by David Rooney
From January 1944, Stilwell was to have increasingly close relationships both with the Chindits and with his own long-range penetration units, Merrill’s Marauders. The Marauders had been recruited and trained with remarkable speed. They were brought by ship to Bombay and immediately started training under the Chindit regime. Colonel Hunter was involved from the start, and early in January 1944 General Merrill arrived to take over command. The Marauders were organised in three battalions, with each battalion divided into two combat teams of nearly 500 men under eighteen officers – nearly twice the size of a Chindit column. Like the Chindits they had no artillery or tanks, but they were effectively organised for their particular role, with special sections for pioneer, demolition, intelligence and reconnaissance work. Their weapons included carbines, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, heavy machine guns, mortars and rocket launchers. These weapons and their ammunition meant that each combat team needed a large number of mules.
When Merrill arrived, Mountbatten finally agreed to Stilwell’s insistent demand that the Marauders should come under his direct command and not Wingate’s. Merrill was an able graduate who had come up through the ranks and had been assistant military attaché in Tokyo, where he acquired a fair knowledge of the Japanese. Cheerful and self-confident, he did not immediately impress Stilwell, who, when told that the Marauders would move off in three weeks, wrote, ‘My God, what speed.’ Merrill used his knowledge of Japanese to gain maximum benefit from the Nisei, the Japanese-speaking Americans who were used for all aspects of intelligence work. Well before the Marauders arrived, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) had established a framework of intelligence gatherers with the local Kachin hill people. Small groups of Kachins with American and British officers provided valuable information about Japanese units and their movements.
Nineteen forty-three had been a period of intense frustration for Stilwell, but in January 1944 the situation in north Burma clarified, albeit with top-level strategic plans and different code names still being tossed about. On the ground the road from Ledo had already advanced more than 70 miles through the formidable jungle-covered Patkai mountain range, which rose to over 10,000 feet. The two Chinese divisions, 38 and 22, whose fighting had made possible the advance of the road, were now poised at the heads of two important valleys – the upper Chindwin and the Hukawng – which led south along Stilwell’s proposed route to Mogaung and Myitkyina. Merrill’s Marauders were assembling rapidly, and the Chindit brigade under Fergusson was about to start its long march towards Indaw.
Stilwell’s own comments during January are fairly brief and non-committal. He continued to grumble that the Limeys and the G-mo were reneging on their agreements, and he expressed concern that even Sun, the divisional commander in whom he had the greatest confidence, was timorous in the face of Japanese opposition. In a letter home he wrote that he expected to meet Tarzan any day, and, more seriously:
This experience is different from the last time. Now we have aviation and ammunition and artillery and a certain amount of training, so we don’t have to take it on the nose as we used to, with no chance of answering. The Chinese soldier is doing his stuff, as I knew he would if he had half a chance. It’s only the higher-ups who are weak and they are still pretty terrible. The Americans are all doing a good job and they all enjoy the life. If I could just have a couple of U.S. divisions. But the Brain Trust won’t turn them over, so I’ve got to go on struggling with my shoestring. The Glamour boy [Mountbatten] is just about that. He doesn’t wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla, but damn little fighting. And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.
His diary records fairly frequent efforts to bolster up Sun and make him more aggressive, but it also notes the devastation caused to Japanese positions by the accurate fire of the mortars. Several hundred Japanese dead were found in one captured strongpoint.
On 30 January 1944 Stilwell, straight from the front line in the jungle, attended a brief and bad-tempered conference in Delhi. He was to find that Chennault, together with General Wedemeyer, his own assistant, who later was to succeed him and whom he considered an arrogant and conceited young man, were increasingly critical of his policy and campaign in north Burma. At the conference Stilwell argued his case bluntly and forcefully Referring obliquely to the thousands of staff at SEAC headquarters, he reminded them that Clive had captured India with 123 men. The conference discussed Mountbatten’s proposal for AXIOM, a plan which returned to the idea of amphibious attacks with the corollary of the withdrawal of support for a major effort in north Burma. Stilwell’s diary entry for this conference was merely ‘The Limeys are welching’ and ‘Big walla-walla’, but he realised the seriousness of the situation. He had learned that Mountbatten was sending a delegation to Washington to support the AXIOM proposal. The delegation included Wedemeyer, who was to argue the cause of the increasingly bitter anti-Stilwell group in Chungking. They alleged that he was arrogantly courting disaster, marching through a trackless waste, and that this could result in a serious defeat which would knock China out of the war. Stilwell realised the danger of this approach, which appeared to have the support of Churchill – who as ever was more interested in the recapture of Singapore and Hong Kong.
Stilwell returned to the jungle, but then, without informing Mountbatten, sent his own delegation to Washington ahead of the official group. He appointed Brigadier General Haydon Boatner, who was to become very close to him in the dramatic remaining months of the campaign, to lead his delegation. There followed one of the odd quirks of war – rather like Wingate’s dinner with Churchill in Downing Street. Boatner, to his amazement, was invited to see Roosevelt alone to present the case for supporting Stilwell. The President even encouraged him to draft an appeal to Churchill to order Indian Command to help Stilwell and not to hinder him. To encourage Stilwell and Chiang, Roosevelt added the message that if Chiang co-operated fully he could take over French Indo-China at the end of the war. However, in spite of the high hopes and tensions engendered by these encounters, it all came to nought. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the AXIOM proposals and Churchill refused Roosevelt’s request. There was one significant result. Mountbatten was furious with Stilwell and considered his action in sending a separate delegation to Washington to be out of order and dangerously disloyal.
Back in the jungle the arrival of Merrill’s Marauders gave a boost to Stilwell’s hopes, but it also produced some difficulties. The Marauders were not all the tough, well-disciplined, experienced fighters for which the initial appeal had hoped. Rather, there were many unfit men with all sorts of problems. As often happens in war in response to a general appeal, units took the opportunity to offload their most difficult characters. During training many had reacted adversely to the severe Chindit discipline and, as they saw it, inadequate British rations. During their journey across India they had created severe problems by shooting from the train at cows – sacred to Hindus – in the fields and even at Indian peasants.
By the beginning of February 1944 Stilwell was able to clarify his plans. Because Chiang had once again refused to advance with Yoke Force, Stilwell brought Merrill’s Marauders – code named Galahad – into the attack on the Japanese in the Hukawng valley. Originally they had been designated to operate with Yoke Force. During January, by dint of personal example, bravery, threats to shoot useless commanders and rewards for successful effort, Stilwell had badgered and cajoled the Chinese forces to advance against the Japanese. As part of this advance, 22 Division broke through the mountains and captured the Japanese base at Taro in the centre of the Taro plain on the upper Chindwin. Stilwell was opposed by General Tanaka, who had been instructed by Mutaguchi, the overall Japanese commander in Burma, to concentrate on delaying Stilwell’s advance down the Hukawng valley and, as the ultimate priority, to hold the town of Kamaing at all costs.
Stilwell was still suspicious of interference from SEAC, and even from Slim –
under whom he had agreed to serve – and the Fourteenth Army, and he therefore set up the Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC) to keep the Chinese divisions and Merrill’s Marauders under his own direct control and to ensure his control over their supplies.
From this situation Stilwell planned for 22 Division to lead the advance down the dry-weather road towards Maingkwan and Walawbum. They were to be supported by the 1st Provisional Chinese Tank Group under an American commander, Colonel Rothwell Brown. The 38th Division, which had suffered heavy casualties in the January fighting, would be used to clear the area to the east of the road, while in their first action the Marauders were sent on a wide sweep along the eastern fringe of the Hukawng valley. They aimed to reach Walawbum and cut off Tanaka’s 18 Division before it could withdraw southwards. This very sound tactical plan posed a serious problem for Tanaka, who had to decide whether to stand firm at Maingkwan, where he would be in danger of being cut off when the Marauders reached Walawbum. This plan also illustrated a significant difference between Wingate’s long-range penetration plans for the Chindits – a difference that was to be dramatically demonstrated early in March in the second Chindit operation – and Stilwell’s tactics of using the Marauders in much closer support for the advancing Chinese divisions. Stilwell’s approach had been commended by Brooke, the CIGS, who like most of the British top brass did not accept Wingate’s precepts.
The Marauders set off on 21 February on their wide sweep east of the Kamaing road. They sent reconnaissance patrols to ascertain the boundaries of the Japanese positions, and there were some fire fights with enemy defenders, but the main body of the Marauders completed the operation, with three battalions approaching Walawbum by 3 March. During this first operation the Marauders received considerable help from Kachin guides and from a British officer who had been a colonial official and lived among the Kachin before the war. With their local knowledge, the Kachins gave crucial help to the Marauders, who normally operated in thick, unmapped jungle away from any roads.
When the Marauders approached Walawbum, 3 Battalion was deployed close to the town on high ground overlooking the road and the river. The 2nd Battalion advanced to the north of the town ready to cut the road up to Maingkwan. The 1st Battalion operated between the two wings and acted as a reserve to be called on when needed. It was planned that the Marauders would attack and hold their positions around Walawbum until 22 Division and the tanks arrived. When they took up their positions, they discovered the main Japanese telephone line from Tanaka’s headquarters to the HQ at Kamaing, and one of their Nisei operators was able to intercept all the orders and communications affecting Tanaka’s moves. Because of a breakdown in Japanese communication, Tanaka – although there had been some clashes with the Marauders’ reconnaissance patrols – remained unaware that a substantial and effective American unit was approaching Walawbum and was blocking his escape route to the south. A tough and experienced commander, he did not appear to be too worried by the enemy presence at Walawbum. He still held a poor opinion of Chinese fighting troops and assumed that they would advance very slowly. He therefore left some defensive screens to impede their advance and decided to concentrate on destroying the Marauders at Walawbum.
The attack on the Marauders started as early as 4 March. In fluid and confused fighting the Japanese suffered heavy casualties and discovered that they were now facing a formidable enemy. In the close-combat jungle fighting the Marauders used the Thompson submachine gun (tommy gun), light and heavy machine guns and, in particular, their 81-mm mortar, which like the Chindits’ 3-inch mortar proved itself the most valuable weapon in jungle fighting. And in the battle at Walawbum the Marauders were able to call on another significant weapon – the fighter bomber. The Chindits had demonstrated the critical importance of air liaison officers both for accurate supply drops and for close support attacks, and now each Marauder battalion had an air liaison officer who was able to call in air strikes against the Japanese units facing them at Walawbum.
The Japanese launched their heaviest attacks on 2 Battalion, which had established a strong road block on the road down from Maingkwan about two miles west of Walawbum. The Marauders were well prepared with carefully constructed slit trenches, and they held their positions with remarkably few casualties in spite of a constant barrage from Japanese artillery. In contrast, the Japanese suffered more than one hundred killed in that one attack. It lasted over thirty-six hours, and when the Marauders ran short of food, water and ammunition Merrill ordered them to withdraw a short distance to take an air drop of supplies and to join 3 Battalion, which was holding the high ground that overlooked the town and dominated the road to the south. While the fighting at the road block continued, the tank unit – which had left the road further north and had been guided along a track by Kachin guides – emerged from the jungle close to the Marauders’ position and, more significantly, in a location from which they could attack General Tanaka’s headquarters.
The fiercest fighting occurred on 6 March when Tanaka realised the seriousness of his position between the Chinese 22 Division, along with the tank unit advancing from the north, and the strongly held Marauder road block at Walawbum. He therefore attempted to disengage and move as rapidly as possible west and south in order to bypass Walawbum and regain the road to Kamaing. Merrill, who had a brief conference with the commanders of the tank group and the leading Chinese regiment, reckoned that the Marauders had carried out Stilwell’s orders to delay the Japanese as long as possible.
The battle in and around Walawbum was valuable as an initial operation for the Marauders and it succeeded in driving the formidable Tanaka off the Kamaing road, but Stilwell had hoped that the whole of Tanaka’s division would be trapped and destroyed. In this he was disappointed, partly because Tanaka moved so swiftly in extricating his units from Walawbum but also because the two Chinese divisions, which had arrived during the battle, were too slow to move against Tanaka and close the trap.
Stilwell’s had been the clear directing hand in the successful fighting around Walawbum, and although he was disappointed to have Tanaka escape from a well-planned trap, he was pleased with the achievements of the Marauders and the Chinese. Soon, however, he was to be caught up in wider issues and more discussions at top level. The early days of March 1944 were to see the start of momentous developments that did not end until the victorious occupation of Rangoon.
* B. Fergusson, Beyond the Chindwin, Collins, London, 1945; and The Wild Green Earth, Collins, London, 1946.
† Fergusson, Wild Green Earth, p. 22.
CHAPTER 10
March–April 1944: Crisis
In March 1943, a year before the month of crisis described in this chapter, the Chindits undertook their first operation. In this they should have been backed up by three simultaneous attacks: by the British forces at Imphal, by Stilwell and the Chinese–American divisions in Ledo, and by Yoke Force in Yunnan. The Chindit expedition went ahead and sustained heavy casualties because not one of these supporting attacks took place. In March 1944 things initially appeared remarkably similar. Chiang still refused to advance with Yoke Force, Stilwell was making slow progress in the Hukawng valley, and the British Fourteenth Army at Imphal was still building up its strength and was not ready to advance.
On 4 February 1944 the Japanese had begun an attack, code named Ha Go, in the Arakan. The battle along this coastline between Akyab and Chittagong, although a sideshow compared to what was to come, was significant for a number of lessons which the Japanese failed to learn. Their 55 Division – about 8,000 strong – made a rapid advance against 5 and 7 Indian Divisions and appeared to take them by surprise, eliciting some acid comments from Stilwell. The Japanese advanced for several days, but then the two Indian divisions rallied and, under direct orders from Slim, formed what was known as the ‘Admin Box’. This was an all-round defensive position with the defenders supplied by air. The Admin Box held out from 6 to 24 February and inflicted 5,000 casualties on the Japanese. British air superi
ority was complete and they were able to use the newly arrived Spitfires. The Ha Go attack had forced Slim to move two divisions from the reserves he was building up near Imphal – 26 Indian Division and 36 British Division – to support the defences in the Arakan. Then, on 24 February, the Japanese 55 Division suddenly withdrew because it had run out of ammunition, suffered over 50 per cent casualties and the men were starving.
General Mutaguchi, who commanded the Fifteenth Army and co-ordinated all the subsequent Japanese attacks, made several false assumptions before the Ha Go offensive and he failed to learn the lessons of this small but significant defeat. He assumed that the British would rapidly crumble and surrender as they had done during the retreat in 1942; he failed to realise that the Admin Box, in which the defenders were supplied by air, had introduced a totally new factor into jungle warfare; and he failed to see the crucial corollary of the increased British resistance – that he could not send off a division with a few weeks’ rations on the assumption that they would quickly overrun British supply depots. The Japanese retreated from the Admin Box because their men were starving.