citizen rights. Typical y, defeated Spartans lost these rights.12 Such a stigma would have then afflicted a sizable segment of the already dwindling Spartan male
population. Disliked and in danger at home, Acrotatus was an individual in search of adventure abroad, and in the spring of 313 he got his opportunity. Envoys
from the Sicilian city of Acragas arrived badly in need of a competent military
commander to lead the Sicilian opposition against the expansionism of the
Syracusan tyrant Agathocles (Diod. 19.70.1–6). Agathocles had seized control of
the premier Greek city in Sicily in the summer of 317 (cf. Diod. 18.1.1, 75.3).13
On his way to his command in Sicily, Acrotatus was blown off course and arrived
at Apollonia. The Spartan refugee relieved the siege and even arranged a peace
between Glaucias, king of the Taulantians, an Illyrian tribe controlling much of
the land west of Epirus, and the Apollonians before continuing on to Sicily where his cruelty and bloodlust, along with his lack of success, alienated his employers, and he had to flee back to Sparta (Diod. 19.70.7–71.5).
These lands along with Epirus accorded ready access to Macedonia and had
been dangerous in the past. An Epirote army had attempted to intervene to defend
Olympias, and the Illyrians in the past had on several occasions invaded Macedonia with devastating results. It was an invasion by the latter that brought Philip II, Alexander the Great’s father, to the throne, when the Illyrians entered Macedonia, defeated a Macedonian army, and killed the Macedonian king, Perdiccas III,
Philip’s brother (Diod. 16.2.4–6). A more powerful individual, not on his way to
Sicily but actively hostile to Cassander, could have used these lands as a base for operations against both Cassander and Macedonia. Even though Cassander at this
time had an alliance with Epirus and his commander Lyciscus was official y
“guardian and general” of the realm (Diod. 19.36.5), Epirus, along with the Greek city of Corcyra and the tribal Illyrians, remained dangerous both to the interests of Cassander and to those of Macedonia in general. Cassander in particular did not
wish to see any strengthening in Illyrian power. He took Apollonia on the first
assault, and passed into the territory of Macedonia’s northwestern neighbor Illyria, where he defeated Glaucias, the Illyrian king, and established peace with him on
the understanding that the Illyrians were not to attack Macedonia or any of
Cassander’s allies. Then, after securing the city of Epidamnus on the western coast of Epirus with a garrison, he returned to Macedonia in the fall of 313 (Diod.
19.67.3–7, 68.2; Just. 15.2.1–2).
That a Spartan commander with limited resources could engage actively in
this political arena was symptomatic of this period. Earlier Thibron had shown
what an adventurer with cash and mercenaries could accomplish. Certainly
with the break-up of the old army of Alexander, loyalty became a personal
bond. Rarely after the death of Eumenes could a commander claim allegiance
from his forces by appeals to a Macedonian heritage or to the kings. Service
with the great Alexander brought prestige, but money, personal reputation, and
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especially success, the hallmarks of prominent mercenary commanders, brought
loyalty from the rank-and-file.
While Cassander actively resisted Antigonus’ activities in Greece, Ptolemy, as
noted, had done little during the first campaigning season of the war. He did not send relief forces to either Tyre or Gaza, and his only operation in Asia during 314
was that conducted by Seleucus, who failed to intimidate Antigonus’ allies in
Phoenicia and unsuccessful y besieged Erythrae. At some point, in response to
Antigonus’ diplomatic initiative in the spring, it appears he had sent 3000 troops to Cyprus (Diod. 19.62.3), but the timing of the dispatch is unknown, other
than that it occurred after the Tyre Proclamation. In the winter of 314/13 Ptolemy, however, had secured an alliance with Asander in Caria (Diod. 19.62.2). Asander
was apprehensive of Polemaeus’ intentions. Asander also very likely had a separate alliance with Cassander. This would have been brokered during the time Antigonus
was in the east and Cassander’s forces were operating in Asia Minor. As a result, while Asander had an alliance with Cassander prior to his agreement with Ptolemy, he was not technical y at war with Antigonus. He is not listed as part of the initial coalition that formed in early 314. In this same winter of 314/13, the Carian satrap, in league with the Athenians, made an unsuccessful assault on an Antigonid al y,
the island of Samos (O’Sullivan 1997: 110–13; 2009: 263; Anson 2006b: 230–1).
The combination of Carian satrap and Athenians in an attack on this island was a
natural pairing. Threatened by Polemaeus, with the island’s excellent harbor wel
positioned for an attack on Caria, its possession by a friendly power was certainly in Asander’s interests. As for the Athenians, Samos had been in their possession
until 320 (see Chapter 2) and they longed to get it back. Moreover, Samos was
likely an al y of Antigonus at this time (Habicht 1957: 169–70), and hence an
enemy of Cassander’s, who was then controlling Athenian affairs. The evidence
for this expedition comes solely from two fragments of an official decree(s)
enacted by the Athenian Assembly relating to Asander and Athens. IG II2 450
records honors bestowed on Asander by the Athenian people on the 11th of
Gamelion during the archonship of Nicodorus, i.e., in early February 313.14 This
unsuccessful attack on the island’s independence would have solidified Samos’
staunch support of Antigonus (Habicht 1957: 169–70; Shipley 1987: 171; Billows
1990: 118 n. 45).
In the summer of 313, Ptolemy sent his brother Menelaus with an army of 10,000
men and a fleet of 100 warships to Cyprus (Diod. 19.62.2–4).15 After consultation, the Ptolemaic commanders present on the island decided to divide their forces.
Polycleitus, the fleet commander sent with Menelaus, was to proceed to the
Peloponnesus with fifty ships to aid in the campaign against the coalition of
Antigonus’ general Aristodemus and Polyperchon. However, when Polycleitus
arrived at Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, and discovered Alexander’s
change of allegiance, he sailed to Pamphylia and Cilicia. There finding that
Antigonus’ commander Theodotus was sailing from Lycia to Caria, accompanied
by a land army marching under Perilaus, he arranged a successful ambush on both
land and sea. The Antigonid army and fleet were captured. Theodotus was
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wounded and later succumbed to his injuries; Perilaus was captured. The victo-
rious Polycleitus then sailed back to Cyprus and then on to Egypt. Perilaus and
certain others were subsequently released by Ptolemy when requested to do so by
Antigonus. Ptolemy then met with Antigonus at a point east of the Nile delta to
discuss peace, but nothing came of the encounter for Antigonus was not willing
to agree to Ptolemy’s demands (Diod. 19.64.4–8). The terms discussed are not
specified, but after Polycleitus’ victory, it is doubtful that Ptolemy’s demands
were much altered, if at al , from the original ones which brought on the war,
i.e., Ptolemaic possession of Phoenicia and Syria.
Myrmidon, the Athenian, who commanded the 10,000 mercenaries sent with
Menelaus to Cyprus, was to take his force
to Caria and aid Asander, who was cur-
rently under attack by Antigonus’ general Polemaeus (Diod. 19.62.5). This force is not heard of again in our sources, and it is clear, given the dire straits in which Asander is later found, that Ptolemy’s relief force was at the least ineffective.
Seleucus and Menelaus remained in Cyprus in support of Ptolemy’s Cypriot al y,
Nicocreon, the king of the city of Salamis (Arr. Succ. 10.6). These forces managed to retake certain of the cities that had deserted Ptolemy for Antigonus (Diod. 19.62.6), but a number of the Cypriot kings remained loyal to Antigonus (Diod. 19.62.5). In Macedonia, after his campaign in the west, Cassander learned late in the year of
Polemaeus’ invasion of Caria (Diod. 19.68.2), and sent an army with Prepelaus
to aid Asander. In Caria, this force arrived after Polemaeus had already settled
his army in winter quarters, it being late in the year 313. Polemaeus had recently lost his father and was attending to his funeral. Prepelaus sent a subordinate,
Eupolemus, with 8000 infantry and 200 cavalry to lay an ambush for the returning
Polemaeus. Apparently, soon after Eupolemus’ dispatch, Polemaeus learned of the
plan from deserters. Taking 8000 infantry and 300 cavalry, he surprised Eupolemus’
camp about midnight. Eupolemus and his army surrendered (Diod. 19.68.5–7).
Since Eupolemus is later found as Cassander’s “general in Greece” (Diod. 19.77.6), he must have been released from custody, and even though nothing is said of
this army, it is likely these troops were enrolled among the troops of Polemaeus.
As seen, this was the typical pattern of behavior, the repatriation of captured
commanders and the appropriation of captured soldiers.
In Phoenicia, after the fall of Tyre and the completion of a fleet totaling 240 warships, Antigonus dispatched fifty ships to the Peloponnesus, sending the remainder of the fleet, under Dioscorides, to secure the Aegean (Diod. 19.62.6–9). This
expedition would lead to the creation of what is termed the “Nesiotic League,” or the “League of the Islanders” (Billows 1990: 118). While the evidence for this
association comes entirely from inscriptional evidence (see in particular, IG XI 4.1036), with no mention of its existence in our literary sources (Buraselis: 1982: 180–88; Merker 1970: 141; Constantakopoulou 2012: 51–2), its creation fits well
with Antigonus’ earlier proclamation issued at Tyre during the previous fal ,
guaranteeing the freedom and autonomy of the Greeks. Also, given the attempt
in the winter of 314/13 by Cassander along with his subject al y Athens to gain
control of Samos, and given the traditional dominance of Athens in much of the
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Aegean, this proclamation by Antigonus would have resonated with the islanders.
At some point a federation with a common council of the free and autonomous
islanders was created, allied with Antigonus, and celebrating a festival in honor of the latter as founder of the association, known as the Antigoneia ( IG XI 2.1542, 4.1036).
Dioscorides, in the summer of 313, used his fleet to repel an Athenian attempt to regain control of the north Aegean island of Lemnos (cf. Diod. 19.68.4). Demetrius of Phalerum, the “guardian” of Athens and the firm al y of Cassander, had dispatched twenty ships to attack the former Athenian possession. On arriving at Lemnos,
the Athenian commander, Aristotle, called on Seleucus to join him from Cyprus
with additional ships. The Lemnians, however, refused to break their alliance with Antigonus, and the allied commanders now pil aged the countryside and began a
siege of the city. While the siege was well underway, Seleucus sailed to Cos, which was allied with Ptolemy, but perhaps was experiencing some unrest due to Antigonus’
“freedom” offensive (Diod. 20.27.1). Learning of the departure of Seleucus and his forces, Dioscorides (Diod. 19.62.9; Billows 1990: 381–2) attacked the Athenians,
capturing most of the ships and their crews (Diod. 19.68.1–4).
When Antigonus learned that Cassander had sent forces to Asia in support of
Asander, in the winter of 313, he left his son Demetrius behind in Syria and
marched north with a force of 10,000 mercenaries, 2000 Macedonians, 500 Lycians
and Pamphylians, 400 Persian archers and slingers, 5000 cavalry, and 43 elephants.
In view of Demetrius’ youth (he was 22 years of age),16 several experienced com-
manders were assigned to counsel him (Diod. 19.69.1; Plut. Demetr. 5.2; App. Syr.
54); among these were Nearchus, Alexander the Great’s former fleet commander
(Heckel 2006: 172), and Pithon, the son of Agenor, the satrap of Babylonia
(Diod. 19.56.4, 69.1). Since it was late in the year, Antigonus encountered snows in crossing the Taurus and entered winter quarters in Celaenae in Phrygia. While
there, he ordered his fleet in Phoenicia to sail to the Hellespont. On their way they encountered thirty-six ships of Cassander’s fleet sailing from Pydna which
they defeated, capturing the ships and the crews (Diod. 19.69.2–3). So ended the
year 313, Antigonus wintering in Celaenae, Demetrius in Syria, Cassander in
Macedonia, Ptolemy in Egypt.
The following year saw a flurry of activity. Sometime very early in 312, Asander
agreed to terms with Antigonus. By this agreement he was to surrender his army
to that commander, free all the Greek cities of Caria, but remain satrap of Caria as Antigonus’ subordinate. This agreement lasted but a few days before Asander
repented his action and sent envoys to Ptolemy and Seleucus begging for help.
This double dealing probably forced Antigonus to leave his winter quarters sooner than he had planned. He ordered Caria to be attacked by land and sea. Medius, a
mercenary commander from Larisa, was to command the fleet, and Docimus, the
former Perdiccan and satrap of Babylonia, the army. These individuals captured
the citadel of Miletus by siege and “restored the city’s autonomy” (Diod. 19.75.1–4) in February of 312. The list of stephanephoroi, eponymous Milesian officials drawn from the senior members of the sacred singers and dancers (Sherk 1990: 251),
“War, both the King and Father of Al ”
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records the Antigonid liberation of the city during 313/12, which in Miletus began in March 313 (Milesian stephanephoroi list no. 123 = Ditt. Syl . 3 322). With both Polemaeus and Antigonus assaulting the cities loyal to Asander, in short order
the cities of Caria were made “subject to Antigonus’ authority,” but apparently
garrison-free (Diod. 19.75.5–6). At about the time Caria was submitting to
Antigonus’ authority, envoys arrived from the Aetolians and the Boeotians seeking formal alliances (Diod. 19.75.6). With respect to the latter, even though Cassander had consulted with the Boeotians concerning the refounding of Thebes and had
received their consent (Diod. 19.54.1), it would appear that such acquiescence
was the result of Cassander’s presence with an army. Earlier the Boeotians had
supported the Macedonians in the Lamian War (Paus. 1.25.4; Hyp. 6.11), because
they feared that, if the Athenians and their coalition won, the Athenians would restore Thebes (Paus. 1.25.4), the very action that Cassander had taken (Diod. 19.53.2).
Also, in the late spring of 312, Antigonus opened negotiations with Cassander
to secure peace “in the Hellespontine area,” but nothing came of this (Diod.
19.75.6). The major cause of concern was the growing power of Lysimachus. Up to
this point our sources have been silent with respect to Lysimachus’ activities.
While arguments from silence are dangerous, it does appear that he was too pre-
occupied
with securing his own base to launch any operations outside of Thrace.
It is suggested that his role in the coalition was the limited one of controlling the Hellespont to prevent a crossing (Lund 1992: 59–60; Landucci Gattinoni 1992:
112). This may well be true. Lysimachus was to this point not a major player.
His inclusion in the coalition may have resulted from the foreseen danger of an
alliance between the holder of Thrace and Antigonus. Lysimachus’ minor role is
clear in the initial demands the respective generals and satraps made on Antigonus.
Lysimachus was to receive Hellespontine Phrygia, while the others were to receive far more substantial holdings. Events, however, in the winter of 313/12 and
the following spring, when a number of Greek communities in the Pontic
region led by Cal antia drove out their garrisons and formed an alliance to secure their autonomy against Lysimachus’ claim of authority (Diod. 19.73; Landucci
Gattinoni 1992: 113; Lund 1992: 40–43; Andrews 2010: 44–46), were to change the
junior status of Lysimachus. The cities in revolt were Greek cities located on
the western shores of the Black Sea. They formed treaties with the neighboring
Scythians and Thracians and had established good relation with the other Greek
colonies in the area. While Lysimachus quickly recovered two of the main cities
in revolt, Odessus and Istria, his attack on Cal antia was less successful. The
Cal antians were joined by their allies among the Thracians and the Scythians.
Lysimachus intimidated the Thracians into changing sides and the Scythians were
severely defeated. The former bodyguard of Alexander the Great now began to
besiege Cal antia, but Antigonus sent an army and a fleet to aid the beleaguered
people of the besieged city. Even though Seuthes joined in the attack on Lysimachus, the latter was able to defeat all of these forces separately and soundly, even killing Antigonus’ commander and capturing most of that commander’s force (Diod.
19.73.4–10). After what was a long siege, and after many of its inhabitants had
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migrated at the invitation of Eumelus, the “king of the Bosporus,” to a region
that the king allotted to them (Diod. 20.25.1), Cal antia surrendered in 310
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