany. The 10th Jäger Battalion, Guderian with it, were on stand-by and he was provided with light comic relief when most of his fellow company commanders were captured by rebels in Hildesheim. They managed, however, to seize guns from the rebels. In five days all was over. Commonsense persuaded him to resist the temptation to join with Kapp and von der Goltz in their attempt to set up a military dictatorship. A year later, during the Max Holtz disturbances, and in 1923 at the time of the Hitler putsch in Munich, Guderian remained loyal to Seeckt and the new Reichswehr as it grew as a separate instrument of state, controlled by the Chief of the Army High Command working through and not against the Republic to which they swore their oath of allegiance.
Guderian: Panzer General Page 6