The following day the delegates, indicating they possessed a degree of skepticism about Travis’s call for relief, passed the following resolution: “Believing it of vital importance that this convention know correctly the condition of our army, they would recommend the convention to accept the services of Major [Matthew] Caldwell, who purposes to start this day for the frontier.” Caldwell, a Gonzales resident, had every reason (Gonzales was next in line after San Antonio) to believe that Travis’s letters were the truth, even if Houston and the other delegates doubted the documents.51
The convention took no further action until the morning of Friday, March 4. Houston claimed that because of the actions of the General Council he was no longer the army’s commander-in-chief. He argued that independence demanded a new appointment, as his “former oath of office was under the constitution of 1824, and in obedience thereto.”52 To satisfy Houston, the following preamble and resolution were introduced.
Whereas we are now in a state of Revolution, and threatened by a large invading army, from the central government of Mexico; and whereas our present situation, and the emergency of the present crisis, renders it indispensably necessary that we should have an army in the field; and, whereas, it is also necessary that there should be one Supreme head or Commander in Chief, and due degrees of subordination defined, established and strictly observed, Therefore, be it Resolved, that General Samuel Houston be appointed Commander in Chief of all land forces of the Texian Army, both regulars, volunteers, and militia, while in actual service, and endowed with all the rights, privileges and powers due to a Commander in Chief in the United States of America, and that he forthwith proceed to take command, establish headquarters and organize the army accordingly.53
Apparently over lunch a number of the delegates decided the government needed to ensure its control over Houston. Thus, the preamble and resolution were passed with an addition:
“And that Samuel Houston retain such command until the election of a chief magistrate of this government, and to continue in such office unless, superseded by order of the government, subject, however, to the general orders of the government de facto, until the general organization agreeable to the constitution, and always amenable to the laws and civil authorities of this country.”54
Another resolution was introduced that specified that if Houston did not “immediately set out for the army” he should resign. Houston said that he would depart the next morning and requested that the resolution be withdrawn. The proposed mandate was dropped by its sponsor. The body then adjourned for the weekend, agreeing to meet on Monday, March 7.55
In the late 1830s, Isaac W. Burton reported his opinion of Houston’s behavior at the convention: “I thought him a man of uncommon natural abilities – But I fancied perhaps that his acquired ones were in a great measure superficial – I thought him in the main a man of an excellent heart but dissipated, eccentric, and vain – and on the whole I ranked him among the first men in Texas and was at that time his Political as well as warm personal friend – However, he delayed taking Command of the Volunteer Army and staid [sic] in the Convention employed in Legislative matters when I thought that his honor as a soldier was hourly getting dimmed.”56
On Sunday morning, March 6, Houston still had not left for the Alamo. Travis’s final dispatch, however, arrived at Washington-on-the-Brazos during the delegates’ breakfast and, after some hesitation, brought the issue of Houston’s departure to a head. Richard Ellis, president of the convention, called the delegates together and the secretary read the letter. Many members, apparently because of Houston’s influence, continued to doubt that the Alamo was under siege.57 Forty years later, Lancelot Abbotts remembered it this way:
The veracity of the courier who carried it to Washington, and the authenticity of the signature of Travis, were questioned by some members of the Convention and by citizens. Two or three of the members were aware that I knew well the handwriting of Col. Travis, and a Committee of the Convention waited on me to ascertain my opinion on the matter. I unhesitatingly pronounced the despatch (brief as it was) to be the handwriting of the brave Travis.
A public meeting was called for the purpose of enlisting volunteers for the relief of the Alamo. At this time there was living in Washington a doctor by the name of Biggs, or Briggs, who was a big, burly, brave Manifest Destiny man. He made a speech, in which he declared his unbelief in the despatch, and the utter impossibility of any number of Mexicans to take the Alamo, when defended by near 200 men.58
Finally, late that afternoon Houston left for Gonzales to take command of the forces that had mustered under the command of Lt. Colonel James C. Neill to reinforce the Alamo. Mrs. Angelina Eberly, a San Felipe resident, reported Houston’s departure with these strong words: “it was Sunday – collecting his besotted faculties, he [Houston] said, with much levity, to the anxious spectators, [‘]You must throw a shoe at me for good luck.[’] No one did so – why? ‘I would have had my foot in it,’ they cried. It was the 6th of March – the last express came from Fannin and Travis, with a letter from the latter to Miss Cummings to whom he was engaged. They [Houston and staff] got off the same evening. That morning Travis fell!”59
The ride to Gonzales should have taken two and a half days at the most. Instead, Houston took five days to make the trip. He spent the night of the sixth at Dr. Asa Hoxey’s plantation at Coles Settlement, northwest of Washington-on-the-Brazos. On the seventh he traveled to Burnam’s Crossing on the Colorado River, south of present-day La Grange. At Burnam’s, William W. Thompson, an old settler, confronted Houston about his obvious delay in moving to the relief of the Alamo. Thompson described the encounter with these words: “Houston swore that he believed it [Santa Anna at the Alamo] to be a damned lie, and that all those reports from Travis & Fannin were lies, for there were no Mexican forces there and that he believed that it was only electioneering schemes [by] Travis & Fannin to sustain their own popularity[.] And Genl Houston showed no disposition of being in a hurry to the army, much to the surprise of myself & others; for he remained at Capt. Burnums all night, & all that day, and all night again before he started for Gonzales. And this at a time, when anxiety for the relief of Colo. Travis & his heroic comrades, appeared to fill the minds of everybody.”60
Whereas, in 1859, Houston reported his ride to Gonzales with these words: “The Alamo was known to be in siege. Fannin was known to be embarrassed. Ward, also, and Morris and Johnson, destroyed. All seemed to bespeak calamity of the most ireful character. . . . The general proceeded on his way and met many fugitives. The day on which he left Washington, the 6th of March, the Alamo had fallen. He anticipated it; and marching to Gonzales as soon as practicable, though his health was infirm, he arrived there on the 11th of March.”61 Thus, Houston did not hurry to Gonzales because he was sick and he believed the Alamo had already fallen.
Still others, besides Thompson, believed that Houston had traveled too slowly in riding to the sounds of war. San Jacinto captain Moseley Baker penned a private letter to Houston that detailed Baker’s knowledge of Houston’s participation in the revolution. In regard to the Alamo, Baker wrote:
While the coming of Santa Anna was . . . daily expected in the month of January, 1836, you [Houston] deliberately took your departure for Nacogdoches, on a plea of going to pacify the Indians, without having previously organized a single company for the defense of the country. You remained absent, and was still so, when the Mexicans actually invaded the country and besieged the immortal Travis in the Alamo, and he in calling for assistance writes to the Convention, on account, as he himself says, “of the absence of the commander-in-chief.” But sir he called in vain – you had left no organization, nothing on which the people could rally, and no one to whom to look for orders in your absence, and before the people could recover from their consternation, the Alamo had fallen, he [Travis] and his brave comrades shouting for Texas and her rights [paper torn] if we are to believe all contempt [torn] testimony you fell shouting [torn] your post
should have [torn] [San Antonio] because it was one of danger and glory. You should have been there because the destinies of Texas were nominally resting on you. But you were in the East removed from danger, and in a condition that even your enemies, for the honor of Texas are loath to mention.
On learning the fact that Santa Anna had actually invaded the country, you hurried to Washington to meet the Convention. You there read the appeals of Travis for assistance, but you stirred not, you remained for days waiting a reappointment, and how far you restrained yourself from your accustomed habits, let those speak who had the mortification to see you. You finally reached Gonzales, but before you did so, Travis and his Texian band had shouted their last battle cry for Texas, and then slept the sleep of the Brave. Lamented Travis, so long as brave and generous deeds shall command the admiration of the free and the good – will you and your band – be immortal. Had [Ben] Milam lived or had [Edward] Burleson commanded, you [Travis] now would be among us, but friend of my early days rest in peace. When the name of Houston shall be forgotten, yours will be repeated as the more than successful rival of Leonidas.62
Today one can argue that the Coleman, Thompson, and Baker statements were nothing more than political attacks on Houston. While political considerations may have produced the statements, that does not mean the declarations are false. Moreover, a document from Houston’s own quill verifies an important element of the Coleman and Thompson reports.
On March 7, 1836, before Houston left for Burnam’s Crossing, he wrote James Collinsworth, chairman of the government’s military committee. In this missive, Houston’s own words prove he was telling people he did not believe that the men, women, and children of the Alamo were under attack by the Mexican army. Also, the letter reveals that Houston, the commanding general of all Texian land forces, was oblivious to the military situation that faced the newly formed country. Houston wrote:
Before I proceed on my way this morning, you will allow me to call your attention, if you please, with that of the committee, to the subject of fortifying “Live Oak Point,” on the bay of Copano. Troops coming from the U. States via New Orleans can sail for that point on armed vessels, with artillery and lumber sufficient for such fortifications as will be necessary for the present. The cannon there placed should be large pieces, 12 and 18 [pounders], and very few will suffice. Col. [James] Power can give you all the information that you may desire; I will only suggest that it will give us command of all supplies destined for Goliad and San Antonio, if the enemy should even possess them [italics added]. If a liberal appropriation of money should be made for the army, although we should not immediately receive it, it will keep down much discontent until it can be had. I pray you to have the Cherokee treaty ratified, and Major Washington Lewis, residing at Masters’ on the road, appointed agent for the Cherokees to reside near Bowls’. This will be of importance to the safety of the frontier. – If any plan be devised by which the Comanches can be approached by the head waters of the Brazos, and they induced to fall down and range upon the Laredo route to Bexar and steal horses, it will be important. A Mr. Dillard, residing at the Falls of the Brazos will be a proper person to communicate with. Measures should be attended to if possible to prevent the Creek Indians from emigrating to the East of Texas. Col. [Thomas J.] Rusk can inform you of the fact of A. Hotchkiss’ interest in inducing the Indians to emigrate to the country. The evidence is conclusive. – It would be well that the steam packet “Wm. Brown,” if purchased, should have such guns placed on her as would enable her to throw grape and canister into the enemy in close contact, as I am told she cannot carry large pieces. If Copano is occupied by us, the enemy will never advance into the Colonies. God bless you and may you long continue useful to Texas. I rode until late last night, and rose early this morning. . . .
There is a Blount in Washington, who deserves a Captaincy in the cavalry, if you should think proper to advance him. I pray that all appointments in the army, since the 6th of January, made by the self-styled “Council,” may be set aside, if the persons should be afterwards appointed. – Please see Doctor [Stephen H.] Everitt, and he can speak to you of a Mr. [Stephen W.] Blount of Jasper. He only received a Lieutenancy when he should have been advanced. . . .
What say you of a resolution, that Texas is part of Louisiana, and the U. States by [the] treaty of 1803?63
On March 7, 1836, when Houston dictated the previously detailed letter, “the key to Texas” had been turned. In fact, the door to “the sacred Territory of the Colonies” had been blown off its hinges and was about to crash down on Gonzales. Thus, with all of the territory south of the San Antonio River under control or soon to be under the control of Santa Anna’s centralist soldiers, what were Houston’s plans for the defense of Texas?
Not much, as Houston’s words, “if the enemy should even possess them [Bexar and Goliad],” coupled with the Coleman and Thompson statements, demonstrate an apparent denial of everything military that had occurred in Texas since February 1, 1836. Otherwise, he planned to defend the Republic of Texas with the following actions: (1) ratification of his Cherokee treaty and appointment of an Indian agent for the tribe, (2) arrange for the Comanche Indians to travel the Laredo road to steal horses from the Mexican army, which suggests that Houston did not believe the Mexican army was at the Alamo and was anticipating a future advance of the enemy on the Laredo road, (3) stop any Creek Indian immigration from the United States, (4) arm a steamboat with appropriate cannon, (5) void many of the military appointments of the previous Texas government, which would have given him stronger control over the army forming at Gonzales, (6) fortify Copano, Texas’s most remote and least used gulf port, which he saw as the “key to Texas,” (7) request Collinsworth have the new Texas government pass a resolution that claimed Texas was included in the “Louisiana Purchase” of 1803, which would mean it was part of the United States.64
In the aggregate, the evidence supports a number of conclusions concerning Houston’s role in the defense of Bexar and the fall of the Alamo. First, Houston did not order the Alamo demolished and San Antonio abandoned as he later claimed. He did, however, suggest those actions to Governor Henry Smith, who ignored the advice and reinforced San Antonio. Also, the General Council instructed the Alamo commander: “. . . in no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity.”
The Cherokee Sam Houston, ca. 1820s
Photo courtesy Texas State Library & Archives Commission
Second, between February 1, 1836, and February 23, 1836, a time when the San Antonio garrison and Texas most needed its commander-in-chief, Houston was on leave from his military responsibilities. He was taking care of private affairs and conducting peace talks with the Cherokee Indians of East Texas.65
Third, Houston, after learning of Santa Anna’s arrival at Bexar, ignored his military duties so that he could play a political role at the convention. He appears to have acted the politician to protect his position as commander-in-chief and to obtain even greater authority in that role. Houston obviously understood that if the Texians defeated Santa Anna’s army, the Texian general would be seen as hero, which would give that commander a political advantage after the revolution. He insisted that because of the General Council’s former acts he was no longer the army’s commander-in-chief, that the Declaration of Independence required a reappointment of the position. After being reaffirmed, he was threatened with dismissal if he did not depart immediately for the army. He promised to leave the next day. Then, after the threat of being fired was removed, he broke his pledge. Otherwise, he spent his free time in the grog shops, celebrating the declaration of independence, which he alleged had been passed on his birthday.66
Fourth, Houston, at the convention and on the long ride to Gonzales, protested that there was no need to hurry to the army because the enemy was not on the frontier, and that such claims by Travis and Fannin were political schemes. In the case of the convention, the evidence suggests that Houston was successful in convincing mos
t of the delegates that the Bexar command was not threatened.
Fifth, Houston, when only days away from taking command of the troops at Gonzales, appears to have been totally out of touch with the military conditions that had existed on the frontier for over a month and the strategic reality he was about to encounter.
Sixth, Houston’s suggesting the Texas government claim that Texas had been part of the Louisiana Purchase and was rightfully part of the United States appears to have been an attempt to give President Andrew Jackson and the United States an interest in Texas’s struggle against Mexico.
The idea that Houston did not believe the enemy was at Bexar or Goliad is incomprehensible. Still, the evidence shows that Houston was telling people he did not believe the Mexican forces were at those locations. He even suggested the same to James Collinsworth, chairman of the government’s military committee. Nevertheless, could Houston have really have been that out of touch or stupid? Who knows? Only time and new sources will tell.
In 1845 Houston responded to a critical letter from Anthony Butler, minister to Mexico at the time of the Revolution, with these words: “The sliding scale may do in politics, but it will not do in matters of character.” Such may be the case with most politicians, but for Houston everything was politics. In the end, the Alamo defenders, whose loyalties were with Houston and Governor Smith, were just problems that Houston left to the “sliding scale.” What would the men, women, and children of the Alamo have thought of Houston’s actions? Given that Captain James B. Bonham, on the morning of March 3, brought in the news that Houston would not be riding to the rescue, the people of the Alamo probably saw Houston’s behavior as pure and simple betrayal of the worst kind.67
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