by David Rooney
I see the Limeys are going to rush to our rescue in the Pacific: like hell. They are going to continue this fight with their mouths. Four or five battleships and about ten R.A.F. planes will go to Australia, but in twenty years the schoolbooks will be talking about ‘shoulder to shoulder’ and ‘the Empire struck with all its might against the common enemy’, and all that crap. The idea, of course, is to horn in at Hong Kong again, and our Booby [Roosevelt] is sucked in.
Stilwell still had considerable responsibility for the critical situation created by the Japanese advance, their capture of the airfields and Chiang’s petulant threat to withdraw Yoke Force, so he signalled Marshall with details of the crisis on the ground in China. The message included the view that Chiang was hoping to bide his time until the Americans defeated Japan. The message reached Marshall during the final Quebec Conference, where Roosevelt and Churchill were involved in serious and often acrimonious discussions about the future of Germany. There is no doubt that Roosevelt was seriously unwell and exhausted and that his attention was focused on major European issues. In view of this preoccupation, the general attitude at Quebec seems to have been that the Allies should merely try to keep China in the war, though there was mention of a plan for the Allies to conduct an amphibious operation to open a port on the Chinese mainland.
Marshall had witnessed how Chiang constantly made promises to Stilwell and then reneged, so he had his staff prepare a three-page telegram from the President to Chiang spelling out the need for immediate action in the clearest possible way. After a brief perusal, Roosevelt signed the document. It referred to the urgent need to reopen the Burma Road and to safeguard air supplies, both of which would be jeopardised by the threat to withdraw Yoke Force. ‘I have urged time and again in recent months that you take drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving closer to China and to you. Now when you have not yet placed General Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced with the loss of a critical area in east China with possible catastrophic consequences.’ The message continued, arguing that the only way to stop the Japanese was to place General Stilwell immediately in unrestricted command of all Chinese forces, and it concluded, ‘All your and our efforts to save China are to be lost by further delays.’
Because previous messages from the President had not been delivered or had been watered down by Madame or T.V. Soong, Roosevelt had ordered that in future his messages to Chiang should be delivered personally by the senior American officer present. The present fateful message was given to Stilwell, rather than to Hurley, to convey to Chiang. After years of frustration Stilwell felt that at last Roosevelt had spoken bluntly, and he relished the opportunity to deliver the message. His eagerness is understandable, but he did not then consider the consequences that were to follow.
He quickly had a translation prepared and took it to Chiang’s HQ, where the latter was in conference with Hurley and Soong discussing, as it happened, details of Stilwell’s appointment. Hurley came out of the meeting and Stilwell showed him the text. Hurley, realising what a bombshell it was, suggested a milder paraphrase. Stilwell rejected the suggestion. He went in, observed the tea-drinking ceremony and handed over the document. He expressed his feelings in a diary entry for 19 September 1944.
Mark this day in red in the calendar of life. At long, at very long last, F.D.R. has finally spoken plain words and plenty of them with a firecracker in every sentence. ‘Get busy or else.’ A hot firecracker. I handed this bundle of paprika to the Peanut and then sank back with a sigh. The harpoon hit the little bugger right in the solar plexus and went right through him. It was a clean hit, but beyond turning green and losing the power of speech he did not bat an eye. He just said, ‘I understand.’ And sat in silence jiggling one foot. We are now a long way from the ‘tribal chieftain’ bawling out. Two long years lost but at least F.D.R.’s eyes have been opened and he has thrown a good hefty punch.
Chiang had often reacted violently to bad news, but now he showed remarkable restraint, at least in front of the Americans, although he apparently had one of his alarming screaming fits that evening. Soong considered that Chiang could not appoint Stilwell in such circumstances because it would prove his weakness, and if that happened he might be forced to accept the Communists. There was no official reaction to the note for some days. Soong, who had received a clear warning a few days before, believed that Stilwell had arranged the whole episode in order to humiliate Chiang. The leader’s inner circle at the time were sensitive to some shrewd Japanese propaganda which suggested that Stilwell was ambitious to take over China himself. While serious heart-searchings continued Stilwell, in a letter home, took an almost flippant attitude and included a poem, the first verse of which read:
I’ve waited long for vengeance –
At last I’ve had my chance.
I’ve looked the Peanut in the eye,
And kicked him in the pants.
Other verses were even worse.
Stilwell did not realise that Chiang was seriously angry until several days later. Even then, in communicating with Marshall, he maintained that as ever Chiang was stalling in the hope that American advances would spare him from having to recognise the Communists or appoint a foreigner to command his forces. During these days Stilwell was working on detailed plans which he hoped to put into operation as soon as he was given command. The plans, which were produced at his headquarters, aimed at an offensive towards Canton with the present Chinese forces and, it was hoped, a US corps of 10,000 men. Then, with the possible help of units that were still being trained in India and from Yoke Force, a major drive north would capture Hankow and drive on towards Shanghai and the Yangtze valley.
Hurley was actively engaged in these discussions. On 23 September, with Stilwell’s agreement, he reported to Roosevelt that he had encouraged Chiang not to produce a deadlock over the document of 19 September, and he hoped that although the situation was still difficult a harmonious solution was possible. On the same day Stilwell conferred with the Chinese chief of staff and produced an interesting memorandum on how to solve the problem. He felt that Chiang was obstinate about control of Lend–Lease because he knew that there were no strings attached to the same supplies going to Britain and Russia. Stilwell therefore suggested that he should go to the Communists and offer equipment for five full infantry divisions in return for the Communists accepting his military command and Chiang’s ultimate authority. Second, he suggested that Chiang should handle Lend–Lease material with the following strict priorities: the divisions training in India and Yoke Force would have top priority, following which the next thirty divisions and the five Communist divisions would have priority. No other units would be given supplies until all of these were fully equipped.
This proposal was a genuine and sincere attempt by Stilwell to solve the deadlock and to galvanise both the Kuomintang and the Communists under his command to take effective action against the Japanese. Had it succeeded it could have changed the whole strategic situation in China long before the attack on Hiroshima in August 1945. More significantly, it might have changed the post-war history of China. With Stilwell in charge of over 100 trained and well-equipped divisions there might well have been a very different outcome to the Chinese civil war of 1947–9.
Hurley was impressed with Stilwell’s proposals and took them to Chiang, but in the intervening days the Chinese leader had been considering his options. In a fairly early reaction he told Soong that after the note and the way Stilwell had delivered it he was not prepared to offer Stilwell the command. At the same time he realised this had to be done in a way that would not give Roosevelt an excuse for stopping Lend–Lease. He therefore prevaricated for some days – even discussing details of the military action against the Japanese around Kweilin. As a token of his determination he had one army commander executed. With the continuation of Lend–Lease as his top priority, Chiang believed that Hurley and Nelson would remain his supporters as the defeat of Japan and the prospect of a pea
ce conference came closer. He estimated correctly that America would not simply cut its losses in China. Nelson in particular, with lavish promises of post-war aid, had made a big impact on Chiang, who responded by offering him full responsibility for China’s reconstruction. Chiang even allowed himself to believe that Nelson had promised him control of Lend–Lease supplies.
Chiang prepared his reply to Roosevelt’s memorandum with care. He claimed that the way Stilwell had delivered the memo was insulting and was an attempt to make him a subordinate. By refusing the demand for an attack on Bhamo, Stilwell had disobeyed orders. He considered Stilwell unfit to take on a role as complex as commander of the army Carefully placing all the blame on Stilwell, Chiang was careful to stress his willingness to co-operate in the future and to appoint an American to command the Chinese army.
Hurley, who received Chiang’s reply, initially refused to pass it on to the President because it was insulting, but shortly afterwards he accepted an amended version. He added that he regretted his failure to establish harmony between Chiang and Stilwell, but he now felt that they were incompatible. He stressed that the decision to remove Stilwell had not been made until after the delivery of the President’s memorandum on 19 September. In the final version that was sent to Roosevelt, Chiang confirmed his agreement to the appointment of an American as commander in chief but insisted that Stilwell must go. He maintained that Stilwell never had any intention of co-operating but believed ‘that in fact he was being appointed to command me … I can never direct General Stilwell or in all seriousness depend on General Stilwell to conform to my direction.’ He continued by asserting that Stilwell was unfitted for the vast, complex and delicate duties of the new command and had always disregarded the mutual confidence and respect that were necessary for Allied co-operation. The previous October he had intended to ask for Stilwell’s recall but desisted when Stilwell ‘solemnly promised that in future he would unreservedly obey my orders’. Finally, Chiang argued that Stilwell’s appointment would cause grave dissensions and do irreparable injury to Chinese–American co-operation. This reply showed clearly that Chiang’s view of the appointment was very far removed from the American idea of a commander acting under Chiang but with complete power and authority over the Chinese forces.
For some time Washington did not react officially to Chiang’s reply, but then Dr H. H. Kung, Chiang’s brother-in-law, who was in Washington, reported a conversation he had with Harry Hopkins – a very senior Presidential aide – during a dinner party. Kung alleged that Hopkins had let slip that Roosevelt was prepared to agree to Stilwell’s recall. When Kung’s message reached Chiang it had a dramatic effect. He had held back from the public the details of his reply to Roosevelt, but now he announced openly that he had rejected the proposal to appoint Stilwell. He used this opportunity cleverly, stating boldly that in future Lend–Lease must come to him and that any American commander would only command those forces allocated to him. He shrewdly introduced a new element: that Stilwell’s claim was an infringement of China’s sovereign rights and a new form of imperialism. He even stated that if American aid was withdrawn China could get along without it. Soong in Chungking made sure that the information was sent at once to Hurley and the Americans.
At the same time another interesting aspect was provided by General Merrill, who had just returned from the Quebec Conference. He explained to Stilwell that talk of the Allies making an attack on the Chinese coast was just a cover for major operations elsewhere (MacArthur’s attack on the Philippines). America was not interested in the Canton area, it was not going to commit land forces to mainland China, and military operations in China were not now a high priority.
On 24 September Stilwell wrote a fairly relaxed letter to his wife. He referred to Chiang slapping his best and only friend in the face, but added, ‘He has at last had one resounding kick in the pants that nearly brought on apoplexy.’ Then his diary for the following day records:
Pat [Hurley] in with bad news. The Peanut reversed the field yesterday Put in hours talking but you might as well talk to a blank wall. The Peanut lied about me and made astounding statements to the effect that I was bucking him … he is afraid of my influence on the Army. He had the nerve to say he would have a mutiny on his hands … ‘Throw out General Stilwell. General Stilwell has more power in China than I have, etc, etc.’
The following day his bitterness continued: ‘Two years and eight months of struggle and then a slap in the puss as a reward. Jap broadcast said I was plotting to oust Chiang Kai-Shek. Clever.’
As over several days it gradually emerged that Roosevelt was not going to back him up, Stilwell received some indications of the unfolding drama. He heard from Hurley that Soong had asked if Stilwell had got Roosevelt to send the rebuke to Chiang, and added, ‘Pat refused to ask me. A-ha! Maybe this is the low-down. It fits in. The G-mo thinks I had it done and then tore his face off with it. So he has to tear me down.’ On 30 September, when the news was still not officially public, he wrote to his wife. Unable to give her the whole story, he contented himself with ‘We are still floundering around with a gang of morons who can’t see beyond their noses … there may be a loud bang out here before you get this and if you look carefully in the debris … you may see yours truly with his pants blown entirely off.’
The following day Hurley passed on a report that Roosevelt seemed pleased that another American would be appointed but appeared to accept Chiang’s argument that the conditions proposed for Stilwell’s appointment were an infringement of sovereignty. Stilwell commented grimly, ‘F.D.R. proceeds to cut my throat and throw me out. Pat feels very low about it. I don’t. They just can’t hurt me. I’ve done my best and stood up for American interests. To hell with them.’
At the beginning of October 1944 he was able at last to write to his wife and express his real feelings:
It looks very much as though they have gotten me at last. The Peanut has gone off his rocker and Roosevelt has let me down completely. If old softy gives in on this, as he apparently has, the Peanut will be out of control from now on. A proper fizzle. My conscience is clear. I have carried out my orders. I have no regrets. Except to see the U.S.A. sold down the river. So be ready, in case the news isn’t out sooner, to have me thrown on the garbage pile. At least, I’ll probably get home and tell you about it. God help the next man.
In more detail, he made notes on the current situation in China as he saw it:
• Chiang is head of a one party government supported by a Gestapo, secret service, and an S.S. of 100,000.
• He hates the so-called communists, and intends to crush them by keeping all munitions from them and occupying territory as soon as the Japanese retire.
• He will not fight seriously. He wants to finish the war with a big supply of munitions so as to perpetuate his regime. He has blocked us for three years and will continue to do so.
• He has spoken contemptuously of American efforts and has never uttered one word of gratitude.
• He has been responsible for major disasters in the war.
The depth of his personal feelings was expressed when he explained that he would remain persona non grata unless it was made clear to Chiang that he was not responsible for the note of 19 September. ‘Ignored, insulted, double-crossed, delayed, obstructed for three years … False charges of disobedience and non-co-operation. Constant attempts to put the screw on us. Use our air force. Borrow our money.’
In Washington, although Roosevelt had more or less given in on the question of Stilwell’s appointment, there were still powerful voices in support of his general thesis. Secretary of War Stimson, in particular, maintained that Stilwell was the only success in South East Asia and that the policy of giving Chennault thousands of tons of supplies every month, which were largely wasted, had undercut the supply of aircraft for the main American advance across France and into Germany. Marshall, too, who had always supported Stilwell, continued the fight, partly because he realised that his memorandum of
19 September had prompted Chiang’s attack. While the frenzy of tense activity over Stilwell’s position continued – and for him the final denouement was close – there were reminders in October 1944 that the war still had nearly a year to run. Stilwell himself flew down to Myitkyina to oversee the on-going campaign against the Japanese, and Marshall left Washington to spend two weeks in France, where hopes of gaining a decisive result against Germany before the winter were rapidly receding.
On 7 October, some encouragement came in a fairly stiff note from Roosevelt to Chiang saying that the situation in China was now so bad that America would not accept the responsibility of overall command. It also proposed that, because of the continuing Japanese threat to the Hump airfields, Stilwell should continue to command the forces in Burma and those in Yunnan – meaning Yoke Force. Chiang and his advisers had been desperately worried that America might curtail or even stop the supplies over the Hump, but to Chiang’s great relief this did not happen. Emboldened by this he took a stronger line, saying that as head of state and commander in chief he was entitled to demand the recall of any officer in whom he had lost confidence. He went on to blame everything on Stilwell, even arguing, preposterously, that draining off the best-equipped divisions to Burma had created the problem in east China.
When Stilwell saw Roosevelt’s message, he wrote to his wife to say that it was stronger than he had expected, and ‘Maybe ole Pap won’t get tossed on the pile with the other garbage – We are not yet completely sold down the river.’ The tense delay continued through October. On the 13th he wrote: ‘Sitting. Waiting. Twiddling our thumbs. Peanut still on a High Horse. Some indications F.D.R. will get tough but I don’t trust politicians. Valuable time is lost and nothing done.’