by Philip Dwyer
On the whole, there were no strong anti-French feelings among the people of Moscow before the invasion.31 When they learnt, on 22 June, that Napoleon had entered Russian territory they were ‘stupefied’, or at least those educated enough to care.32 Throughout the weeks during the invasion and before the entry of the Grande Armée into Moscow, Rostopchin had assailed the population with inflammatory declarations. At his behest, all sorts of patriotic gestures were made: French snuff was emptied out ostentatiously in the salons of the elite; French pamphlets were burnt; many Muscovites refused to drink French wine; anti-Napoleonic posters were displayed; and the upper classes renounced speaking French. The talk was of a ‘national war’. In some respects, this was a way for the authorities to deflect anger that might otherwise be directed against them for failing to defend the country.33 In one instance in early August, Rostopchin’s Belgian cook was denounced for having claimed that Napoleon was coming to liberate the people of Russia: Rostopchin had him publicly flogged and deported to Siberia.34 The governor also publicly ridiculed French residents before deporting them from Moscow. Fyodor Nikolaevich Glinka had his French books burnt and drove around Moscow in his carriage appealing to Muscovites to give up French wines and drink the national drink, vodka.35 The atmosphere in Moscow in 1812 was similar, in some respects, to the patriotic fervour whipped up by the revolutionaries in Paris in 1793–4, which led to horrific acts of violence as well as acts of patriotic altruism.36
Rostopchin had evacuated the treasures of the Kremlin well before the battle of Borodino and had spoken as early as May about setting the town alight if it fell into the hands of the French; he reiterated the threat many times after that. When Kutuzov decided to abandon the city, it was natural that some Muscovites should seek to revenge themselves on Rostopchin. They surrounded his palace and would have lynched him had he not callously handed over a young man accused of being a French spy.37 While the mob butchered the unfortunate young man, Rostopchin slipped away.38 There does not appear to have been any premeditated plan to abandon Moscow; it was simply a reaction to the circumstances.39 Indeed, it would appear that no one believed the French would actually get to Moscow, and certainly not without the army doing battle before its walls. It is one of the reasons why the population appears to have been so nonchalant, and why news of the arrival of the French exploded like a bombshell.
This was also the case at Petersburg. ‘One can hardly depict the general surprise, and especially that of the sovereign, when it was declared . . . that the French were in Moscow, and that nothing had been done to defend it. The sovereign had received no news directly either from Kutuzov or from Rostopchin.’40 The last time Kutuzov saw Alexander, he had promised that he would rather die than abandon Moscow.41 Kutuzov had, moreover, claimed to have held Napoleon in check at Borodino, stating that ‘despite their superior forces, nowhere had the enemy gained a single yard of land’.42 The shock of the defeat and the abandonment of Moscow was then all the greater; the atmosphere in Petersburg was tense. Rumours started flying of peasant riots; Alexander’s life was feared for. Some observers believed that they were about to witness the fall of another dynasty. ‘One can kill the sovereign,’ wrote Joseph de Maistre, ‘but one cannot contradict him.’43 On 27 September, the anniversary of Alexander’s coronation, the imperial entourage travelled to Kazan cathedral to mark the occasion, although the Tsar was persuaded not to ride on horseback, but to shelter in the carriage of the Empress. It was probably a good decision; people in his entourage were struck by the deathly silence that greeted them as they rode through the city.44 Immediately after the ceremony, Alexander left for the island of Kamennyi Ostrov in one of the branches of the River Neva, where he now spent most of his time. It would appear that it was after this event that he discovered religion.
Rostopchin left behind the police chief, Voronenko, with orders to set fire to everything he could. By the evening of 15 September, large parts of Petersburg were ablaze. Voronenko was aided by criminal elements (the prisons had been emptied) who went about looting (as did numbers of lower-class Russians) and setting fire to houses. Careless troops belonging to the Grande Armée also looted and sometimes accidentally set fire to houses, and a strong wind fanned the flames.45 At first, Napoleon refused to believe that the fire could have been started deliberately, until two Russians, caught red-handed, were brought to him; the interrogation took place in his presence.46
Napoleon contemplated the fire from the Ivan Tower in the Kremlin, where he had set up residence, then slowly descended the steps, followed by a few officers. Colonel Boulart speaks of the uncertainty that seemed to possess him about whether he should stay or go.47 In the end, the fire got so bad that Napoleon was forced to evacuate. He took up residence in an imperial palace in the country a few kilometres outside Moscow before the fire died down enough for him to re-enter the city.48 The park of Peterskoi, frequented by Moscow high society, became the bivouac of the Guard. From there, the light thrown by the fire in Moscow was so bright they could easily read at night.49 Napoleon, watching the city burn, is supposed to have said, ‘What a horrible sight! To do it themselves! All those palaces! What extraordinary resolution! Why, they are Scythians!’50 It was of course typical of the ‘barbaric’ behaviour of the Russian people.
There is no doubt that the Russians were to blame for this needless destruction of their city, despite their attempts to rewrite history and Rostopchin’s blatant denial of the order he had given in an account he wrote years afterwards.51 Rostopchin had already set the example by putting his own estate to the torch at Vornovo, south-west of Moscow, a gesture that had a profound impact on the French. After he had learnt that Kutuzov was prepared to abandon Moscow without a fight he had a group of men place inflammable materials in a number of houses in the city, men who were probably directed by officers of the police force.52 We know too that Cossack detachments, in keeping with the scorched-earth policy that had been practised, set fire to the stores that were left behind.53 Napoleon blamed Rostopchin, dismissing the fire as ‘the irresponsible act of a deranged Asiatic’. In a letter to Alexander he made it clear who had started the fire, but what he failed to understand is that the rest of Russia, and indeed the rest of the world, would not see things that way.
If there was some division of opinion, among educated Russians at least, about who was to blame, this was not the case for the Russian peasants. Their attitude to the fire may have been dominated by a certain fatalism – ‘The inhabitants saw their homes burn with an equanimity that only belief in fatalism can give . . . God wanted it that way’54 – but they blamed the French for the disaster and this greatly increased the discontent among the general population towards Napoleon.55 The burning city acted as a bright symbol that united Russia around its Tsar. If there was hesitation about what to do with Napoleon before he entered Moscow, the struggle, already evolving towards a brutal drawn-out conflict, had now been transformed into a fight to the death.56 Alexander learnt of the abandonment and burning of the city from his sister according to some, from one of Kutuzov’s aides-de-camp according to others. In any event, he was said to have broken down in tears.57 For him, there was no question of peace now; ‘Only a rogue could now pronounce the word peace.’58
The fires began to wane after three days and Napoleon moved back into the city on 18 September, although it does not look as though it was entirely under control until three days after that.59 An enormous change had come over the city: the streets were no longer recognizable, burnt cadavers, mostly of peasants and wounded soldiers, were intermingled with the remains of horses, dogs, cows. Now and then one would come across men, incendiaries, who had been shot by firing squad and their bodies strung up. The survivors took all that in their stride, indifferent to the devastation and loss of life.60 The conflagration destroyed about two-thirds of the city, but even though it might have been demoralizing for the occupying army, it was far from being a strategic disaster. Accounts vary, but it is possible that given the supplies left
behind in the city Napoleon could have stayed quartered in Moscow for the coming winter if he had so chosen,61 but his communication lines with Smolensk and then Paris would inevitably have been cut by ‘partisans’ and Cossack raiding parties.62 It is erroneous to think, as did some contemporaries, that the Russians, by burning the city, were forcing Napoleon into a precipitate retreat.63 On the contrary, there is enough anecdotal evidence to suggest that those who were billeted in Moscow, despite the fire, lived reasonably well, and enjoyed an abundance of food, at least for a while.64 While they may not have been lolling about on precious furs, smoking opulent pipes with tobacco perfumed with roses from India and drinking punch made of Jamaican rum as they were entertained by exotic women – pace Sergeant Bourgogne’s idyllic reminiscences of their life in Moscow – they at least had shelter and food.65 The fire may have destroyed most of the city, but there were still enough buildings made of stone that survived.66
However, the longer Napoleon stayed in Moscow the more problematic became his situation. Once the neighbouring villages had been exhausted, the army was obliged to look ever further afield for food and fodder.67 The further afield they were forced to look, the more exhausted became the horses. Lack of fodder meant, naturally, no cavalry, no artillery and no communications with France; the weaker Napoleon became the stronger Kutuzov became. Kutuzov was reinforcing his army of 80,000 men at Tarutino, within easy striking distance of Moscow, as new recruits and soldiers from other fronts arrived over the coming weeks. During that time, the Cossacks constantly harassed Napoleon’s supply lines to the point where the verb cosaquer was invented to describe their attacks.
‘I Want Peace, I Need Peace, I Must Have Peace!’
This was hardly an unprecedented situation for Napoleon. There had been other occasions when enemies had failed to submit in the face of defeat – recall Prussia and Spain – but never had an enemy ignored the normal rules of war and continued the struggle in the face of repeated requests to negotiate. It was as much a clash of cultures as a clash of arms, one in which neither side really comprehended the other. Napoleon for one could not hide his disappointment at the way in which the Russians were behaving, or rather were not behaving.68 He had to decide whether to stay, find winter quarters elsewhere or march on to Petersburg. Some officers, including Eugène, thought that Petersburg was the next obvious phase in the campaign. Ney, on the other hand, suggested resting in Moscow a week and then retreating to Smolensk.69
It was also the kind of thing that became the object of conversation among the troops. One soldier, irritated by the Russians’ persistent refusal to negotiate, asked of his brother, ‘How is one supposed to deal with such cannibals?’70 Napoleon was probably asking himself the same thing. He had never intended staying in Moscow for any length of time, and now that most of it had been burnt to the ground, it was no longer an appropriate political space for eventual or potential negotiations with Russian authorities. But he was unsure what to do next and procrastinated. Rumours of a departure from Moscow could be heard one day only to be contradicted the next.71 Napoleon fell back on the hope that Alexander would negotiate; it was the logical thing to do. He desperately looked about Moscow for potential intermediaries, but they were few and far between. One of the few who had not fled Moscow was Alekseyevich Yakovlev, the brother of a Russian diplomatic agent in Germany. He was dragged before Napoleon, who started the interview by berating the poor man, as if he were somehow responsible for the war. In any event, Yakovlev and his family were given safe conduct out of Moscow in order to deliver a letter to Alexander, in which Napoleon stated that ‘a single note from him would put an end to hostilities’.72
About a week or so later, still without a reply, Napoleon wanted to send Caulaincourt to St Petersburg, but Caulaincourt argued his way out of the mission by insisting, probably correctly, that Alexander would not receive him. Instead, Napoleon sent General Lauriston. ‘I want peace, I need peace, I must have peace! Just save my honour!’ Napoleon is supposed to have told him.73 The problem, of course, was that the more he clamoured for peace, the more desperate he looked. He realized this, and yet he still kept sending Alexander new messages.74 Caulaincourt believes that it revealed an extraordinarily blind faith in his star.75 How could Napoleon have entertained such illusions, knowing full well that his position in Moscow was tenuous, and that any reverses would transform the Austrian and Prussian troops guarding his rear into his worst enemies? Possibly because ‘his enthusiasm was such, and so eager was he to nurture his own illusions, that he nursed the hope of receiving a reply from the Tsar, or at least negotiations for an armistice with Kutusov, which would lead to further results’.76 Napoleon by now thought his enemies so weak that he could not conceive of any other outcome than victory and a treaty. He was behaving like a jilted lover, begging his partner, who had left him and who had no intention of coming back, to kiss and make up. He seems not to have realized the extent of the rupture. Moreover, the Russians were only too happy to drag things out in what now looks like a deliberate ploy to keep Napoleon in Moscow as long as possible.77
This had dire consequences for the occupation and the army. Napoleon was in a relatively strong position strategically, but, for reasons that cannot fully be comprehended, he refused to organize the regions he occupied in the way he had done in previous campaigns. Six weeks after the battle of Smolensk, for example, the streets had still not been cleared of the dead. Bands of brigands made up of deserters had established themselves in various regions. As early as August, the region between Vilnius and Smolensk was ‘covered in vagabond soldiers’.78 Desertion rates were high. Nobody capable had been placed in charge of the areas behind the lines. In Moscow, and most of the other cities the troops had occupied, the Russian administration had absconded and nothing had filled the void. The wounded were totally neglected, and were dying not only from lack of treatment, but from starvation and dehydration; Napoleon did not even bother issuing orders to evacuate them westwards.
Another side to Napoleon was revealed; he dug in his heels and made as though he were not going to move from Moscow until Alexander came to the table. It is what Ségur called a ‘struggle of obstinacy’, Alexander holding out and Napoleon deferring the day when he would have to call a retreat.79 Orders had been sent to bring fresh troops to Moscow; there was talk of bringing the Comédie Française to entertain the troops.80 Napoleon later argued that he had declared his intention of passing the winter in Moscow in the hope that the enemy would be more disposed to negotiate a settlement, although this declaration cannot be taken at face value.81
In the meantime, the troops made the best of a bad situation. Since the majority of Russians had fled the city, and two-thirds of it had burnt down, there was not all that much to do. There were some grumblings in the army about staying so long, especially since the lack of supplies began to be felt.82 Others, like General Dessolle and the Comte de Valence, had asked to be transferred back to France, usually on the pretext, sometimes justified, of ill-health. Some complained of the conditions in which they found themselves – ‘badly lodged, no sheets, no shirts, no clothes, no boots, badly fed’83 – although they were far better off than those living off the land around Moscow, where provisions were a good deal harder to come by, and where troops had been obliged to sleep in the open for weeks. They generally came to Moscow to pillage.84 Napoleon on the other hand seems to have been living in a world protected from the harsh realities of the troops, and dismissed reports coming in from Murat in the vicinity of Tarutino about the difficulties he was facing.
He was just hanging on in the vain hope that something would come along to put things right. Caulaincourt noted that Napoleon ‘could not admit to himself that fortune, which had so often smiled upon him, had quite abandoned his cause just when he required miracles of her’.85 This is why the Emperor lingered longer in Moscow than he should have, with the consequences that we shall shortly see. He had gone from being an active agent of his own destiny to a passive agent, a sta
te in which the belief in his star assumed fatalist proportions. The delusion went so far that he dismissed suggestions that the Russian winter was harsh, or that the army should be provided with suitable clothing.86 Admittedly, he was not alone in being lulled into a false sense of security by the exceptionally mild weather they had experienced in October. ‘The weather began to turn bad this morning,’ General Mouton wrote to his wife, ‘but the previous days it was as beautiful and as mild as Brussels, we were all enchanted by the kindness of the heavens.’87 Even so, it started to snow in the middle of October, which should have forewarned Napoleon of the difficulties ahead. The Russians interpreted this change in the weather as a good omen.88
‘A Cadaver of a Capital’
At the beginning of October, Napoleon instructed his corps commanders to be ready to leave Moscow at short notice.89 He had had a conversation with Caulaincourt about whether Alexander would respond to new peace overtures; Caulaincourt did not think so. He repeated what he had said so many times, namely, that as the season progressed and winter arrived, the position of the Russians became ever stronger.90
Napoleon did not want to hear this. He urged Caulaincourt to leave for Petersburg where he could talk directly with the Tsar. At the same time, however, he was issuing orders to fortify the Kremlin and build redoubts on the Moskva.91 His behaviour during this period has been described as ‘moody and taciturn’ but it is a portrayal that fits with his demeanour throughout the campaign, during which he would swing between periods of intense activity – rare but nevertheless testified to by the correspondence that came out of Moscow where he could spend three nights going over the details of the new regulations for the Comédie Française – and stretches when he would while away his time on a sofa, reading novels.92 It is possible that Napoleon sensed he was on the verge of defeat, which is one reason he put off withdrawing from Moscow for so long, to delay the inevitable.93 It is only in hindsight, however, that we can say that the decision to stay six weeks in Moscow was fatal. During that time, Kutuzov was reinforced by twenty-six regiments of Don Cossacks, around 15,000 light, irregular cavalry that were to play havoc with Napoleon’s retreating army. During that same time, Napoleon’s own cavalry was considerably weakened through lack of fodder. If he had stayed only two weeks and had rested his men, one historian has asserted, then the army would have had plenty of time to retreat in good order before both the onset of winter and the arrival of the Don Cossacks in great numbers.94