by Ed Moloney
(v) that they would respond, with the necessary legislation, to any constitutional and political decisions about the future of Ireland which such a Conference might make.
11. An agreement in principle that, if the proposed strategy proves to be acceptable in principle, an advisory committee or conference, representative of the leaders and parties concerned, should be set up immediately to proceed with the organization of the strategy.
The function of this committee or conference, in part at least, would be:
(i) to consult and advise on the tactics of the strategy;
(ii) to consult and advise on ways and means of presenting, explaining and publicizing it;
(iii) to consult and advise on ways and means of winning support for it at home and abroad but especially from the main nationalist-republican parties, the main Unionist parties and the British authorities;
(iv) to consult and advise on the form of a new Constitution for Ireland.
12. An agreement in principle that, when those first concerned have discussed the proposed strategy between themselves, they would then approach others whom it would be necessary to approach to explain it to them, and to obtain their views on it.
Some Comments on the Background and on the Validity of this Proposal
This proposal for an overall political strategy for peace emerged from discussions and communications which took place over the past two years or so and which involved people who, from their knowledge and experience, were able to give expert advice on the present attitudes and policies of the nationalist parties, the republican movement, the unionist parties and the British authorities.
The proposed strategy is based on this advice so it may be said that it was not thought out in any abstract or a priori way but that it emerged from the heart of the conflict. This fact alone should guarantee its validity as a viable and realistic strategy for peace.
I believe that a comparative examination of the political principles of the strategy and the political principles of the main parties engaged in the conflict will show that they are in keeping with one another; that the principles of the strategy do not essentially contradict the principles of any of these parties but that, in a true sense, they respect, encourage and embody them.
I suggest therefore that this strategy is in keeping with the realities and the needs of the conflict in that it faces and meets them with a peace dynamic which is powerful enough to bridge the gaps and to reconcile the divisions that are at the heart of it.
Its inherent and enduring viability as a strategy for peace is also guaranteed by its commitment to the ongoing use of the principles of political dialogue, political persuasion and political force—the only principles through which agreement on a constitutional and political framework for a just and lasting peace can be worked out and put into effect.
Given this understanding of the strategy, there is, I believe, no reason in principle, why any of the main parties concerned should refuse to accept it as an overall political strategy for peace.
How the principles of the strategy relate to the principles of the main parties concerned
The nationalist parties: the principles of the strategy, especially its basic ones (the Principle of Self-Determination and the Principle of Consent or Co-determination) are in keeping with the traditional principles of the Nationalist parties, North and South.
The principles of the strategy are also in keeping with the principles which, from a nationalist point of view, underlie the Anglo-Irish Agreement insofar as this Agreement formulates and expresses the Irish, unionist and British dimensions of the conflict because these dimensions imply the Principles of Self-Determination and Co-determination or at least open the door to the kind of political dialogue which would develop and apply them.
I believe, therefore, that the proposed strategy should be acceptable in principle to the leadership of the main nationalist parties, North and South.
The republican movement: I am satisfied, from my knowledge of the spirit and principles of the republican movement, that this strategy should be acceptable in principle to its leadership provided they are convinced that the other parties concerned would genuinely commit themselves to it until a final agreement about the constitutional and political future of Ireland had been reached.
I say this, first of all, because the cardinal principle of the republican movement is the right of the Irish people as a whole to self-determination and this is also the cardinal principle of the peace strategy. Up to now, as the republican movement have seen it, the first step in the actual implementation of this principle of self-determination would be a declaration by the British authorities that they intend to leave Ireland at some future date or that they intend to set aside the 1920 Government of Ireland Act with a view to introducing an alternative constitutional arrangement.
One or other of these declarations would imply that the British authorities intended to give the Irish people, as a whole, the freedom and the independence to decide their own constitutional and political future. This strategy of “withdrawal” by the British authorities and its relationship to the implementation of the Principle of Self-Determination are also embodied in the proposed strategy, not in the sense in which, up to now, the republican movement has understood them but in the sense that, in keeping with a situation in which all the parties concerned had accepted the proposed strategy, the British authorities would withdraw from the central area of historical, political, religious and cultural conflict in Ireland and allow the parties to it, that is, the people of the nationalist tradition and the people of the unionist tradition, to resolve it through free, independent and democratic dialogue among some themselves.
In this definition of a “British withdrawal” the British authorities would act as the facilitators and the sponsors of the dialogue between the two traditions but they would not interfere in it, much less, dictate to it. While this definition of a withdrawal by the British authorities is not the same as the definition which, up to now, the republican movement has given it, it embodies the same principle.
It also gives the same strategic reason for such a withdrawal, namely, the creation of a situation in which the Irish people, through dialogue among themselves, could determine their own future without interference or dictation from the British authorities. Given then that the proposed strategy is in keeping with the policy of the republican movement insofar as both embody the Principle of Self-Determination and the strategy of a British withdrawal, it follows that the Principle of Consent, as defined by the proposed strategy, is also in keeping with their policy because, as this strategy notes, the people of Ireland as a whole, to whom the principle of self-Determination applies, are defined, by the realities of the situation, as the people of the nationalist tradition and the people of the unionist tradition. The Principle of Self-Determination cannot therefore be implemented without the consent of both traditions.
There is no reason of principle, therefore, why the republican movement should refuse to accept the principle of consent as defined by the proposed strategy.
It may also be said that, were they to refuse, they would be going against the whole spirit of their own movement, because, by its own definition, it exists to resist the oppression of the Irish people by what it sees as colonial interests. It would be a strange turnabout, to say the least, if such a movement were itself to become an oppressor and colonizer of Irish people by trying to coerce the consent of Irish loyalists.
The British authorities: I am satisfied, from an authentic and authoritative explanation of present British policy towards Ireland, that the proposed strategy would be acceptable, in principle, to the British authorities provided it becomes acceptable to the main nationalist, republican and unionist parties (see page 6 of the document “A Concrete Proposal for an Overall Political Strategy to Establish Justice and Peace in Ireland”).
The unionist parties: I am satisfied, on expert advice, that there is no reason why the main unionist parties and the peo
ple whom they represent should refuse to accept the proposed strategy provided they are assured that the main nationalist parties and Republican movement would genuinely commit themselves to it as an overall political strategy for peace.
APPENDIX 9
IRA Statement Ending its Armed Campaign against Britain, July 28, 2005
“The leadership of Oglaigh na hEireann has formally ordered an end to the armed campaign.
This will take effect from 4 p.m. [1600 BST] this afternoon [Thursday, July 28, 2005].
All IRA units have been ordered to dump arms.
All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means.
Volunteers must not engage in any other activities whatsoever.
The IRA leadership has also authorized our representative to engage with the IICD [Independent International Commission on Decommissioning] to complete the process to verifiably put its arms beyond use in a way which will further enhance public confidence and to conclude this as quickly as possible.
We have invited two independent witnesses, from the Protestant and Catholic Churches, to testify to this.
The Army Council took these decisions following an unprecedented internal discussion and consultation process with IRA units and Volunteers.
We appreciate the honest and forthright way in which the consultation process was carried out and the depth and content of the submissions.
We are proud of the comradely way in which this truly historic discussion was conducted. The outcome of our consultations show very strong support among IRA Volunteers for the Sinn Fein peace strategy.
There is also widespread concern about the failure of the two governments and the unionists to fully engage in the peace process.
This has created real difficulties. The overwhelming majority of people in Ireland fully support this process.
They and friends of Irish unity throughout the world want to see the full implementation of the Good Friday Agreement.
Notwithstanding these difficulties our decisions have been taken to advance our republican and democratic objectives, including our goal of a united Ireland.
We believe there is now an alternative way to achieve this and to end British rule in our country. It is the responsibility of all Volunteers to show leadership, determination and courage.
We are very mindful of the sacrifices of our patriot dead, those who went to jail, Volunteers, their families and the wider republican base.
We reiterate our view that the armed struggle was entirely legitimate. We are conscious that many people suffered in the conflict.
There is a compelling imperative on all sides to build a just and lasting peace. The issue of the defence of nationalist and republican communities has been raised with us.
There is a responsibility on society to ensure that there is no re-occurrence of the pogroms of 1969 and the early 1970s.
There is also a universal responsibility to tackle sectarianism in all its forms.
The IRA is fully committed to the goals of Irish unity and independence and to building the Republic outlined in the 1916 Proclamation.
We call for maximum unity and effort by Irish republicans everywhere. We are confident that by working together Irish republicans can achieve our objectives.
Every Volunteer is aware of the import of the decisions we have taken and all Oglaigh are compelled to fully comply with these orders.
There is now an unprecedented opportunity to utilize the considerable energy and goodwill which there is for the peace process.
This comprehensive series of unparalleled initiatives is our contribution to this and to the continued endeavours to bring about independence and unity for the people of Ireland.”
P. O’Neill, Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin
Notes
Preface to the second edition
1. The Clonard Priest, BBC Radio Four, November 29, 2006.
Prologue
1. This account of the last days of the Eksund has been derived from a number of conversations with serving and former IRA members in 1998.
2. Hibernia, Dec. 20–27, 1979.
3. This account of the IRA’s early relationship has been derived from interviews and conversations with former IRA members in 1979 and 1998.
4. U.S. Department of State Libya/PIRA Background Paper, P860082-0954, July 10, 1986.
5. From notes of conversation with former IRA activist, Jan. 19, 1999.
6. Interviews and conversations with former IRA members, 1979 and 1998.
7. Interview with former IRA member, 1998.
8. Interview with senior IRA figure, 1998.
9. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 506.
10. Ibid., 448.
11. In Dublin, Feb. 18, 1987.
12. Interviews with former IRA members, 1998 and 1999.
13. Interview with senior IRA member, 1998.
14. See Jack Holland, The American Connection: US Guns, Money and Influence in Northern Ireland (Swords, Co. Dublin: Poolbeg Press, 1993), chap. 3, for a full account of Harrison’s IRA career.
15. Interview with IRA member, 1999.
16. Ibid.
17. Interview with IRA member, 1998.
18. Brendan O’Brien, A Pocket History of the IRA (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2000), 108.
19. Interview with IRA source, 1998.
20. Interview with senior IRA source, 1998.
21. Interview with senior IRA member, 1998.
22. “Libya ‘Planning to Resume Aid to IRA,’” Irish Times, June 18, 1986.
23. “Gaddafi: I’m Stepping up IRA Aid,” Observer, March 1, 1987.
24. “Libya ‘Will Open Centre for IRA,’” Irish Times, April 16, 1987.
25. U.S. Department of State Libya/PIRA Background Paper, P860082-0954, July 10, 1986.
26. Interview with IRA source, 1999.
27. Interview with IRA source, 1998.
28. O’Brien, Pocket History of the IRA.
29. Interview with senior IRA member 1998.
30. Interview with senior IRA source, 1998.
31. Ibid.
32. Interview with senior IRA source, 1999.
33. Notes of conversation with IRA member, 1999.
34. Interview with senior IRA source, 1998.
35. Interview with former IRA activist, 1999.
One: Roots
1. Interview with a former IRA member, Sept. 2000.
2. Gerry Adams, Before the Dawn: An Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1996), 3.
3. Michael Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 1976), 93–94.
4. David Sharrock and Mark Devenport, Man of War, Man of Peace? The Unauthorized Biography of Gerry Adams (London: Macmillan, 1997), 9.
5. The father of the civil rights leader Bernadette Devlin discovered that the term “politically suspect” had been stamped on his insurance card. He lost his job and was forced to go to England to seek work. His was not an unusual experience.
6. Kevin Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon Books, 1983), 63.
7. Ibid., 64.
8. Sharrock and Devenport, Man of War, 34–35.
9. Ibid., 37.
10. Brendan O’Brien, A Pocket History of the IRA (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2000).
11. Farrell, Northern Ireland, 256.
12. J. Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army: The IRA, 1916–1979 (Dublin: Academy Press, 1979), 344.
13. Kelley, Longest War, 85.
14. Ibid., 86.
15. Mike Milotte, Communism in Modern Ireland: The Pursuit of the Workers’ Republic since 1916 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1984), 265.
16. Kelley, Longest War, 87.
17. Unpublished interview with Gerry Adams, Feb. 1984, p. 2, author’s copy.
18. Adams, Before the Dawn, 124.
19. Unpublished interview w
ith Adams, 5.
20. Adams, Before the Dawn, 123.
21. Ciaran de Baroid, Ballymurphy and the Irish War (Belfast: Aisling Publishers, 1989), 50.
22. Adams, Before the Dawn, 94.
23. Ibid., 110.
24. Interview with Provisional IRA founding member, May 17, 1999.
25. Adams, Before the Dawn, 129.
26. Irish News, letters page, Nov. 14, 1986.
27. Interview with Ruairi O Bradaigh, Oct. 5, 2000.
28. Adams, Before the Dawn, 129.
29. De Baroid, Ballymurphy and the Irish War, 57.
Two: The Defenders
1. Sean MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary (London: Gordon Cremonesi, 1975), 93.
2. Ibid., 135.
3. P. O’Neill, Freedom Struggle (Dublin: Provisional IRA, Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, 1973), 64.
4. Kevin Kelley, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon Books, 1983), 129.
5. Ibid.
6. Kevin Bean and Mark Hayes, eds., Republican Voices (Monaghan: Seesyu Press, 2001), 50.
7. Ibid., 76.
8. MacStiofain, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 84.
9. O’Neill, Freedom Struggle, 19.
10. Interview with former Sinn Fein and IRA member, March 8, 1999, with former Sinn Fein member, Dec. 28, 1998.
11. Interview with former Sinn Fein member, Dec. 28, 1998.
12. Robert W. White, Provisional Irish Republicans: An Oral and Interpretative History (London and Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1993), 55.
13. Irish News, Nov. 24, 1998.
14. Undated interview with Brendan Hughes, author’s copy.
15. Bean and Hayes, eds., Republican Voices, 31.
16. Wolfe Tone, An Argument on Behalf of the Catholics of Ireland (1791).
17. Robert Kee, The Most Distressful Country, vol. 1 of The Green Flag (London, Melbourne, and New York: Quartet Books, 1976), 72.
18. Bean and Hayes, eds., Republican Voices, 34.
19. Gerry Adams, Before the Dawn: An Autobiography (London: Heinemann, 1996), 118.
20. Ciaran de Baroid, Ballymurphy and the Irish War (Belfast: Aisling Publishers, 1989), 59.