Carthage Must Be Destroyed

  A change in the named minting authority that issued military coinage in Sicily may be a sign of a wider change in Carthage’s relationship with its army on the island. There is little reason to think that the army’s actions during the Agathocles crisis had done much to promote confidence in either its loyalty or its military capabilities. Indeed, the armed forces on Sicily had been in complete disarray, and had contributed nothing to the defence of North Africa. Moreover, senior military commanders such as Bomilcar had been involved in the planning and execution of coup attempts.

  These concerns may explain the gradual transferral of minting authority for the military from mhmhnt (‘the people of the camp’) to mhsbm (‘the controllers’).67 Were the mhsbm Carthaginian officials sent to take over the financial administration of the army in Sicily, so that the authorities in Carthage could reassert their authority?68 After all, mercenary soldiers tended to be loyal to those who paid them. Tellingly, all Carthaginian military coinage production had ceased by the end of the first decade of the third century BC, with troops presumably being paid with electrum shekels which were now being minted in Carthage.69 More importantly, it is clear that the disruption caused by Agathocles’ African onslaught had left Carthage on the brink of financial exhaustion.

  In fact there was no new war with Agathocles. Clearly unchastened by his recent humiliation in North Africa, in 306 Agathocles declared himself a king, before turning his attention northward to the Italian peninsula in an attempt to build up a new empire which might be able to challenge the dominance of the Carthaginians.70 However, his dreams of an Adriatic/southern-Italian empire were dashed, as were his hopes of contracting a grand alliance with Ptolemy, king of Egypt, and several other Hellenistic potentates. Eventually a terrible illness, most likely to have been cancer of the jaw, finally robbed Agathocles not only of his Carthaginian ambitions, but also of his life.71 As a final irony, the man whose silken tongue had propelled him to such notoriety was reputedly burnt alive on his funeral pyre, because the disease had robbed him of the capacity to move or speak.72

  In eventually prevailing over this most persistent of enemies, the Carthaginians had shown resilience and resourcefulness. Over two decades, they had survived coup attempts, disastrous military defeats, Libyan and Numidian rebellions, an invasion, and a siege of their home city. Yet, despite his grand pretensions, Agathocles was no Alexander, and the grave difficulty that the supposedly dominant power of the western Mediterranean had in finally overcoming the threat that he posed suggested that it might struggle even more against a betterresourced and more consistent opponent. Other Hellenistic warlords would now view Africa as a viable target in a way they had not done before Agathocles.

  Thus the Greek biographer Plutarch’s account of the African ambitions of the Molossian general Pyrrhus, who spent 278–277 attacking Punic interests in Sicily, may have been apocryphal, but it probably accurately reflected contemporary opinion: ‘For who could keep his hands off Libya, or Carthage, when that city got within his reach, a city which Agathocles, slipping stealthily out of Syracuse and crossing the sea with a few ships, narrowly missed taking?’73

  6

  Carthage and Rome

  THE RELENTLESS MARCH OF ROME

  By the late fourth century BC, the treaty that Carthage in 509 BC had concluded with what had then been a small city in upper Latium must have begun to look like an inspired piece of forward-thinking diplomacy. Although Rome had faced a number of serious setbacks, including internal political stasis, catastrophic military defeat, and the humiliating capture of much of the city by a Gallic war band in 387, its successes had been extraordinary.1 Latium had been brought under Roman control through a seemingly endless round of military and diplomatic initiatives. This had been followed by three terrible wars of attrition against the powerful Samnite confederation who lived in the mountainous Apennine region of central and southern Italy, which had eventually led to the latter’s subjugation. At the same time, the regions of Etruria and Umbria were brought under Roman control, and an alliance with the city of Capua brought much of the agriculturally rich region of Campania into the Roman sphere of influence.2

  Such had been the scale of Rome’s conquests that one general, Manius Curius Dentatus, issued the famous boast that it was unclear which was the greater: the amount of land which been taken or the number of people captured. It has been calculated that by the early third century BC Rome controlled 14,000 square kilometres of territory –more than two and a half times more than it had just under half a century before. The Roman domain spread right across the expanse of central Italy, and decades of war and conquest had brought considerable wealth to the city. It was recorded that during the great triumphs of 293 BC, to celebrate the final victory over the Samnites, one consul brought back 830 kilograms of silver and 1,150,000 kilograms of bronze.

  It was not just the scale of Roman expansion that was extraordinary, but also the manner in which it was achieved. Perhaps the most striking feature that emerged from these years of conquest was not the incredible run of military triumphs, but the fact that these victories had been interspersed with some devastating defeats. Rome in this period is conventionally defined above all by its extreme aggression and acquisitiveness, but it is clear that these were precisely the characteristics required not only to thrive, but even to survive, in Italy during this period.3 As the historian Arthur Eckstein has commented, ‘The Roman experience of competition for influence, power and security, first in Latium, then in central Italy, and then in the wide western Mediterranean, was a harsh experience, against formidable and warlike rivals.’4

  Rome quickly developed a marked capacity to absorb the loss and shock of defeat. The Roman state responded to defeat not with offers of peace treaties and truces, but with the sending out of new armies to recover what had been lost. It was often the relentless pressure that Rome was able to exert which led to final victory. One of the key problems which Rome presented for its enemies was that no one individual or clan had such a monopoly on political power that a lasting or meaningful peace treaty could be negotiated. All regular senatorial offices were held for only a year, and consecutive terms were forbidden. It was also exceptional that any Roman held the consulship more than once. The competition to hold the top job in Roman politics was so ferocious, and the tenure of office so short, that no Roman general would risk the disapproval and opprobrium of his peers by daring to negotiate when facing defeat.

  However, military success was only one part of the equation. There was also the extraordinary efficiency with which the Romans asserted their control over the newly subjugated territory. This was achieved in a number of different ways. First there was an emphasis on the implementation of new physical infrastructure to connect the new lands to Rome. Within a short period of time a network of roads was cut through the countryside connecting the city to all the major settlements in the region, both old and new. Large-scale movement of the population was instigated, with colonists from Rome being sent out to establish new settlements and Latin peoples being moved from their traditional homes to new territories.5 But Rome’s greatest strength in this regard was an extraordinary ability to integrate quickly and efficiently the native populations of the newly subjugated lands and thereby create a large and very stable territory for itself. By using newly created legal statuses rather than ethnicity or geography as the basis for membership of the state, Rome quickly drew on a huge reservoir of human resources to fight its battles, rather than relying on mercenaries like most of the Mediterranean world.6

  A new body of knowledge was created that represented these newly won lands in explicitly Roman terms, and divine portents and signs which occurred in these lands were carefully recorded and expiated by Roman ritual practice. The cities of Latium enjoyed the same legal rights that they had previously enjoyed in respect to Rome, but they were now bound by a series of treaties to provide Rome with troops whenever they were required. The ancient Latin identity survived, but only as a set of
duties, rights and privileges enshrined in Roman law. Thus Rome sought to display its mastery and indeed ownership of this territory. Italy would never be just a piece of conquered territory that could be evacuated if circumstances dictated.7 It was Roman land that was to be defended as if it were within the city itself.

  The Roman genius for appropriation and redefinition extended also to the religious sphere. Latin religious cults and practices were sustained by the Romans, but only under strict supervision and with an agendum that placed Rome at the heart of Latin identity. The religious ritual of evocatio, for example, designed to entice an enemy deity from its native land to Rome (where it could expect due and, indeed, greater reverence), was now used to great effect. The first instance of the evocatio being used by a Roman general occurred in 396 BC at the siege of the Etruscan city of Veii, where Iuni/Juno was the chief deity. After the fall of the city, the cult of the goddess was transferred to Rome, where she was worshipped as the queen of the Roman divine pantheon. Superficially this process appears comparable to the religious syncretism that took place in central Italy in the archaic period, but in fact it was an abrupt departure. Foreign gods were incorporated on strictly Roman terms.

  CARTHAGE IN ROME

  Now that Rome was emerging as an important regional power, the Carthaginians were clearly anxious to maintain and indeed strengthen diplomatic relations between the two city states. Thus in 351 BC a Carthaginian embassy was sent to Rome in order to present a massive gold crown weighing 11 kilograms as congratulations for victory against the Samnites. So proud were the Romans of this recognition of their growing stature by the most powerful state in the western Mediterranean that it was decided to place the crown in their most important temple, that of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitoline Hill.8

  This was followed in 348 by a fresh treaty between the two cities, the terms of which were a more detailed and expanded version of the first (with Spain now added to the zones of Carthaginian influence). Carthage had plenty of reasons for maintaining friendly relations with Rome. The terms of the treaty afforded both Roman and Carthaginian merchants the same rights and privileges as citizens in each other’s city, and there is reason to believe that there was a significant Punic mercantile presence in Rome and in the wider area of Latium.9 Certainly the placing of copies of this and the previous treaty in the Treasury of the Aediles–senatorial officials whose roles included the supervision of Rome’s commercial markets–adds to the picture of a thriving trading relationship between the two states that would have probably involved fish products, salt, Sardinian fleeces and African garlic, as well as almonds and pomegranates.10

  There are also several other intriguing clues that point to a Carthaginian presence in Rome. Varro, a Roman writer of the first century AD, mentions an area of Rome called Vicus Africus on the Esquiline Hill, which he said had got its name from resident hostages of the Punic wars.11 However, recent research has shown that this ‘African quarter’ must have dated to well before that period.12

  Further clues to a Carthaginian presence in Rome exist in the description of a strange monument called the Columna Lactaria, the Milkers’ Column, at Rome’s vegetable market, the Forum Holitorum: this may have actually been a sacred betyl originally worshipped by the Punic inhabitants of the district.13 Varro described the Forum Holitorum as ‘the old Macellum where vegetables were the provender’, assuming that macellum was a Greek word.14 However, it is in fact a Semitic word for a market that was much used in the Punic world. Indeed, the word macellum can be linked to several towns in Latium, suggesting that they also possessed Punic commercial enclaves.15 Moreover, there is strong evidence for a Punic presence elsewhere in the region at the town of Ardea, where a votive deposit containing Punic pottery and two Punic inscriptions has been found in the locality of the temple of Hercules.16

  Carthage also had major mercantile links with Bruttium (modern Calabria) in the toe of Italy. Recent archaeological research into the provenance of transport amphorae found in Carthage has shown that in the fourth century BC Bruttium was a greater source of goods and materials even than Sardinia.17 Carthage had certainly developed strong links with the region, and had even sent troops to help the people of the town of Hipponium refound their city after they had been displaced by Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse.18 To the north, the region of Campania also had close links with Carthage, with a considerable number of mercenaries from the region fighting in the Carthaginian armies in Sicily.19 The new treaty was recognition of Rome’s growing influence in the Tyrrhenian region and also of Carthage’s interests on the peninsula.

  The terms of the new treaty made allowance for Carthage to intervene again in Italy if it needed to. If the Carthaginians captured any Latin cities, they were to hand them over to the Romans while keeping any property or captives (although if any of the latter were brought to Rome they would be set free). North Africa (excepting the city of Carthage itself) and Sardinia would remain strictly out of bounds to Roman merchants, but the treaty terms seem to suggest that trade on Sicily was allowed. Militarily, the Carthaginians probably saw Rome as an important regional ally to counter the influence of Syracuse, and Rome may have seen Syracuse as a potential threat. Both Dionysius and Agathocles had displayed ambitions to extend their authority into Italy, and indeed the Romans had recently beaten off an unwelcome visit by a Sicilian Greek fleet.20

  PYRRHUS

  By the early decades of the third century BC the Romans had turned their attention to the wealthy cities of Magna Graecia, the area of southern Italy that had been colonized by Greek settlers. After clashing with Roman troops in several border incidents, Tarentum, the most powerful city in the region, started to cast around for allies both inside and outside Italy. Eventually a potential saviour was found in the form of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, a small Hellenistic kingdom roughly where Albania is now.21 Now thirty-eight, Pyrrhus had already led a very eventful life, which had included several depositions and restorations to the throne, a spell as a hostage at the Egyptian court, and a short-lived interlude as king of Macedonia.22 Once more confined to his small kingdom, he found the Tarentines’ invitation to save them from the clutches of Rome too good to refuse.

  On the face of it Pyrrhus was an exceptional ally. He was widely considered by his peers (and by later admirers) as one of the finest generals of the ancient world. Moreover, many other Hellenistic monarchs–anxious to see the back of such an indefatigable creator of trouble as he strived to establish a powerful kingdom for himself –furnished him with troops, elephants, ships and money. The campaign started rather inauspiciously, with his armada being scattered by a severe storm in the Adriatic. However, after his forces had regrouped, and he had himself been appointed by the Tarentines as supreme commander with unlimited powers, Pyrrhus vigorously prepared his new charges for war with Rome.

  The Romans had now faced the best military opposition that Italy had to offer, in the form of the tough Samnites, but Pyrrhus and his core of battle-hardened Molossian troops from Epirus were a different proposition altogether. Now, for the first time, Rome met Hellenistic troops on the battlefield, and it came off worst in two battles at Heraclea in 279. (Aside from his tactical nous, Pyrrhus was greatly aided by the panic and disarray of the Roman cavalry at the sight of the combat elephants that he had brought with him.) In the wake of his victory, Pyrrhus was even able to advance to within a relatively short distance of Rome itself.23

  Carthage, which had watched the initial stages of the war from the sidelines, now decided to intervene. Any obligations that the Carthaginians may have felt towards their Roman allies were almost certainly increased by the fear of Pyrrhus’ ambitions towards Sicily. In 280 a Carthaginian commander named Mago had arrived at Ostia, the port of Rome, with a fleet of 120 warships and offered to lend assistance to the Romans. The Romans, clearly wary of leaving themselves open to future Carthaginian interference, politely rejected the offer.24 After almost agreeing to the peace terms that Pyrrhus had dictated, the Roman Senat
e, chastened by the defiance shown by one of its oldest and most distinguished members, Appius Claudius Caecus, at the last minute showed the resilience for which it would become famous, by rejecting them and voting to continue the war. Although Pyrrhus won another victory against the Roman legions, at Ausculum in 279, it came at such a cost to the king that he was said to have pithily exclaimed that if he won one more victory like that then he would be utterly ruined.25 With his army seriously weakened, he had little choice but to retreat back to Tarentum.

  This devastating ‘Pyrrhic victory’, while positive for Rome, had serious ramifications for its Carthaginian allies, for Pyrrhus, his enthusiasm for the Roman campaign now at an ebb, was invited by the Syracusans to take a command against the Carthaginians. What made this proposition particularly appealing was that his wife, who was the daughter of no less a figure than Agathocles, had borne him a son, thus giving him a legitimate claim over Syracuse and its territory at a time when it was weak and politically divided.26

  It was probably at this juncture that a third treaty between Carthage and Rome was signed. As well as renewing the terms of the 348 treaty, it also added several new clauses. Any peace negotiations with Pyrrhus would be entered into jointly, thus pre-empting an attempt on the part of the Epirote king to make an alliance with one against the other. Provisos were also included for limited military cooperation if either Carthage or Rome came under direct attack, and it was agreed that each side would supply and pay for its own troops (although Carthage would provide the naval support).27