by David Rooney
For weeks, as he struggled to recover from his jaundice, Stilwell remained in Chungking and had frequent discussions with Chiang and Madame. These centred on three main issues: the reorganisation of the Chinese army, the provision of all the necessary military equipment, and the question of who should command the Chinese forces in India. Stilwell continued to argue that there was little point in providing expensive modern equipment unless the whole Chinese army was reorganised so that the supplies could be concentrated on a few good divisions and not scattered across the country to more than 300 divisions. He added that it was futile to give a tank or a modern gun to a peasant who had never handled anything more sophisticated than a wheelbarrow.
Madame, in some ways more forceful than her husband, supported General Tu’s claim that he should command the Chinese forces in India. Stilwell, who had witnessed Tu’s pitiful performance during the retreat from Burma, considered him to be absolutely useless and would not agree. In the end Stilwell accepted a compromise, and General Lo was appointed. During the discussions about a commander for the forces, Chiang sent a memorandum to Stilwell which goes some way to explain his habit of corresponding directly with the divisional commanders:
There is a secret for the direction of Chinese troops unlike the direction of foreign troops. I am well aware of the fact that our senior officers do not possess enough education and sufficient capacity for work. Anticipating they will make mistakes I often write to them personally so that, timely warned, they might avoid them. Knowing their limited capacity I plan ahead for them. We have been carrying on the war of resistance for five years in such conditions … If you are with me closely for a few months you will understand the psychology of Chinese officers, and I will tell you more about their peculiarities.
Stilwell considered this to be the usual crap.
The discussions on organisation for the CBI theatre were difficult enough, but they were soon to be overshadowed by complex extraneous strategic issues. By June 1942 Chiang had clearly realised that he was not going to be represented on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Council and, what was more significant for him, the Munitions Assignment Board, which allocated all American military supplies in overseas theatres. Chiang’s powerful and scheming agent in Washington, T.V. Soong, determined to give maximum publicity to this issue and to keep it in the forefront of their demands. In the early part of 1942 nearly 150,000 tons of Lend–Lease material allocated to China had become stranded in America and another 45,000 tons in India. Soong agreed to the USA repossessing the 150,000 tons and in return accepted a promise of 5,000 tons of equipment per month to be supplied over the Hump. This would be controlled by Stilwell.
The figure of 5,000 tons a month remained central to the long and bitter in-fighting between Washington and Chungking and between Chiang and Stilwell. Five thousand tons was an easy round figure for negotiations at high level. In practice it was an almost impossible commitment. It took no account of the appalling flying conditions over the Hump. The monsoon storms, which started in mid-May, combined with the most formidable mountain barrier inflicted a very heavy toll on both men and machines. In the next two years more than 500 aircraft were lost making the trip over the Hump – an average of twelve planes every month, and more during the monsoon. The loss of aircraft was serious enough, but the loss of the experienced and intrepid air crews who worked valiantly to keep old and worn-out machines in the air in spite of grave shortages of spare parts was even more threatening to the enterprise. When an aircraft crashed very few of the crew made it back to base, and those who did brought tales of the whitened bones of crews lost earlier hanging in the trees.
It increasingly appeared to Chiang that he was being given specious promises which the American administration never intended to keep. The 23 American Pursuit Group of fighter aircraft had been promised but did not arrive. He and other Chinese leaders, supported and encouraged by Chennault, set the highest store on the provision of American air power to operate from the airfields in the approaches to Chungking.
The failure to provide promised aircraft caused a serious crisis in the relations between Chiang and America. The top-secret Doolittle air raid on Tokyo was carried out by bombers that set out from an aircraft carrier in the Pacific and landed on airfields in southwest China. Because of the notoriously lax Chinese security, the raid was kept secret until the last moment even from Chiang, and what appeared to the Americans as a brilliant blow against the Japanese only infuriated him. The immediate and angry Japanese response to the Doolittle raid was to send a major military force of more than fifty battalions to advance through Chenkiang province on the approach to Chungking to annihilate everyone in the area and to destroy the air bases.
This heightened the tension in Chungking. Chiang, encouraged by Soong in Washington, increasingly blamed Stilwell for the broken promises and for not producing all the supplies that had been pledged. Neither Chiang nor Stilwell fully realised that there were equally urgent demands in other theatres of war and that China was fairly low down on the list of strategic priorities. Stilwell pleaded with Marshall for more help, and Chiang wrote personally to Roosevelt, but few aircraft arrived. The main supply airfield in Assam was frequently jammed with aircraft that were grounded because of the lack of aircrew or spare parts. All these difficulties meant that, instead of the 5,000 tons a month that had been promised, about 100 tons a month were delivered. Soong kept up the pressure, sending letters and memoranda to Roosevelt, Churchill and many others. He threatened to withdraw China’s support if a minimum supply programme was not maintained.
Despite the continuing clash over the whole question of supplies, during early June 1942 Stilwell had prolonged and fairly amicable talks with Chiang and Madame on many wider issues. When he argued for the urgent reorganisation of the Chinese army, Madame pointed out that her husband had many complex issues to consider. Stilwell understood that, but he added in his diary: ‘With the U.S. on his side and backing him, the stupid little ass fails to grasp the big opportunity of his life.’ He added that Chiang had frequently double-crossed him in Burma and never replied to any of his memos. ‘The question now is what do I do next? Just sit here, or resign?’ On 21 June events took place half a world away from Burma which highlighted all of Chiang’s and Stilwell’s problems. In North Africa, Rommel and the Afrika Corps had won a series of battles, and on that day his troops captured Tobruk, taking 30,000 prisoners and capturing half a million gallons of petrol and three million rations. On the same day Churchill, in Washington with Roosevelt, heard the news. Later he said that it was the worst blow he had received during the war. To help Britain after the fall of Tobruk, with Rommel now poised to advance to the Suez canal, Roosevelt diverted Brereton and the promised bomber force from China to the Middle East. At the same time a large consignment of Hudson bombers was diverted from India to Cairo and 300 Sherman tanks were sent to Egypt. These decisions were made to meet a grave military crisis, but the effect on the Chinese, who were not even informed, was disastrous. On 26 June Stilwell went with senior American colleagues to see Chiang and Madame to pass on the news that Brereton’s bomber force and the Hudson aircraft had been diverted to the Middle East. Chiang was furious and demanded to know who could divert a force that had been authorised by the President. Of course, the answer was that Roosevelt himself had done it. Madame made fierce allegations of Stilwell’s bad faith and argued that there was no point in China remaining in the war since China was not important to the rest of the Allies. Stilwell radioed Marshall with the main details of the crisis he faced, and Roosevelt replied to Chiang the next day but did not make any firm promises.
Roosevelt’s reply did little to assuage Chiang’s anger, and Stilwell received from the latter what became known as the Three Demands. These were that:
1. Three American divisions must be deployed to India by September to reopen the supply route up the Burma Road.
2. Five hundred war planes should be provided by August and subsequently kept up to strength.<
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3. Five thousand tons of supplies a month must be sent over the Hump from August.
Chiang accompanied these demands with the clear threat that China might pull out of the war if they were not met. When Madame insisted that Stilwell should forward the demands with his recommendation, he demurred. She was furious. ‘Obviously mad as hell. She had cracked the whip and the stooge had not come across.’
The summer of 1942 was the lowest point of the war for the Allies. Rommel was threatening Egypt and the Suez canal. The Nazi drive to Stalingrad looked unstoppable, and it was feared that these two pincer movements might meet up in Syria and Iraq and cut off Allied access to all Middle East oil. It is no wonder that the situation in China appeared less urgent.
Although Stilwell had to bear the brunt of Chiang’s anger and outrage, he was able to understand that side of the problem. On 25 June he wrote: ‘Now what can I say to the G-mo? We fail in all our commitments and blithely tell him to just carry on old top. The A.V.G. is breaking up, our people are dead slow about replacing it, the radio operators don’t arrive and our boys are brand new at the game.’ On the next day Madame spoke to him directly. ‘Now I’m the villain. I sabotaged the transport grab … In general I’m an s.o.b, … I am afraid I am now suspect. Also, I am afraid the War Department is using me as a whipping boy. “In a jam, blame it on Stilwell.”’ With deep and increasing bitterness Chiang and Madame began to blame Stilwell for all the failures in the supply system and for all the broken promises. This intense feeling gave birth in Chiang’s mind to the idea that Stilwell should be removed.
Stilwell had been forced into an untenable position by events over which he had no control, and although he knew he could rely on the support of his old friend Marshall, he was less certain of the Washington administration as a whole. He therefore felt it necessary to clarify his situation and to spell out his various responsibilities. He was the American representative in China and commander of all US forces in the China-Burma-India theatre. This involved co-operation with the British in Burma and India. He was Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and controller of all Lend–Lease supplies. He was responsible for military planning, for training – particularly of the Chinese troops in India – and for field operations, but he was not responsible for the procurement of supplies. He concluded, ‘My only objective is the effective prosecution of the war.’
During the crisis it became clear that Soong in Washington had altered and toned down Roosevelt’s reply to Chiang. When the truth emerged Soong’s deviousness, or dishonesty, made Chiang extremely angry. Stilwell, referring to Soong, wrote, ‘The damn fool: didn’t he know he’d be caught. He should be called up, dressed down and thrown out. Imagine an official of his position suppressing a message of such importance from Frank to Peanut.’*
The doctoring of a message from the President of the United States was clearly a grave matter. Roosevelt took it very seriously indeed and sent a special envoy, Dr Currie, to Chungking. Currie, who arrived in July, was an experienced negotiator and understood the Chinese situation. He supported Stilwell’s general strategy but was critical of some of his attitudes. He recommended the restoration of an airlift target of 3,500 tons a month, and it was agreed that all correspondence with the President should be copied to Stilwell. Currie took part in some of the long, detailed and difficult negotiations that Stilwell was conducting during this period, but, having witnessed the depth and intensity of the bitterness felt by Chiang and Madame, when he returned to Washington he recommended that Stilwell should be transferred to another theatre and that Soong be replaced as Chinese ambassador to Washington. At this stage Roosevelt, Stimson and Marshall saw clearly that Soong had caused the crisis and they remained loyal to Stilwell.
Some progress was finally achieved by the long and tortuous negotiations held through June and July 1942. The British, reluctantly, agreed to the Chinese troops being housed and trained at Ramgarh, a large camp some 200 miles west of Calcutta. Their main concern was the presence of 8,000 of these troops in Bengal, where the Congress independence movement was strongest. This was a remarkable achievement by Stilwell, who gained the agreement of the British to his control of training, equipment and supply while they housed, fed and paid the Chinese troops.
Stilwell, as an American patriot, believed passionately that because of the colossal American investment in both men and supplies he should have a controlling role in the strategy. He argued constantly in favour of the provision and training of thirty Chinese divisions in the Kunming area so that they would be ready and well placed for a major offensive against the Japanese. In contrast, Chiang had complex reasons for opposing this plan. He felt that the commander of thirty well-trained divisions could become a military and political threat to him. At the same time, many of his most loyal supporters were the commanders of the three hundred divisions scattered across China. He rarely deviated from his view that American supplies should be carefully conserved so that after the war, when the Allies had defeated the Japanese, he would be in a strong position to fight the Communists under Mao.
The general strategic plan, which Stilwell put forward in July 1942 and which was agreed and supported in principle by both Washington and Chungking, envisaged one American, three British and two Chinese divisions attacking the Japanese from the major British base at Imphal. Simultaneously, twelve Chinese divisions would advance down the Burma Road towards Lashio. The two prongs would then join up in the area of Mandalay and drive on rapidly to recapture Rangoon and continue further south through Thailand to Bangkok. Another group of nine Chinese divisions based near Kunming would advance due south from Kunming towards Hanoi in French Indo-China. This appeared to be a feasible and realistic plan, although most American commanders remained sceptical of Chinese determination and already suspected that Chiang would stockpile most of the weapons, aircraft and other material provided in response to his incessant demands for use against the Communists after the war. The depth of the scheming is illustrated by Soong, who in an unguarded moment suggested that when the war was over Chiang would be thrown out within six months.
Colonel Frank Dorn, a long-standing and loyal supporter of Stilwell, made a significant comment when he forwarded the plan to Washington. He stressed that all aid must be supplied ‘on an ultimatum basis’ dependent on Chiang’s agreement to act. ‘If he threatens to make peace tell him to go ahead.’ Dorn added that across much of China there was substantial trade with the Japanese, and concluded: ‘Until we re-take Burma, and re-open the port of Rangoon all talks and planning to aid China is utterly meaningless.’*
While high-level negotiations were going on, Stilwell concentrated on his other major responsibility of training his Chinese troops, especially those in India. In July 1942 he made an impressive broadcast on a Chinese radio station:
Five years ago today I went to Wan Ping Hsien to find out what was going on in a clash between Japanese and Chinese troops reported there. I found that the Japanese were attacking the town and that, much to their surprise, the Chinese were putting up a spirited resistance. This defence proved to be prophetic and symbolic; the Chinese defence has stood up, and now, after five years it is a privilege to be here and pay tribute to the man who has carried the burden and gone through the test of battle – the Chinese soldier. To me the Chinese soldier best exemplifies the greatness of the Chinese people – their indomitable spirit, their uncomplaining loyalty, their honesty of purpose, their steadfast perseverance. He endures untold privations without a whimper, he follows wherever he is led without question or hesitation, and it never occurs to his simple and straightforward mind that he is doing anything heroic. He asks for little and always stands ready to give all. I feel it is a great honour, as a representative of the U.S. Army to salute here today the Chinese soldier.
Although Dorn had dismissed the danger of Chiang doing a deal with the Japanese, Stilwell was less certain. The Japanese foreign minister had been active in Chungking and Peking, and Stilwell’s intelligence service
informed him that a senior Chinese official from Peking who was well known as a Japanese collaborator had come to see Chiang with peace feelers from the Japanese. Stilwell knew better than most the strong German influence in China during the 1930s, and among the Chinese under the virtually fascist rule of Chiang there was considerable sympathy for the Nazis. In the wider strategic context, Chiang was apprehensive about the future role of Russia in eastern Asia and the danger of its possible support for the Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-Tung. He calculated that if America transferred its main focus away from a second front in Europe to the Pacific, Japan would be defeated and Germany might then be able to defeat Russia.
As it became obvious that Chiang was trying to get rid of Stilwell the antipathy between them deepened. He headed a letter to his wife ‘The Manure Pile’. He wrote, ‘This is the most dreary type of manoeuvrings I’ve ever done, trying to guide and influence a stubborn, ignorant, prejudiced, conceited despot, who never hears the truth except from me, and finds it hard to believe.’ Stilwell’s continuing anger and resentment at the incessant Chinese demands, and the complete lack of gratitude for what they did receive, was now compounded by the problem of the exchange rate between the American and Chinese dollars. The rate had been fixed at one to twenty, but when Chiang simply printed more notes to cover his declining revenue and the cost of the war he created wild inflation, which brought the real exchange rate to closer to one to four hundred and meant that Americans had to pay about twenty times over for everything they bought.
In the latter part of July 1942, in an atmosphere of increasingly bitter tension, Chiang argued strongly that he could order Stilwell to obtain supplies. This Stilwell, backed by Washington, rejected. He continued to send Chiang memoranda on important issues, and these were rarely answered. The atmosphere was not improved when it became known how many lies Soong had spread about Stilwell. The first of August was a fairly typical day. He wrote, ‘To office and worked through some poison. S.N.A.F.U.* with Peanut. No answer on anything. He’s having a hell of a time with his face.’