by Uzi Eilam
After the Six Day War, France under President Charles de Gaulle also made a 180-degree about-face in its relations with Israel, putting an end to the golden age of French–Israeli defense cooperation. The severance of defense ties with Britain and France — the two major industrial powers in Europe — created a situation in which we found ourselves pushed toward the United States. As a result Israeli—American cooperation in defense related R&D continued to intensify. Here too the curiosity and interest of the armies in question were important, as were political considerations and decisions.
We had much to learn from the Americans, and in the early 1970s we could base our long-term plans for the future according to what we saw the Americans doing in the present. During my first days as director of the R&D Unit we commissioned the services of a small consulting firm staffed by former employees of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). It was headed by Professor Moshe Arens, and the task we assigned it was to formulate a concrete program for Israeli research and development. Arens’s work resulted in a well organized two-volume technological engineering program based primarily on what we could learn from the Americans in openly published sources. This was the beginning of Israel’s independent technological path, which bore fruit only after years of work and investment in Israel’s national laboratories and defense companies.
Our relationship with the Americans continued to grow closer, and we were convinced that the R&D Unit should have a representative in Washington. Lieutenant Colonel Yaakov Granot, an Ordnance Corps officer who was assigned to my branch of the Weapons Development Department back when I was director of Branch 2, was chosen for the position.
Before the Six Day War we had a formal framework for cooperation with the Pentagon in the area of defenses against border infiltration. We decided not to establish a new cooperative framework but rather to add appendices to the existing agreement. In this way, stage after stage, areas that we regarded as important for maintaining a military technological dialogue were added to the agreement. Every new sub-framework was assigned American and Israeli representatives from the relevant corps of the military — the Air Force, the Navy, and the ground forces. We encouraged direct contacts between the American and Israeli officers responsible for the various issues, and we quickly realized that these frameworks were extremely strong. The privilege of travelling abroad to meet interesting counterparts, to gain new insights, and to acquire assistance in weapons development, emerged as an attractive perk that the R&D Unit could offer military officers.
Although we scaled back our contacts with Britain and France as a result of political decisions our relationship with Germany took a different course. Over the years we had developed a working routine of meetings, military dialogues, and visits to German defense industries. A warm and open relationship continued to develop with the MBB Company thanks to Mr. Bölkow, its owner, and Dr. Held, the director of its development laboratories. As mentioned, this relationship dated back to the visit of these two men to the Sinai Peninsula after the Six Day War. These international relationships opened before us a world of warheads and shaped and capped charges. The IDF’s Operations Branch chief frequently headed our delegation to the German–Israeli dialogue meetings, and the Germans also made sure to send senior generals to participate in the dialogue. When the Merkava tank went from the stage of drafting and analysis of the many different design possibilities to the purchase of critical sub-systems like the motor, the ignition and caterpillar track system, hydraulics, etc., the Germans were open and supportive.
Over the years I developed a warm personal relationship with Peter Runge, the pivotal German Defense Ministry official in charge of technology and purchasing. Peter, with his booming voice and huge thirst for beer, instilled fear among both Israelis and Germans, but I found my way into his good graces and was frequently sent by our people to set the record straight with him.
Yitzhak Yaakov’s Permanent Replacement
After the R&D Unit had been in operation for one year, we felt that the new entity had effectively established itself within the IDF and the ministry. It was unclear how long Yaakov would want to retain his position as director, and it was important for me at that point to be promoted. I explored the possibility of being promoted to the rank of brigadier general as chief engineering officer, chief ordnance officer, or deputy chief of the Quartermaster’s Branch.
I met with the CGS, who knew about my efforts to be promoted. I should stop worrying, he told me, as Yaakov would step down as director of R&D at the end of the year and I had been designated as his successor. Shortly after that meeting Yitzhak Yaakov went abroad for a planned six-week trip to the Far East and Australia. It was decided that I would function as Acting Director of R&D during his absence, and I received two letters of appointment to the post: one from the IDF and the other from the defense ministry.
No sooner had the wheels of Yaakov’s plane to the Far East left the ground than I initiated a meeting with Benny Peled, the new commander of the Air Force, to discuss the possibility of selecting a deputy director of R&D from the Air Force. Peled liked the idea and promised to think it over and to propose a number of candidates. My assessment was that selecting an Air Force man as my deputy would be an important first step in better integrating all the services of the IDF into the operations of the R&D Unit.
I attended my first General Staff meeting on May 13, 1972, one week before my 38th birthday. It was a situation assessment attended by Defense Minister Dayan and his advisor Tzvi Tzur. Intelligence Branch Chief Eli Zeira presented intelligence data and threat assessments, and Tal, the Operations Branch chief, presented the main principles of the concept of his branch. Tal’s comments were aimed at moving in the direction of grand policy and the definition of national goals, which to me seemed appropriate. When Dayan spoke right after the Intelligence Branch and Operations Branch briefings, he expressed his opinions with clarity and sarcasm. Zeira, Dayan asserted, should represent the Intelligence Branch and not the Arabs. He also emphasized that while Tal had the right to express his opinions, even if they were unconventional, he, Dayan, disagreed with some of them.
Dayan’s concept was consistent with his character. He maintained that we needed to take advantage of all opportunities and, if forced to fight, to use them to achieve relatively small territorial conquests, which he referred to as “corrections.” He did not, however, regard the conquest of large territories and capital cities as worthwhile. He maintained that Israel had neither the reason nor the ability to launch a preventative war, but he did not rule out striking a first blow. Dayan’s comments were consistent with those made by CGS Elazar and there was a distinct impression that they had coordinated their comments. After Zeira, Tal, and Dayan, all the other speakers, including Air Force Commander Peled, were entirely unimpressive.
The routine work dictated by the multiple roles played by the director of the R&D Unit was staggering, and my demanding scheduled took me from issue to issue and from meeting to meeting. I found myself dealing with efforts to retain Yedidia Shamir, the civilian deputy director of the R&D Unit who was now considering resigning. Shamir’s modesty and integrity, and his experience in the development of electronic systems, made him a calm and dependable authority. When I learned that there was a good chance that I would be the next director of R&D I knew I wanted him by my side, and I made every possible effort to convince him to stay. I asked Yaakov and Itzhak Ironi to assist me, and Shamir ultimately agreed.
The position of acting director introduced me to new issues. A meeting with Tzur and Air Force Colonel Yosef Ma’ayan, who was subsequently appointed to the post of commander of the Air Force Equipment Squadron, focused on secret and sensitive cooperation with the Germans. It also provided me with an opportunity to observe the working methods of Tzvi Tzur, who took effective advantage of his status as advisor to the defense minister and a former CGS to summon military officials to his office for meetings and consultations.
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p; Tzur’s power as advisor to the defense minister also stemmed from Dayan’s unique working style, and his preference for focusing only on specific issues. Dayan entrusted Tzur with responsibility for the defense budget, for working with the defense industry, and for all aspects of coordination with the IDF. Tzur’s control of a large part of the ministry’s R&D budget, as well as the initial procurement of advanced weapons systems, meant that he occupied a position of pivotal importance within the ministry. However, it was only when I began functioning as acting director of R&D that I learned how he operated. One day I was summoned to Tzur’s office for a consultation on an air-to-surface missile with electro-optic homing which Rafael was developing at the time. While I was in the reception area, Benny Peled walked out of Tzur’s office. Tzur told me that he had been trying to convince the Air Force commander to reduce the Air Force’s request for missiles to ensure its approval by the IDF and defense ministry. Tzur rightly felt that if the requested budget was too high and threatened other IDF priorities, the CGS might ask the defense minister to kill the project. I was suddenly let in on this secret and highly charged issue, and was asked to prepare an analysis and comprehensive proposal to justify the missile’s continued development.
Development of the missile, later named the Popeye, was eventually completed successfully, and the Air Force armed itself with a substantial stock. Even the American company Martin Marietta, in partnership with Rafael, opened an assembly line to build missiles for the US Strategic Air Command.
At the time missile and rocket development was a source of contention between IMI and Rafael. Many years later IAI also embarked upon work in this area. Tzur asked us to prepare a document recommending a division of responsibility between the two government-owned defense laboratories, IMI and Rafael, in the realm of rocket propulsion. This was my first experience in shaping policy on technological infrastructure. At the end of the meeting we saw no option but to lay out a compromise between the two companies, who were in the midst of a fierce battle for preferred status within the defense ministry, and to make sure that each entities’ rocket propulsion infrastructure would match the weapons systems they were supposed to develop.
During its first year in existence, the R&D Unit underwent a process of acclimatization. The military department directors needed to internalize the fact that both the defense ministry and the defense industries had policies and concerns that transcended military considerations. It was essential that the civilian department directors, including my scientific deputy Yedidia Shamir, be aware of the desires of the various corps of the IDF, but also remain strong and confident, despite their heavy work load, and not give in to the whims and demands of their colleagues from the military. This principle remained relevant during all the years of my work in defense R&D, and I applied it myself during my tenure as director of MAFAT. Tzur and Elazar’s decision to establish the R&D Unit branded the new entity with the tensions and conflicts of interest between the defense ministry and the IDF. The golden mean between these interests required, and will always require, that senior officials overseeing R&D administration within the defense establishment possess a thorough understanding of these conflicting interests and a wise sensitivity of how to go about navigating them.
An Important Visitor — Another Test
As if the burden of serving simultaneously as the deputy director and acting director of the R&D Unit was not enough, I now had another challenge: a secret visit to Israel by the defense minister of an African country. As the guest of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the official arrived for his first visit in Israel accompanied by his Intelligence Branch chief, his wife, and a personal assistant. I was assigned to serve as his official escort during his visit, and preparations began approximately two weeks before he arrived.
We met our guests at the airport and brought them to the secure and isolated special hosting facilities laid on for such confidential high-level guests. Assistant Defense Minister Tzvi Tzur and I met at the secret hosting facility to finalize all the details of the visit, which was to include a tour of the Jordan Valley and Jerusalem. Major General Rehavam Ze’evi would host the visitors during this part of the visit, and he accepted the plans we made for him with virtually no objections. The weather was hot as it usually in the Jordan Valley and we could only talk comfortably inside in the airconditioning. At the end of a long day touring Jerusalem we decided to forego any other activities and allowed to guests enjoy a quiet dinner, without any ceremony. The minister told me that he was extremely pleased with his visit, and that he knew that to a large extent I was responsible for its success. It felt good to receive a compliment from such an impressive man and to know that the great efforts I made were appreciated.
On the last evening of the visit, Moshe Dayan hosted a farewell dinner in the garden of his home in Tzahala, and Naomi was invited to join me for this special event, along with Tzvi and Rachel Tzur, Shimon and Sonia Peres, David and Thelma Elazar, and Eli and Esther Zeira. Before we took our seats at the tables, Dayan gave us a tour of his personal antiquities garden and provided us with fascinating explanations based on his love of archeology and his extensive knowledge of the field. His words during dinner were warm and full of hope for future cooperation. Naomi and I were proud and honored to be in such company. The gifts presented to the visitors that evening were also extraordinary. The African defense minister received a specially bound bible decorated with gold ornamentation, a gift that was typically bestowed upon only the most distinguished guests. Dayan gave the defense minister’s wife an ancient necklace that was more than two thousand years old. The necklace enchanted everyone and from the moment Dayan placed it on her neck, she refused the other women’s requests to take it off to allow them a closer look.
As far as Tzvi was concerned, the task of preparing the visit and escorting the guest was yet another test. A few days after the visit, Yitzhak (Brigadier General Yitzhak Yaakov) and his wife Shula returned from the long trip they had been on. According to my journal, I drove to Ben-Gurion airport to meet them early Friday morning at the ungodly hour of 3:40 a.m. “Yitzhak and Shula returned from their trip chubby and relaxed......rote at the time. Tzvi told me to deliver a message to Yitzhak, telling him that he was needed for a meeting that very same morning at 11:30 a.m. I updated Yitzhak during the hour before his meeting with Tzvi but there was no time to go into details. Yitzhak wanted to hear “how I had gotten on with Tzvi and if things at R&D were fine overall.” During his first meeting with Tzvi after his return, Yitzhak heard a flattering report of my work during the period of his absence, which contained terms such as “balanced,” “good judgment,” “quick response,” and “diligence.” Although I was happy to hear these compliments from Yitzhak, deep down I wondered whether he had somewhat embellished Tzvi’s assessment to encourage me and ease his retirement as Director of R&D.
A few days later I went to see Tzvi’s loyal and trustworthy assistant Avraham Ben-Yosef , who had asked to speak with me personally. Ben-Yosef confirmed that the trial period of Yitzhak’s absence had gone well, and that the successful visit of the African minister and my careful management of all the details had strengthened Tzvi’s opinion about the success. However, Ben-Yosef ’s most important news was that the CGS had formally recommended to the defense minister that I be promoted and appointed to the position of Director of the R&D Unit at the end of the Jewish year. As the position answered to both the IDF and the Israeli defense ministry, Tzvi had done his part and had recommended me on behalf of the defense ministry.
I knew that the transition would take place sometime in September or October 1973, and I could clearly see that Yitzhak was having trouble finding the will to resume control of the R&D Unit. It was extremely clear why Yitzhak was distancing himself from all contacts with the General Staff, and particularly from Operations Branch Chief, Major General Israel Tal. I was also not particularly comfortable with Tal either, and didn’t like the way he often postponed our meetings at
the last minute. This was why it was interesting years later for me to find an entry in my journal about a meeting with Tal (to which Yedidia Shamir accompanied me), which described him as having been in a great mood. Upon reading the entry, I wondered whether this anomaly was because he had just been selected to receive the Israel Defense Prize for his role in promoting and developing the rollerbridge. I shall return in a later chapters to the odyssey of the development of the roller-bridge, which had been planned to serve as a way of crossing the Suez Canal.
During my service as Acting Director of R&D we became deeply involved in the drafting of R&D policy, and Simcha Maoz, who was gifted with thorough economic thinking and a broad systemic outlook, was recruited to assume a central role in the effort. It was necessary, however, to find ways to encourage Simcha to work. After arguments with R&D personnel and people at the General Staff, or when something did not work out as he planned, he would often withdraw and move to the sidelines. Yitzhak abandoned his role in shaping R&D policy and Simcha took part in a working meeting with Tzvi to discuss how to best present the new policy. We worked together on a presentation for the Council for Production and Development, the senior defense ministry forum that Tzvi headed and that included the branch directors of the defense ministry, the directors of the defense industries and the government owned defense laboratories. We suggested to Tzvi Zur that we present the Council with a survey of the budgetary framework and prepare discussion points only on the main issue of specialization centers. Tzvi was wisely hesitant about conducting a discussion on the matter without General Staff approval. I took it upon myself to brief Tal on the work we had done, but I first wanted to meet with Brigadier General Avraham Tamir, assistant director for planning of the Operations Branch, to enlist his help in convincing Tal. I had been dreaming of a joint symposium of the General Staff and the senior officials of the defense ministry where we could present all aspects of Israeli policy on defense research and development. I thought the term “symposium” would seem less intimidating and less binding in the eyes of the branch chiefs of the General Staff. Yitzhak chose to remain uninvolved in many aspects of work, and this resulted in a heavy load and an uneasy feeling.