Carthage Must Be Destroyed

Home > Other > Carthage Must Be Destroyed > Page 53
Carthage Must Be Destroyed Page 53

by Richard Miles


  93 Livy 26.19.8–9.

  94 For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon see Scullard 1970, 53–7. For the theory that in fact the ebb was caused by the effects of localized wind see Walbank 1957–79, II: 65–6.

  95 Livy 26.42.2–26.46.10; Polybius 10.8.1–10.15.11; Goldsworthy 2000, 271–7; Lazenby 1978, 134–40.

  96 Polybius 10.2.12–13.

  97 Ibid. 10.17.6–10.18.5. For the good relations that Scipio carefully developed with the Spanish tribal leadership see Eckstein 1987, 212–20.

  98 Livy 26.47.1–10; Polybius 10.19.1–2.

  99 Livy 27.17.1–27.19.1; Polybius 10.34.1–10.39.9; Goldsworthy 2000, 277–9.

  100 Livy 27.19.3; Polybius 10.40.2–5.

  101 Livy 27.19.4–5. See also Polybius 10.40.4–5.

  102 Livy 27.19.1, 27.20.3–8.

  103 Ibid. 28.12.13–28.15.16; Goldsworthy 2000, 279–85.

  104 Polybius 11.20.1–11.24.11; Livy 28.16.10–13.

  105 Livy 28.19.11–28.37.10; Polybius 11.25.1–11.33.7.

  106 Livy 27.37.1–15.

  107 For the development of Juno as an enemy of the Romans in early Roman epic see Feeney 1991, 116–17.

  108 See Dumézil 1970, 680–82, for the Pyrgi inscription.

  109 Huss 1985, 235–6.

  110 Livy 27.26.7–27.27.14, 27.33.6–7.

  111 Ibid. 27.28.1–13.

  112 Ibid. 27.39.1–9; Polybius 11.2.1.

  113 Livy 27.39.10–27.49.4; Polybius 11.1.1–11.2.2; Goldsworthy 2000, 238–43.

  114 Livy 27.51.11–13.

  115 Although he had minted currency for his army in Italy, now he had both the time and the necessity (there was little chance any more to acquire war booty) to produce considerable quantities of coinage for the general populace too–usually bearing the prancing horse and head of Tanit associated with Carthaginian coinage (Crawford 1985, 66–7).

  116 Livy 28.38.1–11.

  117 Ibid. 28.40.1–28.45.11.

  118 Ibid. 28.45.13–28.46.1, 29.1.1–14.

  119 Ibid. 28.46.7–13.

  120 Polybius 15.1.10–11.

  121 Livy 28.46.14.

  122 Ibid. 28.5.1–28.8.14; Goldsworthy 2000, 253–60.

  123 Livy 29.12.8–16.

  124 Ibid. 28.45.12.

  125 Ibid. 29.10.4–29.11.8, 29.14.5–14; Ovid Fasti 4.247–348.

  126 Gruen 1990, 6–7.

  127 Ibid., 17–19.

  CHAPTER 13: THE LAST AGE OF HEROES

  1 Livy 28.17.10–28.18.12; Appian 7.9.55.

  2 Livy 29.23.2–29.24.2.

  3 Ibid. 29.24.10–29.27.15.

  4 Ibid. 29.28.1–29.29.3, 29.34.1–29.35.15.

  5 Ibid. 30.3.1–30.12.4.

  6 Ibid. 30.16.1–15; Eckstein 1987, 246–9.

  7 Livy 30.22.2–3.

  8 Polybius 15.1–4; Livy 30.22.1–30.23.8.

  9 Livy 30.20.1–4.

  10 Ibid. 30.19.

  11 Ibid. 30.20.5–9; Appian 7.9.59.

  12 Polybius 3.33; Livy 28.46.16. For Livy’s treatment of Hannibal’s association with the sanctuary at Cape Lacinium see Jaeger 2006.

  13 Campus 2003b.

  14 Livy 24.3.3–7, 28.46.16.

  15 Cicero Div. 1.24.48. Cicero stated that his source was Coelius Antipater, who later he states used Silenus for his information on Hannibal.

  16 For Livy’s selectiveness in using Coelius and other sources so that the moral schema of his work remained unchallenged see Levene 1993, 68; Jaeger 2006, 408–9.

  17 Wardle in Cicero, Div. 1 (2006), 229.

  18 Servius Aen. 3.552.

  19 Brizzi 1983, 246–51; Lancel 1999, 155–6.

  20 Livy 42.3.4.

  21 Crawford 1985, 66.

  22 Livy 30.24.5–30.25.8, 30.29.1. A papyrus fragment from Egypt (P. Rylands III 491) dated to sometime before 130 BC appears to give a very different account of the diplomatic wrangling that went on at this time. In particular it makes no mention of the seizure of the Roman cargo ships or the attempted ambush, and has therefore led to the suspicion that these events may have been exaggerated or even completely falsified by Polybius and perhaps other pro-Roman writers (Hoffman 1942). Eckstein (1987, 253–4) has nevertheless convincingly argued that on balance Polybius’ account, although perhaps embellished to portray Scipio in as positive a light as possible, is probably to be trusted. See Hoyos 2001a for the suggestion that the papyrus fragment may in fact have been part of an epitome of the Roman historian Fabius Pictor.

  23 Livy 30.29.1–4.

  24 Ibid. 30.29.5–30.31.9.

  25 Lazenby 1978, 221–7.

  26 Livy 30.32.4–30.35.3.

  27 Ibid. 30.35.4–30.37.6.

  28 Ibid. 30.37.7–11, 30.42.11–30.43.9.

  29 Cornelius Nepos Hann. 7.1–4; Aurelius Victor De Caes. 37.3.

  30 Livy 33.46.1–33.47.5.

  31 Lancel 1995, 404.

  32 Livy 33.45.6–8. For general historical accounts of Rome’s wars with Antiochus see Grainger 2002; Errington 1971, 156–83.

  33 Livy 33.48.9–33.49.8.

  34 Ibid. 34.60.4–6. The plan to attack Italy was most probably designed to persuade Antiochus to buy into Hannibal’s grand strategy for a new war against Rome; see Grainger 2002, 143–5.

  35 Grainger 2002, 143–5.

  36 Livy 34.60.3–4.

  37 See ibid. 36.7. The unrealistic nature of the proposals for attacking Italy has led some scholars to speculate that they were a later fabrication (Lancel 1999, 200; Grainger 2002, 223–4).

  38 Grainger 2002, 270.

  39 Livy 37.8.3, 37.23.7–37.24.13.

  40 For Crete, see Cornelius Nepos Hann. 9.1; Justin 32.4.3–5. For Armenia see Strabo 11.14.6; Plutarch Luc. 31.4–5.

  41 Livy 39.51.

  42 Plutarch Flam. 21.5.

  43 Ibid. 21.1.

  44 De Beer 1969, 291.

  45 Cornelius Nepos Hann. 13.2. For the outrages committed by the Romans, particularly against the Galatians, see Polybius 21.38; Livy 38.24.

  46 Brizzi 1984b, 87–102; Momigliano 1977, 41.

  47 For an account of the Scipios’ legal difficulties see Scullard 1970, 219–24.

  48 See Levick 1982, 57–8, for the wider context of the tension between individual ambition and equality within the Roman Senate after the Second Punic War.

  CHAPTER 14: THE DESOLATION OF CARTHAGE

  1 Livy 36.4.8.

  2 Greene 1986, 109–16.

  3 Livy 31.19.2.

  4 Ibid. 36.4.5–9.

  5 Ibid. 43.6.11.

  6 Morel 1982, 1986; Lancel 1995, 406–8; Bechtold 2007, 53–4.

  7 Bechtold 2007, 53–4, 66–7; Lancel 1995, 408–9. This view of Carthaginian renewed prosperity as built on agriculture and trade is confirmed by Appian (8.10.67).

  8 Crawford 1985, 72.

  9 Visonà 1998, 20–22; Crawford 1985, 136–8. Crawford argues that Carthage’s last two issues of pure silver coinage were the result of its economic renaissance, whereas Visonà views them as the money that the Carthaginians had to mint to meet their war expenses at the outbreak of the Third Punic War.

  10 Appian 8.14.96.

  11 For an extensive study of this harbour see Hurst 1994, 15–51.

  12 Lancel 1995, 181–2.

  13 Ibid., 180.

  14 Hurst & Stager 1978, 341–2.

  15 Appian 8.10.68.

  16 For the sanctuary at El Hofra, see Berthier & Charlier 1952–5, II.

  17 Rakob 1979, 132–66. Others include the Medracen, the mausoleum of the Massylian royal dynasty, near Batna, and the funerary monument built for their Massaesylian counterparts at their capital of Siga.

  18 However, it had to be heavily restored after being all but demolished during the nineteenth century by the British consul at Tunis, who was anxious to get his hands on the bilingual Libyan and Punic inscriptions (Lancel 1995, 307).

  19 Ibid. 307–9.

  20 Alexandropoulos 1992, 143–7; Visonà 1998, 22; Crawford 1985, 140.

  21 Polybius 3
6.16.7–8; Appian 8.16.106.

  22 Livy 43.3.5–7.

  23 Leigh 2004, 28–37.

  24 Arnott 1996, 284–7.

  25 Franko 1996, 439–40, 442, 444. Many of the observations that follow are taken from this particular study.

  26 Plautus Poen. 104–33.

  27 Franko 1996, 429–30.

  28 Plautus Poen. 975–81, 1008, 1121.

  29 Gratwick 1971; Adams 2003, 204–5.

  30 Plautus Poen. 1297–1306 (based on tr. Nixon, pp. 131–3).

  31 Plautus Poen. 1312–14 (based on tr. Nixon, p. 133).

  32 Franko 1996, 445.

  33 Clark 2007, 96–7. For the same prejudices in Plautus’ broader canon see Leigh 2004, 23–56.

  34 Errington 1971, 202–12 (quote = 210); Harris 1979, 227–33.

  35 Errington 1971, 260–62.

  36 Diodorus 32.4.4–5.

  37 Ibid. 32.5.

  38 Polybius 31.21; Livy 34.62. I agree with Lancel (1995, 411) that Polybius’ account and dating of this episode are to be favoured.

  39 Polybius 31.21.7–8.

  40 Livy 34.62.9–10.

  41 Ibid. 34.62.11–14.

  42 Lancel 1999, 178, for the ambiguity of the terms.

  43 Appian 8.10.68–9.

  44 For Cato’s hounding of the Scipios see Scullard 1970, 186–9, 210–24.

  45 Plutarch Cat. Maj. 26.2.

  46 Appian 8.10.69.

  47 Livy Epitome 47.15.

  48 Pliny NH 15.74–5; Thürlemann-Rappers 1974; Little 1934.

  49 Plutarch Cat. Maj. 26.2–3.

  50 Ibid. 27.1.

  51 Baronowski 1995, 27–8; Lancel 1995, 277–8. See also the comments of Pliny (NH 15.76) on how Carthage ‘was destroyed by the testimony of one piece of fruit’.

  52 Plutarch Cat. Maj. 26.2.

  53 Diodorus 34/35.33.5.

  54 Livy Epitome 48. For a discussion of the Scipio Nascia position see Vogel-Weidemann 1989, 83–4.

  55 Polybius 36.2; Appian 8.10.69.

  56 Appian 8.10.68.

  57 Ibid. 8.10.70–73.

  58 Baronowski 1995, 20–21; Diodorus 32.1; Livy Epitome 48; Zonaras 9.26.1–2.

  59 Adcock 1946, 120.

  60 Harris 1979, 54–104.

  61 Plutarch Mor. 200.11.

  62 Baronowski 1995, 28–9. For the attack on Carthage as related to the rise of Numidian power, and the forthcoming succession of Masinissa, see also Adcock 1946, 119; Vogel-Weidemann 1989, 85.

  63 Appian 8.11.74.

  64 Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta 78–9.

  65 Rhetorica ad Herennium 4.14.20; Quintilian Or. Ed. 9.3.31. See Baronowski 1995, 24–5, n. 22, for a discussion of its context.

  66 See Cornell’s (1996) convincing thesis that Brunt (1971, 269–77) seriously underestimates the damage that the war inflicted in southern Italy.

  67 Scheid & Svenbro 1985, 334–8; Cicero Nat. Gods 2.61. For the suspected influence of Timaeus on Cato see Astin 1978, 228–9.

  68 Aulus Gellius 10.1.10.

  69 Appian 8.11.76.

  70 Ibid. 8.11.78–8.12.81.

  71 Lancel 1995, 413.

  72 Appian 8.12.81–5.

  73 Ibid. 8.12.86–9.

  74 Ibid. 8.13.90–93.

  75 Visonà 1998, 22.

  76 Lancel 1995, 156–72.

  77 Mezzolani 1999, 108–16.

  78 Lancel 1995, 158–9.

  79 Ibid., 415–19.

  80 Appian 8.13.94–8.16.110.

  81 For the early career of Scipio Aemilianus see Astin 1967, 12–61.

  82 Ibid., 62–9.

  83 Appian 8.16.110–8.18.117.

  84 Polybius 36.8.7; Livy Epitome 49; Diodorus 32.9a; Plutarch Cat. Maj. 27.6.

  85 Appian 8.18.117–21.

  86 Ibid. 8.18.122–3.

  87 Ibid. 8.18.124–6.

  88 Polybius 38.7.1–38.8.10.

  89 Ibid. 38.8.13.

  90 Ibid. 38.8.7, 38.8.11–12.

  91 Appian 8.18.118.

  92 For a succinct account of Polybius’ life see Champion 2004, 15–18.

  93 Appian 8.19.132. For the Scipio quote, see Homer Iliad 6.448–9.

  94 Harris 1979, 240–44, who sees it as yet another diplomatic incident largely provoked by the Roman Senate. Errington (1971, 236–40) lays much of the culpability on the inexperience and impetuosity of the new leadership of the Achaean League.

  95 Eutropius 4.12.2; Diodorus 13.90; Cicero Verr. Or. 2.2.86–7, 2.4.72–83; Valerius Maximus 5.1.6.

  96 Although there is no evidence of large-scale Roman appropriation of Carthaginian territory for over twenty years after the destruction of the city, it has been pointed out that an in-depth survey of the land began almost immediately: see Wightman 1980, 34–6.

  97 Purcell 1995, 133.

  98 The association is clearly made by later writers such as Cicero (Agr. 2.87), and Livy (26.34.9).

  99 Purcell 1995, 134–5. For the half-heartedness of later Roman apologia for the fate of Carthage see ibid., 145–6.

  100 Ibid., 143.

  101 In many ways Cato would build on the historiographical foundations laid by Fabius Pictor. He would also follow the myth of Aeneas and the Trojan origins of the Romans (Gruen 1992, 33–4).

  102 Astin 1978, 217.

  103 Ibid., 227–31. Despite his legendary contempt for some aspects of Greek culture, Cato appears to have followed the model of Timaeus in this respect, although with one important difference. Whereas the Sicilian Greek had sought to place Italy and Rome within a wider central-Mediterranean context, Cato wished to highlight the centrality of Rome to Italy.

  104 Astin 1978, 213–16.

  105 Aulus Gellius 10.1.10.

  106 Feeney 1991, 99.

  107 Goldberg 1995, 52.

  108 Gruen 1990, 92–106; Goldberg 1995, 32–6.

  109 On the biographies and work of Naevius and Ennius see Gruen 1990, 106–22; Goldberg 1995, 114–22; Jocelyn 1972, 991–9.

  110 Such is the intertwining of myth and recent events in the work of Naevius that it has been suggested that a famous section describing a battle between giants and heroes was in fact a description of a frieze on the eastern pediment of the temple of Zeus at Acragas in Sicily (Fraenkel 1954, 14–16; Feeney 1991, 118).

  111 Wigodsky 1972, 29–34, for a discussion of what role Dido may have played in Naevius’ epic. The fiction of Rome as an established and venerable central-Mediterranean power was further aided by the historical conceit of transforming Romulus, the founder of Rome, into the grandson of Aeneas: see Goldberg 1995, 95–6.

  112 Feeney 1991, 109–10.

  113 In Ennius this is confirmed by the testimony of Servius Aen. 1.281 (Feeney 1991, 126–7), whereas in Naevius it is merely suspected (ibid., 116–17). Certainly, Rome’s increasing political and military involvement in Greece and the Hellenistic East during the late third and early decades of the second century BC had played its part, for the Roman senatorial elite sought to explain not only the extraordinary success that they had enjoyed, but also their relations with the wider Hellenic community (Gruen 1990, 121–3; Goldberg 1995, 56–7).

  114 Feeney 1991, 109–10.

  115 Goldberg 1995, 162, n. 5. Feeney (1991, 110 n. 58) also entertains the idea that Naevius wrote it after the end of the Second Punic War.

  116 Jocelyn 1972, 997–9.

  117 Ibid., 1006. Ennius, out of respect for Naevius, wrote very little about the First Punic War, even though he also appears to have been dismissive of Naevius’ literary talents (ibid., 1013–14).

  118 Aulus Gellius 6.12.7 (E. Warmington 1935, 270: 98–9); Paulus 439.7 (E. Warmington 1935, 282: 104–5); Festus Rufus Avienus 324.15 (E. Warmington 1935, 237: 84–5). Later writers would recognize Ennius as being strongly partisan, particularly in downplaying the disasters that were suffered by the Romans (Cicero Pomp. 25).

  119 Servius Aen. 1.20. For Naevius and prophecy see Feeney 1991, 111–13.

  120 Macrobius Sat. 3.7–9.

  CHAPTER 15: PUNIC FAITH />
  1 Appian 8.20.134; Orosius 4.23.5–7; Florus 4.12. Other sources claim that Scipio completely demolished the city (Velleius Paterculus 1.12; Eutropius 4.12; De Vir. Illustr. 58; Zonaras 9.26–30). However, archaeologists have discovered that some of Carthage was certainly still standing after the onslaught (Lancel 1995, 428–30). For Hasdrubal’s retirement see Eutropius 4.14.2; Zonaras 9.30; Orosius 4.23.7. For a general discussion of these references see Ridley 1986, 140–41.

  2 Geus 1994, 150–53; Krings 1991, 665–6; Diogenes Laertius Clitomachus.

  3 Appian 8.20.133. For other evidence of a form of curse being placed on the site to prevent its reoccupation see Cicero Agr. 1.2.5; Plutarch C. Gracch. 11; Appian CW 1.24; Tertullian De Pallio 1. On ploughing the ground and sowing it with salt see Modestinus, in Justinian Dig. 7.4.21; Stevens 1988, 39–40; Purcell 1995, 140–41. The surveying and reorganization of Carthage’s old territory = Wightman 1980, 34–6.

  4 Appian 8.20.134.

  5 Bellen 1985.

  6 Polybius 6.9, 6.57; Champion 2004, 94–8. Walbank (2002, 206–8), while acknowledging the Polybian view that Rome’s decline was inevitable, in my view underplays the importance of this in Polybius’ general historical thesis. Indeed, Cato’s mention of Carthage’s mixed constitution in his Origines might well reflect that this was a position that he held (Servius Aen. 4.682). It was certainly a view held in Stoic philosophical circles a little later (Champion 2004, 96–7).

  7 Polybius 6.51–2; Champion 2004, 117–21; Eckstein 1989.

  8 Pliny NH 35.23.

  9 Lintott 1972.

  10 Appian CW 1.3.24; Plutarch C.Gracch. 11; Orosius 5.12; Livy Epitome 60. In 111 an agrarian law was passed that made provision for the North African public land but forbade any resettlement of the site of Carthage.

  11 Appian CW 1.26.

  12 Plutarch C. Gracch. 17; Clark 2007, 133–4. Unsurprisingly, this building would long remain a symbol of the fragility of Roman political cohesiveness. It was an association that a talented political operator such as Marcus Cicero knew how to use to his own advantage. When in 63 BC, as consul, he chose the temple as the venue for the trials of those who had been involved in an unsuccessful coup d’état, Cicero, clearly wishing to distance his own actions from the bloody events that had prompted the temple’s construction, was careful to emphasize that his own successful attempt to defend Roman concord had not ended in terrible bloodshed, a clear reference to Opimius’ own purge. See Clark 2007, 172–6; Cicero Cat. 3.21; Sallust Cat. 9.2. Cicero would also use the temple as a place to launch a vitriolic attack on Mark Antony and the hypocrisy of his speech on concord after the murder of Caesar (Cicero Phil. 3.31, 5.20).

 

‹ Prev