46. For more on the CIA’s misjudgment about Mao Zedong’s entry into the war, see CIA Research Report, ORE 58–50, “Critical Situation in the Far East,” October 12, 1950, in CIA Research Reports: China, 1946–1976, reel 1. See also Ranelagh, The Agency, 215; and Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950–1951: They Came from the North (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 298–303.
47. Zheng Jiemin to Chiang Kai-shek, March 17, 1951, TD / XQG, no. 59776.
48. CKSD, diary entry for July 2, 1951, Box 49. See also Frank Holober, Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations during the Korean War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 108–109; Jing Shenghong, Xibeiwang Hu Zongnan (Hu Zongnan: master of the Northwest) (Zhengzhou, China: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1995), 441–448.
49. Joint Activities Report for Month of September 1952, commissioned by Guerrilla Committee, October 1952, TD / XQG, no. 59782.
50. Zheng Jiemin to Chiang Kai-shek, March 15, 1952, TD / JMBZ, vol. 103, no. 58130.
51. Charles Johnston to Madame Chiang Kai-shek, March 15, 1951, TD / XQG, no. 59781; CKSD, diary entries for April 15 and 18, 1951, Box 48. Other members of the Guerrilla Committee included Zheng Jiemin, Mao Renfeng, Claire Chennnault, and Robert J. Delaney. See Guerrilla Committee to Chiang Kai-shek, March 12, 1952, memorandum, TD / JMBZ, vol. 101, no. 58090.
52. During the height of WEI activities in 1952 and 1953, Chiang continued to believe that recapturing the mainland should be a long-term goal taking even up to ten years to fulfill. To a certain degree, his realistic attitude might have stemmed from what he had seen during these covert activities. See, for example, CKSD, diary entries for March 14, May 3, and June 18, 1953, Box 50.
53. For a detailed narrative of these raid operations, see Holober, Raiders of the China Coast.
54. Delaney to Chiang Kai-shek, June 6, 1953, memorandum, TD / XQG, no. 59784; Delaney to Chiang, June 10, 1953, TD / XQG, no. 59795; Guerrilla Committee, “Talushan, Hsiaolushan, and Yanghsu—After Action Report,” top secret memorandum, June 27, 1953, TD / JMBZ, vol. 101, no. 58099; Report on the Dachen Situation, by Guerrilla Committee, July 1953, TD / JMBZ, vol. 101, no. 58094.
55. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 138–139.
56. “An Outline of the Supply Plan for a Counter-Offensive on the Mainland by the National Armed Forces,” by Nationalist Ministry of Defense, May 27, 1953, TD / DMW, vol. 11, no. 58952.
57. Nationalist Ministry of Defense recommendations concerning Nationalist forces in Vietnam, August 1950, TD / JMBZ, vol. 104, no. 58136; Report submitted by the KMT Party to Chiang Kai-shek regarding Nationalist secret activities in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia, March 20, 1951, TD / ZQJ, vol. 380, no. 56896.
58. State Department, “U.S. Government Response to Oral Message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to Mr. Lovett,” top secret memorandum, May 25, 1951, no. 794A.5/5–2551, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. See also Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 59–63.
59. Rankin to State Department, July 2, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/7–2551; U.S. Embassy in France to State Department, July 5, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/7–5551; Donald Heath (U.S. consul general in Saigon) to State Department, July 13, 1951, no. 794A.5-MAP/7–1351, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
60. State Department, Memorandum of Conversation, Subject: Chinese Troops in Indochina, August 29, 1951, NARA, RG 59, 793.5851G/8–2951.
61. State Department to U.S. Legation in Saigon, September 24, 1951, NARA, RG 59, 793.5851G/9–2451; Heath to State Department, December 18, 1951, NARA, RG 59, 793.5851G/12–1851. As late as October 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still considered the use of Nationalists on Indochina feasible should the Vietminh forces be reinforced by the Chinese Communists. See Joint Strategic Plans Committee memorandum, October 23, 1952, RG 218, Geographical File 1951–53, Entry: UD 10, 190:1/29/01.
62. Rankin to State Department, May 1, 1953, no. 794A.00(W)/5–153, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 3; Rankin to State Department, May 8, 1953, no. 794A.00(W)/5–853, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 3; Rankin to State Department, July 13, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/7–1353, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; CKSD, diary entries for May 3, 9, and 19, 1953, Box 50.
63. State Department, “Proposed Financial Aid to the Government of China to Support Repatriation of Chinese Internees from Indochina,” memorandum, May 18, 1953, in ROCA, reel 32.
64. William M. Leary, Perilous Missions: Civil Air Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), 128–131; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991), 163–168.
65. Chinese Embassy Thailand to Chiang Kai-shek, top secret, February 8, 1951, TD / JMBZ, vol. 104, no. 58150. See also Victor S. Kaufman, “Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division,” China Quarterly, no. 166 (2001): 441–442.
66. Robert H. Taylor, Foreign and Domestic Consequences of the KMT Intervention in Burma (Ithaca, NY: Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1973), 32–33; McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 169–179; Kaufman, “Trouble in the Golden Triangle,” 442.
67. Ranking to State Department, April 1, 1952, no. 794A.521/4–152, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. See also Lifayuan Gongbao [Gazette of the Legislative Yuan], 11 no. 6 (June 1953): 24–26.
68. Topping, On the Front Lines of the Cold War, 148–150; Alexander Cockburn and Jeffrey St. Clair, Whiteout: The CIA, Drugs and the Press (London: Verso, 1998), 215–234.
69. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, IR no. 5480.1, “Chinese Communist influence in Burma,” April 15, 1952, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII, reel 1; Division of Research for Far East, Department of State, IR no. 7350, “Disputed Frontiers: The Shan and Kachin States of Burma,” November 29, 1956, O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII, reel 1.
70. CKSD, diary entry for March 21, 1952, Box 49.
71. Shelby Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Independence (London: Pluto, 2001), 165–168; Matthew Foley, The Cold War and National Assertion in Southeast Asia: Britain, the United States and Burma, 1948–1962 (London: Routledge, 2010), 97–117.
72. Li Mi to Chiang Kai-shek, report, February 26, 1953, TD / JMBZ, vol. 104, no. 58153; CKSD, diary entry for March 26, 1953, Box 50.
73. CKSD, diary entries on February 21 and 25, and March 2, 18, and 26, 1953, Box 50; Rankin to Walter P. McConaughy, May 4, 1953, NARA, RG 59, 794A.11/5–453.
74. Rankin to State Department, May 8, 1953, no. 794A.00(W)/5–853, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 3; Rankin to State Department, February 19, 1954, no. 794A.00(W)/2–1954, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 3; Li Mi to Chiang Kai-shek, top secret, July 1, 1953, TD / JMBZ, vol. 104, no. 58162; Zhou Zhirou to Chiang, November 28, 1953, TD / JMBZ, vol. 104, no. 58157.
CHAPTER 10 ▪ The Making of an Island State
1. Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean Conflict (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 59–69; Peter Lowe, The Korean War (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000), 90–100.
2. Howard Jones to State Department, April 23, 1953, no. 794A.5/4–2353, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Rankin to State Department, September 4, 1953, no. 794A.00/9–453, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 2; CKSD, diary entries for April 15 and June 7 and 23, 1953, Box 50.
3. CKSD, diary entry for June 7, 1953, Box 50.
4. Zhou Zhirou to Chiang Kai-shek, January 12, 1953, TD / ZQJ, vol. 4, no. 56893; CKSD, diary entry for January 9, 1953, Box 50.
5. See Minutes of the 42nd CRC meeting, October 28, 1950, CRCA, 6.4–2, reel 2; Minutes of the 136th CRC meeting, May 21, 1951, ibid; Zhou Zhirou to Chiang, January 24, 1953, TD / ZQJ, vol. 4, no. 56892.
6. Jacob-Larkcom to Foreign Office, “Summary of Events in Formosa during February, 1953,” March 24, 1953, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:315–316.
7. Outlines of military operations in Dongshan, top secret, Nat
ionalist Ministry of National Defense, 1953 (n.d.), TD / ZJS, vol. 8, no. 56952.
8. Jacobs-Larkcom to Foreign Office, July 23, 1953, FO 371/105180 FC10111/50; Admiral Gui Yongqing (personal chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek) to Charles Cooke, August 14, 1953, Charles M. Cooke Papers, Box 6; Holober, Raiders of the China Coast, 195–222.
9. CKSD, diary entries for July 18, 21, 24, and 31, 1953, Box 50.
10. Holober, Raiders of the China Coast, 221–222.
11. Rankin to State Department, top secret, July 17, 1953, no. 794A.5/7–1753, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; State Department, memorandum, August 3, 1953, no. 794A.5/8–353, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; Rankin to State Department, top secret, September 4, 1953, no. 794A.5-MSP/9–453, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
12. Tang Enbo to Chiang Kai-shek, September 23, 1949, TD / ZJJR, vol. 444, no. 54221; Tang to Chiang, September 1949, TD / ZJJR, vol. 444, no. 54222; “The proposed budget for the establishment of the New Army,” prepared by Tang Enbo, 1949 (n.d.), TD / ZJJR, vol. 444, no. 54223.
13. Outlines of “Anti-Communist New Force,” prepared by Tang Enbo, 1949 (n.d.), TD / ZJJR, vol. 444, no. 54225; Opinions regarding financing and subsidizing the New Army, 1949 (n.d.), vol. 445, no. 54226.
14. See Society of the Baituan Records Preservation, ed., “Haitan Monogatari” [The story of Baituan], Part 4, Kaisha [Journal of the Military Club] 1 (Tokyo, 1993): 26–27.
15. Strong to State Department, May 19, 1950, no. 794A.00(W)/5–1950; Strong to State Department, July 1, 1950, no. 794A.00(W)/7–150, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 2.
16. General Chase first broached the issue of Baituan and his opposition to its existence in a meeting with Chiang Kai-shek on June 27, 1951. Chiang was surprised and annoyed, and decided to ignore the issue. See CKSD, diary entry for June 27, 1951, Box 49.
17. Rankin to State Department, August 28, 1951, no. 794A.553/8–2851, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
18. Rankin to State Department, July 2, 1951, no. 794A.553/7–251, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
19. CKSD, diary entries for July 5, 7, 16, August 8, and November 24, 1952, Box 49; Society of the Baituan Records Preservation, ed., “Haitan Monogatari,” Part 7, Kaisha 4 (1993): 23–35.
20. Ibid., Part 15, Kaisha 12 (1993): 20–26. See also Lin Zhaozhen, Fumian Budui [The masked troops] (Taipei, Taiwan: Shibao chubanshe, 1996).
21. General Peng Mengqi to Chiang Kai-shek, “Guang” Plan, May 23, 1953, TD / SX, vol. 2, no. 58958; Peng to Chiang, addendum to “Guang” Plan, May 1953, TD / SX, vol. 2, no. 58559; Peng to Chiang, “The first-stage operation plan of the Guang Plan,” May 1953, TD / SX, vol. 2, no. 58560.
22. CKSD, diary entry for June 11, 1953, Box 50.
23. CKSD, diary entries for November 12, 13, 17, and 29, 1952, Box 49; Chiang Kai-shek, copy of handwritten instructions, 1952 (n.d.), TD / GSJ, vol. 4, no. 56925.
24. MAAG Taipei to State Department, CINCPAC (Pearl Harbor), and CINCFE (Tokyo), December 8, 1952, ROCA, reel 27.
25. CKSD, diary entries for December 9, 10, and 11, 1952, Box 49.
26. CKSD, diary entries for June 2 and 4, 1953, Box 50.
27. CKSD, diary entry for July 20, 1953, Box 50.
28. Foreign Minister George Yeh to Admiral Radford, top secret letter, January 4, 1954, enclosed in MAAG memorandum to General Zhou Zhirou, February 4, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/2–454, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
29. CKSD, diary entry for December 28, 1953, Box 50.
30. MAAG Formosa to the adjunct general, Department of the Army, top secret, February 20, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/2–2054, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
31. Rankin to State Department, “Chinese Government Military Aid Proposal,” top secret memorandum, March 8, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/3–854, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
32. Walter McConaughy to Walter Robertson, top secret State Department office memorandum, March 8, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/3–854, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
33. Rankin to Everett Drumright (deputy assistant secretary of state), March 13, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/3–1354, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
34. CKSD, diary entries for February 3 and March 21, 1954, Box 50.
35. Ranelagh, The Agency, 430–431.
36. A. H. B. Hermann (British consul in Tamsui) to Foreign Office, May 27, 1954, FO 371/110232 FC1019/29.
37. Chiang Kai-shek and James Van Fleet, minutes of conversation, May 13, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58983; Chiang and Van Fleet, minutes of conversation, May 16, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58985; CKSD, diary entries for May 13 and 16, 1954, Box 50.
38. Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1945–1958 (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1994), 155–156; Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, 263–265.
39. State Department, “Notes on General Chiang Ching-kuo’s call on Secretary of State Dulles,” memorandum, October 1, 1953, in ROCA, reel 30.
40. Ibid., 156–157; Rankin, China Assignment, 193–196.
41. CKSD, diary entries for June 19 and 21, 1954, Box 50.
42. CKSD, diary entry for June 28, 1954, Box 50.
43. Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle, 157–158; Thomas E. Stolper, China, Taiwan, and the Offshore Islands: Together with an Implication for Outer Mongolia and Sino-Soviet Relations (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1985), 45–50.
44. Hermann to Foreign Office, October 6, 1954, FO 371/110239 FC1019/53.
45. For more on the Quemoy artillery war in September 1954, see Chang, Friends and Enemies, 116–120; Michael Szonyi, Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 42–49.
46. CKSD, diary entries for September 8 and 9, 1954, Box 51; The ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, September 9, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 581–582.
47. CKSD, diary entries for September 10, 12, and 14, 1954, Box 51.
48. Rankin to State Department, memorandum of September 21, 1954 conversation among President Chiang, Ambassador Rankin, and General Chase, September 21, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/9–2154, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4; CKSD, diary entry for September 21, 1954, Box 51.
49. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, memorandum, September 11, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 558–610.
50. Acting Defense Secretary (Anderson) to President Eisenhower, September 3, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 556–557.
51. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 165–168; Steve Tsang, The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 121–138.
52. British consul in Tamsui to Foreign Office, October 22, 1954, in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:544.
53. Rosemary Foot, “The Search for a Modus Vivendi: Anglo-American Relations and China Policy in the Eisenhower Era,” in The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960, eds. Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 152–153.
54. Rankin to State Department, October 5, 1954, no. 794A.5-MSP/10–554; Robertson to Dulles, top secret memorandum, October 7, 1954, no. 793.5/10–754, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4.
55. Dulles to Robertson, memorandum, October 8, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 709.
56. Division of Research for Far East, State Department, Intelligence Report IR 7052, “Prospects for U.S. and British Bases in the Far East through 1965,” September 23, 1955, in O.S.S./State Department Intelligence and Research Reports VIII, reel 1. See also Ralph N. Clough, Island China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 10–14.
57. CKSD, diary entries for October 12 and 13, 1954, Box 51.
58. For the details of the meetings between Robertson and Chiang in Taipei, see memorandum of conversation, October 13, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 728–753.
59. Rankin to State Department, Novem
ber 6, 1954, no. 794A.00(W)/11–654, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. For a careful analysis of John Foster Dulles’s management of the 1954 Taiwan Strait crisis, see also Appu K. Soman, Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts: The United States and China, 1950–1958 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 122–153.
60. Memorandum of conversation, top secret, November 4, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 860–861; George Yeh and Robertson, minutes of meeting, November 4, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58982.
61. CKSD, diary entry for November 7, 1954, Box 51; Soman, Double-Edged Sword, 146–148.
62. Memorandum of conversation, top secret, November 6, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 870–871; George Yeh and Robertson, minutes of meeting, November 6, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58982.
63. Memorandum of conversation, top secret, November 16, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 896–898; George Yeh and Robertson, minutes of meeting, November 16, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58982.
64. CKSD, diary entry for November 11, 1954, Box 51.
65. Memorandum of conversation, top secret, November 19, 1954, FRUS 1952–1954, vol. 14: China and Japan, Part 1, 904–908; George Yeh and Robertson, minutes of meeting, November 16, 1954, TD / DMW, vol. 12, no. 58982.
66. Rankin to State Department, December 11, 1954, no. 794A.00(W)/12–1154, Formosa 1950–1954, reel 4. A similar observation was shared by the British consular staff in Taiwan. See, for example, “Tamsui Political Summary, November and December, 1954,” in Taiwan Political and Economic Reports 1861–1960, ed. Jarman, 10:556–558.
67. CKSD, diary entry for December 3, 1954, Box 51.
Conclusion
1. Qin, ed., Zongtong Jianggong Sixiang Yanlun Zongji, 26:183–184.
2. Ibid., 184.
3. MAAG Taipei to CINCPAC and the State Department, November 10, 1954; CINCPAC to MAAG Taipei and the State Department, November 16, 1954; State Department, “Reported Chinese Communist Assault on Wu-Ch’iu,” memorandum, November 26, 1954, ROCA, reel 37.
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