145 . Ibid., p. 81.
146 . Ibid., pp. 81–82.
147 . Charles A. Kroeger Jr., “ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System,” Studies in Intelligence 2, 1 (Winter 1958): 71–83; Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, p. 94; Richard M. Bissell Jr., Deputy Director (Plans), Memorandum for: Major General J. M. Williams, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence USA, et al., Subject: ELINT Requirements Requiring Sensitive Collection, September 9, 1959, 2000 CIA Release, NARA.
148 . Olav Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945–1970 (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 90, 92, 149–150.
149 . Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 106–107; Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, p. 105; interview with a former CIA official.
150 . Riste, The Norwegian Intelligence Service, pp. 147–148.
151 . Ibid., p. 149; Central Intelligence Agency, Cost Reduction Program: FY 1966-FY 1967, September 1, 1965, p. 9, NARA, RG 263, Entry 36, HRP 89-2/00443, Box 7, File 713; Rolf Tamnes, The Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), pp. 121–122, 212.
152 . Interview with Robert Phillips, Rosslyn, Virginia, June 4, 1999.
153 . William H. Nance, “Quality ELINT,” Studies in Intelligence 12, 2 (Spring 1968): 7–19 at 8.
154 . Ibid.
155 . William E. Burrows, Exploring Space: Voyages in the Solar System and Beyond (New York: Random House, 1990), p. 99.
156 . Henry G. Plaster, “Snooping on Space Pictures,” Studies in Intelligence 8, 4 (Fall 1964): 31–39 at 31.
157 . Ibid., pp. 31–32.
158 . Ibid., p. 32. NSA went on to design and produce special equipment that would show oscilloscope pictures as a signal was being received, with the first two sent to ELINT sites in Hawaii and Alaska. Video transmissions from Sputnik 9 and Sputnik 10, both launched in March 1961, gave verification that the flights carried canine passengers. More important was the ability of NSA to report, 58 minutes into Yuri Gagarin’s 108-minute flight on April 12, 1961, that the Soviets had indeed placed a man into orbit and he was alive. See Plaster, “Snooping on Space Pictures,” p. 34.
159 . James Burke, “Seven Years to Luna 9,” Studies in Intelligence 10, 3 (Summer 1966): 1–24 at 4–5, 7; Burrows, Exploring Space, p. 420.
160 . Burrows, Exploring Space, p. 420; Burke, “Seven Years to Luna 9,” pp. 7–8.
161 . Burke, “Seven Years to Luna 9,” pp. 8–9; Burrows, Exploring Space, pp. 130–131.
162 . David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), p. 121; Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (San Francisco: Stonehill, 1975), Appendix 3; “CIA Historical Program,” January 1971, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 4, Folder 3.
163 . Agee, Inside the Company, p. 351.
164 . James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America’s Most Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), p. 142.
165 . Memorandum for General Maude, Subject: Proposed U.S./U.K. Cooperation within Area 5 of Technical Cooperation Program, May 4, 1951, NARA, RG 341, Entry 214; Pocock, Dragon Lady, p. 47–48.
166 . Nicholas R. Garofalo, “Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 2 (Spring 1969): 53–61 at 53–54; [deleted], Assistant Chief, DPD-DD/P, Memorandum for: Acting Deputy Director (Plans), Status of CIA Personnel Staff, Project [deleted], July 22, 1960, 2000 CIA Release, NARA.
167 . Ibid., pp. 54–55, 60.
168 . Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (London: Wei-denfeld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 146; Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 211; Kevin Whitelaw, “A Killing in the Congo,” U.S. News and World Report, July 24–31, 2000, p. 63.
169 . Ranelagh, The Agency, p. 211.
170 . U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 71, 89.
171 . J. S. Earman, Inspector General, CIA, Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1967), pp. 23–24.
172 . Ibid., p. 24; Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 148.
173 . Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets, p. 150.
Chapter 2: False Start
1 . Allen W. Dulles, Memorandum for: Deputy Secretary of Defense, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Subject: Proposed Curtailment of Project CORONA, December 4, 1958, in NRO Collection of CORONA, ARGON, LANYARD Records (subsequently CAL Records).
2 . John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA, from Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), pp. 410, 730.
3 . Donald E. Welzenbach, “Science and Technology: Origins of a Directorate,” Studies in Intelligence 30, 2 (Summer 1986): 13–26 at 22; CIA, N-120-2, Organization and Functions: Office of the Deputy Director (Plans), Establishment of the Development Projects Division, February 18, 1959, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 44, Folder 14.
4 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 22; Albert D. Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability,” address at CIA, December 19, 1984, p. 9.
5 . U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, Book IV: Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Foreign and Military Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 77.
6 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 22.
7 . Ibid.
8 . Richard M. Bissell Jr., with Jonathan E. Lewis and Francis T. Pudlo, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 203.
9 . Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared—The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), p. 272.
10 . Letter, Richard M. Bissell to John McCone, February 7, 1962.
11 . Ibid.
12 . Ibid.
13 . Ibid.
14 . Ibid.; CIA, HN 1-18, February 14, 1962, NARA, CIA Historical Review Program 89-2 RG 263, NN3-263-94-010, Box 1, HS/HC 706, Folder 7.
15 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 23.
16 . John A. McCone, HN 1-8, February 14, 1962; John A. McCone, HN 1-9, February 16, 1962; information provided by CIA Public Affairs Staff.
17 . Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, DDCI, HN 1-15, “Transfer of Special Projects Branch,” April 16, 1962, NARA, CIA HRP 89-2, NN3-263-94-010, Box 5, HS/HC 706, Box 7.
18 . “Reconsideration of the Missions and Functions of the Deputy Director (Research),” July 3, 1962, 2000 CIA Release.
19 . Lt. Gen. Marshall Carter, Deputy Director, HN 1-23, “Deputy Director (Research),” July 30, 1962.
20 . Ibid.; Col. Stanley W. Beerli, Assistant Director for Special Activities, Office of Special Activities, OSA HQS Notice No. 1-16, June 20, 1962.
21 . Interview with Albert Wheelon, Montecito, California, November 11–12, 1998.
22 . Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: The Essential CIA (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis, 1976), pp. 4, 54–55, 105, 120, 123, 133, 149, 172, 194; Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 23.
23 . Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” pp. 22–23; Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, p. 200.
24 . “Reconsideration of the Missions and Functions of the Deputy Director (Research).” Helms did not object to the DDR’s conducting “agent-oriented” research that would be useful to the Plans directorate. (John A. Bross, Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: [Deleted], December 21, 1962, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 47, Folder 15.)
25 . Telephone interview with Edward Giller, June 29, 1999; Wheelon interview.
26 . “ORD Milestones,” September 1966, NARA, TRB, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 5; “Missions and Responsibilities of the Office of Research and Development,” Septe
mber 26, 1962, NARA, RG 263, 1998 CIA Release, Box 66, Folder 4.
27 . “Missions and Responsibilities of the Office of Research and Development.”
28 . John Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate”: The CIA and Mind Control (New York: Norton, 1991), pp. 210, 224; telephone conversation with Bud Wheelon, January 28, 2000.
29 . Marks, The Search for the “Manchurian Candidate,” pp. 224–225.
30 . Ibid., p. 225.
31 . Ibid., pp. 225–226.
32 . Henry G. Plaster, “Snooping on Space Pictures,” Studies in Intelligence 8, 4 (Fall 1964): 31–39 at 34; Peter A. Gorin, “ZENIT: The Response to CORONA,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian, 1998), pp. 157–170 at p. 162.
33 . Donald C. Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,” Studies in Intelligence 13, 2 (Spring 1969): 11–19 at 11; Chris Pocock, The U-2 Spyplane: Toward the Unknown (Atglen, Pa.: Schiffer Books, 2000), pp. 172–174.
34 . Brown, “On the Trail of Hen House and Hen Roost,” p. 12.
35 . Ibid., pp. 12–13.
36 . Gene Poteat, “Stealth, Countermeasures, and ELINT, 1960–1975,” Studies in Intelligence 42, 1 (1998): 51–59 at 53.
37 . Ibid.
38 . Ibid.
39 . Ibid., p. 55.
40 . Ibid.
41 . Ibid.
42 . Ibid.
43 . Ibid.
44 . Ibid., pp. 55–56.
45 . Ibid., p. 56.
46 . Ibid.
47 . Robert A. McDonald, “CORONA: Success for Space Reconnaissance, a Look into the Cold War, and a Revolution in Intelligence,” Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing 60, 6 (June 1995): 689–720 at 715–716.
48 . Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954–1974 (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1992), p. 200.
49 . Ibid., pp. 200–201.
50 . Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 105.
51 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 205.
52 . Ibid., p. 206.
53 . Ibid., pp. 206–207.
54 . Interview with Jack C. Ledford, Arlington, Virginia, October 7, 1999.
55 . Ibid.; United States Air Force, Biography: Brigadier General Jack C. Ledford, n.d.
56 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 207.
57 . Ibid.; Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume One, Chapters I-II (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1973), p. 100; Ledford interview.
58 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 207–208.
59 . Capt. Sanders A. Laubenthal, The Missiles in Cuba, 1962: The Role of SAC Intelligence (Of-futt AFB, Nebr.: Strategic Air Command, 1984), pp. 22–26.
60 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, pp. 208–209.
61 . McDonald, “CORONA,” p. 700; Director of Central Intelligence, SNIE 13-2-63, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” July 24, 1963, pp. 4, 5–6; National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA, “Search for Uranium Mining in the Vicinity of A-Ko-Su, China,” August 1963, in Kevin Ruffner (ed.), CORONA: America’s First Satellite (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1995), pp. 175–183 at p. 176.
62 . National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA, “Chronological Developments of the Ka-pustin Yar/Vladimirovka and Tyuratam Missile Test Centers, USSR, 1957 Through 1963,” November 1963, in Ruffner (ed.), CORONA, pp. 191–196 at pp. 192–193; National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA, “Suspect CW Agent Production Plants—Dzerzhinsk USSR, Changes Since 1962,” August 1963, in Ruffner (ed.), CORONA, pp. 185–189; National Photographic Interpretation Center, CIA, “Probable Solid Propellants Testing Facilities and Associated Explosives Plants in the USSR,” December 1963, in Ruffner (ed.), CORONA, pp. 197–214 at pp. 199, 213.
63 . Pedlow and Welzenbach, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance, p. 289.
64 . Thomas P. McIninch, “The OXCART Story,” Studies in Intelligence 15, 1 (Winter 1971): 1–34 at 11–12.
65 . Ibid., pp. 12–13.
66 . Ibid., p. 13.
67 . Ibid., pp. 13–14; telephone conversation with Albert Wheelon, January 28, 2000.
68 . Dwayne A. Day, “The Development and Improvement of the CORONA Satellite,” in Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell (eds.), Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites (1998), pp. 48–85 at pp. 75–77; McDonald, “CORONA,” p. 695.
69 . Interview with a former CIA official; Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 24.
70 . Dwayne A. Day, “A Failed Phoenix: The KH-6 LANYARD Reconnaissance Satellite,” Space-flight 39, 5 (May 1997): 170–174; McDonald, “CORONA,” p. 694.
71 . Day, “A Failed Phoenix.”
72 . Frederic C.E. Oder, James C. Fitzpatrick, and Paul E. Worthman, The CORONA Story (Washington, D.C.: NRO, 1987), p. 92; Welzenbach, “Science and Technology,” p. 26; Herbert Scoville Jr., letter to John A. McCone, April 25, 1963.
73 . Herbert Scoville Jr., letter to John A. McCone, April 25, 1963.
74 . Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Allen W. Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, September 6, 1961.
75 . Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5: Management of the National Reconnaissance Program, 1960–1965 (Washington, D.C.: NRO, 1969), pp. 42, 47, 51.
76 . Ibid., p. 49.
77 . Ibid., pp. 49–50; interview with Joseph V. Charyk, June 1, 1999; Herbert R. Scoville Jr., Deputy Director (Research), Memorandum for Dr. Charyk, Subject: SecDef-DCI Agreement on NRO, April 20, 1962.
78 . “Agreement Between Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Responsibilities of the National Reconnaissance Office,” May 2, 1962; Office of Special Projects, 1965–1970, Volume Four: Appendixes B, C, & D & Annex I (Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1973), p. 6 in CAL Records 2/A/0077; Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 51–52.
79 . Joseph V. Charyk, Memorandum for: NRO Program Directors, NRO Staff, Subject: (S) Organization and Functions of the NRO, July 23, 1962; Gerald K. Haines, The National Reconnaissance Office: Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years (Washington, D.C.: NRO, 1997), p. 22; Martin interview; Secretary of the Air Force/Public Affairs, “Biography: Major General John L. Martin, Jr.”; telephone interview with Albert Wheelon, May 19, 1997; interview with a former CIA official; Jeffrey T. Richelson, “The Wizards of Langley: The CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, 1962–1996,” Intelligence and National Security 12, 1 (January 1997): 82–103; Organization Chart, Office of Special Activities, July 1962; GRAB: Galactic RAdiation and Background (Washington, D.C.: NRL, 1997); Dwayne A. Day, “Listening from Above: The First Signals Intelligence Satellite,” Spaceflight 41, 8 (August 1999): 339–346.
80 . Col. John L. Martin Jr., Memorandum for the Record, Subject: 22–23 May Conference on NRO, May 24, 1962; Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 53.
81 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 61.
82 . Ibid., pp. 61, 63–64.
83 . Herbert Scoville Jr., Memorandum for: Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Subject: Comments on Organization and Functions of NRO, August 29, 1962.
84 . Wheelon interview; interview with John McMahon, Los Altos, California, November 17, 1998.
85 . Wheelon interview; McMahon interview.
86 . Interview with Edward Giller, June 29, 1999; Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability.”
87 . Scoville, Comments on Organization and Functions of NRO.
88 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 67.
89 . Ibid., pp. 67, 73.
&n
bsp; 90 . Ibid., pp. 71–73.
91 . Ibid., p. 73–74.
92 . Ibid., p. 74; Wheelon, “Genesis of a Unique National Capability.”
93 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 75.
94 . Ibid.
95 . National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, “U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad,” January 18, 1961.
96 . Oder, Kirkpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, pp. 90–91; telephone interview with Brockway McMillan, September 15, 1999; Buzard interview.
97 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, p. 78.
98 . Ibid., p. 91; Joseph Charyk, “A Summary Review of the National Reconnaissance Office,” February 25, 1963.
99 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, pp. 93, 96–97.
100 . l. Edward Giller, Assistant Deputy Director, Research, Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Meeting Between Mr. McCone and Dr. McMillan–21 March 1963, March 22, 1963, NRO CAL Records, 1/E/0011. Perhaps McCone believed the agreement was more workable because he did not see it as significantly limiting his authority over the DNRO. Thus, in the same meeting, he also voiced his displeasure to Charyk’s successor about the state of the satellite reconnaissance program. He also wanted to know if certain instructions he had given to the DNRO had been carried out, obtained a promise from the DNRO to produce a new launch schedule for presentation to the USIB, and instructed him to involve the NRO in the aerial portion of the NRP.
101 . John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence, and Roswell Gilpatric, “Agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence on Management of the National Reconnaissance Program,” March 13, 1963, p. 1.
102 . Ibid., pp. 1–2.
103 . Ibid., pp. 3–4.
104 . Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume 5, pp. 93–96.
105 . Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, p. 92; Buzard interview.
106 . Oder, Fitzpatrick, and Worthman, The CORONA Story, p. 92.
107 . Ibid.
108 . Ibid.
109 . Interview with Herbert Scoville, McLean, Virginia, 1983.
110 . Giller interview.
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