Over time, the Taliban murdered hundreds of maliks (tribal landlords) in FATA, accused of spying for Pakistan; beheaded drug peddlers, kidnappers, looters and dacoits and collected jaziya (taxes on non-Muslims) to establish their rule. It would change the traditional social structure and hierarchy and cause an exodus of landlords, political agents and secular communities to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s settled areas.
In Khyber Agency, the main artery connecting Peshawar to Kabul, a running battle between two religious groups – led by Mufti Munir Shakir and an Afghan, Pir Saifur Rehman – in 2005 resulted in a heavy loss of life. Shakir’s group spawned the Lashkar-i-Islam (Army of Islam), whose leader Mangal Bagh used FM radio stations in the madressahs (Islamic schools) of the tribal belt to incite listeners into acts of sectarian violence against the local Shia population. From time to time, they blew up transmission towers of FM radio stations to stop the government from broadcasting music and information.
While the government encouraged the predominantly Shia population of the surrounding Kurram agencies to form tribal armies – or lashkars – for self-protection, the militants responded by suicide missions that included ramming explosive laden vehicles into jirgas (tribal councils). These militants banded under the ASSP and LEJ also found ways to attack Shia refugees and their congregations in prayer houses, shrines and mourning processions that stretched all the way from Khyber to Karachi.
Although Shias did not turn against Sunnis on a large scale, as has been the case in Iraq, these attacks led to steady stream of retaliation. Where the military took on the Taliban, their sectarian affiliates responded with growing attacks on non-Muslims, surpassing the sectarian violence witnessed two decades before.
As the Bush administration mounted pressure on Pakistan to “do more” in the “War on Terror,” Pakistan’s army soldiers came in the front line of fire. Being poorly equipped and trained, the conventional army was no match for the well-armed Taliban who fought with guerrilla tactics that included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide attacks, kidnappings and beheadings. It led to situations in which entire contingents of soldiers were kidnapped and several were beheaded. Others were either forced to surrender or voluntarily deserted the army.
In 2006, matters reached a point where Musharraf was forced to make a deal with Taliban militant Hafiz Gul Bahadur in North Waziristan that his tribesmen would expel foreign fighters from the tribal belt and refrain from attacking the Pakistan military in return for the administration’s movement of 80,000 troops from check posts in Waziristan to the Afghan border. The deal succeeded in getting rid of Uzbek fighters – subsequently leading to the assassination of their chief, Tahir Yuldashev, through a drone attack.
But the North Waziristan deal would eventually turn the area into the last refuge for jihadists. As late as 2010, Awami National Party Senator, Afrasiab Khattak admitted to me that Gul Bahadur ’s forces had become a “problem” for his government.
Meanwhile, tribesmen were eyewitnesses to the return of Afghan Mujahideen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in North Waziristan. In December 2009, these former CIA-funded Mujahideen gave sanctuary to a Jordanian double agent who used suicide bombing to wipe out a sizeable portion of US intelligence officials who were posted at Khost, Afghanistan.
Former FATA security chief Brig Mahmood Shah, who quit his post in 2005, calls the North Waziristan accord “a bad deal” that enabled the Taliban to consolidate its position. While initially the Afghan Taliban did expel foreign fighters from the region, soon it was back to square one as the Haqqani network attracted foreign jihadists and launched increasingly daring attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Drones Attack Last Refuge for Jihadists
During Musharraf, the Bush administration worked out a deal with him to allow drones to take out “high value targets” in the FATA areas bordering Afghanistan. Both sides kept a high level of secrecy about the drone attacks and for years the Pentagon refused to acknowledge them. Musharraf’s media spokesmen were given the difficult task of answering to civilian deaths in drone attacks, even while his administration scuttled the issue.
The US gradually increased drone attacks in FATA to counter growing insurgent attacks on NATO troops in Afghanistan. By 2007 drone attacks were frequently used against the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), which surfaced under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud and was found responsible for a substantive increase in the Afghan insurgency. That year, as Pakistan buckled under US pressure and killed Taliban militants in South Waziristan, Baitullah’s response was to launch a spate of suicide attacks against military and police targets in Pakistan.
Still, careful not to antagonize Baitullah, the Musharraf administration sent delegations led by JUI (F) Senator Saleh Shah and the late Maulana Merajuddin to negotiate with the TTP militants. These leaders were ever-ready to defend the fire-brand militant. They held Baitullah Mehsud in awe, notwithstanding the fact that the militant had let fall all pretenses and declared open war against Pakistan.
On the other hand, the Afghan Taliban led by Afghanistan’s deposed Taliban leader, Amir ul Momineen (Leader of the Pious), Mullah Omar, assiduously avoided attacks on Pakistan and instead used its territory to launch attacks against NATO troops in Afghanistan.
As the CIA became more vocal about the ISI’s role in shielding the Afghan Taliban, the US threatened to take drone attacks deeper into Pakistan’s territory. Talk of an Afghan government in exile – notably the Quetta Shura – gained currency as the US alleged that Mullah Omar and his coterie had formed a government-in-exile in Balochistan. Even if the US threatened to carry out drone attacks in Quetta, merely to test the waters, anxious residents expected the missiles to rain on them any day.
In Quetta, it is an open secret that Mullah Omar’s fighters often travel to neighboring Qandahar in dark-tinted vehicles, laden with weapons. From time to time, they ambush the NATO supply trucks at Chaman, bordering Qandahar. Those wounded by NATO troops are brought back by popular routes for treatment to Quetta’s hospitals. Still, the Afghan Taliban refrain from attacking targets inside their host country and instead keep a good relationship with the Pakistan army, which in turn looks the other way for its broader strategic objectives.
On the outskirts of Quetta lies a well-lit colony for the Afghan Taliban called Kharotabad. This base camp in the hills sparkles amid otherwise dark surroundings. Apart from Pashtuns, the three other ethnicities of Afghanistan – the Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara – are frequent visitors. The colony has become a notorious focal point for the smuggling of heavy weapons, narcotics, as well as vehicles and tunnels that enable a quick getaway.
But even as the US-leaked memos and statements accused the ISI of secretly supporting the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan put its foot down on allowing the US to operate inside settled areas. While US drone missile strikes grew more frequent, they were only allowed to operate in the FATA belt along Afghanistan. Drones became a weapon of choice in North Waziristan, where Al Qaeda’s foreign fighters and Taliban congregated but where the military held off from conducting any operation.
The UN has questioned the legality of drone attacks because of the highly covert nature of the strikes. Although the true extent of civilian casualties are unknown, a study by the New America Foundation shows that while drones have killed more than 1,300 people, the civilian fatality rate is approximately 30 per cent of that figure.
On the other hand, Washington has ramped up drone attacks because they avoid the loss of US lives, and there is no media to record the blood spilled on the ground. But the strikes remain highly unpopular in Pakistan, where common people pay the ultimate price. These drone attacks have been avenged by the militants through a spree of almost indiscriminate suicide attacks in Pakistan.
Pakistan in 2007 AD
In 2007 – the year that gave birth to the current situation in Pakistan – alarm bells rang in Washington that two firebrand clerics – Maulvi Abdul Aziz and Abdur Rashid Ghazi – planned to “Talibanize
” Pakistan through their state funded Red Mosque in Islamabad.
There were real fears in the US that the speed with which the Taliban had grown under Gen. Musharraf had reached Islamabad. In Washington, think tanks had begun to speak out that the sons of the late Islamic radical Maulana Qari Abdullah – who had managed to collect rabid militants in the capital of nuclear-armed Pakistan – could usher in a horrific attack on the West that would make 9/11 pale in comparison.
The Red Mosque was emblematic of the dual character of the Musharraf administration. The mosque was patronized by senior government and intelligence officials, even as its clerics were known to keep close links with the Al Qaeda and the Taliban.
On a visit from Washington DC to Islamabad, I came face to face with how the influx of foreign money, massage parlors and video shops had sharpened the contradiction between poor Islamic militants and the corrupt ruling military elite and provoked the puritanical Red Mosque clerics to take on the administration.
Red Mosque cleric, late Abdur Rasheed Ghazi asserted that he and his brother had repeatedly asked the Musharraf administration to clean up the trash – i.e. close down the brothels and the massage parlors – but without success. In his words, “We are now tired of asking and have decided to take out the trash ourselves.”
Thereafter, burqa-clad female students of the Red Mosque’s sister seminary, Jamia Hafsa began a “purification drive” in Islamabad by kidnapping three women accused of running a brothel. Word had it that the brothel was patronized by senior government officials. Ghazi’s activism temporarily paid off and he forced the foreign women and their children to close shop before they were released.
Under US pressure, Musharraf ordered the demolition of a mosque being illegally constructed by the Red Mosque clerics. At that stage, television images captured tall, burqa-covered students in dark glasses and armed with machine guns as they occupied a children’s library next door. It made civil society wonder aloud whether these were really women or tall men in women’s clothing.
Washington watched with unease as the Red Mosque clerics carried out their militant activities right next to Islamabad’s diplomatic enclave. It was strangely reminiscent of 1992, when the military had let dacoits rampage through Sindh without lifting a finger. There was a brief lull as Gen. Musharraf sent senior leaders of his party to negotiate with the militants.
And then came the storm.
Ironically dubbed “Operation Silence,” the encirclement of Red Mosque by 12,000 army men turned into a deafening war between the army and 600 heavily armed militants holed inside. Red Mosque cleric, Maulana Abdul Aziz fled wearing a burqa while his brother, Abdur Rashid Ghazi, a loquacious speaker, held the fort for hours before he was killed with some 84 militants – and promptly dubbed a martyr.
The siege of the Red Mosque proved to be a turning point for Pakistan. Betrayed by the army, the militants fled to North Waziristan where they swelled the ranks of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Apart from the Punjabi Taliban, based on sectarian groups, former state-sponsored elements reinvented themselves under the Asian Tigers.
The connection of Red Mosque militants with North Waziristan came to the fore when the Asian Tigers killed former ISI officer, Khalid Khawaja who had boldly accompanied a British journalist of Pakistani origin, Asad Qureishi, during his investigative reporting into the tribal areas. Khawaja was accused by the Taliban of double-dealing in the Red Mosque episode. At the same time, the TTP kept an accompanying army officer, Col. Inam in capitvity as they debated whether or not to kill him for espionage. He too was eventually killed.
A General Loses Face
When Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf ousted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif through a military coup in October 1999, he had managed to convince a number of people that democracy spelt anarchy. For a while the popular wisdom was that tried and tested politicians were “corrupt,” and that the military was the only institution that could bring stability and relief for people suffering from the greed and chaos of politicians.
But as the Al Qaeda and Taliban introduced suicide bombers on the Iraq pattern, new forms of terrorism manifested in Pakistan. The situation in Balochistan, never good under previous rulers, saw an escalation in violence. Disappearances, torture and an absence of freedom of expression became the order of the day. As poverty showed no sign of abating, people began to clamor for a return to democracy.
In my visits to Pakistan, I saw how Musharraf had attempted to strengthen the military at the expense of the people. The roads were full of potholes, there were many more beggars on the streets and the chaos of people and traffic was more unseemly. The trade deficit had grown by several million dollars. Billions of rupees had been loaned to highly connected people, who had defaulted on payments. While US annual military aid of USD 1 billion was unaccounted for, the Taliban had grown with a vengeance.
In Karachi’s Defense Housing Society, which catered to the privileged military elite, there were new hotels, expensive golf courses and private clubs that catered exclusively to the ruling elite. The armed forces reclaimed land from Clifton beach, where multinational franchises like McDonalds and Kentucky Fried Chicken sprung up for a class which could the afford the dollar rates. New roads, bridges and roundabouts had grown Karachi into a mega city and changed it beyond recognition.
Under Musharraf, army and naval chiefs, as well as intelligence officers – retired and serving, were appointed as heads of the government corporations. They controlled transportation, communication and education at the federal and provincial levels. At the same time, tax exemptions to military personnel had enabled them to invest in national industries and turn it into a profit.
Militaristic responses to political problems, unfair allocation to the provinces, widespread unemployment and a yawning gulf between the rich would motivate poor people to cry for an end to military rule and the return to democracy.
As the Taliban grew more powerful, the US Congress forced Musharraf to release his chokehold on political parties. At the same time, it made contact with secular parties that could play a role in the future set-up. The Awami National Party, based in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province bordering Afghanistan – came up for air. The ANP, which had been sidestepped by Musharraf in the 2002 election, told US leaders that the resurgence of the Taliban was a “ticking time bomb” for the region.
The biggest beneficiary of Musharraf’s fall from grace would be the Pakistan Peoples Party, led by Benazir Bhutto. Educated in the West and keenly attuned to Western needs, Benazir was aware that her fortunes were knitted into Washington’s post-9/11 framework. As the only female prime minister of Pakistan and indeed the Muslim world, Benazir pledged to free her country from Islamic extremism.
Still, the Republican administration led by George W. Bush stayed skeptical of Benazir, aware that only the army could deliver vis-à-vis US strategic interests. Moreover, as chief of army staff and president, Musharraf had since 9/11 enjoyed a special relationship with President Bush. In 2007 however Bush’s fortunes were on the decline and the Democratic Party, aware that Musharraf’s sagging profile needed a facelift, understood the logic of putting Benazir Bhutto in the picture.
And yet, it was nearly decade since Benazir had left Pakistan. During this period, Pakistan had grown vastly more dangerous because of the resurgence of the Al Qaeda, Taliban and its sectarian affiliates. Moreover, being the largest political party, the PPP had been infiltrated by the mafia. The contradictions sharpened because, while the army secretly held on to its policies of strategic depth, Benazir pledged to go the extra mile in crushing the Taliban.
All her life, Benazir had been dogged by the non-transparent dealings of the military’s intelligence agencies. Indeed, as a young prime minister, she had asked us how she could control the agencies. Some two decades later, her sixth sense made her reach out to world that, should anything happen to her, she would hold Musharraf directly responsible for the consequences.
The more things changed, the more they st
ayed the same.
Chapter 7
THE DEMOCRACY
TRAIN REVS FOR
MOTION
A Prime Minister in Waiting
Some two decades may have separated President Gen. Zia ul Haq and President Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf’s military rule in Pakistan, but they had one person in common – Benazir Bhutto. The twice-elected woman prime minister of Pakistan took on both military rulers, one by one, with a promise to take the nation from dictatorship into democracy.
Ironically, on both occasions – 1988 and 2007 – Benazir went to Pakistan with a commitment from officials in Washington at a time when the US needed Pakistan to achieve its strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Never mind the fact that millions of people were ready to vote for her, realpolitik demanded that the road to Islamabad be traveled not through the dusty villages of Pakistan but through the power corridors of Washington DC.
In 2006, as Benazir solicited US help to return to power, I went from DC to Maryland to hear her address a rally – organized by PPP workers. That cold February afternoon, she told expatriates gathered in a hotel around lunch tables in a speech in English, intended for the consumption of the US government,
“One crucial reason Gen. Musharraf gets so little pressure from the Bush administration about restoring democracy is the assumption that only a dictator can deliver military cooperation. That had better not be true.”
Benazir made the sales pitch to Washington at a time when its “blue eyed boy,” Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf – who then wore two hats as chief of army staff and president – prosecuted President George W. Bush’s “War on Terror.” Western pressure on Musharraf to relax his chokehold on politicians had led to the release of Benazir’s husband Asif Zardari in 2004. Pakistan’s former woman prime minister followed it up with a visit to the US capital to test the waters for her return to power.
Aboard the Democracy Train Page 20