49 “A list of the Gonzales Ranging Company,” February 23, 1836; Matthew Caldwell to Joseph Kent for military supplies and services, February 8, 1836, number 387, Audited Military Claims ledger, 304-2511, TSL; Matthew Caldwell to G. W. Cottle for military supplies and services, February 9, 1836, number 302, AMC-ledger; Matthew Caldwell to John Davis for military services, February 12, 1836, number 378, AMC-ledger; John Fisher to Sarah DeWitt for military supplies, February 21, 1836, number 107, AMC-ledger; Matthew Caldwell to Dolphin Floyd for military supplies, February 24, 1836, number 368, AMC-ledger. The actual Kent, Cottle, Davis, DeWitt, and Floyd claims have been lost or destroyed. The ledger, however, has entries that show, except for the DeWitt claim, the claims were authorized by Matthew Caldwell, one of the officials who organized the Gonzales ranger companies.
50 “A list of the Gonzales Ranging Company,” February 23, 1836; Thomas B. Zumwalt affidavit, July 24, 1880, Kerr County and David B. Kent affidavit, July 22, 1880, Kerr County, RV 1419, GLO. David Kent did not make the ride to San Antonio with the Gonzales rangers. Instead, on or about March 1, 1836, he carried an express from Gonzales to Texanna near the coast on the Lavaca River and returned with Captain George Sutherland’s company. At the time Kent was eighteen years old.
51 Caldwell to Kent, February 8, 1836; Matthew Caldwell to James Gibson for military services and supplies, February 23, 1836, number 371, AMC-ledger; Nathaniel Addson file, RV 683, GLO. Bevil’s Settlement came to be named Jasper after the revolution.
52 [Marcus Sewell] Entry 579, “Proceedings of the Land Commissioners,” RHRD Number 114, Nacogdoches County Records, East Texas Research Center, Stephen F. Austin University, Nacogdoches, Texas; Certificate 650, “Heirs of John Harris,” in Carolyn Reeves Ericson, Nacogdoches Headrights (New Orleans: Polyanthos, 1977), 20; “List of votes taken at the Precinct of Upper La Vaca for the purpose of electing two Delegates to the Convention to convene 1st March at the town of Washington,” February 1, 1836, Upper Lavaca River, Election Returns, TSL; “Roll of Brazos Guards,” November 21, 1835, Bexar, Austin Papers, CAH; J. C. Neill to Robert While, February 14, 1836, Bexar, Robert White file, AMC-TSL; J. C. Neill to John T. Ballard, February 14, 1836, Bexar, John T. Ballard file, AMC-TSL; J. C. Neill to William A. Irwin, February 14, 1836, Bexar, William A. Irwin file, AMC-TSL; “List of men who have this day volunteered to remain before Bexar,” November 24, 1835, Austin Papers, CAH; George English entry in Tyler, Barnett, Barkley, Anderson, Odintz, eds. The New Handbook of Texas, II: 870.
53 “L. Smither to All the Inhabitants in Texas,” February 24, 1836; Townsend to Adriance, February 26, 1836.
54 Albert Martin to the People of Texas and all Americans [February 25, 1836, Gonzales], Green, “To the People of Texas & All Americans,” 493; Almonte, “Private Journal,” 17-18.
It is speculation on this investigator’s part that Smith departed the Alamo on the night of February 24, rather than on the afternoon of February 23. First, the available evidence indicates that John Sutherland’s report that Smith and he had departed the Alamo on the twenty-third is fiction. Second, Seguin said only Smith was sent out to scout the Leon Creek road on the afternoon of February 23 and that Smith returned to the fortress about five o’clock. Third, given that Launcelot Smither, Travis’s rider to Gonzales, left at 4:00 p.m., there would have been no reason for Travis to have also sent Smith to Gonzales that day. Fourth, since Smith returned to the Alamo with Albert Martin, it makes sense that he probably left the Alamo with Martin.
55 R. M. Williamson to Governor and Council, February 25, 1836, Mina, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 434-435.
56 John S. Brooks to A. H. Brooks, February 25, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 426.
57 James W. Fannin Jr. to Acting Governor James W. Robinson, February 25, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 429-230.
58 Townsend to Adriance, February 26, 1836.
59 “Martin to the People of Texas and all Americans” [February 25, 1836].
60 Dimmitt to Kerr, February 28, 1836. Just what route Dimmitt and Noble took to return to their home is unknown. Because they are not mentioned in any of Goliad documents from that time frame, they most likely went by way of Gonzales.
61 Travis to Houston, February 25, 1836; Almonte, “Private Journal,” 17-18.
62 Ibid.; Jesus F. de la Teja, A Revolution Remembered: The Memoirs and Selected Correspondence of Juan N. Seguin (Austin: State House Press, 1991), 79. Seguin claimed the date as February 28, but that appears to have been a mistake on his part.
63 Travis to Houston, February 25, 1836.
64 De la Teja, A Revolution Remembered, 79; Seguin to Fontaine, June 7, 1890; Almonte, “Private Journal,” 18; Matias Curvier file, PC-TSL; Antonio Cruz Arrocha account, Box SM-2, Gentilz Collection, Daughters of the Republic of Texas Library, Alamo, San Antonio, Texas.
Curvier stated that he left the Alamo with a letter from Travis to Houston.
Seguin, in his memoirs, claimed he had been sent to Fannin at Goliad, instead of Houston at Gonzales. At that time, the brief biography was written for political reasons, to defend past Seguin actions. Also at that time, Houston was being attacked by old veterans for his lack of leadership during the revolution. Seguin and Houston were old friends and political allies in the new Democratic party. Seguin may have claimed that Travis sent him to Fannin, instead of Gonzales, in order to protect Houston’s reputation. Also, for Seguin, there was no need of claiming he had attempted to reinforce the Alamo and had failed. Most likely, his enemies would have claimed it was another example of his flawed character.
65 Almonte, “Private Journal,” 18.
66 Ibid.
67 Edward Burleson affidavit [February 29, 1836], Thomas G. McGehee file, AMC-TSL. Burleson stated that the provisional government had ordered him to organize the militia and raise volunteers for the draft. This investigator’s belief that Williamson left Bastrop that morning is speculation based on the fact that Williamson had learned of the Alamo situation the day before and would have hurried to Gonzales once Burleson had been notified of the events.
68 James W. Robinson to Sam Houston, February 26, 1836, Washington-on-the-Brazos, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 445; W. B. Travis to Andrew Ponton, February 23, 1836, Bexar, Acting Governor James W. Robinson copy, February 26, 1836, Washington-on-the-Brazos, Don Carlos Barrett Papers, CAH. Robinson copied Travis’s short note to Ponton and added two notes to the bottom of the copy, which was sent to D. C. Barrett. It reads:
Washington Feb. 26th 1836
Send copies in every direction and let the militia turn out in mass.
James W. Robinson
Acting Governor
N. B.
The militia will rendezvous at Gonzales.
69 Alexander Thomson and G. A. Pattillo to James W. Robinson [February 26, 1836], Washington-on-the-Brazos, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 472. Jenkins missed it, but the original document is dated February 26.
70 James W. Fannin Jr. to James W. Robinson, February 27, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 455-456; Fannin to Francis to De Sauque and John Chenoweth, March 1, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 477-478; John S. Brooks to Mother, March 2, 1836, Goliad, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 485-488; De la Teja, A Revolution Remembered, 79-80; “Muster Roll Capt. Chenoweth’s Co., Mustered into service February, 1836,” Muster Roll book, 68; “John Smith petition for a first class headright land grant,” n.d., M&P-TSL.
71 “Muster Roll Capt. Chenoweth’s Co.,” February 1836.
72 “John Smith petition,” n.d.; J. W. Peacock affidavit, January 27, 1836, Bexar, J. W. Peacock file, AMC-TSL; J. C. Neill affidavit, February 3, 1836, Peacock file.
73 “Muster Roll Capt. Chenoweth’s Co.,” February 1836; Houston to Smith, January 17, 1836; Neill et al. to Convention, February 5, 1836, Bexar, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 263-265; Houston affidavit, February 9, 1837. G. J. Thayer, H. O. Marshall, and W. G. Frazier died with Fannin at Goliad according to land grant records.
74 James W. Fan
nin Jr. to “troops at Gonzales,” February 25, 1836, Goliad, in Foote, Texas and The Texians, II: 224-225; “Ben Highsmith account,” Sowell, Early Settlers, 9-10; Fannin to De Sauque and Chenoweth, March 1, 1836, Jenkins, ed., Papers, IV: 477-478; Juan N. Seguin, Personal Memoirs of John N. Seguin, From The Year 1834 to the Retreat of General Woll From the City of San Antonio, 1842 (San Antonio: Ledger Book and Job Office, 1858), 9; Alamo voting list, February 1, 1836; “Information Derived From J. W. Andrews,” Lamar Papers, IV, Part II: 237.
Highsmith claimed that Tom Mitchell entered the Alamo with David Crockett and a number of men from Gonzales. Tom Mitchell appears to have been Edwin T. Mitchell. Mitchell’s brother Doctor Warren J. Mitchell was the commanding officer of the Georgia Battalion with Fannin at Goliad. Edwin T. Mitchell’s name does not appear on the February 1, 1836, Alamo voting list. Thus, given that Mitchell was most likely a member of the Georgia Battalion at Goliad, it seems the only way he could have joined the Gonzales force is that he was sent to Gonzales as a courier. Warren J. Mitchell died at Goliad. J. W. Andrews listed a third brother, Goodwin Mitchell, as dying with Fannin. Currently, Goodwin Mitchell is not included on the Goliad list of victims.
75 Brooks to Mother, March 2, 1836.
76 R. M. Williamson to William B. Travis, March 1, 1836, Gonzales, found in Spanish translation in El Nacional (Mexico City), Suplemento al Numero 79, March 21, 1836, see Thomas W. Streeter, A Bibliography of Texas, number 1647. In this missive Williamson stated that the last courier from the Alamo had arrived at Gonzales four days earlier, which would have been February 26.
77 Houston et al. Treaty, February 23, 1836; Gray, From Virginia, 121.
78 Barrett, Clements, Thomson, and Pattillo to Robinson, January 31, 1836. The military committee of the Texian government had ordered: “. . . that the Commandant [of Bexar, J. C. Neill] be required to put the place [Alamo] in the best possible state for defense, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen, supply and provision the Garrison, and in no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity.”
Chapter Four
Three-Legged Willie’s Entreaty:
“Hold On Firmly”
Dear Colonel Travis – You cannot conceive my anxiety: today it has been four whole days that we have not the slightest news relative to your dangerous situation and we are therefore given over to a thousand conjectures regarding you.
Major R. M. Williamson1
Getting sufficient armed men to San Antonio to prevent the destruction of Travis and his men would not be an easy task for their like-minded countrymen. After the start of the Texian insurrection in October 1835, the advance on Bexar by General Stephen F. Austin’s volunteer army from Gonzales took eleven days. The gathering of men, arms, equipment, animals, and provisions was not done with ease or speed. Also, given human nature, the organization of companies and the election of officers was not done quickly or without friction.
The move to San Antonio would have taken longer, except for several factors. Austin, expecting armed conflict, had issued a declaration of war on September 18. Thus militia companies and volunteer units were already organizing when a detachment of centralist soldiers rode into Gonzales and demanded the return of a bronze cannon (a six-pounder) that the Green De Witt colonists had been loaned for protection against Indian attack. That attempt at “gun control” kicked off the hostilities on October 2, 1835. When Austin arrived at Gonzales on October 10 to take command, many of the militia companies and volunteer units were already on site or on the road to that settlement. More importantly, the colonists were unified behind a single general, Austin; a single political purpose, support of the federal constitution of 1824; and a single military mission, expulsion of the centralist Mexican army from Texas.2
Robert “Three-Legged Willie” Williamson
Photo courtesy The Center for American History,
The University of Texas at Austin
The 1836 siege of the Alamo, however, was a far different situation. Organization and delivery of an adequate reinforcement to the Alamo would be even harder than the formation of Austin’s 1835 federalist army of volunteers. Two enormous obstacles stood in the way of getting relief to Bexar. After the December 1835 victory in San Antonio, the colonists began fighting over the political objective of the war. The provisional government split into two persuasions and the military forces into three factions. Lieutenant Governor James W. Robinson and the council, using Colonel James W. Fannin Jr. and his volunteers, were operating in the name of Mexican federalism. Governor Henry Smith, Sam Houston, and James Bowie, with only the Alamo soldiers on their side, supported independence and separation from Mexico, so that the country could be annexed to the United States. James Grant and F. W. Johnson, using the American volunteers from the storming of Bexar, hoped to unite with northeastern Mexican federalists and create a new republic made up of several Mexican states and Texas that would not be joined to the U.S. The result was that in January 1836, when Houston should have been organizing a defensive line along the San Antonio River, Texas was plagued by three military commanders: Houston, Johnson, and Fannin, who were, albeit for different political goals, attempting to turn a defensive war into an offensive campaign by attacking the port city of Matamoros. If any of the commanders had ever studied Napoleon’s rules of war, they appear to have forgotten what the great general said about offensive war and leadership. Firstly: “The passage from the defensive to the offensive is one of the most delicate operations of war.” Secondly, he observed: “Nothing is more important in war than unity in command. When, therefore, you are carrying on hostilities against a single power only, you should have but one army acting on one line and led by one commander.”3
Travis had summed up the Texas situation pretty well on his way to San Antonio in January 1836, when he wrote Henry Smith: “The people are cold & indifferent. They are worn down & exhausted with the war, & in consequence of dissensions between contending rival chieftains, they have lost all confidence in their own govt. & officers. You have no idea of [the] exhausted state of the country – volunteers can no longer be had or relied upon. A speedy organization, classification & draft of the Militia is all that can save us now.”4
Governor Smith seems to have either ignored Travis’s advice or was too busy with his own political schemes to understand what was happening in the country. On February 5, at a time when San Antonio was garrisoned by perhaps one hundred fifty men, Smith wrote: “This country can never prosper until a few of that baneful faction [F. W. Johnson, James Grant, James W. Robinson, and the Council] are immolated on the altar of their own perfidy. The convention will, I hope, afford the grand corrective. Owing to their base management, much confusion prevails among our volunteer troops on the frontier, but, by using much vigilance, I have now got Bexar secure.”5
Lieutenant Governor Robinson and the Council were equally blind to their own behavior and the manpower needs of the Alamo. On January 31 Robinson and the Council’s military committee, on hearing of Houston’s recommendation that the Alamo be destroyed and the troops moved to Gonzales, demanded that Houston be required “to put the place in the best possible state for defense, with assurances that every possible effort is making to strengthen, supply and provision the Garrison, and in no case to abandon or surrender the place unless in the last extremity.”6
Then, in direct opposition to what they had recommended for the Alamo, they wrote: “The advisory Committee are of opinion that no further necessity exists of increasing the number of troops now at Bejar, beyond those that are already there, or on their way to the place.”7
Thus, the evidence shows that Smith, Robinson, and the Council believed that two hundred men were sufficient to defend the Alamo. That belief was shared by many of the Texians. Many years later Lancelot Abbotts, an old Texian who had been at the convention, observed: “A public meeting was called for the purpose of enlisting volunteers for the relief of the Alamo. At this time there was living in
Washington a doctor by the name of Biggs, or Briggs [Benjamin Briggs Goodrich, brother of Alamo defender John C. Goodrich], who was a big, burly, brave Manifest Destiny man. He made a speech, in which he declared his unbelief in the dispatch [Travis’s March 3 letter] and the utter impossibility of any number of Mexicans to take the Alamo, when defended by near 200 men.”8
Austrian George Bernard Erath, a veteran of San Jacinto, later reported:
After the fall of Bexar, in the month of December, 1835, the people became overconfident in their own ability and Mexican insignificance. A land speculating element of immigration, who did not remain, induced them to lean too much to private interest, and when the Alamo was besieged, no entreaties could bring men in the field, believing the handful of men under Travis sufficient to repulse 7,000 Mexicans who advanced from the Rio Grande. When Travis and his men fell and were put to the sword by Santa Anna’s proclamation for the extermination of the American people from the soil of Texas, terror took the place of self-confidence and boasting.9
Moseley Baker described General Houston’s failure in preparing the country for Santa Anna’s advance into Texas. He wrote:
While the coming of Santa Anna was daily expected in the month of January, 1836, you [Houston] deliberately took your departure for Nacogdoches, on a plea of going to pacify the Indians, without having previously organized a single company for the defense of the country. You remained absent, and was still so, when the Mexicans actually invaded the country and besieged the immortal Travis in the Alamo, and he in calling for assistance writes to the Convention, on account, as he [Travis] himself says, “of the absence of the commander-in-chief.” But sir he called in vain – you had left no one whom to look for orders in your absence, and before the people could recover from their consternation – the Alamo had fallen. . . .10
Alamo Traces Page 16