by Yong Zhao
In short, the quantity of China's scientific and technological output looks more than impressive, but the quality of its patents and research publications is abysmal. China still trails many developed countries when it comes to real innovation and significant patents. In other words, while the grand wish of the government has been realized in terms of quantity, the government has not gotten what it really wants. The trillions of dollars China has spent on its scientific and technological Great Leap Forward has had an outcome almost identical to the previous Great Leap: lots of steel without much value and rampant cheating.
By Design
The high percentage of low-quality products and fraudulent research seriously hampers China's ambition for indigenous innovations. Unless it can reverse the trend, China is likely to produce even more low-quality inventions, and cheating is unlikely to stop. The government has repeatedly called for higher ethical standards, handed down severe punishment to violators, and tweaked policies. But the problem runs deeper, and it's almost unsolvable. It is rooted in an authoritarian culture that has continued for thousands of years, and very few Chinese, particularly those in leadership, have any desire to change that culture. In fact, any criticism of this authoritarian culture is viewed as un-Chinese and anti-Chinese, inviting not rational discussion but emotional attacks and quite possibly political and legal troubles.
The current approach to scientific and technological innovation is in design no different from the approach that built the Great Wall. The emperors had their wishes realized at great cost, without necessarily reaping the intended benefits. The same approach produced a stunning number of medals for China in the Olympic Games. The methodology is not unique to China; its fundamental characteristics are shared by all authoritarian cultures. This approach is highly effective in accomplishing predetermined goals and thus often wins praise. But what makes the approach effective is also what makes it ineffective—and at times disastrous.
Reason 1: Wishful Thinking
The authoritarian approach typically starts with a grand vision conceived by the central, most powerful, dominating entity—which can be an individual, such as an emperor, or a group of individuals, such as a corporate board or the politburo of the Communist Party government. Having a grand vision is not a problem in itself, but often the grand vision in a dictatorial system lacks sufficient information about reality. In a system that demands compliance, it's hard for different and opposing views to reach the authority. And when they do, it's easy for the dictator to ignore them. As a result, the vision may be completely impossible. Numerous emperors in ancient China, for example, spent vast sums and put countless alchemists to death, all in a vain effort to realize the vision of developing medicine for eternal life.
China's vision for instant, breakthrough innovations is an example of such wishful thinking. The desire is understandable and easy to appreciate, but it ignores a number of basic realities. First, modern science and technological innovations require specialized knowledge of the existing literature, which has accumulated over a long period of time. Innovations cannot be made without individuals who have studied this literature and acquired the necessary know-how. Moreover, breakthrough innovations cannot be made by one or two great individuals. Breakthroughs require a community of experts. China did not and still does not have enough well-trained individuals to produce the quantity of scientific and technological innovations the government has demanded by 2015.
Second, modern scientific and technological innovations also require hardware, knowledge of the processes of management and support, and established communities with platforms and opportunities for peer interactions. China has invested large amounts of money to acquire hardware, build labs, and purchase equipment, but except in a few universities and national laboratories, China's research facilities are still not well enough equipped to generate the desired outcomes. It also takes time to learn how to manage and support scientific research and establish the norms and practices of scientific communities.
Third, diligence is necessary for innovations, but diligence alone is insufficient. True creative work also requires inspiration, talent, and passion. One can be forced to memorize Shakespeare, but one cannot be forced to produce plays of Shakespearean quality. Simply mandating people to come up with great innovations in a preset time frame does not necessarily mean they can and will do so. For that reason, although milestones and objectives are important, it is unrealistic to set specific time lines and targets for innovations.
In sum, China's grand vision for innovation was admirable but unrealistic. Yet the government pressed forward. Using both stick and carrot, China's central government mobilized institutions and professionals to deliver the dream in spite of the unfavorable realities.
Reason 2: Upward Accountability
What makes China so effective at executing the wishes of the central government is its system's upward accountability. An essential characteristic of a hierarchically organized society is upward accountability, in which lower-level government officials serve at the pleasure of higher-level officials. While career ladders exist in all societies and organizations, in a centrally governed society there is only one career ladder that all must climb. That means the only hope for upward mobility is to be chosen by the upper-level authority. As a result, government officials hoping to be promoted work very hard to please their superiors. As long as the superiors are happy, the promotion is almost certain, regardless of how a given official is viewed by peers or subordinates. Moreover, the Confucian tradition of piety and loyalty deeply rooted in the Chinese culture dictates absolute obedience to authority, be it the emperor, father, or a higher-ranked official.
Upward accountability makes it extremely easy to execute the will of the central authority. As soon as the central authority expresses a desire, no matter how unrealistic, lower-level officials adopt it as an order and pass it on to their subordinates. Few dare question the order, for that might displease their superiors. In addition, each time a new wish is issued, new opportunities arise for some officials to demonstrate their ability to deliver the wish better than their peers and thus earn recognition or promotion. Even those who aren't angling for a promotion have to implement the orders just to keep their current position and win precious resources that are centrally controlled.
Upward accountability not only incentivizes officials to show off how well they can fulfill their superior's wish, but also protects, even encourages, cheating. In the controversy of Yingying Wu, the motivation of Beijing Normal University was called into question. Beijing Normal University was compared to the 1950s communes that raced to exaggerate their productivity during the first disastrous Great Leap Forward. Some suggested that the university was working with the Chinese Communist Ministry of Propaganda to create a new model of Chinese college student in order to fulfill the government's wish for innovation. The university denied the accusation, but admitted that the intention of Beijing Normal University was to promote Wu as an intellectual star, a model of the “creative and innovative students” that China needed, according to an official of the university's Propaganda Department.34 The deputy party secretary of Beijing Normal University, Zheng E, was “pleased that the University was able to cultivate students like Wu”; at the press conference, she shared the university's experiences in fostering creative and innovative talent. In other words, Beijing Normal University wanted to promote itself as an institution that cultivates the talents the government desires.
In China's campaign for greater innovation, as soon as the central government issued state plans and targets, provincial governments created policies and measures to motivate their local governments and institutions. Nearly all layers of government and all institutions developed similar plans and targets.35 Every university and research entity now has policies that mandate and incentivize their employees to produce patents and research papers. The outcome, not surprisingly, is a nationwide race to out-innovate each other.
Reason 3: A Uniform
and Quantifiable Standard
In order to reduce variations and avoid corruption, the centralized approach requires a uniform, quantifiable, easily measured standard. Since the authority controls all resources, including financial and other possible benefits such as promotion, housing, residence rights, college admissions, and honors, it needs a way to objectively and fairly award these resources. In a large society with a long history of guanxi, or relationships, the best way to do that is to quantify just how much organizations, local governments, and individuals contribute to the wish of the higher authority. Those quantities are then translated into quotas for institutions, made part of individuals' responsibilities, and used to award punishment and prizes accordingly.
In the first Great Leap Forward, the measure was the amount of steel and grain produced. In the campaign for innovation, it is the number of patent applications and publications.
China has therefore developed an elaborate and uniform mechanism to determine the contribution of researchers. It has officially published guidelines for ranking the quality of patents and papers based on their outlets. Patents registered in patent offices outside China are worth a lot more than those registered in the Chinese State Intellectual Property Office. The same is true for publications and conference presentations. Although many institutions outside China, in developed countries, have similar practices in evaluating the contribution of researchers, their rules are not nearly as steadfast and rigid. Other systems leave room for discretion because different fields may have different practices and because true innovations may not be recognized (and may even be rejected) by the authorities that control existing outlets for publication and conference presentations. The rigid scheme China uses to evaluate innovations by the recognition they receive from established authorities also reflects the Chinese tradition of believing in established authority—which in itself can hinder innovation.
Furthermore, because quantity matters more than quality, Chinese researchers learn to game the system by producing large quantities of low-quality products—easily had patents, like the utility model patents; insignificant papers; plagiarized patents and papers; and patents and papers purchased outright. The motivation is not to create breakthrough innovations but to meet the needs of the authority and reap the due reward. For example, a group of Chinese researchers found that the most influential factor determining the quality of China's patents is motivation. There are different types of motivation at play, but the primary motivations are all utilitarian. “Seeking promotion and prizes” was the most frequent reason given for patent application. The second most frequent reason was “to meet the mandate of the authority,” followed by “being recognized as a high-tech enterprise and receiving tax benefits.”36
The Emperor Is Fooled
By nature, Chinese are no less creative than other people, nor are they less inclined to take risks or more predisposed to cheating. But in a system that imposes unrealistic expectations through carefully orchestrated mechanisms of punishment and reward—with the results decided by meticulously designed and seemingly objective measures—individuals have to develop certain skills and strategies to survive and prosper. China's rampant cheating and high percentage of low-quality patents and papers are the consequence of those survival skills and strategies.
Cheating is risky given the consequences. It's even riskier than proposing an innovative idea. But when one is unable to produce the mandated “innovations” in time, cheating begins to look like the only choice. Judging from the many cases of cheating and various other strategies to satisfy the authorities, the Chinese students and researchers have been highly creative. But they've used their creativity to find practical ways to satisfy the authority, not to improve scientific and technological research and development. The “small cleverness” that can be observed in the low-quality patents, various forms of plagiarism, and canny methods of avoiding detection is certainly a form of creativity, just as running a fake publishing house requires a certain entrepreneurship. But all of this creativity and entrepreneurship is misdirected because of the unrealistic wishes of authority: produce innovations in specified areas, following the required formats, verified by established authorities, and within a specific time frame.
In summary, the fundamental reason behind China's inability to produce breakthrough innovations is the cultural mind-set that innovation can be mandated by pressure from above and achieved by effort alone. In other words, if there is a wish, a system to impose the wish on individuals, and a way to verify the efforts of individuals, innovation can be achieved. But that mind-set violates the basic logic of creativity. Innovation comes from the work of free-spirited people driven by passion, equipped with the necessary expertise and resources, and granted the autonomy to explore. And free-spirited people are what China lacks and actively discourages through its educational system—the issue we deal with in the rest of this book.
Notes
1. Z. Liu, F. Yang, and M. Lu, “Tianjiang chaopiaoyu yuanlai shi zangkuan” [Raining money from the sky turns out to be filthy lucre], Beijing News, September 19, 2013, http://epaper.bjnews.com.cn/html/2013–09/19/content_466363.htm?div=-1.
2. G. Mei and Y. Li, “Lunwen maimai xingcheng wanzheng chanyelian, 09 nian guimo ji yida 10 yi” [Science paper trade formed a complete industrial chain, reached a scale of one billion Yuan in 2009], September 23, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013–09/23/c_125426553.htm.
3. Jane Qiu, “Publish or Perish in China,” Nature 463 (2010): 142–43, http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100112/full/463142a.html.
4. Z. Wang, “Xi Jinping: Shishi chuangxin qudong buneng dengdai guanwang xiedai” [Xi Jinping: We cannot wait, hesitate, or slacken off our efforts in implementing innovation-driven development strategy], October 1, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013–10/01/c_117582862.htm.
5. Alok Jha, “China Poised to Overhaul US as Biggest Publisher of Scientific Papers,” Guardian, March 28, 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2011/mar/28/china-us-publisher-scientific-papers; Royal Society, Knowledge, Networks and Nations: Global Scientific Collaboration in the 21st Century (London: Royal Society, 2011).
6. Y. Cheng, “China Shows Off Scientific, Technological Achievements,” September 28, 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013–09/28/c_132757994.htm.
7. X. Wang, “Zhongguo zhuanli shenqing zongliang ju shijie diyi” [The number of patent applications in China ranks top in the world], December 23, 2012, http://news.xinhuanet.com/overseas/2012–12/23/c_124134316.htm.
8. J. Wang, “Kejibu buzhang shuju jieshuo Zhongguo keji bianhua” [Minister of science and technology uses data to explain the technological changes in China], October 14, 2013, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2013/10/283704.shtm.
9. J. Adams, C. King, and N. Ma, Global Research Report China: Research and Collaboration in the New Geography of Science (Leeds, UK: Thomson Reuters, 2009).
10. World Intellectual Property Organization, “Statistical Country Profiles: China,” 2012, http://www.wipo.int/ipstats/en/statistics/country_profile/countries/cn.html.
11. “Woguo Gaoxiao Gongdu Boshi Xuewei Renshu Jinnianlai Chixu Zengzhang” [The number of PhD applicants in Chinese universities continue to rise in recent years], China Education Online, May 23, 2013, http://kaoyan.eol.cn/nnews_6152/20130523/t20130523_947348.shtml.
12. L. Hu, “Jiaoyubu: Gaocengci liuxue rencai huiliulv di, boshi jinzhan 5.8%” [Ministry of Education: The return rate of top overseas talents is low, only 5.8 percent of those returned hold a doctoral degree], August 6, 2013, http://edu.gmw.cn/2013–08/06/content_8516161.htm.
13. Ministry of Education of the PRC, 2012 Jiaoyu Tongji Shuju [Education statistics data 2012], http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s7567/.
14. Mark Patterson, “Open-Access Megajournals: Find Out More in Estonia,” PLOS Blogs, June 20, 2011, http://blogs.plos.org/plos/2011/06/open-access-megajournals-%E2%80%93-find-out-more-in-estonia/.
15. Qiu, “Pu
blish or Perish in China.”
16. According to Jinggangshan University's 2006 guidelines encouraging scientific research.
17. Jinggangshan University, “Xuexiao jianjie” [About Jinggangshan University], October 2013, http://www.jgsu.edu.cn/xxgk/201104/t20110413_12883.htm.
18. Shanghai Jiaotong University, “Shanghai Jiaoda guanyu Hanxin shexian zaojia chuli yijian de tongbao” [Shanghai Jiaotong University's opinion on the suspected Hanxin fraud], May 12, 2006, http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2006–05–12/1824935539.shtml.
19. N. Wen, “Guowuyuan guanyu yinfa ‘Guli Ruanjian Chanye he Jicheng Dianlu Chanye Fazhan de Ruogan Zhengce’ de tongzhi” [Notice of the State Council on issuing Several Policies on Encouraging the Development of the Software and Integrated Circuit Industries], June 24, 2000, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/bf/200207/20020700031375.shtml.
20. B. Zhai, “Dalian daliang zhongxuesheng wei Gaokao jiafen Shenqing guojia zhuanli” [A large number of high school students in Dalian apply for national patents to receive bonus points in Gaokao], September 14, 2009, http://ip.people.com.cn/GB/10047024.html.
21. J. Gao and K. Wang, “Wuhan zhongxiaoxuesheng ai faming, zhuanli shenqingliang 9 Nian zeng 500 bei” [Primary and secondary school students in Wuhan love to invent, the number of patent applications increased 500 times in nine years], December 6, 2011, http://www.cnhubei.com/ctdsb/ctdsbsgk/ctdsb04/201112/t1912743.shtml.
22. C. Yu, “Wu Yingying chengwei meinu zongcai zhiqian [Before Wu Yingying became the beauty executive], Nandu Weekly Blog, http://nanduzhoukan.blog.sohu.com/28818858.html.