Damn Few

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by Rorke Denver


  A bunch of absolute professionals who had committed their entire lives to chasing the nation’s enemies had just paid the ultimate price on behalf of all of us.

  * * *

  As the war in Afghanistan trudged on and on, I found myself increasingly wondering: What are we still doing there? I think a lot of people were wondering the same thing, even some of the SEALs who’d been fighting so valiantly in what had become America’s longest-running military conflict.

  Most well-read, educated people—academics, students of history—would have said early on: “When it comes to Afghanistan, invade if you need to, but do not plan on staying for long. Just don’t. Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires.” The British discovered that the hard way. The Russians certainly did. So did occupying powers going back to Alexander the Great. The terrain, the warlords, the corruption, the weather, and the fiercely independent tribesmen—they all conspire against foreign powers in Afghanistan. I’m a sports guy. I know how to read a box score. In Afghanistan, the visiting team is currently 0 and 42.

  Someone overlooked that history lesson, and I don’t mean the U.S. and British special operators who led the invasion or the hundreds of thousands of conventional troops who followed them in. Under highly trying circumstances, they did everything they were asked to and more. The problem was an outmoded strategy. On a twenty-first-century battlefield, America decided to prosecute a twentieth-century war. The mistake wasn’t that we went in so aggressively. The mistake was hanging around so long. Afghanistan should have been conceived from the start as a limited-duration special-operations campaign. That would have achieved what we needed to and allowed us all to move on.

  U.S. troops, along with a handful of allies and fighters from the Afghan Northern Alliance, launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001—and for good reason. Less than a month earlier, al Qaeda terrorists had committed the worst mass murder in U.S. history. The evidence was clear: The terror network had been using Afghanistan as a training base with the full agreement of the country’s Taliban government.

  The initial action unfolded in a series of violent, aggressive specialops assaults led by the Navy SEALs, Green Berets, the Army Rangers, the British SAS, and other elite commandos. Almost all of that went our way. The U.S. air support, from drones and manned aircraft, was overwhelming. The Taliban fighters were simply no match for our special-ops teams or for the conventional U.S. Marine and Army units who backed us up. The results were swift and dramatic. The Taliban regime was ousted in a few short weeks. Most of the senior Taliban leaders fled to neighboring Pakistan. Our handpicked choice, Hamid Karzai, was installed as Afghanistan’s interim president three days before Christmas.

  And that, right then, would have been an excellent time to leave.

  By then, we had killed or chased off—rough estimate—60 to 80 percent of the active Taliban mujahideen and almost all of their protected al Qaeda buddies. We had degraded the enemy’s fighting capacity by similar amounts. Very quickly, we’d achieved most of what we came for, delivering an appropriate response to 9/11. It was time to go. But before we departed, we should have left a note on the ground in Mullah Mohammed Omar’s stronghold, reminding the Taliban chief and his fundamentalist followers what would surely happen if they ever decided to harbor al Qaeda again:

  “Do not make us return. It will be worse next time.”

  Instead, like so many powers before us, the United States got bogged down in a deadly and expensive occupation and nation-building campaign that has proven almost impossible to extract ourselves from. As a culture, those Afghan tribal warriors are tougher than we are. That’s just a fact. They hold blood feuds with each other for generations. They truly respect killing. They seem almost admiring when their enemies put up a good fight. Whether it was Alexander, Genghis Khan, Timur, or the Mughal Empire, the people of Afghanistan have had ample experience tangling with powerful invaders, sometimes overwhelmingly powerful ones. What sends the Afghanis into a blood-boiling frenzy, what makes them crazy, is being occupied. Their independence matters to them more than almost anything. Being under the control of a foreign power goes totally against their most basic tenets in life. No matter how much they hate their own government or how much they hate the tribe one mountain pass away—they cannot abide occupation.

  We should have approached Afghanistan like a sudden punch in the face—hard, quick, and done. That’s what’s most effective with these terror-age enemies.

  I understand the argument on the other side. It has some merit. A decade of war got us Osama bin Laden. The pressure we applied, the intelligence we gathered—that long and rocky path through the Hindu Kush led eventually to Abbottabad. But no one can say that wouldn’t have happened anyway.

  Iraq presented similar issues. It’s all a matter of using our military power in the most effective ways. I’m not suggesting that the SEALs didn’t contribute during those long occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They contributed mightily. Every unit did. The SEALs and special-ops commandos remained deployed and highly active the entire time the U.S. military was present, making momentum-shifting contributions to both fights.

  We’re still the best. We have the absolute top-shelf guys. But the truth of the matter is that in both countries many of the missions we were involved in could have been handled by conventional Army and Marine units.

  Iraq and Afghanistan have provided the conventional forces a tremendous chance to hone their own deadly expertise. Nothing builds battle prowess like going into battle, and since 9/11, our entire military has had nearly endless opportunities for that. Experience counts in war, and they’ve been getting lots of it. So the gap between conventional and special ops has been narrowing. They’re getting awfully good at this stuff. And with every raid they go on and each roadside firefight, they’re narrowing that gap some more. There will soon come a time, if it isn’t here already, that conventional Army and Marine units can handle many of the aggressive battlefield encounters that we performed so effectively.

  It’s great to see those Army and Marine conventionals develop beyond their traditional roles and grow into more comfortable and cohesive units.

  I’m not saying we should change the SEALs’ objective entirely. I can never envision the day when SEALs don’t conduct assault missions and commando raids. These really are at the core of our war-fighting skills. And even in the video-game era of high-tech drone wars, there will always be times to suit up for action and get the job done. Plus, let’s admit the obvious. Those adrenaline-pumping missions are really, really fun.

  But if the others can do some of what we’ve been doing, maybe it’s time for us to find some new and exciting challenges. It’s about recognizing which important tasks the SEALs are uniquely qualified for. There won’t be just one thing, of course. We have never been a one-hit wonder.

  We have a real opportunity here, coming off bin Laden and the pirates and some of our less publicized but even dicier missions. We’ve proven ourselves quite dramatically in that realm. We are lethal. We are patient. We know how to leverage intelligence and local assets. And around the world, the message has been clearly received by our enemies and potential enemies: “Even if it takes us a decade, we will get you.”

  I see a new direction for the SEALs, one we are perfectly suited for. As we look forward, we should be out roaming the earth in Global Pursuit Teams to capture or kill the worst of the worst of the worst. It’s an idea I’ve been interested in for a while now. Its time has very much come.

  We could take our inspiration from the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted List, the one that used to hang at the local post office, and create a new Global Pursuit Ten Most Wanted List. Yesterday’s domestic bad guys with their scrunched-up faces, distinguishing marks, and creepy nicknames fired the imaginations of a million future cops, prosecutors, and federal agents—and recruited the American public into J. Edgar Hoover’s nationwide law-and-order dragnet. It was great PR for the bureau. Whenever they nabbed someone, the special agents
would hold press conferences and trade attaboys while thanking the local authorities for being so cooperative. Not infrequently, some ruthless killer, kidnapper, or bank robber from the list would inspire a full episode of the popular ABC television series The F.B.I. Sometimes, at the end of the hour, Efrem Zimbalist Jr. would come on with an update on a real-life Ten Most Wanted case.

  Today’s international bad guys are far worse than the criminals Inspector Erskine and Special Agent Colby used to nab. Terror is just another tool for today’s Most Wanted. They are frequently aligned with violent guerrilla movements and protected by corrupt governments. Their motives often go beyond personal passion or monetary gain. The havoc they inflict knows no bounds.

  I like the idea of personalizing the hunt. We can say: “This is who I’m assigning in the Special Operations Command to hunt you down. That will be their job. This team won’t be building bridges. They won’t be performing medical support operations. They won’t be engaged in nation-building partnerships with other foreign nationals. The only thing they’ll be doing is globally pursuing you. Yes, you. Wherever you are, this special team will be hunting for you.”

  I think it would be great if the president said, “The entire special-operations bud get is now devoted to chasing bad guys. We’ll put individual spec-op country teams in Chad or Yemen or Indonesia” and wherever else makes sense. “You will grow beards and blend in with the local populations. You will partner with other U.S. three-letter agencies and share intelligence. You’ll make connections and figure out who’s bad and who’s good. You’ll develop those networks and those alliances.”

  Then a phone call would go back to SOCOM. The assault force would head back into action. We would just start knocking characters off the list.

  Let’s go get ’em, I say.

  Moving across borders like that brings up all kinds of international issues, but they are not unsolvable. It may mean negotiating a deal with the government in Country X. We’d call the president of Country X and say, “Here’s the deal. We have actual intelligence, and this is a one-shot opportunity. We know he is at this grid location in your country. We can hit him alone. You can hit him alone. You can hit him with us. Or you can do nothing. We’re giving you those four options. It’s the only time we’re giving you this information, and it’s the only time we’ll ask permission to come do it. We believe vital American and world interests are met by taking this character out.”

  If that country says, “We’ll get him,” we’ll see if they do. If they do, “Great. Job done. We appreciate it. Aid continues to flow into your country.” If they say, “We’ll partner with you—let’s do it together”—sweet. We’ll put local guys in the helicopter. Together, we’ll get the target. If they say, “Come get him,” you know we will. If they say, “No,” we’ll say, “Fine. No more aid comes to your country. Done. Not a dime gets sent from American funds to your nation until we get him. You have chosen to harbor this international outlaw.” Then we leave.

  And if we decide to go in anyway—well, I think we’ve proven we know how to slip in and out of challenging places and take care of some serious business while we’re there. Just ask Osama bin Laden.

  Regardless of which approach we follow, we’ll announce it: “Okay. Got him. He’s off the Global Pursuit Ten Most Wanted List. Who’s moving up?’”

  Just announcing these Global Pursuit teams and their Top Ten mission would be a psychological nightmare for any of those targets. “Son of a bitch,” they’d be thinking to themselves. “Ten years, and they found bin Laden, barely living, hiding in a damn house. The SEALs got him.”

  I don’t mind the world’s worst characters glancing over their shoulders, constantly concerned about when the SEALs will arrive. Worrying when Big D’s breacher charge will bust open the door to their hideaway, when Sonny and Josh will appear with their heavy machine guns, when Lope will be standing outside with his big green radio calling in air support, when our snipers have eyes on and the end is near.

  The choice to serve is the best decision I have made in my life, short of marrying Tracy. As most of my friends went out to make a living, I was discovering what I was made of and how I could give some part of that back.

  Every minute of this SEAL experience has been clean for me. I joined for the same reasons most of my brothers did—because it meant something special for each of us. The fact that the journey was exceptionally difficult was a big part of what made it so appealing to me. It has been an incredible honor to be part of a community that believes in taking on great challenges and does what it takes to meet them.

  That mind-set is hugely potent. It applies to many things in life.

  I am not certain what is next for me. When you’ve been through the things that we have, everything that follows is a gift. Your perspective is forever changed. You don’t worry about things that a lot of people worry about. You know you can withstand the daily inconveniences. You know you can meet the most hideous challenges. As you look forward, you know that you can always find a way to do things right.

  I know for a fact I will continue to serve.

  I have a commitment in my head. I plan to carry it with me. My sword has been and will forever remain in the service of the nation. But it turns out that the values that SEALs live by, the values that SEALs measure themselves by, apply far more broadly.

  Be excellent.

  It pays to be a winner.

  The only easy day was yesterday.

  Don’t ever let your teammates down.

  Carry your full measure of the load.

  Don’t disrespect the game by not preparing fully or playing it as well as you possibly can. Be present always.

  That’s really what it’s all about, wherever we find our battlefields. All of us are carrying our own piece of the load and carrying someone else’s if we’re needed.

  I will do my best to follow the inspiration of Tecumseh, a message so pure and powerful, I’ll be passing it on to my girls.

  “Live your life,” the Shawnee chief said, “that the fear of death can never enter your heart.”

  I have, and it won’t.

  THE WARRIOR’S BOOKSHELF

  ANCIENT WAR

  The Peloponnesian War, by Thucydides

  You thought Iraq and Afghanistan dragged on long? This brilliantly crafted account of ancient warfare explores the earliest attempts at democracy. Written by a true historical and philosophical genius.

  Scipio Africanus: Greater than Napoleon, by B. H. Liddell Hart

  Timeless lessons from one of history’s few undefeated warriors. An insightful read for leaders and military strategists.

  The Art of War, by Sun Tzu

  The definitive work of military strategy and tactics, attributed to a high-ranking Chinese general of the late 400s BC. Everything you need to know to wage war.

  Gates of Fire, by Steven Pressfield

  Intensely dramatic, perfectly nuanced, this meticulous novel has achieved mythic status among modern warriors. The gold standard of warrior-brotherhood fiction, our culture at its most extreme.

  MODERN WAR

  The Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant

  There is no finer memoir of a military career.

  Once an Eagle, by Anton Myrer

  An incredible novel about leadership, selflessness, and courage, it follows a career U.S. Army officer from the Mexican expedition to Vietnam. Great stuff.

  On Combat, by Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman

  A fascinating exploration of the physiology and psychology of deadly-force encounters, and what happens to men’s bodies and minds when they go to war.

  An Army at Dawn: The War in North Africa, 1942–1943, vol. 1 of the Liberation Trilogy, by Rick Atkinson

  The crucial but often forgotten lessons of World War II’s North Africa campaign.

  Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War, by Karl Marlantes

  Incredible novel of young men at war, although I may be biased. The story follows BRAVO Company. I w
as always a BRAVO Platoon SEAL.

  Band of Brothers, by Stephen E. Ambrose

  Do I really even need to go into detail?

  Blood Meridian: Or the Evening Redness in the West, by Cormac McCarthy

  Because writing about violence and the borderlands just doesn’t get any better.

  Last of the Breed, by Louis L’Amour

  The great gunfighter novelist of the Wild West explores the world of U.S. Air Force test pilots. No special military leadership lessons, just a fun, gripping read.

  THE IDEALS WE FIGHT FOR

  Declaration of Independence

  Because it is staggering in foresight and beautiful in language.

  Constitution of the United States

  Because you haven’t read it yet.

  Gettysburg Address

  Because it wastes not a single word.

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  I believe in giving thanks. Partly, this is because I have so much—and so many—to be thankful for. But the importance of expressing appreciation is also one of the greatest lessons I have learned in my years as a Navy SEAL.

  We do not live in the golden age of American manners. Today, decorum is often dismissed as an outmoded formality—unnecessary and insincere. But customs and courtesies still matter in the military. Warriors uniquely understand: These rituals of kindness and respect are a rare and special thing. I have never once felt that a genuine thank-you was wasted on anyone.

  The way I see it, if you are in this book, you have already made the supreme cut. Thank you again. You got me here.

  To my cherished cousins, uncles, aunts, and grandparents: You have helped to make me who I am. Please accept that the intensity with which I wrote about family in this book applies as well to you. I am sincerely grateful to all of you.

 

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