by Ed Moloney
Charlie McGlade:
Sinn Fein looks upon itself as back-up to Provos. We would need to watch that we don’t just call ourselves socialists and not Republicans. Don’t get into entrenched positions—we must get rid of any discontent. In rural areas there is a real fear of Communism.
Liam Haddock:
Grass roots are not aware of what is happening at top—change of direction or whatever should be passed on to members.
Matt Devlin:
People of Tyrone felt bad after what happened at ArdFheis—they felt there had been a split. Wrong time for change in policy. S.F. does not have the same credibility since the document.
Paddy J. Kearney:
No lack of faith in leadership. People are thinking that S.F. has been demoted. Not as significant anymore. If the original document was rejected out of hand it shows how ill informed were the people who drew it up. No stance of boycott in Connaught. We sold papers. Rejection of fisheries in newsletter.
C. Kelly:
Country areas thought document was too far to the left and that they didn’t have any say in the organisation.
Niall Fagan:
Danger is that we will defeat ourselves. General consensus of opinion right around the country is that we are demoted—of no consequence. The most dissenting voices are the ones who are fully behind the “Brits Out” campaign. AP/RN leading us to extreme left— red left. Stifling veto on policies by one branch of the movement over the other. We need to have our confidence restored—custodial ownership—the key word. This drives them mad.
George Stagg:
I made my position clear and that’s where I am staying. Horrified at G. Adams’ statement at Ard Fheis that “without policy going through it is not worth death of one Brit or one man in prison.” Hope we are not going to have witch-hunt. Are rumours about Sean MacStiofain true?
Joe Cahill:
He has been given job of distribution manager in AP/RN. He is not in Sinn Fein.
Tom Hartley:
Sinn Fein is demoting itself. If there is loss of membership that is Sinn Fein’s fault and not the [IRA]. There has been a policy crisis. We are part of a mass of people who want freedom. Perhaps that is truly international.
Phil Flynn:
I already had my say.
E. O Doherty:
Sixth sense says that there is discontent. Since amalgamation—discontent. No editorial and withdrawal of Christine [sic] Ni Elias’s Eire Nua.
Paddy Bolger:
There was not the same unanimity in A/C as was in the military leadership. Smouldering discontent manifested itself after Ard Fheis. Socialism and nationalism are related. Confusion about general aims of the Movement. Sticks betrayed the Movement. Hysterical reaction to the new policy. It’s a development of Republicanism. Nothing sinister.
John Joe McGirl:
Present policies of political parties are breaking down in front of them. No point in having document unless it is implemented. Fully support the document—it is in the line of Republicanism. Discontent being promoted from the A/C by those who do not accept document. If we want unity we must have it from in here.
Sean O Bradaigh:
We must move on the basis that there is trust and confidence in the leadership. Original Eire Nua was designed as a left document but to win over as wide a spectrum of people as possible. There was a directive from the [Army Council]—Federalism to be put in cold storage. You cannot issue directives to the Ard Comhairle of Sinn Fein like that. Concept of leadership is meaningless unless you have followers.
Daithi O Conaill:
Motivation of Movement has been damaged. Trust damaged—air of apathy. 1) Policy Review Committee was a failure 2) Air of arrogance coming from the [Army Council] These statements usually unify and point the way forward. You must win respect—not take it for granted. Sinn Fein committed itself to Federalism at last Ard Fheis, [the Army Council] rejects this policy. [The Army is] committed to policy of de-centralisation, nothing outlined. No alternative proposed by them to Federalism. There should be equal participation.
Richard Behal:
Not pessimistic about outcome. Shock of this dissent may set us back on the right road. Political wing should make policy statements not the other way around. Get rid of division between [the IRA] and S.F. No inquest into why we did not contest local elections in 6 counties. Should take RTE to Strasbourg over Section 31. There is Marxist influence within the Movement. G. Adams was pulling a fast one when he stated there wasn’t.
Gerry Adams:
Campaign of innuendo and vilification. There are nationalists within the R.M. [separatists] wrong to be only a separatist. Can anyone outline the anti-Republican essence of this document? Republicanism is composed of many elements. This struggle is a life and death struggle. Going left is not something foreign. Failed to harness the anti-establishment feeling, successive A/C have failed. What [the Army Council] did was done with best intentions. Perhaps they did make mistakes. Need to stop backbiting. We are not a National Liberation Movement. We are a Republican Movement going through a stage of national liberation. Are we a radical republican Movement?
T. O. Sullivan:
As a member of A/C I accept document but how to sell it to the people. [The Army Council] statement is what caused division. There is not backstabbing of leadership. Leadership should have seen what the reaction would be around the country when document 1. was rejected. We have a duty to tell membership where we are going.
Jimmy Drumm:
Comments should be passed on to the other side. G. Stagg should not be criticised for probing worms out of the woodwork. Dissension in Donegal re AP/RN not insurmountable.
Des Long:
Changes in policy—grass roots not informed. A/C was not even kept informed. Ten acre capitalists are not going to let their land go. We will not get votes from these people with this document. Unless something else is offered we must keep Federalism. Attitude of AP/RN was—we are not carrying your policy but you will sell our paper. Insensitivity of AP/RN re centre-spread. Appeared at wrong time. We need a cooling off period.
Christin Ni Elias:
Primary duty of party is to lead people. Lack of consultation with members of S.F. Lifting of ban is recognition of mistake that was made. Level of political awareness is greater now then in early seventies. Custodial ownership frightened people. There must be evolution. We must re-assure people that we know what membership wants.
George Lynch:
AP/RN is whipping boy. Other side also. With exception of Meath there has been no backlash. A/C members cause of there being a backlash. I abide by decision. Never favoured Federalism but as education officer I spread it. We must abide by democratic decision of majority in this organisation. Urban and rural conflict. Land should be distributed to meet the needs of the people. The social message is not being put across. No effort was put into Federalism but now we are being told how great it was. The presentation of document is bad—people have to be told what we mean. Adverts are up in the Brochure this year—that is an answer. If leadership in consultation with S.F. members want to drop Federalism I will abide with that decision.
Ruairi O Bradaigh:
A few points—I did not propose something at Ard Fheis that I did not believe in.
Joe Cahill:
There is a desire to resolve difficulties. Let us now have proposals.
Phil Flynn:
We must stand behind decision of Ard Fheis—create structures which will bring back confidence.
These are merely the comments of all Ard Comhairle members present at the special meeting of An Ard Comhairle on 12th April, 1980. Minutes recorded in official minute book.
APPENDIX 2
TUAS Document—Summer 1994
The briefing paper of April deals with Strategic Objectives and events to that date in more detail than this paper. However a brief summary is helpful.
Our goals have not changed.
A United 32 County Democratic Soci
alist Republic.
The main Strategic Objectives to move us forward towards that goal can be summarised thus.
To construct an Irish nationalist consensus with international support on the basis of the dynamic contained in the Irish Peace initiative.
This should aim for:
(a) The strongest possible political consensus between the Dublin govt, SF and the SDLP.
(b) A common position on practical measures moving us towards our goal.
(c) A common nationalist negotiating position.
(d) An international dimension in aid of the consensus (mostly U.S.A. and E.U. [European Union]).
The Strategic Objectives come from a prolonged debate but are based on a straightforward logic; that republicans at this time and on their own do not have the strength to achieve the end goal.
The struggle needs strengthened [sic]; most obviously from other nationalist constituencies led by SDLP, Dublin government and the emerging I.A. [Irish-American] lobby, with additional support from other parties in E.U. rowing in behind and accelerating the momentum created.
The aim of any such consensus is to create a dynamic which can:
1. Effect [sic] the domestic and international perception of the republican position, i.e. as one which is reasonable.
2. To develop a northern nationalist consensus on the basis of constitutional change.
3. To develop an Irish national consensus on the same basis.
4. To develop Irish-America as a significant player in support of the above.
5. To develop a broader and deeper Irish nationalist consensus at grass-roots level.
6. To develop and mobilise an anti-imperialist Irish peace movement.
7. To expose the British government and the Unionists as the intransigent parties.
8. To heighten the contradictions between British unionism and “Ulster Loyalism.”
9. To assist the development of whatever potential exists in Britain to create a mood/climate/party/movement for peace.
10. To maintain the political cohesion and organisational integrity of Sinn Fein so as to remain an effective political force.
Present British intentions are the subject of much debate and varied opinion. However what can be said is that sometime preceding the D.S.D. [Downing Street Declaration] of December ’93 a deal was done with the U.U.P. [Ulster Unionist Party] to keep the Conservatives in power.
This becomes an obstacle to movement.
The D.S.D. does not hold a solution.
Republicans are not prepared to wait around for the British to change, but as always we are prepared to force their hand.
It is nonetheless important to note that there has been no recent dialogue between the Brit government and Republican representatives since November ’93.
The Republican position is that if the Brits want to talk they should do so through normal political channels.
At the end of the April briefing it states: “Our (strategic) objectives should guide all our actions. Given that these are our guidelines we must now look at what our options are and what initiatives we can undertake.”
After prolonged discussion and assessment the leadership decided that if it could get agreement with the Dublin government, the SDLP and the I.A. lobby on basic republican principles which would be enough to create the dynamic that would considerably advance the struggle then it would be prepared to use the TUAS option.
We attempted to reach such a consensus on a set of principles which can be summarised briefly thus:
1. Partition has failed.
2. Structures must be changed.
3. No internal settlement within 6 Counties.
4. British rule breaches the principle of N.S.D. [National self-determination].
5. The Irish as a whole have the right to N.S.D.—without external impediment.
6. It is up to the Dublin/London governments with all parties to bring about N.S.D. in the shortest time possible.
7. The Unionists have no veto over discussions involved or their outcome.
8. A solution requires political and constitutional change.
9. An agreed united and independent Ireland is what republicans desire. However an agreed Ireland needs the allegiance of varied traditions to be viable.
Contact with the other parties involved have been in that context.
There are of course differences of opinion on how a number of these principles are interpreted or applied.
In particular:
on British rule breaching the principle of N.S.D.;
on the absolute right of the Irish to N.S.D. without external impediment;
an interpretation of what veto and consent mean;
on the issue of timescales.
Nevertheless, differences aside, the leadership believes there is enough in common to create a substantial political momentum which will considerably advance the struggle at this time.
Some substantial contributing factors which point towards now being the right time for an intiative are:
Hume is the only SDLP person on the horizon strong enough to face the challenge;
Dublin’s coalition is the strongest government in 25 years or more;
Reynolds has no historical baggage to hinder him and knows how popular such a consensus would be among grassroots;
There is potentially a very powerful I[rish] American lobby not in hock to any particular party in Ireland or Britain;
Clinton is perhaps the first U.S. President in decades to be substantially influenced by such a lobby;
At this time the British government is the least popular in the E.U. with other E.U. members;
It is the first time in 25 years that all the major Irish nationalist parties are rowing in roughly the same direction.
These combined circumstances are unlikely to gel again in the foreseeable future.
The leadership has now decided that there is enough agreement to proceed with the TUAS option.
It has been stated from the outset that this is a risky strategy.
Its success will depend greatly on workload. All activities must be pro-active.
Those who continue their present work need to double effect.
If you find yourself idle, help in another field.
TUAS has been a part of every other struggle in the world this century.
It is vital that activists realise the struggle is not over.
Another Front has opened up and we should have the confidence and put in the effort to succeed on that front.
We have the ability to carry on indefinitely.
We should be trying to double the pressure on the British.
For various reasons, which include the sensitivity of discussions up to this point, communication up and down the organisation has been patchy.
Since we are now entering a more public aspect to the initiative communication should be a less encumbered matter and therefore more regular than before.
APPENDIX 3
Post–1996 Convention IRA Constitution
This is the version of the IRA constitution as amended by the 1996 General Army Convention.
Additions to the previous constitution, agreed in 1986, are in italics; excisions are enclosed by ( ).
The Executive and the Army Council disagreed about which sections of the constitution had been removed at the 1996 Convention. These sections are indicated by [ ], i.e., square brackets.
1. Title:
The Army shall be known as Oglaigh na hEireann.
2. Membership:
1. Enlistment in Oglaigh na hEireann shall be open to all those over the age of 17 who accept its objects as stated in the Constitution and who make the following pledge:
“I… {name}… promise that I will promote the objects of Oglaigh na hEireann to the best of my knowledge and ability and that I will obey all orders and regulations issued to me by the Army Authority and by my superior officer.”
2. Participation in Stormont or Westminster and in any other subservie
nt parliament, if any, is strictly forbidden.
3. Enlistment shall be at the discretion of the Army Authority.
3. Objects:
1. To guard the honour and uphold the sovereignty and unity of the Irish Republic (of Ireland) as declared by the First Dail.
2. To support the establishment of an Irish Socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation.
3. To support the establishment of, and uphold, a lawful government in sole and absolute control of the 32 County Irish Republic as constituted by the First Dail.
4. To secure and defend civil and religious liberties and equal rights and equal opportunities for all citizens.
5. To promote the revival of the Irish language as the everyday language of the people.
4. Means:
1. To organise Oglaigh na hEireann for victory.
2. To build on a spirit of comradeship.
3. To wage revolutionary armed struggle.
4. To encourage popular resistance, political mobilisation and political action in support of these objectives.
5. To assist, as directed by the Army Authority, all organisations working for the same objectives.
5. Army Control:
1. The General Army Convention shall be the Supreme Army Authority.
2. The Army Council shall be the Supreme Authority when a General Convention is not in session.
3. The Army Council, only after Convention, shall have power to delegate its powers to a government which is actively endeavouring to function as the de facto government of the Republic.
4. When a government is functioning as the de facto government of the Republic, a General Army Convention shall be convened to give the allegiance of Oglaigh na hEireann to such a government.
[5. All personnel and all armaments, equipment and other resources of Oglaigh na hEireann shall be at the disposal of and subject to the Army Authority, to be employed and utilised as the Army Authority shall direct.]