by David Rooney
The danger to the Burma forces from the campaign of railway sabotage can be illustrated by the fragile rail link from Calcutta. This travelled northeastwards to Dimapur (the rail junction for Imphal) and on to Ledo, the rail centre for Stilwell’s forces in north Burma and the supply base for the flights over the Hump to Chiang Kai-shek in China. From Calcutta the railway was normal gauge for 200 miles. Then all supplies had to be reloaded for transport on a one-metre gauge railway for the next 250 miles. At the end of this stretch of line the wagons were shunted on to barges to cross the River Brahmaputra and were then put back on the railway to travel 150 miles to Dimapur, and beyond that another 200 miles to Ledo. This was the precarious supply route for all the future operations to drive the Japanese out of Burma. In 1939 the railway could carry 600 tons a day; by the end of 1943 the capacity had been increased to 2,500 tons, and then six American railway battalions with highly trained staff and modern equipment raised it to well over 4,000 tons a day. Fortunately the Indian protesters did not realize the damage they could cause by sabotaging this particular line, and they were not in touch with the Japanese.
At the same time as the railway route was being built up, a substantial road construction programme was under way. The achievement of the Indian, British and American engineers in building three strategic roads have rightly received the highest praise. The first went eastwards into the Arakan where, because there was no stone, brick kilns were built to provide the base for the road; the second led up to Dimapur and then onwards past Kohima and Imphal to Tiddim; and, finally, the Americans were building a spur running north from Dimapur to Ledo and thence southwards to Myitkyina.
While the internal security crisis continued. Slim’s XV Corps moved to Ranchi, close to Stilwell’s training base at Ramgarh. The strength of Slim’s forces gradually increased. The 70th Division, a tried and hardened fighting force, and 50 Armoured Brigade came under his command, followed by 7, 5 and 20 Indian Divisions. Slim was then able to carry out what was a revolution in infantry jungle training in order to overcome the low morale and defeatist attitudes that understandably influenced the troops after the Burma defeat. Thus, at Ramgarh and Ranchi, with Stilwell, General Sun and the Chinese, along with Slim’s increasingly powerful and well-trained force, a feeling of confidence was slowly established. Plans were made for an attack in the spring of 1943, but Slim believed that it was more important to build up sufficient strength and confidence in new tactics to be certain of victory.
While sound co-operation continued between Stilwell and Slim on the ground, there were still complications at a high level. Wavell was under some pressure from the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, to put forward the realistic concern of the Indian government over the presence of so many Chinese troops in Bengal at a time when Gandhi’s campaign was at its height. Stilwell fumed at the objections and was generally contemptuous of Wavell, whom he saw as a beaten man, but there was some reason behind the concern, for shortly afterwards a map was produced in Chungking that showed India and most of north Burma as belonging to China.
Stilwell went to Delhi in October 1942 for a conference with Wavell on the outstanding issues. He wrote:
Wavell, a lot of bull and crying about this and that. He made it plain the Ramgarh Training Centre is not welcome. All sorts of difficulties – railroads, roads, water, food transport. Will hinder Indian Army development … Well, to hell with the old fool. We have just smoked them out. They don’t want Chinese troops participating in the retaking of Burma. That’s all. (It’s O.K. for US troops to be in England though) … Limeys getting nasty about Ramgarh. Wavell must have a formal request – for the Viceroy. How many troops to come and what for? WHAT FOR? My God! I told them, to help our allies retake Burma.
After three days of conference there was a sudden change in the British attitude – the result, Stilwell assumed, of a cable from Washington or London. ‘Everything is lovely again, so obviously George [Marshall] has turned on the heat.’ The main result achieved by the conference was the agreement that any operation in the spring of 1943 must be of a limited nature and would be carried out by the British on the northern Arakan coast, with the possibility of an attack on the small port of Akyab. Stilwell proposed that the Chinese divisions should advance into Burma through Imphal, but Wavell, pointing out the inadequacy of the approach roads, assigned to the Chinese the northern sector based on the Hukawng valley. Stilwell accepted this and agreed that his mission should be to capture Myitkyina with its airfield, and from there to make contact with the Chinese divisions advancing from Yunnan. The Americans also undertook the task of building the road from Ledo down the Hukawng valley, eventually to join up with the Burma Road.
After the Delhi conference he briefly gave his impressions in a letter to his wife. ‘I feel I have been through the wringer … I am in no shape to write even a note. Our Limey friends are sometimes a bit difficult, but there are some good eggs among them. It is no fun bucking two nationalities to get at the Japs.’ He described a party with Archie (Wavell). ‘The British don’t quite know how to take me. I catch them looking me over occasionally with a speculative glint in their eye. Some of them that I had thought most hidebound and icy prove to have a good deal of my point of view, and take delight in watching me stick the prod into the Most High.’ He mentioned that he had asked for his son-in-law Colonel Ernest Easterbrook to join his staff, and a few weeks later his son, Colonel Joseph Stilwell Jr, also joined him. He described the success of training at Ramgarh: ‘The Peanut is, I believe, quite impressed. Unless he is terribly dumb, he will want to go on with this kind of business.’
As soon as he returned to Chungking he had an important meeting, on 3 November 1942, with Chiang, Madame and T.V. Soong. It was quickly apparent that Soong had been dressed down in Washington, and now – scheming as ever – he obviously thought that China would obtain more Lend–Lease materials if he supported Stilwell. Stilwell immediately noticed the different atmosphere, and his diary for the day of the conference is unusually detailed – probably due to the need to jot down the main points of a long and gruelling discussion.
To his surprise Chiang agreed to the idea of preparing fifteen divisions in Yunnan, subsequently known as Yoke Force, for the drive to recapture northern Burma and for these to be ready by mid-February 1943. Chiang confirmed Stilwell’s command at Ramgarh and gave him the authority to sack the egregious General Lo. There was some complex discussion about joint commands with the British in Burma, but no major snags arose. In this lengthy discussion Chiang, understandably, demanded British and American naval activity in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal to prevent Japanese reinforcements coming in through Rangoon. The day after the meeting Stilwell saw Soong again and commented: ‘If he does half of what he promises [we] will get somewhere.’ He added: ‘What’s the game? But who cares if we get going.’
The appearance of Soong certainly changed the atmosphere in Chungking, and Stilwell found a real enthusiasm among the Chinese commanders for the creation of an effective fighting force. He was determined to make the most of this opportunity, but he still harboured suspicions of the British – ‘if we can keep a fire lit under Wavell’. These suspicions were shared by many senior Americans and have been repeated by Tuchman, who stated, inaccurately, that the British never ceased to oppose the prospect of the road from Ledo to join up with the Burma Road. There is no evidence for this. As usual in his diary, Stilwell mixed high strategy with personal comment. In November his son, Joe, arrived and brought family letters and knitted socks. ‘The socks were delivered promptly and are gorgeous. If they prevent cold feet, you’ve done something for your country.’ His fluent French had not been used for some time, but he referred – as an alternative to the ‘manure pile’ – to affaires empoisonnantes. The enthusiastic build-up of Yoke Force led to a serious clash with Chennault, who continued to demand a larger proportion of the equipment brought over the Hump. Stilwell remained highly suspicious of Chennault because he had the ear of Madame,
who soon afterwards left for her tour of the USA, where she was even photographed in a car with Roosevelt.
Stilwell’s optimistic phase did not last. By the end of November 1942 he was commenting: ‘Ominous stuff from India. Limeys thinking on limited lines. Their objective is a joke.’ The hopes of activity by the Royal Navy and RAF demanded by Chiang were dashed, and Stilwell was even furious with Marshall, who had sent a detailed assessment that amounted to nothing more than they already knew. ‘I’ll be God-damned if I can tell whether they are laughing at me, or whether they can possibly be that dumb.’ After another dig at the Limeys he concluded, ‘This is as lousy a job as was ever invented.’ As if this was not enough, Soong came to warn him, in a friendly way, that he should not press Chiang too hard because he might resent it, feeling that he had already done a great deal.
During these prolonged discussions the British launched a small advance by 14 Division down the coast from Chittagong towards the important island of Akyab, from where the Japanese could bomb Calcutta. The operation was supervised from Eastern Army HQ by General Irwin, who had been so offensive to Slim when he got back to Imphal. Irwin had an old-style attitude and had learnt nothing from the recent disasters. The advance started fairly well and reached the small coastal town of Donbaik. Then, disastrously, it paused, giving the Japanese time to bring up reinforcements and build defensive bunkers. Irwin – ignoring the basic military precept that you do not reinforce failure – sent more and more troops to Donbaik, five brigades altogether. They failed to advance and suffered heavy casualties. Perhaps it was just as well that Stilwell did not comment on this debacle, so reminiscent of the dark days of the Burma retreat. Significantly, Slim, who was busy at Ranchi revolutionising the training of XV Corps and building up its confidence, played no part in the early stages of this disastrous expedition in the Arakan.
In the wider strategic context, November 1942 witnessed a major turning point of the war. In October, at El Alamein, Montgomery and the Eighth Army had decisively defeated Rommel and the Afrika Corps, thereby destroying the German plan for a huge pincer movement to grasp the Middle East oilfields. At the same time the heroic defence of Stalingrad halted the Nazi advance – the other arm of the pincer – and saw the start of the magnificent drive by the Russians that ended in Berlin. The significance of the German setbacks at El Alamein and Stalingrad was reinforced by large-scale American landings in North Africa, code named Operation Torch. General Patton, very much a blood and guts commander, led an expedition from the USA of over 35,000 troops in 100 ships and landed near Casablanca and at Oran and Algiers in November. These events cheered Stilwell, as they did all the Allies around the world, and he hoped that the improved strategic situation would increase his chances of receiving all the help and support he had been promised.
General Marshall wrote to Stilwell personally:
You have far exceeded our expectations in securing authority for the reorganisation, which you are now rapidly putting into effect. We are doing everything in our power to find the ships to carry to you at least the bare essentials you so urgently require … To paraphrase Mr Churchill’s famous statement, nowhere has so much been done with so little, as under your driving leadership.
Stilwell had vigorously pushed forward plans for limited offensives in Burma in the spring of 1943 to capture forward Japanese airfields, including Akyab, from which Calcutta was now being bombed, and to regain enough ground to reopen land communication with China. This last point went as far as the President since it brought the possibility of bombing Japan with aircraft based in the Kunming area. As happened so often with Stilwell, a period of high hopes was followed by frustration and disappointment. A naval attaché from Chungking, openly disloyal to and critical of Stilwell, passed on his view that he should be replaced by Chennault not only to Chiang but to Wavell as well.
Wavell called two conferences in December 1942. Stilwell stressed the urgent need for a road from Ledo to Myitkyina, and preferably continuing to the area of Bhamo, from where materials could be delivered to China by road. If this was achieved it would more than double the tonnage of Lend–Lease supplies available to the Chinese. Wavell opposed these proposals on the grounds that it would not be possible to supply and protect a huge workforce of road-builders during the 1943 monsoon, which started in May. Stilwell then continued his argument that the Chinese divisions trained at Ramgarh should attack southwards from Ledo while the main Chinese force – Yoke Force – advanced from Yunnan and the British from Imphal. These discussions included the Anakim proposal for an amphibious attack on Rangoon, which Chiang was keen on because he assumed that it would massively increase his supplies. Wavell, although he was concerned to keep the co-operation of the Chinese, had to make it clear that Britain would not be in a position to mount large forces east of the Chindwin river early in 1943; he also announced that, because of the North African landings and the need to supply aid to Russia, the Anakim project and the naval challenge to the Japanese in the Bay of Bengal would have to be postponed. It was left to Stilwell to pass this information on to Chiang.
Returning to Chungking, Stilwell noticed an immediate change from the positive enthusiasm of November. He soon discovered that Chiang, without informing him, had cabled Roosevelt to demand that the British should be forced to carry out the Anakim attack. Chiang was frequently to make major decisions that were cabled to Roosevelt and which Stilwell only heard about at second or third hand.
Stilwell’s diary jottings covering the period of Christmas and New Year 1942–3 are the usual mixture of high strategy and personal grumbles: ‘Wavell just whining about difficulties; no hope of Limey naval action in Bay of Bengal; Wavell can’t supply boys during the monsoon; he didn’t tell me about the advance to Akyab; seven division plan now down to three; typical Chinese tactics – deliberate delay, then plead lack of time as an excuse.’ Stilwell badgered Chiang for weeks to appoint an effective general to command Yoke Force, only to discover that Chiang had made the appointment without telling him. ‘Both Chinese and Limeys want to sit tight and let the Americans clean up the Japs.’ During this period Stilwell frequently refers to T.V. Soong as Teevy; Soong still appeared to be giving him genuine support and was trying to push Chiang in the right direction. Stilwell made an interesting comparison between the Indians, whom he saw as poor, ragged, dirty and apathetic, and the Chinese – bright, cheerful, laughing, well-fed and clean. ‘India is hopeless.’
On 8 January 1943 the diary entry is ‘BLACK FRIDAY … Peanut says he won’t fight’. Significantly, this major decision was relayed by Soong to Colonel Dorn and not directly to Stilwell, who commented when he heard it, ‘What a break for the Limeys. Just what they wanted. Now they will quit, the Chinese will quit, and the goddam Americans can go ahead and fight. Chennault’s blatting has put us on the spot.’ Stilwell had warned Marshall of the danger of Chiang pulling out and suggested a very robust American response should it happen. ‘If they don’t get tough we will put ourselves in Peanut’s hands for good.’ During this lengthy fracas Soong appeared genuinely to side with Stilwell in trying to force Chiang to take effective action, especially over the creation of Yoke Force. The wretched General Tu now reappeared and Stilwell commented, ‘Maybe we will get our revenge on the little bastard after all.’ Next, Madame cabled urgently from Washington for Soong to go and help her because she felt she had failed in her mission – whatever that was. On 16 January 1943: ‘Dorn caught three guys at my desk yesterday.’ Among these jottings are fairly frequent personal grumbles, often in a self-deprecating vein: ‘The voice of one crying in the manure pile’, or references to Old Pappy with his white hair and bent back. Sometimes he scribbled execrable verse:
Pappy’s done his bit,
He’s shovelled all the ——
He’s just a sap,
He took a rap,
The wringer got his tit.
As he did his best to cope with all the frustrations and duplicity in Chungking he was seriously heartened by a
letter from Secretary of War Stimson which put his position and his achievement in proper perspective:
Although I have not written you as often as I should have liked to, I have been following your negotiations and actions with the deepest interest and confidence. There is hardly a step you take that is not talked over by Marshall and myself and I know that our feelings for you are similar and deep. You have been sorely tried and I hope you realise how thoroughly we appreciate what you have been through. It is a very real source of gratification to us both that you seem now to be successful in conquering all of the difficulties which have been thrown in your path.
Wherever it is possible, we have tried to smooth your way for we believe in the soundness of your judgment and the correctness of your strategic decisions. We realise the dangers and difficulties of the North Burma campaign which have apparently so disheartened Wavell and his staff, but we agree with you in thinking it is a necessary prerequisite to any thoroughly satisfactory line of communications to China. We hope that you will be successful in conquering the difficulties of the terrain and the dangers of malaria.
When I offered you this China mission I knew it would be a tough one but I confess I did not realise how very tough it would be; and I wish you to feel now my sympathy and congratulations for the surpassing fortitude, skill and courage which you have shown in carrying through. I hope that the New Year will give you a full measure of success and the satisfaction that will go with it.