Whatever the source of the problems, Neoptolemus’ assigned task was a for-
midable one. In general, campaigning in Armenia could be brutal (Xen. Anab.
4.3–5; Plut. Luc. 32; Tac. Ann. 13.35.5–6), especial y for an army deficient in cavalry, which apparently was the case with Neoptolemus’ force (cf. Plut. Eum.
4.3–4). Armenia had long been known for its fine horses and had supplied the
Persians with 20,000 foals each year (Str. 11.13.7, 14.9; Xen. Anab. 4.5.24, 35–6). It is also apparent that Orontes, the satrap of Greater Armenia, provided no material aid to Neoptolemus. Indeed, Orontes later maintained a remarkable neutrality in
the wars that were soon to arise among Alexander’s former commanders (Heckel
2006: 185).
Perdiccas assigned Eumenes the task of rescuing the Armenian campaign,
which had stalled in part due to the insubordination of the Macedonian forces
under Neoptolemus’ command (Plut. Eum. 4.1–3). Plutarch’s statements suggest that, given the difficulty of the campaign, the troops had ceased to follow the
orders of their commander and that individual had proven powerless to persuade
them. Since Perdiccas did not remove Neoptolemus from Armenia and, indeed,
later even put a degree of trust in him (cf. Diod. 18.29.2), this was not a case of Neoptolemus’ insubordination, but that of his Macedonians. Many of these troops
had been responsible for the troubles in Babylon over the succession. They were
not docile new recruits, but hard-bitten veterans (see Roisman 2012). As a result of Neoptolemus’ difficulties in Armenia, Perdiccas, while leaving him in his position there, subsequently did not place him in any other independent commands.
He had proven to be an ineffective leader.
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At first, Eumenes made little headway with either the troops or their commander
(Plut. Eum. 4.3); indeed, it was probably during this operation that Neoptolemus uttered the statement in reference to Eumenes’ long service in charge of the
Macedonian chancellery (Anson 2004: 36–46), found in Plutarch ( Eum. 1.6), that while he, Neoptolemus, “followed Alexander with shield and spear, Eumenes had
followed the king with pen and writing tablet.” The Cardian dealt with the situation by raising a force of 6300 Cappadocian cavalry through the use of outright gifts
and the promise of immunity from taxation (Plut. Eum. 4.3–4). Darius had used Cappadocian cavalry against Alexander (Arr. Anab. 3.8.5, 11.7; Curt. 4.12.12), and Ariarathes had possessed 15,000 cavalry in 322 (Diod. 18.16.2). Eumenes’
concessions to the Cappadocians and his confidence in their military ability
secured for him a very loyal province. At the time of his death, even though
Eumenes had not been in the area for almost three years, his mother, wife, and
children were still resident in Cappadocia (Nep. Eum. 13.4). The loyalty of the native populations to those of Alexander’s Successors who treated them with favor could be great, as was the case later with the Pisidians and Perdiccas’ brother
Alcetas (Diod. 18.46.2–47.3). Accommodating local elites was a policy followed by Alexander the Great himself to great effect (see Anson 2013b: 151–2). The addition of Eumenes’ Cappadocian cavalry “emboldened the Macedonians” (Plut. Eum.
4.4), and rekindled their enthusiasm for the campaign. There is no further word
of difficulties in Armenia, and Perdiccas left Neoptolemus in that command
(cf. Diod. 18.29.2; Plut. Eum. 5.2).
Perdiccas’ campaign in Pisidia was much less taxing than the one in Cappadocia.
Both recalcitrant cities fell after short and brutal struggles (Diod 18.22.2–7). The Isaurians in particular resisted tenaciously, and when such resistance was on
the verge of being overcome, they set their city on fire and threw themselves into the flames. It is unclear what was the status of Pisidia after these cities were captured, but it would appear that Alcetas, Perdiccas’ brother, was made general or satrap of the region. This commander is later found in Pisidia (Diod. 18.44.1).
With Armenia and Pisidia now brought under the control of the regent,
Perdiccas remained in Pisidia and there took up the question of Antigonus. The
latter had ignored the order from the kings and their regent to conduct Eumenes
to his satrapy in 323. While insubordination was the likely charge, the actual
charges are never specified. Diodorus (18.23.4) only states that the charges were
“false and unjust”; Photius’ Epitome of Arrian ( Succ. 1a.20) gives no specifics or characterizations. Moreover, these allegations come approximately a year and a
half after the incident involving Eumenes. Still Antigonus’ only known offense was his lack of response to this call to help the Cardian acquire his satrapy (Briant 1973b: 155–6). It has been claimed that Antigonus was not charged with refusing
to help Eumenes, but rather refusing to aid Antipater during the Lamian War
(Fontana 1960: 328–9). However, no source indicates that Antigonus was ever
asked to send aid to Europe. Diodorus (18.23.2–4) states that the “false and unjust”
charges were the result of Antigonus discovering Perdiccas’ ambition to seize the throne, but it is unlikely that this ambition had yet manifested itself. If Diodorus’
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claim were true, it is difficult to explain Perdiccas’ almost casual pursuit of
Antigonus, if he were trying to silence him. It is likely that Diodorus through his radical abridging of his source has confused the initial call to Antigonus to answer charges with the later report attributing just such ambitions to Perdiccas. What is apparent is that Antigonus had established in the long years away from court
in Phrygia, a semi-independent principality, controlling roughly two-thirds of
Macedonian-held Asia Minor (Billows 1990: 46), and had established ties with
many of his Persian and native neighbors (Anson 1988a: 471–7). The insubordina-
tion of such a powerful individual threatened the entire Babylonian settlement
and the new government.
The Phrygian satrap was summoned to answer charges formal y before King
Philip and his council (cf. Arr. Succ. 1a.20; Diod. 18.23.4). The invitation was issued probably in the late spring of 321. Perdiccas’ purpose was to force Antigonus to flee, since Antigonus would be difficult to move against militarily (Anson 1988a: 471–7).
The regent was in no hurry. In the final analysis, he hoped to accomplish his
purpose without having to invade Phrygia. Consequently, Antigonus was given
time in which to respond (cf. Diod. 18.23.4) in the hope that the Phrygian satrap would flee. The regent’s campaign in Pisidia must have alarmed Antigonus, since
the main military road from the coast passed through Pisidia and continued to
Celaenae, the Phrygian capital. Also, western Pisidia had been ostensibly under
Antigonus’ authority as well (Billows 1990: 46).
Also in the spring of 321, one of Antipater’s daughters, Nicaea, accompanied by
her brother Iolaus, arrived in Perdiccas’ camp (Arr. Succ. 1a.21; Diod. 18.23.1; Just 13.6.6). Perdiccas had requested her hand in marriage shortly after the settlement was reached in Babylon, and likely had sent her brother, Iolaus, one of Alexander’s former pages, to Macedonia with the request (Arr. Succ. 1a.21). Antipater’s preoc-cupation with the Lamian War had delayed his response. There is no evidence that
the delay resulted from Antipater’s dissatisfaction with the settlement reached
in Babylon (Errington 1970: 60). There were ample concerns to keep Antipater
occupied until at least the conclusion of the Lamian War, nor is there any evidence of such dissatisfaction. Antipater, despite his
assigned joint command with
Craterus (Arr. Succ. 1a.7), should have been pleased. After al , Alexander had ordered Craterus to replace him in Macedonia (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4), and those orders had been rescinded in Babylon (Diod. 18.4.1). Indeed, as part of Antipater’s strategy for the new era without Alexander, he wished to create alliances with
various Diadochs through marriages to his daughters: Phila, Nicaea, Eurydice,
and one whose name is unknown. Phila married Craterus after the completion of
the war in Greece (Diod. 18.18.7), and Eurydice at some point married Ptolemy
(Paus. 1.6.8). Antipater and Craterus had returned to Macedonia late in the winter of 322/21, and had begun to make plans of their own. A full-scale invasion of
Aetolia was to begin in the spring (Diod. 18.24.1–25.2). Further, it was decided
that Craterus would eventual y return to Asia (Diod. 18.18.7). Nowhere is it made clear in what capacity Craterus was to be accommodated in Asia. However,
Hellespontine Phrygia had a vacancy; Antigonus had proven troublesome; later,
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53
so would Menander in Lydia. Satraps were appointed by the authority of the king
or his regent and were subject to reassignment, theoretical y at any time.
Consequently, there is no need to see Craterus’ wish to return to Asia as an assault on the authority of Perdiccas (as Bosworth 1993: 427). He may even have been
negotiating for some supervisory authority over Asia Minor. Perdiccas had moved
west from Babylon because of the failure of Leonnatus and Antigonus to support
Eumenes. At this time, the two Macedonians appeared determined to reach a
peaceful understanding with the regent (Errington 1970: 61–2). Their shock shown
later when Perdiccas’ plans to invade Macedonia and seize the kingship became
known (cf. Diod. 18.23.3) certainly suggests that there was no thought of hostility for the present or even in the near future on the part of Antipater and Craterus.
Antipater certainly had been scrupulously correct in his dealings with the
regent. Shortly after the surrender of Athens at the close of the Lamian War, he
had referred the question of Athenian possession of Samos to the kings (Diod.
18.18.6), i.e. to Perdiccas. The Samian exiles were subsequently restored and the island freed on “Perdiccas’ order” (Diod. 18.18.9). Antipater had been, however,
in communication with Ptolemy and these communications had led to an “under-
standing” (Diod. 18.14.2; cf. 18.25.4), and, perhaps, as noted, a marriage. Antipater was facing the threat from the southern Greek world and, moreover, had not been
part of the negotiations and settlement made in Babylon. All of these arrange-
ments with the other Diadochs may simply have been an attempt to join in a
personal way the new order. Perdiccas, however, was himself clearly preparing
for a time when relations with Antipater might sour. Perhaps, as early as in 322
(Errington 1970: 62–3), the regent was in contact with the Aetolians (Diod.
18.38.1) and in receipt of letters from the Athenian leader Demades which invited his intervention in Europe (Diod. 18.48.2). None of these communications were
revealed to Antipater. Diodorus (18.25.4) by his sequencing of events suggests
that Ptolemy may also have been the object of some unspecified plot at this
early date, but it is more likely our author has confused his chronology and that this plotting refers to a later time (Diod. 18.26.1–2, 28.2–29.1; Arr. Succ. 1a.25).
Whatever the purpose of these various communications among the Diadochs, the
situation was to be dramatical y changed by subsequent events.
Concurrent with Nicaea’s arrival, Alexander’s sister, Cleopatra, appeared
offering herself in marriage to the regent (Arr. Succ. 1a.21; Diod. 18.23.1; Just.
13.6.4). This was likely more than just a coincidence. Leonnatus had received the offer of alliance and a daughter in marriage from Antipater, apparently just before the arrival of the matrimonial offer from Alexander’s sister (Diod. 18.12.1).11 Of the regent’s councilors, Eumenes was the most vocal supporter of the marriage to
Cleopatra (Arr. Succ. 1a.21). Many reasons could and have been given for Eumenes’
endorsement of this marriage. It was in Eumenes’ interest to discourage an alliance between his new patron and his old enemy Antipater. While the cause of this
enmity is unstated, it likely stems from Eumenes’ long-standing friendship with
Olympias (Diod. 18.58.2–3; cf. Plut. Eum. 13.1; Nep. Eum. 6.3) and is related to her ongoing feud with Antipater.It is likely that the instigation for the Cleopatra
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Alexander’s Heirs
marriage proposal here again came from Olympias (Arr. Succ. 1a.21; cf. Just.
13.6.4). It has been suggested that Eumenes was behind Cleopatra’s appearance
(Errington 1970: 63). Even though Justin (13.6.4) implies that Perdiccas himself
was responsible for Cleopatra’s presence; this seems unlikely, given the description of the later debate over the two potential spouses. The presence of two possible
marriage partners for the regent brought into the open a rift which had developed within the ranks of Perdiccas’ councilors. This division may also be seen in the
duplicitous dealings of the regent with Antipater, while acknowledging his authority yet secretly communicating with the Aetolians and the Athenian Demades. Eumenes
supported the union with the royal family; the regent’s brother Alcetas supported the marriage with Nicaea and thereby the alliance and the status quo with Antipater (Arr. Succ. 1a.21). Alcetas’ faction believed that Perdiccas, in control of the royal army, the royal treasuries, and the kings, could wait on events. Antipater was old and might not live many more years. Leaving Antipater independent in Europe during
his lifetime would then be the wisest thing to do, especial y since there were others who were in the process of asserting their independence from the authority of
the regent. Antigonus had not responded to the order to aid Eumenes, and more
importantly Ptolemy was acting with a great degree of independence in Egypt.
Moreover, a friendly relationship with Antipater would facilitate the acquisition of fresh recruits for the royal army from Macedonia. In fact, Justin (13.6.6) presents this as the motivation for Perdiccas’ seeking the alliance in the first place.
Eumenes and unnamed others, however, argued that the dual monarchy was
a farce, and that Perdiccas needed to be transitioning to rule in his own right.
The marriage to Cleopatra would tie him to the Argead family and strengthen
his position with Alexander’s veterans. In the end, as before in Babylon when the kingship was offered to him by Aristonous, Perdiccas took the conservative course and followed the advice of his brother. However, while Perdiccas did marry Nicaea (Arr. Succ. 1a.21, 26; Diod. 18.23.3),12 Cleopatra did not return to Europe but remained in Asia Minor, settling in Sardis (Arr. Succ. 1a.26). It is curious that Eumenes and Alcetas are the respective spokesmen for these two positions. There
were associated with Perdiccas many commanders with more prominence, such as
Seleucus, who served as the regent’s military second-in-command (Just. 13.4.17;
Mehl 1986: 23–4; Heckel 2006: 247), Antigenes, the commander of the argyraspids
(Heckel 2006: 30), and Pithon, the satrap of Media and the commander of the
mission against the rebellious eastern Greeks (Diod. 18.36.5). These commanders
are omitted from our sources’ accounts of the debate entirely. Of course, Alcetas was the regent’s brother, but the prominence of Eumenes is curious. Obviously,
Perdiccas had confidence in his loyalty and ability, and he had served a
s an officer in the elite companion cavalry that was under Perdiccas’ overall command (Plut.
Eum. 1.5; Nep. Eum. 1.6). They then did have a close association near the end of Alexander’s reign. But his preference for the Cardian may reflect his lack of the same with respect to his more experienced and prestigious supposed subordinates,
These other commanders did later prove to be disloyal, and, perhaps, there was
some inkling of this already.
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55
The arguments for the marriage to Cleopatra were strengthened by later
events. Sometime after Perdiccas’ union with Nicaea, Cynnane, a daughter of
Philip II by Audata, one of his many wives, and the widow of Amyntas Perdicca,
Philip II’s nephew and Alexander’s cousin, arrived in Asia demanding that her
own daughter Adea be married to King Philip (Arr. Succ. 1a.22; Polyaen. 8.60; cf.
Diod. 19.52.5). Cynnane had raised a troop of her own and had forced her way
out of Macedonia despite Antipater’s attempt to block her departure (Polyaen.
8.60). Perdiccas sent Alcetas north to intercept her. When her determination
proved unshakeable, Cynnane was murdered on Alcetas’ command (Diod.
19.52.5; Arr. Succ. 1a.22–3; cf. Polyaen. 8.60), but probably on orders from his brother (Errington 1970: 64; Anson 2004: 88 n. 43). The result was a riot by the
royal army which forced Perdiccas to agree to the marriage. Adea now changed
her name to Eurydice (Arr. Succ. 1a.23; Polyaen. 8.60; Diod. 19.52.5). It has been suggested that Eurydice was a royal name taken at the time of a royal marriage
by the new bride (Heckel 1978; cf. Bosworth 1980b: 282).13 It certainly was a
common name of Macedonian royal women. In the case of Adea, her name may
have been Illyrian; changing it to that of the mother of Alexander the Great’s
father, Philip II, would have emphasized her Argead connection and also followed
her husband’s change of name from Arrhidaeus to Philip, with both thus associating themselves with the monarch who had initial y brought Macedonia to prominence
(Badian 1982: 101).
The Cynnane episode was a major turning point for Perdiccas and his allies. It
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