His fleet in late 323 numbered 240 vessels (Diod. 18.15.8). Its mobilization was
already underway before the beginning of the war in Greece, and its formation
may have been at least partial y responsible for Craterus’ initial delay in crossing to Macedonia, while Alexander yet lived. Craterus was preparing a fleet either to attack Athens over the Harpalus affair or in preparation for Alexander’s proclaimed western campaign (Diod. 18.4.4; Arr. Anab. 7.1.2; Curt. 10.1.17). Too much emphasis has been put on the supposed delay in responding to Antipater’s request
for aid.62 The likelihood is that what is seen as delay is simply the effect of waiting for a clearer picture of events both in Babylon and in Greece to emerge, the distance
The Death of a Conqueror
39
between Cilicia and the Hellespont (approximately 800–900 miles depending on
route, or a 50–60-day march), and time for preparation (securing Cilicia and
the Hellespont). With Alexander’s death and the Babylonian settlement occurring
in June, the full knowledge of these events would not have arrived in Cilicia
before July. The famous Persian dispatch riders, given that the system described by Herodotus (8.98) was still in operation, would have taken at least ten days to travel from Babylon to Cilicia (Casson 1994: 53). Craterus’ departure from Cilicia under the best of circumstances would have been delayed until the following spring
In the Aegean, the combined Macedonian fleets of Antipater and Cleitus would,
then, have been truly superior to the Greek force, as Diodorus indicates (18.15.8).
The fleet must either have already defeated the Athenians prior to Leonnatus’ arrival in the Hellespont, or shortly thereafter. In any case the warships were available to shepherd that commander and his army across to Europe. Neither Cleitus nor
Craterus would have refused to assist a fellow Macedonian. At that time the empire was united under the authority of its kings and regent. Craterus’ concern for the empire and his loyalty to the interests of Macedonia are patent. When he did leave for Europe, he left more than sufficient forces to protect the royal treasury and the province of Cilicia (Heckel 1982: 60–2; 2006: 30, 290). These forces readily obeyed the commands of Perdiccas, indicating that Craterus had no interest in securing
Cilicia against the regent. Cleitus’ force, after ensuring the successful crossing, remained at Abydus awaiting the arrival of Craterus, while Antipater’s Macedonian fleet under the command of Micion likely returned to western Aegean waters, where it raided the coast of Attica from a base established near Rhamnous (Plut. Phoc.
25.1–4). This latter Macedonian force was then defeated by the Athenians in a land battle. The fate of the fleet is not recorded, but it likely suffered at the hands of the Athenian ships that had survived their defeat in the Hellespont.63 What ships did remain probably joined Cleitus. Much of Antipater’s fleet had been made up of
those ships which had been dispatched from the royal navy to transport and protect a consignment of treasure sent to Macedonia by Alexander (Diod. 18.12.2).
After crossing the Hellespont and entering Macedonia, Leonnatus recruited
additional troops (Diod. 18.14.5), likely from those who had been initial y left
behind by Antipater to guard the country when he himself headed south into
Thessaly (Diod. 18.12.2), bringing his relieving force up to 20,000 infantry and
1500 cavalry. He then marched to the relief of Lamia (Diod. 18.14.5). The Greeks
immediately gave up the siege, but not the war. Sending all non-combatants to
nearby Melitia, they moved quickly to intercept Leonnatus and his army before
they could rendezvous with those of Antipater. In the ensuing battle the Thessalian cavalry proved critical again, and Leonnatus’ force was defeated and its commander killed (Diod. 18.15.1–4; Just. 13.5.14; Arr. Succ. 1a.9). Antipater later brought the defeated troops into his army and retreated from Lamia by ways not easily
accessible to cavalry, but he remained in Thessaly (cf. Diod. 18.16.5), where the Greeks under the command of Antiphilus also remained (Diod. 18.15.5–7).
That summer Craterus crossed the strait, and the balance of power in Europe
was quickly altered. Craterus willingly placed himself under Antipater’s command
40
Alexander’s Heirs
(Diod. 18.16.4–5). Antipater now led 40,000 heavy infantry, 3000 archers, and
5000 cavalry (Diod. 18.16.5); his opponents, 25,000 foot and 3500 cavalry.
Diodorus (18.17.1–2) accounts for the lower numbers of Greeks as being the result of their previous victories over the Macedonians. They had come to despise their
northern neighbors and many of the allies returned home to attend to unspecified
“private matters.”64 While these events were unfolding, Cleitus and the Macedonian fleet, having achieved the mission of securing Craterus’ passage to Europe, had
moved from the Hellespont out into the Aegean, to seek and destroy the Athenian
fleet. The two navies met near the island of Amorgus. The Macedonians then
pursued the defeated Athenians into the Malian Gulf, where the coup de grâce to the Athenian navy was delivered.65 This last naval victory was achieved shortly
before the Macedonian land victory at Crannon in August of 322 (Plut. Dem. 28.1).
Here, as previously, the Thessalians had prevailed over their Macedonian counter-
parts, but the sheer numbers of the Macedonian infantry proved victorious.
While the Battle of Crannon was not decisive on the battlefield, coming as it did on top of the naval defeats in the Aegean, it effectively brought an end to the war.
The allied commanders contemplated waiting for their missing allies to join them
to renew the struggle, but in the end decided to treat for terms (Diod. 18.17.6).
They had hoped to do so as an alliance (Diod. 18.17.7). When, however, Antipater
demanded that each city must sue for peace separately, the commanders withdrew
their offer, and the Macedonian commander began the systematic reduction of the
Thessalian cities. These now began to seek accommodations individual y with
Antipater, who granted them easy terms. Encouraged by the treatment of their
Thessalian allies, many other states sought and received terms. Soon only the
Athenians and the Aetolians remained (Diod. 18.17.7–18.1). The Macedonians
now marched on Athens which, given the desertion of most of its allies, its crippled navy (Diod. 18.15.9), and the Macedonian control of the Hellespont in effect
blocking access to its grain supply from the Black Sea, as demanded by Antipater, surrendered unconditional y (Diod. 18.18.3). The peace was secured, but it was
not a lenient one, despite Diodorus’ claim (18.18.4) that the Macedonians treated the city “humanely.” Athens was garrisoned in early October (Plut. Phoc. 28.2; Dem. 28.1), and 12,000 lower-class Athenians were encouraged by Antipater to emigrate to a new settlement in Thrace (Diod. 18.18.4–5; Plut. Phoc. 28.7).66 It is unknown how many actual y took up the offer, but it likely was not many (Baynham
2003: 26). The new government was to be an oligarchy. While the dominant Greek
political tradition of a sovereign assembly remained as the law-making body,
the former Athenian tradition of that assembly being composed of all adult male
citizens was now drastical y altered. Only those citizens possessing at least 2000
drachmas (one-third of a talent) of property, in total approximately 9000 men
(Diod. 18.18.5), would retain voting rights and the ability to hold office; those with less were disenfranchised, only retaining the private rights of citizenship (Diod.
18.18.4). Antipater demanded that the Athenian democratic leaders, principal y
Demosthenes and Hypereides, be surrender
ed, but they had already fled the city
(Plut. Phoc. 26.2, 27.5; Dem. 28.2; cf. Paus. 1.8.2). The new Athenian delimited
The Death of a Conqueror
41
assembly to assuage Antipater then condemned them to death (Plut. Dem. 28.2; Arr. Succ. 1a.13). Demosthenes committed suicide by taking poison (Plut. Dem. 29); Hypereides was less fortunate. He was captured, and before being executed had
his tongue cut out (Plut. Dem. 28.4; Mor. 849A–B). The leaders of the new Athenian polity were Phocion and Demades; both were pro-Macedonian in their
policies, but where Phocion was described as incorruptible (Plut. Phoc. passim), Demades was anything but (Worthington 1992: 271; contra Williams 1989:
19–21). The days of Athens as a Greek power were now over, as they were for the
city-states in general (so Borza 1999: 59). After settling affairs in Athens, Antipater had proceeded into the Peloponnesus (cf. Plut. Dem. 28.4), where he was dealing with other Greek allies of the Athenians in the late war. Following this incursion into the Peloponnesus, Antipater and Craterus returned to Macedonia in the late
fall or early winter, where Craterus married Antipater’s eldest daughter, Phila
(Diod. 18.18.8), and father-in-law and son-in-law now planned a spring offensive
against the Aetolians (cf. Diod. 18.24.1).
Notes
1 Diodorus (20.20.1) lists his age in 310 as 17; Justin (15.2.3), 15.
2 Diod. 18.2.2.; Plut. Mor. 337D; Just. 13.2.11; 14.5.2; App. Syr. 52; cf. Badian 1964b: 264; Greenwalt 1985.
3 Arr. Anab. 3.16.9; 5.3.6; 6.3.2; 7.25.2; Plut. Alex. 23.2; Diod. 17.16.3, 18.1; Just. 7.2.9–12; 9.4.1.
4 Dem. 19.192; Arr. Anab. 1.11.1; 3.16.9; 5.3.6; 6.3.2; 7.25.2; Plut. Alex. 23.2; Diod. 16.91.4; 17.16.3, 18.1; Just. 7.2.9–12; 9.4.1; Athen. 13.572D–E.
5 Schol. Dem. Olyn. 1.5; Aristid. Or. 38.480; cf. Diod. 18.28.4, 19.52.5; Just. 9.7.11, 11.2.1; Athen. 4.155A; see Hammond 1970: 64–7.
6 On the traditional hetairos relationship, see Stagakis 1962: 53–67; 1970: 86–102; Heckel 2003: 197–225; Anson 2013b: 19–21.
7 The location is confirmed by the presence of a throne (Curt. 10.6.4).
8 On the position of chiliarch and its history, in general, see Collins 2001: 259–83; Meeus 2009b: 302–10.
9 On Alexander’s marriages to Stateira and Parysatis, the daughter of the Persian king Artaxerxes III Ochus, see Arr. Anab. 7.4.4.
10 Arr. Anab. 5.25.1–29.1; Diod. 17.93.2–95.2; Curt. 9.2.1–3.19; Plut. Alex. 62.
11 Curt. 10.2.12–4.3; Arr. Anab. 7.8.1–11.9; Diod. 17.109.1–3; Just. 12.11.1–12.12; Plut.
Alex. 71.2–9.
12 On Macedonian royal polygamy, see Carney 2000: 23–7.
13 The two conspiracies connected to Alexander’s new policies are those of Dimnus/
Philotas in 330 (Curt. 6.7.1–11.38; Just. 12.5.2–3; Arr. Anab. 3.26.1–27.1, 5; Diod.
17.79.1; Plut. Alex. 49.3) and the Pages in 327 (Arr. Anab. 4.14.2; Curt. 8.7.1–6).
14 J.E. Atkinson (Atkinson and Yardley 2009: 182–3) correctly identifies this council as one of the hetairoi, but likely only of “a smaller group of trusted advisers.”
15 Bosworth 2002: 35–45; Martin 1983: 161–91.
42
Alexander’s Heirs
16 Justin (13.1.2–8, 2.1) begins his history of the aftermath of Alexander’s death by remarking that while the “barbarians” were grieved at the loss of their king, the Macedonians were delighted at the death of their leader. But, earlier, according to Justin (12.15.3), the Macedonians were in tears over the impending demise of their king. Moreover, he has Meleager in the meeting of the private principes nominating Heracles for the office (13.2.6–7). This last is certainly in error, given that in Justin’s account (13.2.9–10) Meleager, in the same speech in which he makes the Heracles’
suggestion, condemns any offspring from Roxane as unwanted because the child’s
descent would be from the ranks of the conquered.
17 Hammond estimates the number at less than 10,000 (1980: 245), and Bosworth (1988a: 267) suggests maybe as few as 8000, but there appears no good reason to question
Curtius’ Figure.
18 Clearly Arrhidaeus was a functioning human being whose diminished capacity may have been no more than mild to moderate retardation (Plut. Mor. 337D; Greenwalt 1985: 75–6; Carney 2001: 78–82).
19 The text reads Amissus, but see Heckel 1992: 148 n. 454; 2006: 102.
20 Carney (2006: 70) believes that the prostasia “was not a specific office but rather an undefined prominence and power.” See Anson 1992; 2009; Meeus 2009b, for the
arguments for prostasia referring to the regency.
21 However, see Meeus (2008: 57–8) for the argument that Meleager, Craterus, and Perdiccas were all three to be regents with different areas of responsibility.
22 Curtius states that 300 were put to death, but this number appears excessive and is likely a scribal error. Arrian ( Succ. 1a.4) simply states that the prominent leaders were executed.
23 On the time of his birth, Curtius (10.6.9) states that Roxane was six months pregnant when Alexander died, but Justin (13.2.5) claims that she was eight. With no way to decide between Curtius and Justin, the birth could have occurred as early as the final settlement in Babylon or as late as September (Errington 1970: 58).
24 M.J. Fontana (1960: 127) argues that the phrase “the kings” originates with Hieronymus and that while Philip (Arrhidaeus) was alive, only he possessed the royal title (1960: 124–7). W. Schwahn (1931: 313; cf. Rosen 1967a: 99) declares that while both were royal, Philip was to rule until Alexander came of age. Only the so-called Heidelberg Epitome ( FGrH 155 F-1.1) explicitly supports Schwahn’s contention.
25 While Diodorus 18.23.2 could be taken to mean that Perdiccas had seized the prostasia of the kings from the absent Craterus (Rosen 1967a: 104; Heckel 2006: 98–9), this passage clearly refers back to those confusing days in Babylon before the final settlement was reached (see Anson 2004: 58; Meeus 2008: 74). Diodorus 18.2.4 and 18.3.1 are very clear that Perdiccas from the time of the final Babylon settlement held the regency alone. Throughout this period the actual power remained with those physical y present in Babylon (Anson 1992: 42–3; Errington 1970: 54, 56–7; Heckel 1988: 20–1).
26 These last plans included the building of 1000 warships for a western campaign, construction of a road across North Africa, erection of six grand temples, establishing cities, and transplanting populations (Diod. 18.4.2–5; cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.7).
27 Justin (13.4.5) states that Craterus was given control of finance.
28 On the Odrysian Kingdom of Thrace, see Archibald 1998.
29 Justin (13.5.1) states that the war started while Alexander was still alive, but see Heckel and Wheatley (Yardley, Heckel, and Wheatley 2011: 123).
30 Dmitriev (2004: 379–80) claims that, since Alexander “allow[ed] the Greek cities to use their own laws with respect to those who wished to return,” “this decree did not
The Death of a Conqueror
43
interfere in the internal affairs of Greek cities and had no direct connection to the Lamian war.” Diodorus (18.8.6–7) makes it clear that both the Athenians and the Aetolians after the issuance of the decree remained at peace only through their fear of Alexander. Diodorus, also, however, makes it clear that the decree was only one aspect of what were believed to be the evils of Macedonian hegemony.
31 Harpalus was murdered by Thibron (Diod. 17.108.8.8; 18.19.2; cf. Paus. 2.33.4), who later attacked Cyrene (Diod. 18.19–21; Arr. Succ. 1a.16–18).
32 Plutarch says 200; Curtius, depending on the manuscript, lists either 120 or 190 ships.
33 On this identification and their previous service with Alexander, see Tarn 1948: 151–3; Anson 1981: 117–20; 1988: 131–3; Heckel 1982: 60–2.
34 For the distribution, see Diod. 18.3.1–3; Arr. Succ. 1a.5–8; 1b.2–7; Curt. 10.10.1–4; Just. 13.5, 9–23; cf. App. Syr. 52
–3.
35 Curtius 3.4.1 lists the name of the satrap as Abistamenes. It would appear these are two versions of the same name, rather than two different satraps (see Bosworth 1980b: 189).
36 Strabo (12.1.4) states that Cappadocia had been divided into two provinces prior to the Macedonian invasion.
37 Justin’s statement (13.4.14–15) that Lycia and Pamphylia went to Nearchus is in error.
Nearchus had held these areas until 330 (Arr. Anab. 3.6.6; 4.7.2), when they were transferred to the Phrygian satrap; this fact obviously is responsible for Justin’s confusion.
38 There is considerable disagreement with regard to Cleomenes’ actual title and powers in Egypt during Alexander’s lifetime. While Cleomenes may have ultimately been appointed satrap by Alexander (Seibert 1969: 43–4, 50), it is more likely that he simply became the de facto satrap of Egypt. Our sources state that Alexander had initial y divided authority in Egypt among a number of officials, leaving no one in overall authority (Arr. Anab.
3.5.2–7). Cleomenes’ exercise of financial oversight and his apparent control of the grain exports from Egypt, much of which were being shipped to Greek markets ([Arist.] Oec.
2.2.33, 1352a16; Dem. 56.7), may have made him seem, from a Greek perspective, the supreme authority in Egypt. Alexander likely saw it as unwise to entrust such a wealthy and easily defensible region to one individual (Heckel 2006: 89).
39 On this incident, see Schober 1981: 27–32; Holt 1988: 84–5.
40 While numbers of rebels fled the battle without bothering to surrender, those who did surrender were executed. The text is very clear. Additional y, the so-called prologue to Trogus’ Book Thirteen states that all the rebels were killed by Pithon. The actual number killed, however, was likely about 3000, as suggested by both Schober (1981: 35–6, and n. 2) and Holt (1988: 88–90). There were still thousands of Greeks who
remained in the area after the massacre (Holt 1995: 90–1).
41 This is true despite the remark attributed to Phocion by Plutarch ( Phoc. 23.4) that the Athenians were short on the money needed for a long war. His other supposed claims that the Athenians had too few ships and too few men, especial y, if rowers were being implied, rings truer.
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