The volunteer army at Bexar replaced Austin with Edward Burleson on November 24. Courier Patrick also left a statement in regard to that change of command: “You [Bryan] know my Dear Sir why Col. Jas Bowie wanted to be in camps. . . . When Genl. Austin resigned the command of the army, but unfortunately for his prospects; he had access to strong drink from the city of San Antonio the night of our arrival. On the morning of the electing a successor of your uncle, Col. B. was drunk which secured the election of Genl. Burleson which doubtless was all for the best.”31
Nevertheless, Bowie somehow secured a position on Burleson’s command staff, replacing F. W. Johnson, Burleson’s original appointment as the army’s adjutant general. Bowie, however, did not remain with the army for long. After participating in the Grass Fight on November 26, he moved down the road to Goliad. He appears to have returned to San Antonio sometime in mid-December. On December 17 Houston issued orders for Bowie to organize a volunteer force to proceed to Matamoros and “if possible reduce the place and retain possession [of it] until further orders.” Bowie received the orders on or about December 27, when he reached Houston’s headquarters in Washington-on-the-Brazos.32
Bowie appeared before the General Council in San Felipe on December 28 and 29. He presented his views on the status of the volunteer forces at Bexar and recommended that those troops be used in an expedition against Matamoros. On January 6 he reviewed Houston’s orders for the attack on Matamoros with the Council. Afterward, he departed for Goliad. He and a “Captain Blount” arrived at Goliad on January 11, 1836.33
In mid-January Houston joined Bowie in Goliad. On January 17 Houston received a missive from Lt. Colonel James C. Neill, the commander at San Antonio, that reported a major attack on that city was expected within days. Bowie immediately collected an unknown number of mounted volunteers and rode to San Antonio, arriving the next day, January 18. Bowie’s men appear to have come from Captain John Chenoweth’s company of United States Invincibles, a unit that Bowie probably recruited in the summer of 1835 in the Jackson, Mississippi area. If there was one unit in the revolution that could be called Bowie’s company, it was the Invincibles. The muster roll of that unit, however, does not list a man named Rose.34
Also, the name of Moses Rose or a variant is not found on any of the known siege of Bexar muster rolls or the James C. Neill’s muster roll of about December 31, 1835. More importantly, the February 1, 1836 Alamo voting list contains Bowie’s name and a number of names of men from Chenoweth’s company, but no “Rose.” The only Alamo list that shows a man named Rose is the March 24, 1836 issue of the Telegraph and Texas Register. That roll does not include a first name for Rose. Therefore, the name may refer to James M. Rose, who entered the Alamo with David Crockett. In sum, if one Moses Rose went to the Alamo with James Bowie, his name should be on many of the known documents, but it is not found on a single one.35
Next, there is the entire Travis “line” speech, which is extremely compromised by the fact that Zuber admitted he had created the speech and that one paragraph was fiction.36 In 1877 Zuber wrote Texas Adjutant General William Steele:
One feature in my “Escape from the Alamo,” (see Texas Almanac, 1873,) I must confess, gives it the appearance of fiction. That is, Travis’s address to his companions in arms. This certainly needs an explanation; which I now give.
Rose was, if I am not mistaken, but a poor scholar, if a scholar at all. Yet he distinctly remembered the substance of Colonel Travis’s certificate. But, both the distinctions & the exception were omitted by the printer. That one paragraph contains every word of fiction in my article in the Almanac.
In conclusion, please permit me to explain that the object of the foregoing lines is, First, to establish the following facts; to wit:
1. That, on the afternoon of the third day of March, 1836, Travis, in a formal address, explained to his command, their real situation; & offered to every man who might be disposed to accept it, an opportunity to risk the chances of surrender or escape.
2. That every man, with but one exception, determined to remain & did in the fort, & sell his life as dearly as possible.
3. That Rose alone accepted the offer, & effected his escape.37
Given that Zuber failed to mention the “line in the sand” in his “by the number” explanation, it appears the one paragraph that he admitted was fiction was the one in which Travis’s sword line in the dirt is described.
Furthermore, several other features in the story indicate that the entire document is fiction. Is there any truth to the Zuber/Rose allegation that Travis called the troops together and informed them there was no hope of relief and offered them the opportunity to escape? A new Alamo document coupled with Travis’s March 3 letter to the Convention at Washington-on-the-Brazos and Susanna (Dickinson) Hannig’s adjutant general testimony brands the Zuber tale as bad fiction.
According to the Zuber/Rose account, “two hours before sunset” on March 3, Travis told his men: “Our fate is sealed. Within a few days – perhaps a very few hours – we must all be in eternity.” Travis is alleged to have told the defenders that Fannin had not answered his call for help, that his messengers had not returned, and that no aid was on the way to the Alamo. The truth, however, is the opposite. On March 3, Travis had every reason to think that help was coming, including assistance from Colonel James W. Fannin.38
On the morning of March 1, John W. Smith and Albert Martin, two of Travis’s couriers had returned with thirty men from Gonzales. Then, in broad daylight on the morning of March 3, James B. Bonham, Travis’s “Special messenger” to Fannin, galloped into the Alamo untouched by the enemy. Bonham carried a March 1 missive from Major R. M. Williamson, Travis’s good friend, who was in command of the relief effort at Gonzales.39 The important document, quoted earlier in Chapter Four, is repeated here:
You cannot conceive my anxiety: today it has been four whole days that we have not the least news relating to your dangerous situation and for that time we found ourselves given up to a thousand conjectures about it. From this municipality 60 men have now set out, who in all human probability are found, at this date, with you. Colonel Fannin with 300 men and 4 artillery pieces has been en route to Bejar for three days now. Tonight we are waiting for some reinforcements from Washington, Bastrop, Brazoria and San Felipe, numbering 300, and not a moment will be lost in providing you assistance. Regarding the other letter of the same date, let it pass[;] you must know what it means; if the populace gets hold of it, let them guess [at] it. – It is from your true friend R. M. Williamson. –
P.S. For god’s sake sustain yourselves until we can assist you. – I remit to you with major Bhanham [Bonham] a communication from the interim governor. A thousand regards to all your people and tell them for “Willie” to maintain themselves firm until I go there — Williamson. Write us soon, soon.40
Also, Travis’s last letters from the Alamo, dated March 3, are certainly upbeat. Travis, to his friend Jesse Grimes, wrote: “I am still here, in fine spirits and well to do, with 145 men, I have held this 10 days against a force variously estimated from 1,500 to 6,000, and shall continue to hold it till I get relief from my countrymen, or I will perish in its defense.” Hardly the words of man who believed all hope of survival and victory was lost.41
Thus it is unbelievable that Travis, on the afternoon of March 3, would have declared to his troops that he had been betrayed by his friends and that there was no hope of relief and victory. That conclusion is confirmed by a statement from Susanna (Dickinson) Hannig’s 1876 adjutant general’s affidavit, which reads: “The Mexicans came unexpectedly into San Antonio & witness [Hannig] & her husband & child retreated into the Fort. Enemy began throwing bombs into Fort, but no one hurt till the last day, i.e. the assault, except one horse killed – Had provisions enough to last the besieged 30 days. . . . The enemy gradually approached by means of earth-works thrown up. Besieged were looking for reinforcements which never arrived [italics added].”42
Equally implau
sible and impossible is Rose’s alleged departure from the Alamo and Bexar and his journey to the Zuber home in southeast Texas. Zuber reported that an unarmed Rose jumped from an Alamo wall and strolled down to the San Antonio River, crossed the bridge at what is now Commerce Street, and continued on through downtown Bexar, passing the San Fernando cathedral on the main plaza. That route would have put Rose within pistol shot of Santa Anna’s headquarters, regardless of the date he left the Alamo. This amazing walk was supposed to have been completed in the clear light of late afternoon, without Rose seeing a single Mexican soldier or citizen of Bexar. Such an act would have been impossible on any day of the siege, but it was especially inconceivable on the afternoon of March 3, 1836.43
Mexican dragoon officer
Photo courtesy of Joseph Musso collection
Thursday, March 3 may not have been the most active day of the siege. Still, Colonel Juan N. Almonte’s diary entry for the date reports a situation that conflicts with the one communicated by Zuber. Almonte wrote: “Commenced clear, at 40 [degrees], without wind. The enemy fired a few cannon and musket shots at the city. . . . The General-in-Chief went out to reconnoiter. A battery was erected on the north of the Alamo within musket shot. Official despatches were received from Gen. [Jose] Urrea, announcing that he had routed the colonists at San Patricio – killing 16 and taking 21 prisoners. The bells were rung. The battalions of Zapadores, Aldama, and Toluca arrived.” Jose Enrique de la Pena’s authentic and unpublished diary manuscript (Campaign Diary) reports that the Zapadores entered Bexar “between 4 and 5 in the afternoon.”44
Furthermore, on Thursday, February 25 the “batalion de Cazadores” had been stationed in houses “half a rifle shot” south of the Alamo. Then, after dark, according to Almonte: “Two [artillery] batteries [probably only two guns] were erected by us on the other side of the river in the Alameda of the Alamo – the battalion of Matamoros was also posted there. . . .” In total, the area that Rose was supposed to have strolled through unarmed, unseen, and untouched was swarming with Mexican soldiers who would have killed or captured him in the proverbial blink of an eye.45
In regard to Rose’s departure from the city, Zuber claimed that Rose left the Bexar area “three miles below the town” at twilight on March 3. He remained south of the Gonzales road and walked all night. Rose, however, allegedly made little progress because of numerous cactus collisions that forced him off course. Thereafter, the account claims that Rose only traveled during the day. He reached the Guadalupe River below Gonzales sometime during the day on March 6 and floated across the river on a log. On the east side of the river he found a deserted house, where he remained two or three days. From that point on Rose only traveled on roads. On those arteries he found empty houses because the citizens had retreated in advance of the threat of the enemy. This scenario, however, conflicts with common sense and historical truth.46
Texas prickly pear cactus
The route described by the Zuber account is seventy-five or more miles. A modern infantryman can travel fifteen miles a day. When required, such troops can double time thirty miles a day. A couple of days of such intense marching, however, renders soldiers unsuitable for immediate and effective combat. Also, while the account does not state it, Rose would have had to have slept a large part of the day on March 4. Otherwise, we must accept that despite his “old age” and the thorns that “continued to work deeper into his flesh,” he walked for twenty-four hours before stopping to make “his bed on the soft mesquite grass.” Quite a feat. In reality, given the conditions described by Zuber, the journey should have taken Rose five days or about sixty hours at twelve hours per day. Yet Zuber would have his readers believe that the trip was accomplished in forty-eight hours or less; a twenty-four-hour walk and, say, twelve hours per day on March 5 and 6. Then, one must consider that if Rose slept all day on March 4, the trip only required about thirty-six hours.47
Secondly, the Zuber story locates Rose on the Gonzales to Columbus road on March 8 or 9, when according to Zuber: “The families were retreating before the threatened advance of the enemy, and between the Guadalupe [River] and Colorado [River] every family on his route had left home.” The claim is absurd. Sam Houston did not arrive at Gonzales to take command of the Texian forces until 4:00 p.m. on March 11. The retreat from Gonzales and the “Runaway Scrape” did not start until about 11:00 p.m. on March 13. If Rose had been where Zuber said he was on March 8 or 9, he would have probably encountered Houston and his staff or other Texians on the way to Gonzales.48
Thus the conflicts and inconsistencies show why knowledgeable officials and scholars in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century did not accept Zuber’s tale of Moses Rose as the truth. Texas Adjutant General William Steele was the first to challenge Zuber on the story. In 1877 Steele wrote Zuber, requesting his help in compiling an official list of the Alamo defenders. At the same time, Steele wrote Zuber that the Moses Rose escape story did not match the data the adjutant general’s office had obtained from Susanna (Dickinson) Hannig.49 Unfortunately, Steele’s copy of this letter is missing from his letter book in the Texas State Library. However, we do have Zuber’s response, and it is extremely revealing. Zuber wrote:
I must confine this letter to Rose, who escaped from the Alamo. In 1871, I wrote a tolerably lengthy account of the escape of Rose, & his travels from the Alamo to the residence of my father, in what is now Grimes County. To this account, I supplied quite a number of notes of explanations; showing, as I believe that some parts of the narrative, which, at first view might appear incredible, were, in reality very reasonable statements. Said account was designed for publication in the Texas Almanac; but, judging it too lengthy for an insertion in that periodical, I withheld it, & yet have the manuscript in possession. I however proposed a condensed copy thereof, without notes; which, with my mother’s certificate, was published in the Texas Almanac for 1873. That copy, I believe, contains all the important information which I am able to give on the subject; & therefore respectfully refer you to it.
But, to clear away some apparent doubts which seem to have arisen, I deem it proper to furnish you with some additional particulars.
But, in the first place, please permit me to digress a little. On the night of the 13th of March, 1836, Captain (afterwards lieutenant Colonel) Joseph L. Bennett, with his company, (afterwards Captain Gillaspie’s Company,) encamped on the east bank of the Colorado river; very near the site of the present town of La Grange. I was a private in said company, kept a diary, & witnessed & noted what I am about to state.
On that night, about nine o clock, Colonel J. C. Neill rode into camp & in a conversation with Captain Bennett, confirmed the rumors which we had heard, that the Alamo had fallen. He had borne an express from Colonel Travis to San Felipe or Washington [-on-the-Brazos], & was returning; when, on the 7th of March, I believe, at the ford of the Cibolo, between Gonzales & San Antonio, he met Mrs. Dickinson & her infant, & Colonel Travis’s servant, Joe. They, then & there informed him of the slaughter of his brave companions in arms. They stated to him, that they had, three days prior to the final assault been sent for safety, into the city & placed under the care of a priest, who prepared a place for Mrs. Dickinson & her babe, in the upper part of the church; probably the cupola or belfry; where he concealed them in safety, till the fort had fallen, & the fighting had ceased. Of course, Colonel Neill returned with Mrs. Dickinson, to the Colorado. He first went to Bastrop to inform the citizens of the great calamity, & was proceeding down the river, for the same purpose.50
Zuber’s defensive tale of Mrs. Dickinson being secreted in the San Fernando church tower and Neill finding her on Cibolo Creek is false. More than that, it appears to be an outright lie to cover his trail of lies about Moses Rose. Thus, the evidence shows that Zuber, when questioned about the veracity of the Moses Rose escape story, responded with an explanation that contains only one truth: Dickinson and Neill were real persons associated with the Alamo. Is it not reasonable to a
ssume, since Zuber defended his Rose narrative with a lie, that the Rose story is also a fabrication? Such is the nature of liars and lies. Once a lie is told and questioned, it requires many secondary lies to stay afloat.51
Total acceptance of the Rose tale continued to elude Zuber. On April 22, 1901, he read a paper defending the Rose narrative to the annual reunion of the Texas Veterans Association and the Daughters of the Republic of Texas. Zuber opened with: “I wish to say something in self-defense and for the truth of history, concerning my published account of the escape of a man whose name was Rose from the Alamo, March 3, 1836. The occasion of what I have to say is that I have been reliably informed that my account of that escape has been contradicted. I have not seen any published contradiction of it by any reliable authority, neither do I know of any reliable person who has publicly contradicted it; yet I am led to believe that such contradictions, though unreliable, have made an impression upon the minds of some well-meaning persons. Therefore I feel called upon to present the case more fully.”52
Then, after reviewing the story’s provenance, Zuber said: “The men in the fort (all but Rose), were killed, none surviving to tell the story. Mrs. Dickinson and Travis’s negro were shut up in rooms, and could not see what was done outside the fort, nor much that was done in it. None of the Mexicans knew all that was done, and the official reports of the Mexican officers were not distinguished for veracity. Then, how can any person at this late period disprove Rose’s statement of what occurred about the fort?”53
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