by Uzi Eilam
In the south it was decided to proceed step-by-step. First, Major General Avraham Adan was supposed to move southward from Quneitra and to clean the entire area between Artillery Road and the Canal. Then, Sharon’s division was supposed to attack from south to north. In the meantime, Albert Mendler’s 252nd division needed time to recover from the battles of the previous day. Arik’s division had no noticeable impact on the fighting during the day, and we did not know why. Adan’s division worked hard and, through intense efforts, managed to advance toward the Firdan Bridge. In the afternoon Albert was ordered to operate in the southern sector to stop the advance of the masses of Egyptian tanks that had entered Israeli territory via the Gidi Road. All in all there were now 600 Egyptian tanks on Israeli soil, which almost equaled the number of remaining tanks in our three depleted divisions. Between the morning and the end of the day our great optimism was gradually but rapidly being transformed into a terrifying realism.
Nahum and I went to pay a visit to the Control Post, the command center of the Israeli air force. There, I had the privilege of sitting next to Brigadier General David Ivry and behind Major General Benny Peled during a large air battle in the south. Dozens of our planes were in flight, in the midst of an attack on the missile batteries, and tension filled the air. During their radio transmissions it was interesting to observe how the pilots spoke so differently than the soldiers on the ground. Everything was short and succinct; there was no time for anything else. Benny Peled’s neck and broad shoulders tensed up whenever he received a report of a difficult battle or a pilot in distress. I sensed a connection with Benny Peled, David Ivry, and Rafi Harlev as they conducted the major air campaign. For a moment I felt as if I was one of them. After the war and during all the subsequent years that I engaged in defense research and development, that air battle remains branded on my memory.
During a Deputy CGS Preparatory Working Group meeting held later that evening, R&D was assigned a mission: facilitating a quick learning process for operating Soviet T-62 tanks and understanding their weak points. We were already aware of more than 100 abandoned shot-up T-62 tanks near Quneitra, and we had actually started the process that morning.
We first encountered Soviet tanks during the 1956 Sinai campaign, when the Egyptians were using T-34 tanks. These tanks had been developed during World War II and were no more capable than the American Sherman tanks, also made during the war. During the Six Day War the Egyptians and the Syrians were already using T-55 tanks, which were far superior to the T-34s in armor, cannon, and fire-control system. We knew a bit about the T-62 tank from publications and intelligence reports, but the West had not yet deciphered all of its secrets. The Soviets tended not to supply their most advances weapons systems to other countries, and when the decision was made to sell T-62s to Syria and Egypt, they already had models of their next tank, the T-72, which we would only encounter in the first Lebanon war, during armored battles with the Syrians in the Beqaa Valley in northeastern Lebanon.
Ultimately, the efforts to retrieve the Syrian T-62 tanks from the Golan Heights proved successful, and the Ordnance Corps began immediate work on them at Tel Hashomer.
October 8 was a day almost too difficult to bear, and at day’s end I thought that it might be a good thing that the general public was not privy to the real, concrete wartime worries, but was rather receiving its information via the radio and the press. I retired for a few hours of sleep with the hope that it would be a quiet night and that the next morning would open a decisive day in the Golan Heights.
But it was neither a quiet night nor a quiet day in the Golan Heights. Gloom pervaded the Command Center, and Operations Department Director Yankeleh Stern and Brigadier General David Hagoel, Assistant Operations Branch Chief and Aryeh Levi’s replacement in time of need, surveyed the difficult situation in the Golan Heights. During the night the government had decided to use all force possible against Syria, and Major General Menachem Meron was charged with establishing the rear line in the Sinai Peninsula, which would serve to contain the advance of the Egyptian divisions.
With a heavy heart I went up to my office to present the morning briefing to the R&D Staff Working Group, and I made their lives even more difficult by vividly describing the state of affairs. The mood in the Command Center improved at 10 a.m. as a result of the report that Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal and his 7th brigade had succeeded in holding off the 3rd Syrian Armored Division. Our air force did excellent work, attacking all its desired targets in the Golan Heights with relative freedom. Later in the day, during an afternoon meeting of the CGS Preparatory Working Group, we suddenly received reports of a successful attack against targets in Damascus (the Syrian General Staff compound, air force headquarters, the Defense Ministry, and a number of power stations) and Homs, and against a large Syrian radar facility in Lebanon. Joy again returned to faces in the Command Center, which was typical of the regular mood swings within the country’s military nerve center during wartime.
During the morning we also worked on ordering TOW anti-tank missiles from the United States. The arrangements and records with which we were dealing were aimed at ordering equipment according to Tzvi Zur’s instructions, in coordination with Assistant Operations Branch Chief Aryeh Levi and Director-General Ironi. Due to the overwhelming sense of distress, we ordered 120 launchers at a price of approximately $10 million in great haste. The Americans had not even agreed to supply us with the systems yet. A few months before to the outbreak of the war we raised the possibility of purchasing a few models of American TOW anti-tank missiles for evaluation purposes, but Tal had vehemently objected. “The IDF is saturated with anti-tank systems,” the Operations Branch chief roared in a thundering voice. “There’s no need for any more!” Everyone knew that he was referring to tanks, and that according to his approach, tanks and tanks alone were supposed to deal with enemy tanks. Tal enjoyed complete sovereignty over all things related to Israeli’s ground forces, and all we could was to clench our teeth and remain silent. Now that we were coming to appreciate the power of the Russian Sagger missiles that were being used with menacing success by Egyptian infantry forces and costing us so many disabled tanks with concomitant loss of life, everyone understood just how essential anti-tank missiles were to the integrated battlefield.
The first days of the war were difficult for us all. It was not easy for me to disconnect myself from the Command Center, even when there were no preparatory working group meetings or meetings of any other kind. Under the circumstances Yedidia had assumed practical direction of the Unit and all routine business. On the fourth day of the fighting, almost everyone who had requested to take on a combat role or a combat-support role in the war was released from the Unit and sent to the front. To fill the gap we called up some of our best reserve officers to build ad-hoc frameworks for thinking through and consolidating data collection for the immediate generation of lessons of the fighting. We wanted to achieve the capability to immediately generate technological solutions and to collect data for the subsequent generation of lessons. The daily briefing that was prepared for the expanded defense ministry Working Group had become an extremely popular event and was now in high demand.
At 3:00 a.m. on Friday, October 12, after the Deputy CGS Preparatory Working Group meeting, we met with the Operations Department director, the Intelligence Department director, and the Air department director about the Soviet SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles. The mood in the Command Center was completely different that morning, mainly due to the success of our armored forces in Syria. Eitan’s division launched an offensive at 11:00 a.m. and stopped the Syrian advance some 10–15 km from the border (the “purple line,” or the 1967 ceasefire line) just before dark. In contrast, the air force lost seven attack planes in the course of the day...erious bloodletting. By that point, 80 of our planes had been shot down. People had a bad feeling about the seemingly never-ending duel between our planes and the missiles, and there was a great sense of frustration with th
e fact that we still had not been able to acquire even one SA-6 missile system, which had taken us and the West as a whole completely by surprise. We asked Sayeret Matkal (the elite General Staff commando unit) to make acquisition of such a missile, or of essential pieces of its warhead, a top priority, to help us to develop counter-measures for our planes, even if only partial ones.
At R&D, things started to move and to take shape: Rozen sent the combat weapons system survey teams to the southern and northern fronts, and appointed Lieutenant Colonel (Res.) Itzik Yaakobi, former director of Branch 2 of the Weapons Development Department, to supervise them. Shalom Eitan, director of the Electronics Department, played an active and decisive role both in organizing the TOW training material and consolidating data for the generation of post-combat lessons and the lessons necessary for quick response. The Americans finally authorized the provision of TOW anti-tank missiles, and we sent a team to the US to learn how to instruct troops to use the missiles. In the Command Center I came across Yitzhak listening to the radio transmissions of the 7th brigade as it advanced. He looked old, tired, and sad. I dragged him over to help NBC Defense Department Director Yaakov Livneh write procedures. We also mobilized a large number of R&D reservists who started to take part in the work, and the general feeling was that things were beginning to move in a positive direction.
I continued briefing the top defense ministry officials with sessions entitled “What’s New on the Front,” which prompted the director-general of Israel Aerospace Industries to request a special briefing for their senior working group. The meeting was a unique encounter with some of the people undertaking the practical work who both wanted to know what was happening on the front and were pleased to hear about technological aspects and future directions for work. The endless questions that followed the briefing were extremely relevant and provided me with important ideas to think about for thought for the future.
One day before the briefing of the Defense Ministry Working Group, Chaim Carmon, assistant to the director general of the defense ministry, asked me to come meet a friend of his. His friend, it turned out, was Chaim Israeli, a former aide to David Ben-Gurion who was now serving as a special aide to Defense Minister Dayan. During our very first meeting Israeli impressed me as an exceptionally wise and friendly man. He asked me many questions, about the situation, the T-62 tanks, the structure of the IDF, the role of tanks during war and the proper approach toward continuing the war with the Egyptians. I got the sense that although the voice belonged to Chaim Israeli, the questions actually revolved around issues that were troubling Defense Minister Dayan and that perhaps it was Dayan himself who was actually asking the questions. The following day Chaim Carmon asked me if I would accept an appointment as the spokesperson for the Defense Ministry. I refused, feeling that the large network of people in the R&D Unit needed leadership and that it would be wrong to abandon the reins of the Unit in the middle of the war.
At 6:00 a.m. on Saturday, October 13th I heard that Ben-Gal’s 7th brigade had encountered an array of anti-tank missiles, and Yossi Ben-Hanan, one of Ben-Gal’s battalion commanders (and the husband of Anat, my driver from the Weapons Development Department), had been wounded. An Iraqi division that entered the fighting had pinned down our 210th division, under the command of Brigadier General Dan Laner, and was preventing it from coming to the aid of Moshe Peled’s 146th division located to the south. The morning began with a feeling of strangulation. An early meeting with Tzvi at 7:00 a.m. and a CGS Preparatory Working Group meeting at 7:30 a.m. relieved the sense of unease somewhat, but not the troubling feeling that we were now fighting with all our forces without leaving anything in reserve. Some consolation was provided by the realization that our air force controlled the skies and was dictating the pace and the direction of the war in the air. By the end of the day things were clearer than they had been at the beginning of the day: the Iraqi division had unwittingly entered the open jaws of three Israeli brigades, and at least 80 Iraqi tanks had been destroyed. The obstruction in the northern Golan Heights that had been blocking the advance of the 7th battalion where Yossi Ben-Hanan was injured had not yet been breached, and the Golani Brigade commanded by Amir Drori and a reserve paratroop brigade led by Haim Nadel were sent to assist Eitan and Dan Laner’s divisions. The IDF finally appeared to have recognized the value of infantry in the war. In the fighting by the Canal we had already seen that Egyptian infantry forces with Sagger missiles constituted a serious threat to our tanks. Major General Albert Mendler, commander of the southern division (the 252nd) in the Sinai Peninsula, was hit by an Egyptian anti-tank missile and died of his injuries, and Kalman Magen took over his command. Haim Bar-Lev went down to the Sinai Peninsula to assume command of the front as a whole and to prepare the forces there to hold off the major attack that the Egyptians had been observed preparing over the past few days. Elazar returned encouraged from a visit with the troops by the Canal, and that had a positive impact on all of us. There was also a successful operation of the paratroops in the depths of Iraq, aimed at disrupting the flow of Iraqi forces to the southern Golan Heights. The paratroops‘ accomplishments included, among other things, the demolition of a large bridge and the destruction of tanks while still on their transporters. Our success in stopping the convoys on this route generated a sense of confidence and an overall positive feeling within General Staff headquarters.
As a result of the relatively significant lull in the fighting we now began to notice the talk in the defense ministry corridors and to hear the general criticism and accusations that were emerging regarding a variety of issues, including:
The errors of the Intelligence Branch and the Intelligence Branch chief in particular.
Our underestimation of the importance of infantry forces, which had now been proven to be mistaken.
Our underestimation of the importance of anti-tank weapons and the assessment that “the IDF is saturated with anti-tank systems,” a view originally voiced by partisans of the tank corps.
The air force’s inability to provide close-range support for the fighting forces on the ground.
And even criticism of the Israeli navy.
This time, however, there seemed to be a good chance that we would remember these issues and address them after the war, in contrast to the aftermath of the Six Day War, when the sweeping victory caused us to grow complacent. Nonetheless, when sitting down to begin learning the lessons of a war it is always crucial to remember that no war is similar to the one that preceded it.
A Turning Point in the War – The Efforts to Cross the Suez Canal
At the end of the tenth day of the war I wrote in my journal that although the war had only been going on for 10 days, it felt much longer. “In the evening, everything calms down and everyone goes to rest up for the next day of battles in accordance with the rules of this curious game of death.” We also felt as if a decisive movement in the Sinai was finally within reach. We knew it would not happen quickly, but it was clear that the process had begun.
It started with hundreds of Egyptian attack sorties and attempts by Egyptian infantry and tank forces to improve their positions. Intelligence Branch officials informed us that the Egyptians had moved additional tanks eastward across the Canal during the night, bringing the number of operating tanks to 1,100, and had launched a major offensive in the direction of the Mitla and Gidi Passes. That evening during the CGS Preparatory Working Group meeting Elazar sounded unusually optimistic, arousing more positive feelings in us all. Amir Drori and the Golani Brigade, and Haim Nadel and the 317th Paratrooper Brigade, had breached the obstructions in the north in support of the divisions of Eitan and Laner, and we could now direct our full attention to events in the south.
During the tenth day of the war, 200 Egyptians tanks were reported destroyed. However, only in the afternoon were we able to begin staging the appearance that one of our divisions was breaking out in order to draw the Egyptian forces into a tra
p we were setting for them and to crush them. In the war room we heard frightening radio transmissions from the Israeli 162nd division. The operations officers calmed us down and told us that it was all part of an Israeli deception plan, which was ultimately successful. The Egyptians advanced in pursuit of the retreating 162nd division and the pounding of the Egyptian tank brigade began, making it possible to initiate a substantial offensive action at the Canal. An official announcement of the total number of casualties of the war until that point placed the number at 656. The same day the authorities announced the death of Major General Albert Mendler, the commander of the Sinai Division.
The US Defense Department finally authorized the shipment to Israel of military equipment in American military planes. Huge A5-Cs (Galaxy) and C-141s (Hercules) were already on their way to Israel carrying hundreds of tons of ammunition. In a few days, 70 TOW missile launchers were also scheduled to arrive in Israel, accompanied by the team we had sent to the US expressly for that purpose. I was at Ben-Gurion airport when the first Galaxy landed. It pulled up close to where we were standing and opened its gigantic rear doors, and a shiny polished American tank rolled out, with light exhaust puffing out of its engine. This boosted our morale tremendously, as the knowledge that we had the support of the most important superpower was of the utmost importance. After unloading its cargo the Galaxy just stood there with its enormous wings sloping downwards. To us, it was the most beautiful plane in the world. Tzvi told us that the Americans had agreed to fly Phantoms at the quicker pace of four planes per day, and this was an important source of encouragement for our severely degraded air force.