No Apology: The Case For American Greatness

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No Apology: The Case For American Greatness Page 11

by Mitt Romney


  One of the greatest disparities between our military cost and that of other nations results from the scope and breadth of our respective military missions. The U.S. military provides global humanitarian relief, for example—and we are often the only nation with resources that can be deployed worldwide at a moment’s notice. Our military is also charged with deterring nuclear attack whether from rogue nations or a future would-be superpower; preventing space attack and cyber-attack; protecting world shipping routes; supporting nations in their defense against insurgencies and helping failed states avoid becoming bases for terror; stopping ethnic cleansing and genocide; and maintaining the capabilities to respond to conventional wars wherever they might occur on the globe. No other nation’s military takes on so many diverse missions in so many parts of the world. Our total defense outlays reflect our total responsibilities.

  Defending all fronts from attack is far more expensive than mounting a single offensive against a point of attack. Consider the relative costs of protecting the whole nation against a biological attack versus the cost of obtaining and dispersing a toxin or virus. At the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002, for example, we spent 320 million defending against possible terrorist attacks that could have cost our enemies a small fraction of that amount to deploy. And this cost was for a single event in a single city staged over less than three weeks.

  America spends more on our military than other nations simply because we have so much more to protect and defend—not only for ourselves, but also for our allies. We cannot let official military-spending figures make us overconfident or complacent. Nor should they be considered credible evidence that we spend too much on defense. We should always determine the proper levels of U.S. defense spending only after carefully examining our actual and projected military capabilities relative to others, our present conflicts and future risks, and the specific requirements of our many missions at home and around the world.

  A Strong and Dynamic American Defense

  Americans have paid more for freedom than for anything else. The price for Alaska was 7.2 million and the Louisiana Purchase cost only 15 million. In national treasure alone, however, the cost of liberty has been in the trillions. In the cost of American lives, our greatest treasure, the sacrifice has been far greater. Almost 50,000 lives were lost in the War of Independence and the War of 1812 with Great Britain. More than 600,000 people gave their lives in the Civil War, which brought freedom to the slaves and preserved the Union. And since the close of the Civil War, our costliest conflict, more than 600,000 more lives have been lost in the many battles in distant places to ensure liberty for America and other freedom-loving peoples.

  There has never been a time when our liberty was free. From the founding of the Republic forward, wars have followed wars. It is foolish and dangerous to assume that human history has changed for the better when it comes to its unbroken record of strife and war. For a time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dream of freedom in a world at peace seemed to be on the brink of unfolding. Instead, new tyrants emerged, new wars and threats broke out, and our men and women in uniform once again were forced to enter harm’s way. They expelled Saddam Hussein’s army from Kuwait, fought extremists in Somalia, secured peace in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, and cleared the skies over Iraq. Then came September 11, 2001, and we were in Afghanistan and, soon thereafter, in Iraq once more.

  It has always been the case that we have been unable to predict with anything approaching certainty when or from which corner of the earth would come the next threats to freedom.

  We thought that we could avoid being drawn into the first great war of the twentieth century, but we were wrong. Confident that the ghastly toll would never be forgotten and that World War I would be the war to end all wars, we turned our attention to our domestic travails and dramatically reduced our army and limited our navy. Japan’s 1941 attack and Hitler’s worldwide aggression proved these to have been very unwise indeed.

  When the peace was won in 1945, we failed once again to learn from experience and we disarmed once more, only to be called on to defend South Korea from invasion. More recently, our dismissive attitude toward the threats posed by the jihadists throughout the 1990s left us unprepared for the horrific assault that followed. The 9/11 Commission declared that our lack of preparation was a failure of imagination. In fact, ours has been a long history of failing to imagine the very real threats to freedom and peace. Perhaps what was most unusual about the failures that led up to September 11 is that we remained complacent even though the jihadists had declared open war against us, had killed marines in Beirut, had bombed our embassies in Africa, had nearly sunk a destroyer, and had previously bombed the World Trade Center.

  As President Obama proposes to once again reduce our investment in national defense, I acknowledge the public fervor and widespread wish that world peace will prevail nonetheless. But history, the growing threats around us, and the reality that even now the jihadists are killing Americans, all demand that the truth of our peril must trump hope.

  The truth is that we are at war with a formidable enemy and that nations like Russia and China are intent on neutralizing our military lead. The truth is that hatred and tyranny are pervasive; that we will be attacked again and that we cannot confidently predict the nature of the attack, or when or from where it will come. And so the truth is that for our freedoms to endure, we must pay a large price to maintain our freedom, and if we do not pay enough in dollars, we may be forced to pay the price in blood.

  When former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld said that you go to war with the army you have, he was roundly criticized because it had been the administration’s decision whether and when to go to war with Iraq. But the statement itself was correct, of course. You may do your best to rapidly power up once you know the enemy and the nature of the conflict, but in the interim, you can fight only with the soldiers and equipment that have previously been readied. Years ago, the training of soldiers and the production of armaments of warfare were rudimentary. Washington’s minutemen had muskets at home and they already knew how to shoot. Munitions and cannons could quickly be cast in crude foundries. Even decades later at the commencement of World War II, the production of aircraft, tanks, and small arms was relatively straightforward—auto plants were transformed into tank and aircraft plants in just one year. Even so, because we significantly dismantled our military prior to World War II, the investment required for us to catch up and confront our enemies was massive. The defense budget reached 34.5 percent of the GDP in 1945, about nine times today’s 3.8 percent, and the delay prolonged suffering and loss of life.

  Given the lead times necessary to produce the advanced technology of modern warfare and the extensive training required by today’s fighting forces preparing to wield those technologies, wars of the future will necessarily be fought with the soldiers and armaments at hand and long delays will accompany even the most pressing mobilization. An F-22 can’t be built anywhere but in a specialized and dedicated facility by highly skilled engineers and workers; substantially ramping up production could take years. Our F-22 program began in 1986, but the first fighter wasn’t battle-ready until 2006. The Joint Strike Fighter, commissioned in the mid-1990s, is not expected to join our fleet until 2013. Similarly, the training, equipping, protecting, supporting, and even feeding of our personnel are highly sophisticated and time-consuming endeavors. An officer corps and noncommissioned officer corps take years to put in place. To protect America against the many threats we may face in the future, we cannot wait until they are upon us. We must build a military today that is capable of defending against the threats of tomorrow.

  Some people argue that we should sharply narrow the scope of our military and defend against only our current menaces—terrorist insurgences and asymmetric warfare. Their motivation is unquestionably budgetary. If we spend less on the military, they reason, more money will be available for entitlements and social programs. But because we have never been able to accur
ately predict the nature and timing of the next war, and because it takes years of research, procurement, and training to build military capacity, following such a course is certain to be dangerous and quite possibly disastrous. Optimism as to the prospects of peace could cost tens of thousands of lives, and maybe even more. I can think of no social program that is more valuable than the lives and freedom of our sons and daughters. Rather than scale our military according to our hope for peace or out of a desire to shift funds to domestic priorities, we should build it to be capable of fulfilling each of the missions necessary for our sure defense. Only then can we be confident that we will secure America’s place in the world and preserve life, liberty, and prosperity. Those missions should include the following:

  1. Strategic Defense

  America’s strategic defense relies on credible nuclear deterrence. Accordingly, our nuclear arsenal must be updated—comprehensively and soon. While other nations from France to Pakistan have been testing and updating their nuclear capacity, we have done little to maintain our deterrent power. The bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger Commission concluded in 2009 that our nuclear facilities are in urgent need of repair and transformation.

  Russia is insistent that nuclear reduction talks encompass only strategic nuclear weapons, not theater nuclear weapons, which are currently configured for short-range deployment. Their position is understandable, as they have many times the number of theater nuclear weapons as does the United States; they’d like to cement that superiority into place. You can always count on the Russians to bargain in their own interest. We must bargain in our interest, however, never permitting Russia or anyone else to secure nuclear superiority.

  Just as important, we must develop and install a robust missile defense system. Progress achieved in the Bush years in building a shield to protect the United States from the missiles of rogue states and in preparing for a missile shield in Europe was a good start. The Obama administration’s decision to reduce missile defense funding and to abandon our defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic is inexplicable—especially as Iran and North Korea are working overtime to deploy nuclear-tipped missiles that could threaten the world.

  The Cold War doctrine of mutually assured destruction was an effective deterrent against the Soviet Union, a nation intent on its long-term survival. But when unstable nations like Pakistan and North Korea are armed with nuclear weapons, when North Korea attempts to sell nuclear technology to other rogue nations like Syria, and when the Islamic fundamentalist leadership of Iran pushes hard for nuclear capability, we face a risk of nuclear blackmail or worse.

  As important as our missile shield, however, is our pressure on would-be nuclear powers. Iran must be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will exert the necessary force to avert this catastrophe for the world. Not only will Israel’s very existence be threatened, but the entire region and world will be destabilized. A nuclear Iran will precipitate a nuclear race throughout the Middle East. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has boasted that his nation is ready to provide nuclear technology to others, suggesting that Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir may be one of them. In a world in which its signatories have abandoned the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and rogue nations and terrorist organizations will eventually have nuclear weapons, a missile defense capability is a clear and urgent priority for the United States.

  Ideally, we would rid the planet of nuclear weapons. But we are unlikely to be successful in doing so, at least within the coming decades. To begin with, because Russia’s conventional capabilities have badly deteriorated, it derives its power from its nuclear stockpile and strategic weaponry and it has no interest in losing its place in the world by eliminating its nuclear weapons. It does, however, have a great interest in paring down the U.S. arsenal. Iran is committed to becoming a nuclear nation because it believes that achievement will vault it to superpower status among Middle Eastern nations, perhaps securing its candidacy as the twenty-first-century caliphate. And with nuclear power in hand, Iran is virtually guaranteed that no foreign power will invade, as the United States did in Iraq. Iran learned its lesson from North Korea: No matter its size, a malevolent country can thumb its nose at the world with impunity—if it has the bomb.

  Global nuclear disarmament also has the problem of verification. Deceptions are routine. Both India and Pakistan developed their programs in secret, and there are believed to be many other nations that could go nuclear in a relatively short period of time. Nuclear technology is so widespread that it could be harnessed by any number of foes. Could America, or even Russia for that matter, ever realistically rely on signed treaties and agreements to guarantee that no group, no terrorist, and no nation would secretly develop nuclear weapons? It is inconceivable that jihadists would ever abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons, regardless of agreements. As long as even one country or one group of fanatics pursues nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain robust nuclear capability.

  We must not allow wishful thinking to obscure the truth. We are not on the verge of nuclear disarmament; we are on the cusp of greater and extraordinarily dangerous nuclear proliferation. North Korea and Iran’s nuclear arms will compel others to follow suit. While America and the world still have a chance to stop Iran, neither the current administration nor the global powers have yet shown the stomach for deploying and enforcing the truly withering sanctions that goal would require. As a result, the American nuclear deterrent—updated, tested, and ample—and a highly effective missile defense system are essential not just to our security but to the security of the world.

  We must convincingly make clear to friends and foes alike what our response will be if any nation or group chooses to use a nuclear device or other weapon of mass destruction. During the Cold War, each side understood the stakes: A nuclear attack by one superpower would result in massive retaliation by the other. Nations like Iran that may be inclined to provide fissile material to others must be entirely certain that we will hold any nation that supplies nuclear material just as responsible for its use as a country or group that deploys it. Iran’s rulers and its people must be made to understand that developing nuclear technology carries with it a very real risk: If its fissile material gets into the hands of a group that uses it, Iran itself will suffer devastating retaliation. Now is the time to state this plainly, as a deterrent and as a warning—not following an attack when voices are crying for restraint and a proportionate response.

  2. Counterinsurgency and Land War Capacity

  America must be prepared to fight and win land wars and counterinsurgencies, including the ones we are now fighting, and these conflicts rely on ground troops, tanks, field artillery, helicopters, and close air support. The logistical support requirements are complex, numerous, and expensive. In the future, land forces may be required to stabilize a collapsed state—and Pakistan is certainly a possibility in this regard given its nuclear arsenal. Land forces may also be required to again remove a government that is enabling attacks on America, such as was done with the Taliban in Afghanistan and in Saddam’s Iraq. Of course, the existence of a readily deployable military also helps deter attacks on our allies.

  Iran’s direction and support of Hezbollah’s rocket attack against Israel, as well as Russia’s invasion of Georgia, illustrate just how quickly aggressions around the globe can escalate into wars that demand American responses, though in these two instances, American troops were not involved. But scenarios triggering the need for boots on the ground are far less inconceivable than they once were. A military capable of successful ground fighting is not a thing of the past. Even those who insist that we never repeat a mission like that in Iraq should not forget that ground forces remain vitally important in Afghanistan, and in 1990, they were needed to thwart Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. The Desert Storm conflict employed over 500,000 U.S. troops and over 2,000 tanks and other combat vehicles. It would be foolhardy to rule out the need f
or ground forces capable of winning a decisive victory.

  Former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld held to the view that conflicts like those in Iraq and Afghanistan can be successfully waged with a relatively small number of ground troops. That course has failed in both places. As noted by conservative New York Times columnist David Brooks, this path is an illusion with simply no historical record to support it. He continues: The historical evidence suggests that these middling strategies just create a situation in which you have enough forces to assume responsibility for a conflict, but not enough to prevail.

  To fulfill missions of this nature, a good deal of work and investment lie ahead of us. Our ground forces have been stretched, their equipment worn down, and their stockpiles of crucial materials depleted. The demands of the two-front war in Afghanistan and Iraq came after an era of deep cuts in our military preparedness. After the end of the Cold War, the army was cut from eighteen divisions to twelve and consequently, our army and marines were stretched to the breaking point in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most army brigades have been deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan more than once, and fully a quarter of them have been deployed three or more times. Soldiers’ rotations have been extended, critical training shortened, and recovery and recuperation times have been sharply reduced. Early in 2008, General Richard Cody testified to Congress that the demand for our forces exceeds the sustainable supply.

 

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