Cesare Borgia generously assured Pius III that he was more than willing to loan His Holiness sufficient funds for his coronation, and the relieved pope confirmed Borgia’s reappointment as Captain-General of the Papal Forces. A dismayed Giustinian reported back to Venice: ‘Borgia is far from being as ill as all believed. He speaks in his arrogant manner and promises that he will soon be back with all his possessions in the Romagna.’
Two days later Pius III was crowned pope. Borgia and his liveried troops then marched into the Vatican at the head of a convoy bearing Cesare’s possessions. This was accompanied by his ‘family’ – including mother, brother, children and ‘assorted women’ – who proceeded to take up residence in the Borgia apartments. The Spanish, the Colonna, the Orsini, to say nothing of Cardinal della Rovere, could only look on aghast. Borgia and his troops were now in sole command of the Vatican and the frail figure of Pius III. With the backing of the French, it looked as if Cesare would soon re-establish his complete control of the Romagna, and a grateful Louis XII would in all likelihood allow him to take over Florence. Cesare Borgia was on the point of establishing himself as the power behind the Pope and master over all of central Italy. The strategy of Alexander VI, and the predictions of Machiavelli, were on the verge of becoming reality.
By enacting Machiavelli’s Virtù at its most ruthless, Borgia had succeeded. Yet not for nothing is Fortuna often likened to a wheel. Once again the wheel turned and Fortuna would desert Borgia. On 18 October, just twenty-six days after being elected pope, Pius III died, bringing to an end one of the briefest reigns in papal history. For his own safety, Borgia now moved into the Castel Sant’Angelo, along with his ‘family’. This included two of his known illegitimate children: an infant son, Girolamo, and an infant daughter, Camilla Lucrezia. Also members of this group were the five-year-old Infans Romanus Giovanni, Lord of Camerino (possible son of Alexander VI, but more likely of Lucrezia, fathered by the murdered servant Perotto); and the four-year-old Rodrigo, Duke of Bisceglie (the title he had inherited from his murdered father Alfonso, Lucrezia’s second husband). Cesare Borgia had an anointed heir in the form of Giovanni, Duke of Camerino, as well as a good number of spares in case Giovanni proved inadequate. But he would need to maintain his power while this generation came of age.
Once more the Holy City was faced with the prospect of another conclave; and once more it looked as if there would be a stalemate between those who favoured Cardinal d’Amboise and those who favoured Cardinal della Rovere. This situation induced Cardinal della Rovere to resort to some desperate politicking. As the cardinals began arriving in Rome, Cardinal della Rovere promulgated a rumour that if the Frenchman Cardinal d’Amboise was elected he would take the papacy back to Avignon, causing another schism. And no one wanted this. Even so, it soon became clear that Cardinal della Rovere could still not be sure of obtaining the necessary majority. In desperation, he reverted to an extreme plan, which would once again turn the wheel of fortune for Cesare Borgia. On 29 October, just two days prior to the opening of the conclave, Cardinal della Rovere approached his bitter enemy Borgia with a surprising offer. If Borgia could persuade the Spanish cardinals to vote for him, Cardinal della Rovere promised to reappoint Borgia as Captain-General of the Papal Forces, as well as lend his support to Borgia in his effort to retake his lost lands in the Romagna. And to demonstrate the cardinal’s good faith, this agreement would be sealed by a marriage between Borgia’s legitimate daughter Louise (now aged four, but still living in France) and the cardinal’s thirteen-year-old nephew Francesco della Rovere, the former ruler of Sinigalia.
Borgia found himself in a serious quandary. Should he desert the French after all they had done for him? Yet despite Louis XII’s promises, French support had done little to turn the tide in his favour in the Romagna. This agreement with Cardinal della Rovere meant that he would retain his military power as Captain-General, and be able to regain his power base in the Romagna. Without these two he would have nothing, now that his father was gone. Borgia signed the agreement, and when the conclave took place Cardinal della Rovere was duly elected by an overwhelming majority on the first vote. At fifty-nine he had at last acceded to the throne he had so long coveted, whereupon he took the papal name Julius II.
Despite all the people’s rejoicing at the election of a comparatively young and certainly energetic Italian pope, who looked as if he would reign for some time, Julius II was hardly a popular man. The contemporary Florentine historian Guicciardini records that he
was known to be very difficult by nature and formidable with everyone. He was notoriously restless . . . and had inevitably offended many people, arousing the hatred and provoking the enmity of many great men . . . He had been a very powerful cardinal for a long time . . . and his cause was greatly promoted by the immoderate promises which had been made to anyone who might prove useful to him.
This last aspect did not bode well for Borgia. And so it turned out. Despite Julius II’s promises, he now seemed reluctant to reappoint Borgia as Captain-General of the Papal Forces. By happenstance, Machiavelli had now arrived in Rome, despatched by Florence to be an observer at the papal elections and the beginning of the new pope’s reign. In Machiavelli’s opinion, Borgia had been ‘deluded and blind to support a man whom his family had so sorely offended’. No such man could be trusted to keep his word. Even so, Machiavelli reported of Borgia that
according to some of his men he has also sent orders to northern Italy enlisting soldiers there, too. It appears that he is raising these troops so that when he is once more made Captain-General of the Papal troops he will launch a campaign to recover his territories in the Romagna.
Julius II had apparently granted Borgia permission to march his troops to Ostia. Whereupon Borgia informed Machiavelli that ‘he is taking action to prevent the Venetians from becoming masters of the Romagna, and the Pope is ready to assist him’. When Borgia reached Ostia, he planned to embark in papal galleys for the journey north to link up with the troops he had enlisted in northern Italy.
Yet to reach the Romagna it would be necessary for Borgia to march his troops across Florentine territory. He sent ahead for permission to do this, but Gonfaloniere Soderini adamantly refused Borgia’s request, apparently confident that the French would not abandon their support for Florence. Borgia, too, evidently knew more of French intentions than he had let on, for he seemed to think that this refusal put an end to all his plans. What on earth could he do now? Machiavelli wrote that suddenly Borgia was a changed man: the duplicitous, self-confident braggart he had known had given way to a man ‘paralysed with indecision, become suspicious of everyone, and [he] appeared generally unhinged in his behaviour’.
But Machiavelli knew Borgia all too well, and observed that this transformation in his character
may be due to the natural volatility of his personality. On the other hand, he is used to having the luck of the devil, and this totally unexpected collapse of his fortunes may well have stunned and unnerved him.
Unpredictable as ever, Borgia suddenly left Rome for Ostia. Here he began dividing his troops into separate detachments. His intentions remained obscure. Many thought he had gone mad. Others suspected that he intended to send these troops in separate detachments across Florentine territory to rejoin at Cesena, which along with Imola still remained loyal to him. When news of Borgia’s actions reached Rome, Julius II decided that it was time he too took action. On 12 November the new Pope despatched an envoy to Ostia ordering that Borgia surrender Cesena, Imola and any other lands which he still held in the Papal Territories. When Borgia ignored this order, the Pope sent the entire Papal Guard to arrest Borgia. Borgia was still not fully recovered and resting in one of the papal galleys, whose captain betrayed him to the soldiers sent by Julius II. His own soldiers, feeling leaderless after his surprise arrest, chose not to attempt to rescue him. Borgia was then escorted back to Rome.
Eyewitnesses report that on entering Rome Borgia appeared a dejected man, plunged i
nto depression. To the surprise of all, Borgia was not sent to the dungeons of the Castel Sant’Angelo, but housed in the Vatican under heavy armed guard. Julius II was attempting to encourage Borgia to divulge the passwords to the fortresses that remained loyal to him in the Romagna. On 1 December ‘news arrived that Don Miguel had been taken prisoner, and his force disarmed by Gian Paolo Baglioni on the border between Florentine territory and Perugia’. Borgia had now lost his closest Spanish commander.
The very next day, Julius II appointed Guidobaldo da Montefeltro as Captain-General of the Papal Forces. The Pope had finally broken his promise to Borgia, just as Machiavelli had suspected he would. In fact, he had done no more than Borgia himself would have done. On the other hand, Borgia had found himself with little alternative but to accept the Pope’s promise. He was being backed into a corner. Immediately after his appointment, Guidobaldo of Urbino paid a visit to Borgia in the Vatican. A later report of this meeting by Guidobaldo himself describes Borgia as falling on his knees and abjectly begging Guidobaldo to forgive him for taking Urbino and all the wrongs he had perpetrated on him. Borgia may have been a broken man, but this report rings false. It goes against all we know of Borgia. As we have seen, when Borgia was distressed he may have exhibited ‘unhinged behaviour’ in accord with the ‘natural volatility of his character’, but he never gave up; he was always scheming how to turn the tables on his enemy. His pride in himself – arrogance even – would not have permitted him to behave in such a fashion, even if only for deceitful purposes. Prostration and begging forgiveness do not appear to have been part of his emotional vocabulary. Indeed, this interpretation of Borgia’s character is reinforced when we learn that the account which Guidobaldo gave to Giustinian immediately after his meeting with Borgia makes no mention of such histrionics. Even so, certain things do remain clear: by the end of this meeting, Borgia had agreed to return to Guidobaldo all the treasures which he had looted from Urbino. And, most significant of all, he finally surrendered the passwords to his fortresses in the Romagna. Was this the end?
By no means. Cesare Borgia remained as deceitful as ever. Making covert contact with troops who had remained loyal to him, Borgia initiated two daring exploits. First, a secret convoy of wagons was organized to transport out of Rome all the papal treasures he had looted from Alexander VI’s apartment on his death. And second, orders were despatched to Cesena, instructing the commanders of the garrison, the Ramirez brothers, to send a secret mule train carrying all Borgia’s treasures out of the Romagana. Both of these convoys were ordered to carry their precious cargoes to Lucrezia Borgia for safe keeping in Ferrara. Unfortunately for Borgia, in both cases spies disclosed the purpose of these convoys. Following frantic searches by Papal Troops in Florentine territory, as well as over the northern Romagna, both convoys were intercepted. A further blow to Borgia’s fortunes came when he learned that Miguel da Corella had been transported to the Castel Sant’Angelo, where he was being tortured. Julius II was determined to extract every last piece of information he could about Borgia.
By now heavy snow had begun to fall in the Apennines, all but blocking the mountain passes. Not until 14 December did Julius II’s envoy reach Cesena, presenting the commanders of the fortress, Pedro and Diego Ramirez, with the password. But still the Ramirez brothers refused to surrender, insisting that such secrets could have been obtained from Borgia only by means of torture. The Spanish commander who had been sent to accompany the envoy and act as go-between with the Ramirez brothers was seized as a traitor. Whereupon the Ramirez brothers had him tortured to death, his mutilated body left hanging from the walls.
Julius II decided to try a different tack with Borgia, who still remained under house arrest in the Vatican. He would ruin Borgia financially and then put him on trial. Despite the superiority of his position, Julius II hesitated to take the obvious step and have Borgia murdered. (Ironically, Borgia was at the time occupying the very apartment where, on his orders, Lucrezia’s beloved second husband Alfonso of Bisceglie had been strangled by Miguel da Corella.) Julius II remained comparatively inexperienced and unsure of himself as pope, and had no wish to create the precedent of murdering his enemy so early in his reign. So he set about accumulating financial claims against Borgia from all those who had been robbed by him. For instance, Guidobaldo of Urbino was persuaded to put in a claim for a colossal 200,000 ducats for his losses. Others, including the families of the rulers deposed from the Romagna cities, were also encouraged to put in claims for financial damage. Likewise, Florence began drawing up a list of compensations it was owed for incursions into its territory by Borgia and his commanders (no matter that many of these had been murdered at Sinigalia). The total claims against Borgia soon exceeded 300,000 ducats. As for bringing a legal case against Borgia, this proved much easier. Julius II implicated Borgia in many of the murders committed by his father Alexander VI – particularly those of Cardinals Michiel and Orsini, who had also been robbed of all their possessions. By putting Borgia on trial, Julius II wished to avoid alienating the Spanish cardinals, as well as displeasing the powerful Louis XII, who unpredictably still retained his sympathies for Borgia.
Meanwhile, despite the heavy winter, fighting continued in Naples between the French and the Spanish. Then finally on 28 December the Spanish commander Gonsalvo de Córdoba defeated the French army on the banks of the Garigliano River, thus bringing an end to French resistance. Whereupon, the French garrison at Gaeta surrendered. Borgia’s ally Louis XII now only had a foothold in Italy, far to the north in Milan. As Machiavelli had previously observed in one of his despatches: ‘It looks as if little by little Borgia is sinking into his grave.’
________________
*The sixty-eight-year-old Spanish cleric who was papal chamberlain to Alexander VI, and had been appointed a cardinal just over two months previously.
CHAPTER 20
DESPERATE FORTUNE
THERE IS NO DOUBTING that at this point Borgia’s fortunes were at a low ebb. Yet, judging from his behaviour, the turning point appears to have come some weeks earlier. It was when he learned that he had been refused permission to cross Florentine territory that he became ‘unhinged’. Why should this far-from-major setback have so distressed him? At the time, he still had the backing of Julius II and could thus have marched his troops on the usual route to the Romagna – from Rome up the Via Flaminia and across the Apennines.
It now becomes clear that Borgia’s plan to sail his troops from Ostia masked another plan. This would have involved the final secret which Julius II was trying in vain to extract from Miguel da Corella. The Pope had managed to lay his hands on all the treasures which Borgia had ransacked from the papal apartments, as well as those he had stolen from Urbino, but he was convinced that Borgia had access to further funds which had been secreted elsewhere by Alexander VI. And Julius II was correct – indeed, far more correct than he could possibly have realized. Alexander VI, in connivance with his son Cesare, had hidden away a vast fortune. This was deposited with banking houses in Genoa and according to most estimates amounted to a colossal 300,000 ducats. But for Borgia to lay his hands on such funds he would need to travel to Genoa in person. The real reason for Borgia’s apparent overreaction on being denied permission to cross Florentine territory now becomes evident. The papal galleys transporting him and his troops from Ostia would have docked at the Florentine port of Pisa. Here, Borgia could have taken a further ship or travelled overland, accompanied by an armed cavalry column, to Genoa to withdraw his funds from the banks. Under guard from the troops he was already assembling in northern Italy he could then have transported the money to Cesena. With such funds at his disposal, he would have been able to recruit soldiers and campaign as he had done in the old days, when he had relied upon Alexander VI to support his army. Little wonder then that the Gonfaloniere Soderini’s refusal to let Borgia cross Florentine territory had brought Borgia to the very brink of despair. The clue lay in the secret of the Genoa accounts. A secret which Juliu
s II was determined to uncover by whatever means. A secret which Miguel da Corella loyally refused to divulge . . . Though there remains the possibility that he had no knowledge of the Genoa accounts, which may well have been known only to Cesare Borgia and Alexander VI.
The final stages of Borgia’s career read like a fast-moving adventure story. As the wheel of Fortuna continues to turn, the man of Virtù does his utmost to seize his every opportunity. By early 1504 the situation in Rome had reached an impasse. Borgia remained under house arrest in the Vatican, while Julius II continued building his case against him, as well as accumulating the claims with which he intended to ruin him. But the Pope remained mindful of the larger picture. He now had to come to terms with the Spanish, who had taken over Naples. And the Spanish, in the form of the many senior cardinals who had been appointed by Alexander VI, were pressing Julius II to release Borgia. The impasse remained, but by this stage both Julius II and Borgia were convinced, in their own minds, that they were on the point of gaining the upper hand.
At this point it is worth noting that at the end of his life Machiavelli would judge Cesare Borgia and Julius II as the two men who had most impressed him throughout his long diplomatic career. What was taking place during these early weeks of 1504 was nothing less than the old era bargaining with the new, for the highest stakes. Finally, at the end of January, the leader of the Spanish cardinals, Cardinal Vera, managed to broker an agreement between Julius II and Borgia. If Borgia was willing to surrender his fortresses in the Romagna, the Pope would allow him to go free and retain whatever assets he possessed. Julius II was certainly not aware of the enormity of this amount. But could Borgia trust the Pope, who had already broken his promise to appoint him as his Captain-General? On 8 February Giustinian reported: ‘Borgia’s situation is extremely desperate and no one gives much hope for his life.’ Borgia slept with an unsheathed sword at his side, in the very chamber where murder had been committed on his orders. But Julius II was equally desperate. He needed Borgia’s fortresses in the Romagna before Venice made another move into the region. Without them, he would be threatened by Venice in the north, as well as Spanish Naples in the south. And with the French still in Milan, he would be surrounded by enemies. Compared with the power wielded by Alexander VI, his papacy would be reduced to the impotence of mere spiritual authority. It was little consolation that this was what the papacy was intended to be. This was not why Julius II had become pope.
The Borgias Page 36