BRIDGING TAIPEI AND THE SCAP
The loss of Hainan and Zhoushan, albeit voluntarily, within a fortnight of one another, posed a grave crisis of confidence to the Taipei-based Nationalist authorities. The fall of the two island strongholds and the resultant further shrinking of Nationalist territorial domain struck a blow not only to the prestige of Chiang Kai-shek and his “Free China,” but also to the faith of Chiang’s ardent supporters in the United States.49 William Knowland and Walter Judd, Chiang’s most powerful allies in Congress, informed Cooke that the fall of these offshore outposts had made it difficult to solicit support for Taiwan.50 When Knowland learned that, contrary to widespread news reports, the Nationalists actually had limited loss of their troops and materiel during the evacuation operations, he informed Cooke that even a photograph showing Nationalist troops disembarking in Keelung would facilitate his lobbying efforts in Congress.51
The loss of Zhoushan and Hainan in the spring of 1950 also deepened the belief of American diplomatic representatives in Taipei that Chiang Kai-shek would never survive. They meanwhile predicted that the seat of the Nationalist government might soon be forced to go into exile, perhaps to Manila or to Seoul.52 On May 22, the Consulate General issued a public letter to the American citizens in Taiwan, stating that the recent military developments along the China coast made it appear possible that hostilities might spread to points hitherto peaceful, with the result that normal transportation facilities in Taiwan might be disrupted. The Consulate General therefore urged American citizens without a compelling reason to stay to consider leaving Taiwan while normal transportation facilities remained available.53 Privately, military attachés in the embassy estimated that the invasion of the island would occur sometime between June 15 and the end of July, and accordingly advised Washington to cut official personnel on the island to a minimum by mid-June, leaving only two military officers for evacuation at last moment.54 The proliferation of rumors that Washington would soon shut its consular post in Taipei caused panic among almost every Nationalist high-ranking official on the island. On returning to the United States from a recent trip to Taiwan, General Claire Chennault, in a personal letter to William Knowland, told the senator that it was “most unfortunate” to witness a desperate situation with the steady decline of both Nationalist morale and courage.55
In these darkest moments of the Nationalist rule in Taiwan, Chiang Kai-shek depended on very few but Charles Cooke. To dispel prevailing rumors that the Nationalists had surrendered Hainan and Zhoushan to the Communists without the slightest struggle, Cooke wrote to top figures in Washington, including Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, to clarify and to solicit their support for Taiwan.56 Despite witnessing the Nationalists’ poor military performance at Hainan, Cooke defended Chiang’s position by arguing that the loss of the island actually assisted the defense of Taiwan, as a heavy economic and military load on Taiwan was now substantially lifted.57 He also justified the withdrawal from Hainan as Chiang’s “deliberate strategy” to draw worldwide attention on the deepening crisis in the Far East as well as the rapid spread of communism in this region.58
Cooke was even ready to fight with his fellow Americans in Taipei. To clarify rumors regarding the American position on Taiwan, on May 19, 1950, Cooke arranged an informal meeting with the chief U.S. military attachés in Taipei, including Major James Gault, Colonel David Barrett, and Colonel John Gabbert. Based on his personal experience in Hainan and Zhoushan, Cooke rejected the military attachés’ claim that the evacuations had disastrously left thousands of Nationalist troops and precious matériel to the Communists. Cooke also questioned the biased and unfair reporting on the fate of Taiwan. He embarrassed the attachés by revealing that an informant had told him an “unofficial poll” among American consular personnel and military attachés had recently given July 15 as the expected date of Taiwan’s fall, which these officers admitted to be true. Cooke bitterly tongue-lashed the way in which such guesswork had become the basis for an official report submitted to Washington and thereby the formal justification for evacuating American citizens from Taiwan. In order to clear the air with U.S. policy planners, Cooke sent a quick memorandum about his informal meeting to Nationalist supporters in Washington and Tokyo, including General MacArthur and Walter Judd.59 Cooke’s “enthusiasms” in turn invited sarcasm from embassy personnel, who looked on with cold indifference. On May 26, 1950, Robert Strong wrote to his superior at Foggy Bottom, saying “Cooke is now more or less openly heading up planning for all Chinese forces, but whether he can achieve the necessary in a short time seems doubtful.” Strong went on by questioning whether Cooke had the power to “boost morale, prevent subversion, straighten out the command structure, improve coordination and communication, prevent economic deterioration etc.”60
But Cooke simply refused to pause. While the whole world was speculating that Taiwan’s collapse was imminent, following that of Hainan and Zhoushan, Chiang Kai-shek entrusted Cooke to be a reliable bridge between his near-bankrupt regime and General MacArthur’s SCAP headquarters. Currently available archival materials suggest that, before the outbreak of the Korean War, Cooke flew to Tokyo to meet with MacArthur as Chiang’s personal messenger on April 10, May 24, and June 16. These visits greatly strengthened the link between Taipei and the SCAP, and were critical to the survival of Chiang’s regime in Taiwan.
Before his first visit to Tokyo in April 1950, Cooke drafted a personal letter to MacArthur on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek, in which he broached three key points relating to Taiwan’s security issues. First, the letter sought MacArthur’s opinion on whether, if the Nationalists’ air and naval power remained sufficiently superior, they should mount large-scale raids against the Communist mainland in support of Nationalist guerrillas. This would demonstrate the might of the Nationalist military in Taiwan. Second, if the Nationalists were unable to mount large-scale raids by air and sea, how long did the SCAP believe the Nationalist guerrilla activities on the mainland could continue? Finally, given the resources available to them, how long could the Nationalists sustain their military workload without a serious breakdown? The implication here is that Cooke had advised Chiang to seek the SCAP’s continued military support regardless of changes in Washington’s Far Eastern policy.61 Cooke’s new role as Chiang’s messenger played a positive role in reviving MacArthur’s support for the Nationalists. Instead of discrediting Chiang and his regime, which MacArthur had done in the fall of 1949, the general now openly claimed that if Chiang “has horns and a tail, so long as he is anti-Communist, we should help him.”62
In his second meeting with MacArthur, on May 24, 1950, Cooke gave a firsthand description of the situation on Taiwan. He accused American diplomatic personnel in Taipei of providing Washington with inaccurate reports on the situation in Taiwan, and he tried his best to clear away the misconceptions of the SCAP officials. Cooke also took this opportunity to explain that abandoning Zhoushan and Hainan had actually been in the interest of Taiwan, urging MacArthur and his staff to be firm about Chiang.63 Persuaded by Cooke’s personal experience on Taiwan and the two offshore islands, MacArthur sent a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 29, in which he emphasized that the problem of Taiwan had become urgent, as Sino-Soviet cooperation in the Shanghai area had come to his attention, and that Soviet jets had been sent to the Chinese Communists’ air force. If Soviet forces could use Taiwan, the general argued, the Malay-Philippine-Japan shipping lanes could be cut, leaving Japan isolated:
In the event of war between the United States and the USSR, Formosa’s value to the Communists is the equivalent of an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender, ideally located to accomplish Soviet strategy as well as to checkmate the offensive capabilities of the central and southern positions of the Far East Command front line.64
A COUP AGAINST CHIANG?
Cooke’s third trip to Tokyo took place at a very crucial moment, when the likelihood of Chiang Kai-shek’s political survival in Taiwan was rapidly diminish
ing. Contemporary rumor had it that, given a hopeless landscape, Chiang was willing to relinquish his authority over Taiwan provided that the United States did not abandon the island. According to Robert Accinelli, around early June 1950, Chiang Kai-shek conveyed a personal message to President Truman via Karl W. V. Nix, an Ohio businessman and family acquaintance who had recently held a private interview with the Nationalist leader. In the message Chiang acknowledged his “past mistakes” and stated that if the president would send someone to Taiwan who would not dishonor him, he would do anything Truman asked of him, including abdication.65 A piece of the State Department record also suggests that, on June 26, 1950, Truman disclosed to his subordinates that he had had a private letter from Chiang about a month before, “to the effect that the Gimo might step out of the situation if that would help.” The president further thought that Chiang “might step out if MacArthur were put in.”66 Chiang’s personal diary indicates that his meeting with Nix actually took place on May 24, not in early June. Chiang, however, gave no further details about their conversation, nor anything more about his stepping down.67
Chiang’s personal message to Truman, if it existed, was by no means coincident. On March 3, 1950, a highly sensitive course of action about China and Taiwan was discussed in Dean Acheson’s office. In this meeting, top brass in the State Department contemplated the following points:
1) The United States should not recognize the government on Taiwan as the ultimate solution;
2) The United States should no longer recognize the government on Taiwan as the government of China but would maintain de facto relations with the provincial government of Taiwan;
3) The United States had viewed Taiwan as part of China. However, if steps should be taken spontaneously to establish an independent regime of Taiwan separate from China, the United States would have to determine its attitude in the light of developments as they occurred; and
4) The United States would view with disfavor and would have to reconsider its attitude if an assault were made on Taiwan.
The conference attendees admitted that the proposed course of action was directed toward encouraging the formation of a “more satisfactory regime” on Taiwan, and the creation of a Taiwan independent of China. But Acheson’s top aides were uncertain whether any of this was feasible, as the points raised “would probably set off a train of events [on the island] while exercising no control over the end results.” For example, they found it hard to imagine that, while Washington maintained de facto relations with the Taiwan provincial government, that government actually did not control the military force on the island, whereas Governor K. C. Wu had little influence in military affairs. Further, if Washington continued to supply arms to the regime on Taiwan after the withdrawal of recognition of it as the government of China, the United States would be subjected to widespread attacks in the United Nations and other international bodies. In the meantime, top State Department chiefs predicted that any active steps taken by Washington to influence regime changes would commit the United States to supporting the new regime on Taiwan. Thus, no conclusion was reached after the meeting.68
Nothing happened until April 27, when Paul Nitze, who directed the State Department’s policy planning, told Dean Acheson that he and John Foster Dulles, Acheson’s new consultant on foreign affairs, had some “very interesting ideas on Formosa,” adding that he and Dean Rusk would “look further into the matter.”69 The outcome of this investigation was a bold “hypothetical” plan, brought forth by Nitze on May 3, to remove Chiang. As Nitze saw it, a successful coup could be launched by the much-favored Sun Liren, who in a secret message to Dean Rusk had “confided” that he was ready to “assume full military control” by proposing to depose Chiang and that he would also eliminate from power “all prominent members of the KMT” on the island. The United States could then throw its weight behind Sun and organize an effective defense of the island, while fomenting resistance on the Chinese mainland.70
Doubtlessly, something unusual was brewing. Three weeks later, on May 30, Rusk, Nitze, Philip C. Jessup, Livingston Merchant, and Philip Sprouse met to discuss Nitze’s draft plan and to explore “various possibilities in the Formosan move.” The attendees predicted that the Russians might well welcome a partial commitment of U.S. forces to the protection of Taiwan after Chiang Kai-shek was removed, as this would give Moscow an opportunity to push the Chinese Communists into a clash with the United States, aided probably by direct if unidentifiable Soviet support such as with submarines.71 The attendees also scrupulously formulated several possible options and integrated them into an official memorandum, submitted by Rusk to Acheson on June 9. The key points were that Chiang Kai-shek should be approached, probably by John Foster Dulles, during his upcoming trip to Japan around mid-June, with the following message: In its current state, Formosa was bound to fall; the United States would do nothing to assist Chiang in preventing this; and the only course by which Chiang could prevent bloodshed was to request UN trusteeship.72
There is no evidence that Acheson ever responded to Rusk’s memorandum. But a week later, on June 15, in another top-secret memorandum, the State Department upper echelons further delineated procedures to implement the aforementioned course of action. Putting it concisely, Washington should inform General Sun Liren in the strictest confidence through a private emissary that the U.S. government was prepared to furnish him the necessary military aid and advice in the event that he wished to stage a coup d’état and establish military control over Taiwan. Sun should be given ample funds, which might run into several million dollars, to assist him in buying over other Nationalist commanders necessary to such an undertaking. Sun should also be given firm assurance of whatever additional funds he might need in this connection during the early stages of his governance. And Washington would be ready to arrange for the shipment from Guam or other nearby U.S. military bases of arms and ammunition necessary to meet Sun’s requirements during and/or immediately after the coup.73
In the eyes of some strategists at Foggy Bottom, supporting Sun Liren to replace Chiang Kai-shek also had significant implications for U.S.-Communist Chinese relations. Were the United States to give Sun Liren military advice and assistance to the point where he was in a position to ensure a much more effective defense of Taiwan than would have been possible under Chiang, Sun would become a more important figure in relation to the scene on the Chinese mainland without the handicaps of Chiang and other discredited KMT leaders. In view of the many reports of dissatisfaction on the part of some of the PLA commanders and the possibility of capitalizing on that dissatisfaction once Chiang was removed from the scene, Washington felt it was possible Sun, from a strong position in Taiwan, might be able to make some kind of deal with dissatisfied PLA generals that might result in a break in the Chinese Communist camp. Were such a result possible, the memorandum concluded, it would be infinitely more to the United States’ advantage than the mere denial of Taiwan to the Chinese Communists.74
Meanwhile, key mass media also lost no time advocating Taiwan’s turnover to the United Nations. To rescue Taiwan from falling to the Communists without the shedding of blood, a piece of commentary published in the New York Times in the spring of 1950 argued that Chiang Kai-shek had to “act as a world statesman” by handing Taiwan over to the UN administration and leaving the island, not to act “as a Chinese military leader bent on a last-ditch resistance.” “By fighting for it [Taiwan] with his inferior force and losing it to the enemy,” the commentary roared, Chiang was suicidally turning the island over to the Communists.75
In the weeks after the May 30 meeting, Dean Rusk met secretly with some prestigious members of the Chinese community in the United States, including Hu Shi, China’s ambassador to Washington during World War II, whom Rusk hoped to enlist in the Sun Liren enterprise and take the lead of administrative affairs after a new regime was formed in Taiwan.76 A coup to remove Chiang seemed to be in the offing. Indeed, as Louis J. Fortier, a former assistant director f
or special operations of the central intelligence, wrote tactfully in a memorandum in June 26, before war had erupted in Korea, there were too many Americans who gave Sun Liren the impression that he was America’s only “White Hope for China.”77
It is hard to believe that Chiang Kai-shek was totally unaware of plans to remove him. He was so disheartened that, at one point in early June, he seemed to truly believe it was no longer possible for him to find a living space in this world. In his personal diary around this time, Chiang, despite a despairing situation, still hoped against hope to fight with the “dark forces” for his very survival to the last.78 Charles Cooke’s visit to Tokyo in June 1950 was unquestionably related to the changing American stance toward Chiang. Adopting the posture of apparent self-abnegation that he had taken with President Truman, on June 15 Chiang passed the following message to MacArthur and Charles Willoughby, the general’s deputy chief of staff for intelligence, via Cooke: “The Generalissimo, aware of the danger of his position, is agreeable to accept American high command in every category and hopes to interest General MacArthur to accept this responsibility, … soliciting his advice, guidance, and direction.” Chiang also invited MacArthur to conduct an inspection tour of Taiwan, and to assume command of the island’s military if the situation so warranted.79 Meanwhile, through Cooke, Chiang also petitioned Dulles, Louis Johnson, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley, who were then in Tokyo, for advisors, economic and military assistance, and a “positive declaration of policy” toward Chiang and his leadership.80
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