(Diod. 19.11.1). Alexander is later found to be betrothed to Aeacides’ daughter
Deidameia (Plut. Pyrrh. 4.3). The presence of the young king and his mother in Epirus may have been to arrange this future marriage and the current alliance.
Eurydice and Philip’s army, in the presence of Alexander the Great’s mother and
son, deserted to Polyperchon (Diod. 19.11.2–3). Philip was captured immediately;
Eurydice shortly thereafter (Diod. 19.11.3). In Macedonia, Olympias now took
charge of the kingdom. She appointed generals (Diod. 19.35.4), commanded
troops (Diod. 19.35.4–5, 50.1, 8), dispatched orders to garrison commanders
(Diod. 19.50.8), and administered justice (Diod. 19.11.8–9).34 As one of her first acts, she immediately took control of the captured Eurydice and Philip III, and
after maltreating them for “many days,” saw to their deaths (Diod. 19.11.5–7; Just.
14.5.9–10; Ael. VH 13.36). Diodorus 19.11.5 (cf. Just. 14.5.10) states that Philip died a year and four months after his accession, which would put his death in
October, but a cuneiform text dates a lunar eclipse as occurring on the 27th of the ninth Babylonian month (December), with a brief notice of “Philip,” which has
suggested to some that this reference may be to the king’s death ( Astronomical Diaries 2001: 7, no. 2 V’12’, and commentary, p. 8; cf. van der Spek 2013a).
Moreover, it is very likely that the king’s death was not immediately revealed.35 The Chronicle of the Diadochi ( BCHP = BM 34660, Obv. 18–19) still lists Philip III as king in the spring of 316, as does a contract from the Babylonian city of Uruk
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dated that same summer (Boiy 2000: 118 and n. 15). These dates may reflect, how-
ever, the uncertain nature of the political situation in Babylon (Del Monte 1997: 186). After executing the royal couple, Olympias murdered 100 prominent
Macedonians as “friends of Cassander,” including that commander’s brother
Nicanor (Diod. 19.11.8). Her hatred of the family of Antipater even carried over
to those already dead. The tomb of another of Cassander’s brothers, Iolaus, was
destroyed. Olympias associated this young man with an alleged poison plot that
supposedly killed Alexander (Diod. 19.11.8).
When these acts became known, and apparently all were known to him before
he acted, Cassander, who was in the Peloponnesus conducting a siege of Tegea,
immediately curtailed these activities and hurried to Macedonia (Diod. 19.35.1).
When Diodorus (19.35.1) summarizes the events leading to this invasion, he
gives the false impression that everything happened virtual y at the same time, i.e., Cassander learned of Olympias’ return to Macedonia, the deaths of Eurydice and
Philip occurred, and even that the desecration of his brother’s tomb took place.
These atrocities likely occurred over months, not weeks or days. Moreover, given
the initial favorable reaction to Olympias’ return with the total col apse of
Eurydice’s coup, Cassander was unlikely to attempt another invasion of Macedonia.
But, with the subsequent atrocities and the apparent disgust of the Macedonians at these, such an invasion became more likely to garner success. Even after Cassander made the decision to invade, there were still delays. First, he had to settle affairs with the Tegeans, then, finding that the Aetolians, “wishing to please Olympias
and Polyperchon,” had blocked Thermopylae, he gathered boats from Euboea and
Locris and sailed to Thessaly around the pass (Diod. 19.35.2). The Parian Marble
( FGrH 239 B 14) dates Cassander’s “return to Macedonia” in 316/15, as does Diodorus (19.17.1). Cassander’s invasion, then, occurred in the summer of 316.
Also, supporting this date is the apparent lack of any knowledge of the col apse of Polyperchon’s Macedonian regime in the east. Antigonus had moved in August
of 316 (or in 317 by the high chronology) to Ecbatana (Diod. 19.19.6–8; cf. 19.19.2).
If Cassander, as many have assumed (recently, Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 202), successful y invaded Macedonia in the fall of 317, given that Ecbatana was a major Median city on the “Great East Road,” a main communication line (Cary
1949: 192), this news would have reached Antigonus in a matter of weeks. Yet news of Cassander’s successful invasion of Macedonia appears to have been unknown to
either Antigonus or Eumenes up to and including their final confrontation. None
of our sources makes reference to such knowledge.
Once in Macedonia, Cassander divided his forces, sending an army under his
general Cal as into northeast Thessaly to confront Polyperchon, and another
under Deinias to oppose Aristonous, who was acting on behalf of Olympias, and
to occupy the passes leading into Macedonia. Cassander proceeded to the coastal
city of Pydna, where Olympias had fled, and began a siege of that city (Diod.
19.35.3–36.1). While the siege of Pydna was in its infancy, Aeacides organized
a relief force, but most of the Epirote army did not wish to be involved in the
campaign and when given the option of going home by their king, they did so.
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With a much smaller force, the king and his adherents were defeated by Cassander’s general Atarrhias (Diod. 19.36.2–3). Those who had returned to Epirus prior to
the battle overthrew Aeacides and made an alliance with Cassander (Diod.
19.11.1–2, 36.4–5; Paus. 1.11.3–4; Just. 14.5.9). He was replaced on the Epirote
throne by “the sons of Neoptolemus,” Aeacides’ uncle, with Cassander’s commander
Lyciscus becoming “the guardian and general of Epirus” for the young boys (Diod.
19.36.5; Plut. Pyrrh. 2.1). Aeacides’ own infant son, the future king of Epirus, Pyrrhus, barely escaped with his life and found refuge with the Illyrian king
Glaucias, with whom he lived for the next twelve years (Plut. Pyrrh. 3.1–6; Just.
17.3.17–20). Polyperchon’s army subsequently deserted him, and the war in
Macedonia now became to all intents and purposes the siege of Pydna (Diod.
19.36.6; Just 14.6.2) and the defense of Amphipolis and its surrounding area by
Olympias’ loyalist Aristonous (Diod. 19.50.7).
While these events were transpiring in Europe, Eumenes and his forces arrived
in Persis, where the army, thanks to Peucestas’ attentions, lacked for nothing (Diod.
19.21.1–22.2; Plut. Eum. 14.3). These actions were part of that satrap’s quest for the supreme command (Diod. 19.23.1; cf. Plut. Eum. 14.4). According to Diodorus, to offset Peucestas’ growing influence, Eumenes now presented the previously
mentioned fabricated letter supposedly from the Persian Orontes, a personal friend of Peucestas, reporting that Cassander was dead and that Polyperchon had crossed
to Asia and was already advancing into Cappadocia (Diod. 19.23.1–3).36 This was
a very dangerous game in which Eumenes was engaged, nor was rivalry over the
chief command Eumenes’ only problem. Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, was
charged with conspiring with Antigonus, and a unit of cavalry was sent into
Arachosia, seizing the satrap’s baggage and forcing him to flee (Diod. 19.23.4).
While Diodorus (19.23.4) suggests that these actions were designed to intimidate
Peucestas, since Sibyrtius was one of his friends, there is circumstantial evidence that the charge was legitimate. Sibyrtius was later confirmed in his satrapy by
Antigonus (Diod. 19.48.3).
While Eumenes was in Persis, Antigonus in the fall left his camp in Ecbatana
and set out for Persis. Antigonus and his force
s had spent considerable time in the Median city recuperating from their earlier losses. When Eumenes learned of
Antigonus’ advance, he immediately broke camp, believing that the time was right
for a confrontation with his adversary. The two armies drew within a day’s march
of one another in the Median district of Paraetacene (Diod. 19.34.7), located to the north of Pasargadae between the Zagros Mountains and the central desert
(Bosworth 1980b: 334). Neither side wished to initiate the action, for both had
taken up defensive positions separated by a river and a ravine (Diod. 19.25.2).
Under these circumstances, even though the armies came to be encamped a mere
600 yards from one another, and carried out skirmishing and plundering raids
against one another, no large-scale action was launched by either side. In the midst of this stalemate, on the fifth day after both armies had first sighted one another, Antigonus sent envoys into Eumenes’ camp urging the satraps and the argyraspids
to desert their overall commander. He promised the satraps that they would retain
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their provinces, and to all he offered great rewards. While the satraps may have
been enticed, they did remember that Pithon was Antigonus’ al y. Moreover, the
argyraspids paid no attention to these offers, and, in fact, threatened the emissaries (Diod. 19.25.2–7).
That same night deserters reported that Antigonus had given orders to break
camp during the night. While the deserters did not know Antigonus’ destination,
Eumenes guessed that it had to be the neighboring region of Gabene. Since it was
late in the year, he knew that Antigonus would be seeking an unplundered area,
rich in provisions, and easily defended for his winter quarters. Gabene was the
only such area in the vicinity, and it was but three days distant (Diod. 19.26.1–2).
In consequence, Eumenes was anxious to occupy this region before Antigonus.
He therefore paid certain mercenaries to pretend to desert to the enemy. They
were to report that Eumenes was planning a night attack on Antigonus’ camp.
Since Antigonus believed them, he postponed his departure and drew up his forces
for battle. Eumenes now broke camp and moved his army towards the desired
region (Diod. 19.26.3–4; Polyaen. 4.8.3). When Antigonus discovered from his
scouts what had taken place, he hastily led his forces after Eumenes in a forced
march. Eumenes, however, had a significant head start, which Antigonus soon
realized was too great to overcome. He therefore devised his own stratagem (Diod.
19.26.5–6). While Antigonus instructed Pithon to continue with the infantry at
a regular rate of march, with his cavalry he pursued Eumenes at top speed. At
daybreak he overtook Eumenes’ rearguard as they were descending from some
hill country. Antigonus occupied the now evacuated ridges and made his forces
clearly visible to the enemy. Eumenes mistook, as intended, Antigonus’ cavalry
for his entire army, and drew up his forces for battle. While Eumenes and his
troops awaited the expected assault, the rest of Antigonus’ army rejoined the
cavalry (Diod. 19.26.7–9).
After his infantry arrived, Antigonus prepared his forces for battle and marched
down into the plain. Antigonus’ army contained 28,000 heavy infantry, 10,600
cavalry, 65 elephants (Diod. 19.27.1, 29.2–6), and probably approximately 15,000
light infantry.37 While it is unknown how many of Antigonus’ forces were Asian,
of the enumerated units in his army, 3500 cavalrymen are specifical y mentioned,
but there likely were many others included in his 8000 heavy infantry of mixed
origins. Many of these may have been remnants of the royal army Antigonus had
inherited at Triparadeisus (Bosworth 2006: 15). Eumenes’ forces numbered 35,000
infantry, of which 17,000 were heavy infantry, 6300 cavalry, and 125 elephants
(Diod. 19.28.4).38
In the battle formation, Eumenes’ best troops were stationed on the right side of his line, the place of honor for both Philip II and Alexander the Great. Here were the argyraspids and Eumenes’ own personal hypaspists, with both units under the
command of Antigenes and Teutamus. These personal guards of Eumenes were
not Macedonians, but likely a mixed force, predominantly mercenaries, selected
from those who had joined him in Cilicia. The cavalry on the right wing were also elite units, led by Eumenes himself (Diod. 19.28.1, 3–4, 29.1). Eumenes’ entire
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phalanx was positioned behind a screen of elephants and light-armed troops
(Diod. 19.28.2), with the right cavalry wing curtained by an additional corps of
elephants (Diod. 19.28.4). When Antigonus saw this arrangement, he stationed his
light cavalry on his left under the command of Pithon (Diod. 18.29.1–3). These
were drawn up in open order and were to avoid any frontal action, but rather
attack Eumenes’ right flank (Diod. 19.29.1–2). Their purpose was to engage and
occupy the enemy, rather than strike any decisive blow. Antigonus placed his
heavy cavalry and his 8000 Macedonian heavy infantry on his own right (Diod.
19.29.3–5). Antigonus and his son, the 20-year-old Demetrius (Wheatley 1997),
commanded the cavalry on this wing (Diod. 19.29.4). Like Eumenes, Antigonus
placed his phalanx behind a screen of elephants and kept another corps of the
animals with him and his cavalry on his right (Diod. 19.29.6). With his army thus disposed, Antigonus advanced obliquely downhill on the enemy, with his right
wing leading the way.39 He counted on crushing Eumenes’ left before his own
left was destroyed (Diod. 19.29.7).
At first, Antigonus’ plan was successful. Pithon’s troops initial y caused great
confusion on Eumenes’ right and inhibited this wing’s advance (Diod. 19.30.2),
but Eumenes reinforced his right with additional lightly equipped cavalry from
his left wing, with the result that Pithon and his forces were driven back to the foothil s (Diod. 19.30.3–4). Elsewhere Antigonus’ heavy infantry was also driven
back (Diod. 19.30.5, 10). Eumenes’ left wing held against Antigonus’ attack, and
the latter now faced defeat, if not annihilation. But, by ignoring those who urged him to retreat to the hil s, Antigonus saved himself and his army from this potential disaster. As Eumenes’ phalanx pursued their beaten opponents, a gap opened
in the line between the phalanx and the cavalry on Eumenes’ left. Antigonus
charged through this break, easily routing the forces there under Eudamus’
command. With his left threatened, Eumenes had to recall his victorious right
wing. Antigonus now assembled his defeated forces and formed them up on the
higher ground of the foothil s (Diod. 19.30.9–10). Skirmishing went on well into
the night, but without any further major engagement. By midnight both armies
were too exhausted to continue (Diod. 19.31.1–2). Eumenes wished to march back
to the site of the previous battle to gain control of the dead and thus claim victory, but his troops were anxious to return to their baggage train and Eumenes acquiesced (Diod. 19.31.3). Eumenes was afraid to force the issue for fear that, given the rivalry for leadership in his camp, he might jeopardize his hold on the supreme command (Diod. 19.31.4). Antigonus, however, had no such fears. In the battle,
Antigonus’ forces suffered the loss of 3700 infantry, including light-armed forces, and 54 cavalry, with 4000 wo
unded. Eumenes’ troops lost only 540 infantry and
very few cavalry; his wounded amounted to 900 (Diod. 19.30.9–31.5; cf. 19.37.1;
Polyaen. 4.6.10). The battle, fought in late October or early November of 316,40 was a defeat for Antigonus and his forces. After claiming victory by securing the battle site and the bodies, he was forced to retire into Media, while Eumenes occupied
the original objective of Gabene (Diod. 19.34.7; Plut. Eum. 15.3). Antigonus even detained the emissary from Eumenes who had come to recover the bodies of the
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fallen from Eumenes’ force in order to give his wounded and baggage a head start
on the journey in case the Cardian wished to pursue his retiring army (Diod.
19.32.1–2). It was Antigonus’ action at the end of the battle and his superior discipline that saved his forces from what might have been a decisive defeat.
After his retreat to Media, Antigonus evaluated his situation. His formerly
superior forces were now inferior to those of Eumenes. He now decided to launch
a surprise attack. This move was precipitated by reports that Eumenes was not
encamped in a single location, but that his army was scattered as much as six days’
journey apart (Diod. 19.37.1; Plut. Eum. 15.4–5; Polyaen. 4.6.13). The explanation for the separate camps offered by our sources was a resurgence of insubordination in the army (Plut. Eum. 15.3; Nep. Eum. 8.1–4), but insufficient supplies may also have played a part (cf. Nep. Eum. 8.3).41 To effect the surprise Antigonus determined to lead a forced march through the desert. Gabene was a twenty-five-day march from Antigonus’ camp in Gamarga, if a route through inhabited country
was taken, but through the desert wastes of the Dasht-i Kavir, a journey of only
nine or ten days (Diod. 19.34.8; Nep. Eum. 8.4; cf. Diod. 19.37.3). The desert way, while shorter, was not traveled because it was without water or grass (Polyaen.
4.6.11; Diod. 19.34.8; Nep. Eum. 8.5; Plut. Eum. 15.5), but a march along the roads which traversed inhabited country would be easily observed and reported
to Eumenes, who had anticipated the possibility of a winter campaign and had
stationed troops along this route (Polyaen. 4.6.11). Eumenes had not, however,
considered it necessary to guard the desert approaches. In addition to its dearth of water or grass, in the winter the temperatures were often below freezing
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