by David Rooney
On 26 June Stilwell flew in, relieved Boatner of his command and put Brigadier General Wessels in charge. Stilwell’s brief, grim diary jottings highlight his other problems. The next day he merely recorded, ‘Mogaung. We have it .’ After a brief visit from Mountbatten, he wrote that the GIs ‘were getting a look at the British Empah [sic] with its pants down and the aspect is not so pretty. You can imagine how popular I am with the Limeys.’ He referred to the crisis caused by a powerful Japanese attack in southwest China and wrote: ‘If this crisis were just sufficient to get rid of the Peanut without entirely wrecking the ship it would be worth it. But that’s too much to hope.’ On 19 July he noted: ‘Japs at Mitch shoving off on rafts.’ In a letter to his wife he said that the noose around Myitkyina was good and tight and few would get away – ‘then Old Pappy is going to take a day off’. He added, ‘I feel guilty about Mitch, but we will get it in due time.’
In Myitkyina, Wessels soon proved himself a tough and professional officer, and he insisted that all units should undertake serious training even as they fought. Despite this there were some disastrous incidents. One New Galahad unit was advancing when it mistook a Japanese scout for a Chinese. The unit was led straight into an ambush and all but wiped out. Gradually Wessels efficient and determined approach paid off, and towards the end of July there were signs that the Japanese were preparing to pull out. Patrols noticed an increasing number of barges being assembled near the ferry at Waingmaw. Here, as elsewhere in Burma, the Japanese units had their Korean comfort girls, some of whom were captured as their barge floated downstream. On 1 August General Mizukami, who had undertaken to hold Myitkyina, apologised to the Emperor and committed suicide. The town’s capture was finally announced on 3 August.
Stilwell’s disgraceful decision not to use the British 36 Division at the very start, when Myitkyina had few defences, led to eleven weeks of bitter fighting and 6,000 casualties among the Marauders and the Chinese. Subsequent official inquiries and reports listed grave and costly mistakes, stressing the very poor use of intelligence and the failure to reconnoitre the ground before attacks were launched.
Perhaps General Slim should be allowed the last word. In contrast to Stilwell’s constant and petulant sniping at the British, Slim paid a generous tribute to Stilwell and his achievement. ‘The capture of Myitkyina, so long delayed, marked the complete success of the first stage of Stilwell’s campaign. It was also the largest seizure of enemy-held territory that had yet occurred … When all is said and done, the success of this northern offensive was in the main due to the Ledo Chinese divisions – and that was Stilwell.’
* Nathan Prefer, Vinegar Joe’s War, Presidio, California, 2000, p. 150.
† Prefer, Vinegar Joe’s War, p. 148.
‡ Tuchman, Sand against the Wind, p. 450.
CHAPTER 13
Wider Issues
Even before the final capture of Myitkyina town, Stilwell was called away from his jungle HQ at Shadazup to stand in for Mountbatten at the new headquarters of South East Asia Command in Kandy, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). The great issues of strategy in the Pacific war were still being fiercely and acrimoniously debated between Kandy, Washington, Chungking and London. Mountbatten had gone to London to argue the case for an amphibious attack on Rangoon after the Fourteenth Army reached Mandalay. Other bitterly contested issues included General MacArthur’s advance across the Pacific and Churchill’s hankering after an invasion of Sumatra as a step towards Singapore.
Stilwell’s reputation had preceded him. Tuchman described the feelings at SEAC HQ as the emotions of Rome awaiting Alaric the Hun. General Pownall, who like Stilwell kept a diary which was later published, was Chief of Staff at Kandy. He wrote: ‘Stilwell of course held out against us strongly. He made a pretty fair swine of himself … he was offensive and proved himself ignorant and obstinate … he was opposed by everyone else at the meeting, by none more than the Americans.’ Stilwell was in good company, for Pownall – not a great commander himself – had nothing good to say about Mountbatten or Slim and referred to Wingate as ‘a nasty bit of work’. Mountbatten, while he was away, received reports from all his senior officers that Stilwell ‘was pathetically at sea and incapable of taking charge or giving directions’.
Stilwell did nothing to dispel the apprehension. He was met in Kandy by Mountbatten’s black Cadillac with motorcycle outriders. He rejected this and ordered a Jeep. Coinciding with his arrival he was promoted to four-star general, putting him on a level with Marshall, Eisenhower and MacArthur. He clearly saw his time at Kandy as one of rest and recuperation after the jungle campaign, and he never intended to master all the strategic complexities. On 2 August he wrote, ‘Saw Pownall and told him to run the show. Went through the crap and beat it. PM. To the Temple of the Tooth – no tooth.’ (This was and is the most sacred Buddhist temple in Sri Lanka.) He became lyrical about the beauty of the town and the country around it – comparing it to Yellowstone Park and the climate to Hawaii. He continued this theme in a letter to his wife, which also illustrated his oversensitive attitude. ‘Mountbatten has left temporarily, and as heir to the throne, Little Willie the Country Boy, had to come down and take over. This is a laugh. A goddam American in the driver’s seat, etc, etc. I am going to read and rest and get a lot of sleep.’
After his brief stay in Kandy, Stilwell was called back to face another crisis in Chungking. Before he left he welcomed Mountbatten back to SEAC HQ. He remarked that Mountbatten appeared ill at ease with him. ‘Not surprising because his trip had to do with an operation on his deputy’s throat.’ Mountbatten’s biographer Philip Ziegler considered that they had been in fundamental disharmony. He wrote: ‘Mountbatten characteristically assumed that, in spite of their differences, Stilwell still cherished affection and respect for his Supreme Commander. Stilwell was equally sure that Mountbatten viewed him with loathing. Both were wrong.’* Their relationship had certainly deteriorated since the crisis over the Chindits after Mogaung. At the time Mountbatten considered that Stilwell had treated the Chindits with callous indifference and had overruled him.
During the summer of 1944, when Stilwell was deeply preoccupied with Myitkyina, dramatic events were taking place in China that led up to his final crisis. As early as March 1944 Stilwell’s adviser, John D. Davis Jr, had suggested that America should send a military mission to the Chinese Communists in the hope of gaining their cooperation against the Japanese. An additional purpose was to ascertain how far they were dependent on Soviet Russia for aircraft and weapons. Both the Kuomintang and Mao’s forces were building up their strength in northern China, and Japan was doing its best to embroil them in fighting each other. The Japanese then took more positive action and launched two major offensives. In May 1944 they attacked the Kuomintang forces between the Yellow River and the Yangtze. More significantly, from June to September they launched the Togo campaign, which overran the four advanced airfields from which Chennault’s Fourteenth Air Force was attacking Japanese troops, shipping, supplies and even the Japanese homeland. The attack included a rapid advance by powerful units that drove northeast from the Hong Kong and Canton area. This is what Stilwell had always predicted and was the kernel of his bitter feud with Chennault. When the advancing Japanese troops captured the first of the airfields, Chennault wrote urgently to Chiang. This contravened the clear regulation on which Stilwell had wisely insisted that all communications from Americans to Chiang should pass through him. Chennault gave a lame explanation for what had happened, and Stilwell demanded his dismissal for insubordination. Stilwell dealt with the matter in considerable detail, pointing out that Chennault had always argued that air power was the full and complete answer and that existing Chinese ground forces could definitely defend the air bases; now that he was proved to be wrong he was trying to excuse himself and put the blame on someone else. ‘He has failed to damage the Jap supply line. He has not caused any Jap withdrawals. On the contrary, his activities have done exactly what I prophesied, i.e. drawn a Jap reacti
on which he now acknowledges the ground forces can’t handle, even with the total air support he asked for and got.’
Chennault’s reaction to the Japanese advances and their threat to the forward airfields was to demand yet more of the supplies coming over the Hump. Chiang backed up this demand, but when it went to Washington both Stimson and Marshall rejected it. Stimson stated publicly that demands for transport planes to maintain the tonnage going over the Hump had bled America white. When Chiang added demands for more aid now and a promise of Lend–Lease after the war, the American administration stated that there would be no more immediate aid and proposed bluntly that Chiang should make an agreement with the Communists so that both the Kuomintang and Communist troops could join together and fight the Japanese.
In America serious criticism of the Chiang regime was muffled by the powerful pro-China religious groups and missionary-backed relief agencies, but the truth was gradually emerging. During 1944, serious discontent among both junior and senior officers in the Kuomintang flared into rebellion and sixteen generals were executed. Widespread anger and discontent made it obvious that Chiang’s regime was rotten from top to bottom. Massive censorship was imposed in an attempt to curb demands for democratic reform, while the warlords spoke openly of independence. American agents reported widespread starvation among both peasants and soldiers as the economy ground to a halt.
America now had to consider new and unpalatable factors. While it urgently sought the co-operation of the Kuomintang and the Communists in fighting the Japanese, the feeling grew that the current situation in China could lead to civil war, and if that happened, because of Chiang’s rotten system, Mao Tse-Tung and the Communists might win. This in turn could create a highly dangerous global scenario, with Russia backing Mao and the Communists and the USA backing Chiang, the likely loser. Chiang himself was aware of this danger and tried hard to build up forces with which, after the Japanese were defeated, he hoped to be able to defeat the Communists before either Russia or the Allies could interfere in the internal affairs of China.
The tortuous muddle in China now became further enmeshed in extraneous political factors. Roosevelt, who was facing an election in November 1944, was not keen to have Vice President Henry Wallace as a running mate, so – perhaps to remove him from the limelight – he sent him as a presidential envoy to see Chiang. Wallace’s visit in June 1944 sought Chiang’s agreement to the visit of an American mission to the Communist forces in northern China. As ever Chiang prevaricated, and since Stilwell was in Burma at Myitkyina, Wallace consulted largely with Chennault and his faction. Not surprisingly Wallace, after a brief and superficial visit, recommended Stilwell’s removal. Back in Washington Marshall bluntly and contemptuously rejected the idea, but Wallace’s visit did result in a heightened awareness of the disastrous situation in China and the growing opposition at all levels to the corrupt miasma of Chiang’s system.
While the build-up to the great crisis continued, the Chinese divisions in Yunnan – because of American cajoling – did at last attack. They made two advances, the first to cross the Salween river and capture a town about 100 miles east of Myitkyina, and a second to cross the Salween lower down and capture Lung-ling on the Burma Road. This should have enabled a force of twelve Chinese divisions to reach Bhamo to link up with Stilwell’s forces in the area of Myitkyina and, at last, reopen a major land route into China. These advances had been chronically delayed and only went forward in May 1944 when there were just a few weeks before the start of the monsoon – posing a serious problem to an attacking force that relied largely on supply by air. Stilwell’s old friend and colleague Brigadier General Frank Dorn made a most important contribution to this force. He controlled supplies, training, technical advice, and above all training in air liaison techniques. The Chinese had to attack the weakened Japanese 56 Division, which was thinly scattered. Dorn recommended that when the Chinese attacked they should keep going as independent combat teams so as to maintain their momentum and not stop to subdue every Japanese stronghold.
The Chinese attacked on 9 May and crossed the Salween unopposed, helped by bombers and fighters from Chennault’s bases near Kunming. Each Chinese division had an American liaison officer to advise, although their advice was frequently disregarded. They were appalled at the casual way in which Chinese soldiers were slaughtered, often because they failed to follow the most basic tactical advice such as providing covering fire or making flank attacks. Reports from the liaison officers gave dramatic evidence of massive waste of ammunition and total lack of maintenance on weapons and vehicles. In spite of these weaknesses the Chinese made good progress against determined Japanese opposition. The divisions approaching Lung-ling captured a map showing details of the Japanese defences for the whole area. They reached the town on 14 June after a prolonged struggle through monsoon rain. Nearly 10,000 Chinese troops were poised for the attack on Lung-ling, but then, in the face of a Japanese counterattack with 1,500 men, they broke and fled and control of the vital Burma Road remained with the Japanese.
During the summer of 1944, when the world’s main attention was on the Normandy landings and the Russian drive to Berlin, events took place in Chungking, Kandy, London, Myitkyina and Washington that were to have dramatic repercussions on Stilwell’s career. From his early days in the army his career had often been assisted by his old friend George Marshall, and once again Marshall was to play a key role. On a visit to London in June 1944 he was warned by the CIGS, Sir Alan Brooke, that the British wanted Stilwell replaced because he was notorious for his anti-Limey views, because he had seriously mishandled the Chindit issue after Mogaung and because he did not get on with the three British service chiefs at SEAC HQ. In an angry exchange, which reflected American attitudes going back to the Quebec Conference of 1943, Marshall challenged Brooke. He said that Mountbatten had three service chiefs in India, none of whom would fight, yet they wanted to get rid of Stilwell – the one person who had shown that he would fight the Japanese. Marshall’s argument was strengthened because at that stage Mountbatten was actually in the process of getting rid of all three of his service chiefs – Admiral Somerville, General Giffard and Air Marshal Pierce.
Marshall had been deeply involved with affairs in China and now, far from just making an angry reply to a British proposal, he was planning on a much more significant scale. He, more than most, was aware of the disastrous situation in China. He pondered over the terrific achievements in the China-Burma-India theatre: Stilwell’s drive to Myitkyina, the huge Hump operation, the construction of the road and pipeline from Ledo that followed closely on Stilwell’s advance, and the great increase in supplies brought up the Assam railway thanks to the US railway battalions. The impending opening of the Burma Road meant that supplies of all kinds would be substantially increased, and Marshall was determined that they should not be wasted under the control of Chiang and Chennault. He therefore proposed that Chiang should be given a final blunt ultimatum in the following terms: because of the disastrous situation in China that allowed Japanese armies to roam unopposed, Stilwell should be given command of all the Chinese armies with full power to reorganise, discipline, supply and train them. Marshall saw this as the last chance to achieve anything in the country and to justify the vast investment in men, money and machines that America had made in support of Chiang. He believed that Stilwell was the only person who could possibly succeed in this mammoth task.
Before there was any mention of Stilwell’s possible promotion, Marshall tentatively broached the subject with him. Stilwell gave a careful and reasoned reply, saying that if the President sent a very stiff message pointing out that desperate cases needed desperate remedies, Chiang might agree to the proposal. He then stressed that without complete authority he would not attempt the job. He felt that the damage done to the Chinese army was so tremendous that there were very few alternatives. He did add that two years previously the Communists had agreed to fight under his command, and a joint offensive with them might possi
bly succeed. ‘These matters must be put before the G-mo in the strongest terms or he will continue to muddle along and scream for help without doing any more than he is doing now, which is nothing.’
After he received Stilwell’s unenthusiastic reply Marshall moved rapidly. He submitted the proposal in the name of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointing out that the thousands of tons of supplies taken over the Hump for Chennault had been almost completely wasted and that in the major clash of policies Stilwell had been proved absolutely right. The situation in China was alarming and it appeared that the Japanese forces could move around at will almost unmolested.
On 6 July 1944 Roosevelt sent the message to Chiang. He used Marshall’s draft unchanged but added: ‘The future of all Asia is at stake, along with the tremendous effort which America has expended in that region. Therefore I have reason for a profound interest in the matter.’ On that crucial day Stilwell was at his headquarters in Shadazup, where he merely recorded: ‘Radio from F.D.R. to Chiang Kai-Shek and from George Marshall to me. They have been pouring it into him about me. F.D.R. told Chiang Kai-Shek to give me full authority to run the show, promotion to full general.’ Because previous messages from the President had been altered or watered down by Madame or T. V. Soong, this fateful message was given to Chiang personally by the senior American officer in Chungking.
Faced with the supremely challenging prospect of commanding the whole Chinese army, Stilwell made some interesting comments.