by Uzi Eilam
While wandering through the music shops of Bern during one of our first visits to Switzerland, I found a pocket trumpet. On the last evening of our visit there was a dinner at the home of our military attaché in Bern and I played a number of yodels and traditional Israeli folk songs for our Swiss hosts. It turned out that the Swiss secretary of the joint-committee knew how to play the guitar, adding a musical dimension to the Swiss–Israeli coordinating meetings. At the last meeting I attended, held in Switzerland in 1997, my colleague General Müller knew that I would soon be leaving my position and prepared a surprise. After two days of meetings, the Swiss hosted a celebratory dinner at a palace in Bern. After dinner we began the speeches and gifts that had become customary during our meetings with the Swiss. Müller began by praising the positive and stable relationship between the two countries, and when it came to the time to begin presenting gifts he proposed reversing the order, beginning with members of the Israeli delegation. One after another each member of the delegation was presented with a tie bearing an embroidered symbol of the Swiss army. “And for Oussi,” my friend Müeler continued, “today I have something different.” Then, he formally presented me with a small green instruction booklet for learning how to play the trumpet in the Swiss military orchestra. I leafed through the booklet while thanking General Müller, and jokingly asked for an exemption from the visit scheduled for the next day in order to study the booklet. At that point, the General’s assistant crept up behind my back and placed a large case in front of me. When I opened it, I discovered that it held a shiny silver trumpet! My heart pounded as I picked it up, and I realized that it was a Bach Stradivarius trumpet made in Elkhart, Indiana by the world’s top company for high-quality trumpets. I was speechless. The only words I could get out were: “I’ll forego what I had planned to say, and instead I’ll just play.” I placed the beautiful Bach Stradivarius to my lips and, without warming up, began with a light rhythmic Swiss yodel. I then told the group that I would play an Israeli song, and the first one that came to mind was “Jerusalem of Gold.” It was a touching and extraordinary ending for the period during which I was deeply involved in Swiss–Israeli joint-defense activities.
Asia
Israel’s relations with Asia constitute a unique chapter in the history of Israeli foreign relations. I had the privilege of being instrumental in some aspects of these relations. My connections with the Far East and with Southeast Asia began during a seminar for Asian student leaders in 1959 when I was studying at the Technion in Haifa. During the five weeks I spent in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur with student leaders from other Asian countries, I found a warm place in my heart for Asia, which remains with me today. Years later, while on my way back to Israel after a special program for university lecturers in the field of business administration at California’s Stanford University, I passed through Taiwan, the Philippines, Singapore, and India and visited a few friends from my university days. Martin Bonoan of the Philippines was then working as a professor of business administration at the University of Manila and would later be appointed as director-general of the national airline of the Philippines. Prof. Paul Fang, a Chinese-born economist who moved from China to Hong Kong with his family when he was a boy, relocated to Singapore, where he was appointed as a professor of economics at Nanyang University. Paul and his wife spared no effort in making my stay pleasant. After Singapore declared independence in 1965 the country’s legendary prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, commenced his efforts to unify the people of the country and to lead them on a path that would transform Singapore into a major economic, commercial, and political power within Asia and in the international arena.
The budgetary problem posed by the high cost of developing advanced weapon systems for the relatively small market of the IDF intensified as the years went by. To put things simply, Israeli defense industries faced difficulties providing the IDF with the systems it needed because the army’s armament outlays did not cover the cost of development. The number of systems that the IDF could afford was nothing compared to the quantities that a superpower like the US or the larger European countries could afford. In recent years European Union countries such as France, Britain, and Germany have also started to face the problem of limited purchasing versus high development costs as defense budgets have been cut.
Israeli decision makers reached a point at which there no choice but to work towards the establishment of large collaborative projects for weapon systems. When we started working towards this direction we had no idea how important this would be for the future of Israeli defense export policy. Israeli defense industries were proposing ingenious solutions to the challenges of future wars in the air, at sea, and on land. But there was no chance of getting the budgets to develop these systems from domestic Israeli sources. The only option was to persuade our counterparts in Asian countries to purchase the systems before they were actually developed. This started a very complicated process in which the Supreme Coordinating Committee for International Contacts was asked to authorize the provision of information about the future systems abroad while the relevant corps of the IDF were asked to commit to purchasing the systems upon the successful conclusion of development. These elements were a precondition for our foreign partners to decide to arm themselves with the systems. It was also necessary to obtain the support and authorization of the IDF General Staff and the director-general of the defense ministry. In some cases we were forced to reach compromises that appeared impossible to execute. However, when we finally reached the point of signing agreements, we knew we were heading down a new path. It marked a breakthrough that would lead to hitherto unimaginable modes of work, levels of partnership, and budgetary resources. This format of partnership based on projects beginning with engineering development was so successful that we returned to it at every possible opportunity. Indeed, in Israeli defense exports today, a substantial share of development costs are paid for by the foreign countries who intend to acquire the system. This enables the IDF to save on development costs and to reach the phase of arms purchases with little financial difficulty. Involving the Israeli customer in the process from the beginning allays concerns of foreign customers by reassuring them that every project is under professional supervision to ensure its suitability for operational needs. The involvement of IDF officials also secures the interests of the Israeli customer.
India
From my highly personal perspective, Israel’s special relationship with India also had roots reaching back to the 1959 Kuala Lumpur seminar for Asian student leaders. Another personal factor was my participation in the special course for lecturers in the field of business administration at Stanford University in 1965–1966, where I had eight Indian lecturers as classmates. I was impressed by the Indian participants’ ambition and their drive to succeed. I learned about their national pride and their desire to prove to everyone that India is a world power. They were intelligent, well read, hard-working individuals, and more than anything else, they were ambitious. They had come from different parts of India — from Calcutta and New Delhi to Mumbai — but despite the many differences between them, there was also a discernible common denominator.
When the process of institutionalizing the relationship between the Israeli and Indian defense establishments got underway, I made plans to fly to India to initiate contacts in the area of research and technological development. The man I was to meet was named Dr. Abdul Kalam, who occupied the top position in the massive hierarchy of military and defense R&D activity in India. Defense Ministry Director-General Ivry, who had met Dr. Kalam during a visit to India, described him as a closed, indecipherable man, and did not think we could benefit from a relationship with him in any way. I embarked on my trip with no expectations, but with a great sense of curiosity. First on the agenda was a private introductory meeting with Dr. Kalam.
Abdul Kalam...hort, thin man seated behind a gigantic desk piled high with books and papers — stood up and shook my hand warmly.
Within a few minutes it felt as if we had a common language and the chemistry between us evolved effortlessly. We talked about Israel, and the way both countries had blazed their own trails to technological independence. We talked about the challenges facing Indian research and development and about the almost complete embargo the US had imposed on India after the first Indian nuclear test. Dr. Kalam was a talented aeronautical engineer and was born and raised in the Tamil state of Nadu. This modest Muslim man, who looked like a true ascetic, was also endowed with a powerful, captivating personality. His role in developing India’s ballistic missiles and his deep involvement in India’s nuclear program made Dr. Kalam, a Tamil Muslim, one of the most admired personalities in India.
With great sensitivity and understanding, Dr. Kalam did not raise the nuclear issue even once during our meeting. We both knew about each other’s role in this area. During all the years of the American technological embargo, Abdul Kalam was the moving force behind India’s struggle for technological independence. In 2002, after a long, glorious career during which he led India’s defense research and development community, Dr. Kalam was elected president of India.
During that first trip we visited research laboratories and ambitious projects and bore witness to the Indians’ efforts to develop missiles of all types and sizes. We learned about the major efforts they had been making to develop electronic warfare systems and were impressed by their knowledge of metals and advanced materials and their mastery of computerization and advanced applications. Dr. Kalam also insisted that we visit universities and meet professors and students of the natural sciences. He has always been interested in education and inspiring the younger generations, and he still is today, even after his resignation from the post of president and all other official positions.
At the time of my visit, the Indians were highly ambitious but faced a relatively long road towards their target of developing all necessary capacities on their own without help from the outside. At the conclusion of this instructive, jam-packed visit to India, the most suitable approach appeared to be to establish a cooperative program and to let them understand that they were leading the project. The agreement we reached with Dr. Kalam and his associates called for maintaining a framework of regular meetings that would alternate in location between Israel and India. Issues that were important for them and possibly for us were identified. Nonetheless, in Israel we were only beginning to consider the risks of security exposure and suspicions regarding our new partner’s ability to maintain the confidentiality of shared information. Dr. Kalam made only one request during our first meeting to which I had no choice but to respond with a definite “No” — the Arrow missile. Although Kalam’s request, which was aimed at shortening the process of acquiring a system to defend against long-range Pakistani missiles, was certainly understandable, I was forced to tell him in no uncertain terms that the Arrow missile was being developed in partnership with the Americans and was receiving massive American funding; there was no way Israel could supply India with the system without the express authorization of the Americans. I also knew that more modest help — analysis of a missile defense system that was not from an American source, including its various components — would also require consultation and coordination with the Americans. In short, we clearly understood that any help Israel could give the Indians in the strategic–political area would require assessing American sensitivities on the issue. I told Dr. Kalam that I estimated that we would have to invest approximately two years in the partnership before we would be able to help them in the area of missile defense. By this point it seemed to me that he had a clear understanding of our political and defense oriented limitations. During our ongoing relations with the Indian we came to understand that it was actually our direct and honest negative response to their Arrow missile request that established a bridge of trust which still supports large numbers of technology-laden, high budget complex cooperative projects.
Later, when I was already leading the delegation in Paris, my special personal relationship with Dr. Abdul Kalam brought about a quick trip to India. The trip was sparked by concern within the defense ministry that Israel was entering a period of crisis in our relations with India, which could jeopardize our joint projects. Within less than three days, I flew to Israel to get brought up to speed on the state of relations, continued by plane to India for talks with Dr. Kalam and his associates, flew back to Israel to report the results of the meetings, and then returned to Paris to my responsibilities as head of the defense ministry delegation in the country. When I arrived in New Delhi, Kalam’s office informed me that he would like to meet with me at my hotel. He came alone without assistants, and his bodyguards apparently remained at the entrance to the hotel. Three hours and two pitchers of fresh squeezed orange juice later, we had resolved the entire issue. However, we still needed to meet his senior weapons development and procurement associates for dinner at the fanciest restaurant in town, where we had been reserved a quiet private room. Dr. Kalam’s calm and captivating leadership left his associates unable to do anything but agree with everything he said in his quiet melodic Tamil accent. After dinner, Dr. Kalam’s official car drove me directly to the airport for my flight back to Israel. Our relations and collaborative work returned to normal, and I was pleased to have been able to play a part in maintaining the momentum in Israel’s ongoing relations and collaboration with India.
The United States
During my 12 years at MAFAT, our relations with the military and government defense institutions and agencies in the United States were based on the foundation laid in the 1970s. The diverse work and extensive dialogues that took place following the Yom Kippur War regarding the war’s technical and tactical lessons enabled the Israeli defense ministry to establish strong ties with the Pentagon. My 10-year absence from the defense ministry posed no problems for me in reestablishing close contacts within the Pentagon and the services of the United States military. By that time, the status of the MAFAT representative in Washington was well established, alongside the Israeli defense attaché and his assistants on air, naval, and ground-related matters. When the Arrow missile defense program got underway we added another representative to the embassy in Washington, an official who worked only with SDIO at the Pentagon. In May 1993, shortly after Bill Clinton entered the White House, the Americans decided to change the name of the Defense Department agency responsible for the program to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, or BMDO. In August of the same year, Major General Malcolm O’Neill was appointed to direct the agency and was promoted to the rank of three-star general (lieutenant general). During my first visit to BMDO, which was located in a well-guarded basement deep beneath the Pentagon, I was greeted by O’Neill with the enthusiasm of a long-lost brother. He had told his colleagues that he would never forget the gracious assistance I provided him during a visit to the US in 1991, immediately before the hostilities in Iraq and Kuwait. At that point, O’Neill held the rank of Brigadier General and was the commander of the development laboratories of the US military. Our visit was part of the ongoing close cooperation Israel maintained with the American army during the war. After the Iraqi army seized control of Kuwait, during the period of readiness that preceded the war itself, the Americans were troubled by what awaited them in Iraq. The laboratories of the US military prepared themselves for accelerated emergency work on weapons development for the ground war in Kuwait. The period before the attack was too short for any major projects, and the Americans were impressed by the open manner in which we answered their questions and the willingness with which we provided them with technical information. They were also extremely appreciative of our effort to share with them some of our experience in anti-tank and special forces weaponry. During our visit to the laboratories, which O’Neill hosted, we were provided unprecedented access to the quick reaction projects undertaken by the labs during the period of readiness that preceded the war. During this window of opportunity we were treated
to a one of a kind display of new systems for night vision, mine detection, electronic warfare defense, and special-forces operations.
General O’Neill had a Ph.D. in physics. He was also a paratroop officer who had been trained as a special-forces combat soldier and who received citations for bravery and leadership under fire while fighting with the Green Berets in Vietnam. I felt a strong affinity with him from the moment I met him, but I never suspected that our paths would cross again, certainly not at a juncture as important as the ballistic missile defense system. In this course of his career O’Neill moved from combat positions to positions in R&D administration and back to combat positions, all the time rising in the ranks. A thin muscular man who maintained a regimen of physical activity that included long-distance running and hours of weight training in the Pentagon officers’ club, O’Neill‘s brown eyes always made direct eye contact revealing curiosity, warmth, and a trace of mischievous humor. I was happy to see that he had reached such a senior position that was of such great importance for American– Israeli cooperation in the area of missile defense. O’Neill’s approach permeated the personnel in his command, who provided the Israeli program with open, effective, and encouraging assistance. We were also now let in on the more secret aspects of the American missile defense programs, such as their misgivings after the failure of the Patriot system during the Gulf War. Raytheon’s post-war PR campaign in praise of the missile system they had developed could not change the disappointing fact that the anti-aircraft missile system was ineffective against al-Hussein missiles. O’Neill led the complex development program that included the PAC-2 project, through which Raytheon attempted to improve the Patriot missile, and an effort to develop the capability to intercept Scud missiles from the sea, which would subsequently be incorporated into the advanced defense system of Aegis naval cruisers. I looked on in amazement as O’Neil created new sources of support for missile defense within the defense industry, the services of the US military, and the Pentagon. He knew just how to talk to the different parties in order to turn them into allies. The crowning achievement of the American quest for a suitable solution to the missile threat that had become so apparent during the Gulf War was the development of a new and original defense system known as THAAD — Theatre High Altitude Area Defense. The idea behind the program was ingenious: a light, compact missile that would destroy enemy missiles through direct contact, with no need for an explosive warhead. The system was meant to cover an outer perimeter of missile defense, intercepting enemy missiles at ranges of 150–200 kilometers. For shorter ranges the Americans designated the upgraded Patriot missile, known as the PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3). The new system for guiding the intercepting missile to its target had stringent radar requirements that dictated a light missile weight and a small missile volume. The system was designed to be transportable by C-130 Hercules military cargo planes, which are capable of landing on short improvised landing strips.