intriguing against Antigonus and the arrival of Nicaea and Cleopatra offering the regent marriage ( Succ. 1a.11, 20).
26 Burstein (1991: 139–40) and Collins (2008: 46–59) claim that Alexander was never official y enthroned, but he did assume the titulature of pharaoh (Anson 2013b: 104).
27 The sailing season typical y opened March 10 (Casson 1995 [1971]: 270) putting the crossing likely in April.
28 While this is nowhere stated, Antipater subsequently reappointed him to the satrapy of Cilicia (Arr. Succ. 1.34; Diod. 18.39.6), making it almost a certainty that he must have deserted the Perdiccan cause soon after Perdiccas appointed him.
29 Both Briant (1989: 223–4 n. 13) and Bosworth (1978: 229–37) have argued that
the papyrus fragment PSI 12.1284, from Arrian, refers to Eumenes’ battle with Neoptolemus, not to Eumenes’ later victory over Craterus and Neoptolemus, which is the ascription of most scholars (for example, see Latte 1950; Wirth 1965; Thompson 1984; Billows 1990: 66 n. 27). Briant’s and Bosworth’s claim is refuted, however, by Plutarch’s description of the battle ( Eum. 5.4–5). In the fragment the hostile phalanx
The Funeral Games Begin
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is drawn up in a tight battle formation and remained intact, but in Plutarch,
Neoptolemus’ soldiers are scattered in pursuit of Eumenes’ defeated infantrymen.
In the later battle between Eumenes and Craterus, it is clear that Craterus’ forces are drawn up and remained in formation (Diod. 18.32.1).
30 Justin (13.8.5) names the allies as Antipater and Polyperchon, rather than Antipater and Craterus. Polyperchon had been left in charge of Macedonia (Diod. 18.38.6).
31 Pigres is a name of likely southwestern Asian origin, with the individual here mentioned likely being a cavalry commander assigned to Neoptolemus by Perdiccas (Anson 2004: 108 n. 108).
32 Eumenes was married to his sister Artonis (Plut. Eum. 1.7; Arr. Anab. 7.4.6).
33 Arr. Succ. 1a.27; Diod. 18.30.5–32.2; Plut. Eum. 7.3–7; Nep. Eum. 4.1–2; Just. 13.8.8; Diod. 18.31–32.2; PSI 12.1284.
34 Xen. Anab. 1.3.2–6, 9–20, 4.12–16; 3.2.1–39; 5.1.1–14, 4.19–21, 5.7–24, 6.1–12, 21–37, 7.3–26; 6.1.14, 25–33, 2.4–12, 4.10–14, 17–19, 20–2, 6.11–19, 29–30, 37; 7.1.24–35, 3.2–6, 10–14, 6.7–41.
35 Photius, in his epitome of Arrian’s Successors, makes no mention of the army assembly and has all decisions reached in the conference of the conspirators and Ptolemy.
Diodorus, on the other hand, makes no reference to a conference. Here, both accounts are assumed to be accurate, with the radical nature of the abridgements in the two surviving sources being responsible for the seeming inconsistency.
36 Arr. Succ. 1a.30; Diod. 18.37.2, 59.4, 62.1; Plut. Eum. 8.2; Nep. Eum. 5.1; App. Syr. 53; Mith. 8; Just. 13.8.10.
37 While Triparadeisus has not been positively identified, it was most likely in the valley of the Orontes river in northern Syria (Schlumberger 1969).
38 If Perdiccas’ death occurred no later than early July, then the march from Egypt to Triparadeisus in northern Syria where the royal army rendezvoused with Antipater
(Diod. 18.39.1) would have taken approximately two months; the distance is roughly 650 miles and the army was encumbered with elephants.
39 According to Justin (14.1.11), Eumenes came forward and claimed responsibility for the letters. This aspect of the incident is unlikely. If it were correct, why would Eumenes’
men still believe there was a need for a bodyguard?
40 Throughout the Hellenistic age similar expedients were common (see Launey 1950: 734–5).
41 The palimpsest is a parchment document believed to have original y contained a fragment of Arrian’s lost history of the Successors, which was preserved by being erased and overwritten. Given modern techniques, much of the original Arrian text has been uncovered. See Dreyer 2007: 251–5 for the most current edition and translation.
42 Bosworth 1992a: 76–7; 1992b: 60) believes that there was “active campaigning” between Antipater and Eumenes in Asia Minor. The evidence suggests otherwise. The Gothenburg Palimpsest (fos. 72r 14–73v 11) implies that Antipater and Antigonus did nothing to interfere with Eumenes.
43 While Photius (Arr. Succ. 1a.43) states that Antipater gave Antigonus 8500 cavalry as well as 8500 infantry, the cavalry figure must be an error (Errington 1970: 71 n. 149).
Later, even after acquiring additional horsemen, Antigonus’ cavalry total was still only 7000 (Diod. 18.45.1). Clearly some cavalry were given to him, but probably fewer than 2000, not 8500.
44 Awaiting the arrival of Eumenes appears peculiar, since they thought the time was ripe to escape because Antigonus was heading east to the upper satrapies. Eumenes had
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headed east even before Antigonus. However, there is some evidence that Eumenid
loyalists in Cappadocia were contesting Antigonus’ commander Menander’s occupa-
tion of the Cardian’s old province (see Chapter 5).
45 The actual site of Orcynia is unknown, but it was likely somewhere in eastern Cappadocia (cf. Diod. 18.40.6).
46 Polyaenus 4.6.19, in all likelihood, referring to this battle (see Billows 1990: 75–6), states that Eumenes’ phalanx fled before any advance against Antigonus as the result of an Antigonid ruse. According to Polyaenus, Antigonus arranged for a soldier, while envoys from Eumenes were present, to announce, “the allies are here.” Antigonus then dismissed the delegation and led out his army the next day, drawing up his phalanx with its front twice as long as usual. This description, if indeed, referring to this battle, cannot be reconciled with the descriptions in Diodorus and Plutarch and must be then rejected as erroneous.
47 While there have been many suggested locations for Nora (Ramsay 1923: 8; Talbert 2000: 63, E4; Schneider 1995: 17–20), the site remains unknown.
48 For a description of the ancient fortress, see Arr. Anab. 1.27.5–6 (cf. Str. 14.3.9).
4
The End of a Dynasty
The Perdiccan cause, whatever it had truly stood for, was now dead along with
its leader. Antipater and the kings had gone on to Macedonia; Antigonus, their
general in Asia, had killed, captured, or trapped the last of the prominent followers of the new age’s first regent. Perdiccas’ regime had lasted barely three years (Diod.
18.36.7). The new one would survive for even less.
Antipater, after a protracted illness, died in the late summer of 319 (Diod.
18.48.4; 47.4; Plut. Phoc. 31.1; Eum. 12.1).1 He was 77 years of age (Suda s.v.
Antipater). The new regent was not Antipater’s eldest son Cassander, nor any of his six sons (Heckel 2006: 35), but Craterus’ old second-in-command, Polyperchon,
who had accompanied that commander to Cilicia and then to Macedonia (Diod.
18.48.4; Plut. Phoc. 31.1; cf. Plut. Eum. 12.1). He had remained in charge of the country when Antipater and Craterus had crossed to Asia to attack Perdiccas (Just.
13.6.9), and was held in high regard by the Macedonians (Diod. 18.48.4). While
Diodorus states that Antipater appointed the new regent, and this was the true
nature of the selection, official y it must have been Philip III who chose his regent.
Cassander was made chiliarch, or Polyperchon’s official second-in-command
(Diod. 18.48.4–5). Antipater’s death and this slighting of his eldest son would
see the beginning of the second war over Alexander’s inheritance.
The news of Antipater’s death reached Antigonus after his brief siege of
Termessus, while he was on his way to Celaenae to enter winter quarters, following his very successful campaigning season (Diod. 18.47.4, 52.1). All of Asia now
appeared to be his for the taking (Diod. 18.47.5, 50.1–3). It is clear from Antigonus’
first silent refusal to obey the then regent Perdiccas that he did not view th
e empire as having the status of a state to which he owed allegiance. He had been virtual y abandoned by Alexander in 333 and had operated independently for over a decade
during that ruler’s lifetime. The only real question is the extent of Antigonus’
ambition at this time. It probably did not extend beyond Asia Minor, but that
ambition had likely been kindled by his appointment as royal general. Later events would spark larger hopes. For now, Antigonus and his counselors prepared for the
coming campaign year in which those satraps in western Asia unfavorable to
Alexander’s Heirs: The Age of the Successors, First Edition. Edward M. Anson.
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Published 2014 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
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the royal general would be replaced and new alliances would be formed with other
principal players.
During the winter, Antigonus received an important fugitive, Antipater’s son
Cassander (Diod. 18.54.3).2 Since the nobles and the army commanders in
Macedonia supported Polyperchon (Diod. 18.49.1, 54.2), even though Cassander
wished to challenge his father’s decision to award the regency to Polyperchon, he did not attack the new regent openly. However, during the fall Cassander privately gathered support (Diod. 18.49.2). Given that Polyperchon had strong backing in
Macedonia, Cassander was forced to seek allies elsewhere. He, therefore, sought
alliances with “other commanders and cities,” who had been allied with, or “friends”
of, his father (Diod. 18.49.3). His supporters in Macedonia he sent secretly to the Hellespont in preparation for his own flight from Macedonia (Diod. 18.54.2).
Outside of Greece, he sent envoys to Ptolemy to renew their friendship and
to secure an alliance (Diod. 18.49.3, 54.3). Cassander asked that Ptolemy send a
fleet to his aid (Diod. 18.49.3). While there is no evidence that Ptolemy complied, it is clear that some arrangement was reached (Diod. 18.54.3). To understand
Ptolemy’s actions, it is necessary to return to his suggestion at the original meeting in Babylon that a ruling council be created as opposed to choosing a single successor for the Conqueror. Polyperchon now represented centralized imperial authority.
Cassander, at least judging from his later actions, did not. Antipater’s son wished to establish himself as the legitimate ruler of Macedonia (Landucci Gattinoni 2003:
124–36; 2010), and whatever other parcels might come his way. His ambitions, like those of the other Diadochs, were personal. Their rivalry was not that of the heads of national states, but rather conquerors holding spear-won lands as their own
personal possessions. For a time this rivalry would be played out under the fiction of serving the kings.
When all was arranged, Cassander fled to Antigonus. Our sources state that
Cassander believed that Antigonus, who owed his command in Asia to Antipater
(Arr. Succ. 1a.38; Diod. 18.39.7), and whose eldest son Demetrius, the future Poliorcetes or “Besieger of Cities,” was married to Phila, one of Cassander’s sisters and the former wife of Craterus (Diod. 19.59.3–6), would out of loyalty support
Cassander. It is difficult to believe that Cassander was so naïve that he thought that Antigonus would simply endorse the son out of loyalty to the dead father.
Antigonus would remember that Cassander had denounced him to Antipater
before the latter crossed back to Macedonia (Arr. Succ. 1a.42). The truth is that Cassander, who had suspected Antigonus’ ambitions back in 320, realized that Antigonus might welcome a conflict in Macedonia and Greece. Cassander’s arrival
would have convinced Antigonus and his advisors that with very little effort on
their part a war in Europe could be fomented which would eliminate any possible
interference from that quarter in their plans for Asia.
Before Antigonus could launch his spring offensive, however, Arrhidaeus, the
former regent and current satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, learned of Antigonus’
intentions and began to secure his satrapy against attack; cities throughout the
province were strengthened with garrisons (Diod. 18.51). When the autonomous
The End of a Dynasty
85
Greek city of Cyzicus3 refused to cooperate with the satrap (Diod. 18.52.3),
Arrhidaeus without warning launched an attack on the city early in 318.4 The
attack was poorly executed and proved unsuccessful. When Antigonus heard of
the assault, he set out for the coast with 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry (Diod.
18.52.1). While arriving after the siege had been abandoned, Antigonus still accused Arrhidaeus of attacking an allied city without provocation and preparing to
rebel against legitimate authority (Diod. 18.51.7–52.3). Arrhidaeus was ordered
to surrender his province and retire to a single city (Diod. 18.52.3), but the satrap refused and prepared to resist. Part of his forces he detached and sent to relieve Eumenes in Nora (Diod. 18.52.4). There is no indication in the sources as to
the fate of this expedition, but it is likely that it was intercepted by forces loyal to Antigonus before it reached Cappadocia.
Antigonus detached part of his army and left them to carry on the campaign
against the recalcitrant satrap; these succeeded in driving the latter into the city of Cius, where they placed him under siege (Diod. 18.72.2). Antigonus himself
proceeded still early in the year to Lydia where he planned to depose the satrap
Cleitus (Diod. 18.52.5). Prior to Antigonus’ arrival, Cleitus had secured many of his cities with garrisons and then with the royal fleet, which he still commanded, fled to Macedonia where he revealed Antigonus’ activities to Polyperchon (Diod.
18.52.6). Antigonus captured Ephesus on his first assault, and by the end of spring or early in the summer of 318 he had conquered all of Lydia (Diod. 18.52.7–8).
It must have been about this time that Antigonus sent Cassander back to Greece
with 35 ships and 4000 mercenaries (Diod. 18.68.1; cf. 18.54.3). With these forces Cassander sailed to Piraeus in May 318 (Diod. 18.68.1).5
In line with his “great expectations,” Antigonus had opened negotiations with
Eumenes, offering terms that were quite generous. Depending on how early in the
year the attack on Cyzicus was, it is possible that Arrhidaeus’ actions may have
precipitated Antigonus’ offer of friendship and alliance to Eumenes (Yardley,
Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 175), but it is likely that these negotiations began
earlier during the winter. Eumenes would receive a satrapy, presumably Cappadocia (Diod. 18.50.4).6 In exchange Eumenes was “to share in [Antigonus’] own undertakings” (Diod. 18.53.5; cf. Plut. Eum. 12.2–3; Nep. Eum. 5.7). With the news of the death of Antipater, there was no apparent alternative to an alliance with Antigonus.
Therefore, “at the approach of spring” (Nep. Eum. 5.7), Eumenes swore an oath of loyalty to Antigonus and was released from Nora (Diod. 18.53.5). Plutarch
( Eum. 12.2–4; cf. Nep. Eum. 5.7; App. Syr. 53) paints quite a different picture of the circumstances surrounding Eumenes’ release from that presented by
Diodorus. According to Plutarch, Eumenes changed the wording of the oath of
loyalty proposed by Antigonus, so that he swore allegiance to the kings and
Olympias as well as to Antigonus, thereby obtaining his release without compro-
mising his loyalty to the kings and the royal family. The theme of Eumenes’ loyalty to the royal Argead family is one that permeates our sources (Diod. 18.53.7, 57.4, 58.2–4; 19.44.2; Plut. Eum. 1.4, 3.14; Nep. Eum. 6.5, 13.3) and likely originates with Hieronymus (Anson 2004: 1–11). Eumenes’ career certainly had begun and
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r’s Heirs
had risen as a result of royal patronage. Eumenes, using a connection between his father and Philip II (Plut. Eum. 1.3; cf. Nep. Eum. 1.4), and after having been exiled from his home city of Cardia (Plut. Ser. 1.5), joined Philip, becoming that monarch’s personal secretary (Plut. Eum. 1.4; Nep. Eum. 1.5). Eumenes was a hetairos of both Philip and Alexander (Nep. Eum. 1.6; Arr. Anab. 7.4.4–6; Diod. 17.107.6; 20.109.7).7
As a non-Macedonian aristocrat, he was compelled throughout his early career to
be an Argead loyalist, and later, with the death of Perdiccas, it was a theme he would continue to rely on in his quest for power.8
The tale of the altered oath supports our sources’ general picture of Eumenes’
loyalty, but it is false, much as the general picture of Eumenes’ unbridled loyalty to the royal family is likewise also untrue. There was no changed oath. It would
have freed Eumenes from Nora, but it would have left him in straitened condi-
tions and facing a renewed battle with the powerful Antigonus.9 Like Plutarch’s
earlier description of Eumenes’ refusal to surrender to Antigonus “so long as
I am master of my sword” (Plut. Eum. 10.4), this episode appears overly theatrical, and like certain other passages, these anecdotes may originate with Duris of
Samos’ more embellished history. Eumenes would trick his “friend,” but would
never violate an oath! Diodorus (18.53.5; 19.44.2) makes no reference to a
changed oath, and this is not the result of careless abridgement on that author’s part. The accounts in Plutarch and Diodorus differ in other significant ways.
The causes for and the timing of the subsequent renewal of hostilities between
Eumenes and Antigonus are not the same in the two sources. In Plutarch ( Eum.
12.7), Antigonus sends a force against Eumenes as soon as he learns of the
altered oath; in Diodorus (18.58.4–59.1), Antigonus moves against Eumenes
only after the latter’s alliance in the summer with Polyperchon.10 Moreover,
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