by Philip Dwyer
Baby, baby, naughty baby,
Hush! you squalling thing, I say;
Peace this instant! Peace! or maybe
Bonaparte will pass this way.
Baby, baby, he’s a giant,
Black and tall as Rouen’s steeple,
Sups and dines and lives reliant
Every day on naughty people.
Baby, baby, if he hears you
As he gallops past the house,
Limb from limb at once he’ll tear you
Just as pussy tears a mouse.
And he’ll beat you, beat you, beat you,
And he’ll beat you all to pap:
And he’ll eat you, eat you, eat you,
Gobble you, gobble you, snap! snap! snap!74
In Russia, Napoleon was referred to in the press during the War of the Third Coalition as ‘the son of Satan’ or the ‘abominable hypocrite’.75 Alexander called on the Orthodox Church to assist him in the struggle against France.76 In response the Holy Synod first explained to the faithful the cosmological significance of the struggle against Napoleon: he had taken part in the idolatrous festivals of the French Revolution; he had preached Islam in Egypt; he had restored the Jewish Sanhedrin (a reference to Napoleon calling an assembly of rabbis and Jewish laymen in 1807 to discuss the means of better assimilating Jews); and now he was bent on overthrowing Christianity – with the help of the Jews – and of declaring himself the Messiah. Notable is the Synod’s appeal to anti-Semitism in garnering popular support for their campaign. The Synod went on to describe Napoleon as the Antichrist, something that was then accepted by the Russian peasantry as a truism.77
In the wake of Tilsit, both the state and the Church were subsequently put in the somewhat difficult position of explaining to the Russian people why the Tsar had signed a treaty with the devil. A rumour doing the rounds in Russian villages claimed that Alexander met Napoleon in the middle of a river in order to wash away his sins.78 The Synod’s initial proclamation condemning Napoleon was banned, as were any sermons based on it, but it had become obvious to those who took scripture a little too literally that if Napoleon was the Antichrist and he had defeated Alexander, then Russia’s defeat would usher in the new millennium. Tilsit was interpreted in just that way. The anti-Napoleonic trend in the Russian press continued despite the Treaty of Tilsit and despite Erfurt, so that when war broke out in 1812 Napoleon was already considered the Antichrist by many if not most Russians.79 The thing that sets the Russian literature apart from its European equivalents is that the Tsar was portrayed as the tool of God, chosen to defeat Napoleon.80 The more inevitable an invasion came to appear, the more Napoleon was associated with the Antichrist. He was variously referred to in contemporary Russian texts as the ‘false Messiah’, the ‘Gallic Beast’ and the ‘son of Satan’.81 (In contrast, and from about 1813 on, Alexander became a divine figure and was closely associated in Russia with the ‘divine victory’ over Napoleon.)82 The educated inhabitants of Moscow had a more nuanced view of Napoleon tinged with a mixture of awe and curiosity.83 The vast majority of Russian peasants, on the other hand, perceived the struggle against Napoleon and the French in religious terms that were deeply rooted in the past.84
In Spain, the demonization of Napoleon extended to his family and even to Godoy. Although there does not seem to have been an extensive use of Satanic imagery in that country, there were texts that were reasonably widespread.85 The Spanish Catechism, published in 1808, associated Napoleon with the devil and considered the French to be heretics.86 ‘Who is the enemy of our happiness? – The Emperor of the French. Who is this man? – A villain, ambitious, the source of all evil and so on.’87 It is impossible to know what impact this sort of primitive propaganda had on the people of Spain.
E. T. A. Hoffmann, Die Exorcisten (The exorcists), no date but probably late 1813 or early 1814. Napoleon as the devil. In this engraving an Austrian, a Prussian, a Saxon and a Russian soldier (on the left with a knout) help exorcize France, represented by a woman, of Napoleon, portrayed as a little winged devil. An English soldier is taking her pulse. In the background, one can just make out Imperial Grenadiers fleeing, represented as pigs, wearing the traditional bearskin hat.
In Germany, popular engravings portrayed Napoleon as the Devil, or the son of the Devil. The essential characterization of Napoleon, not only among Germans but among other European peoples, was as a tyrant, impious, bloodthirsty, criminal, hypocritical and – possibly what worried Napoleon the most – illegitimate.88 In 1811, the German poet Ernst Moritz Arndt wrote the following lines in his ‘Song of Revenge’:
Denn der Satan is gekommen
Er hat sich Fleisch und Bein genommen
Und will der Herr der Erde sein.
(For Satan has come
He has taken on flesh and bone
And wants to be lord of the Earth.)89
The Prussian statesman Heinrich Friedrich Karl Freiherr vom Stein ranted about the ‘obscene, shameless and dissolute’ race that was the French, and declared that Paris should be razed to the ground. Ernst Moritz Arndt confessed, ‘I hate all Frenchmen without exception. In the name of God and my people, I teach my son this hatred. I will work all my life towards ensuring that hatred and contempt for this people finds deep roots in German hearts.’90 Francophobia was rampant in the north of Germany and apparent in the pamphlet literature of the day.91 Napoleon could not control the negative press in those countries beyond his reach, but even his own subjects considered that his immense appetite and ambition were leading to his destruction. The devastating consequences of his foreign policy in terms of human life undid any positive image Napoleonic propaganda may have created over the previous ten to fifteen years. In the words of Fontaine, ‘Blind ambition was his only guide.’92
‘A Policy of Illusion’
About the time the Prussians declared war against France – that is, at the end of March and the beginning of April 1813 – Napoleon was putting the final touches to the new campaign he was about to embark upon. This time, he had set up a Regency Council – the lesson learnt from the Malet affair – to take charge of France in his absence. In order to do so, he had rapidly to bring about a change in the Constitution, pushed through the Senate at the beginning of February, so that a regency under Marie-Louise – aided by a council made up of Cambacérès, Joseph, Louis, Eugène, Murat, Talleyrand and Berthier – could rule if anything were to happen to him.93 But he also worked long hours trying to put everything in order within the country, preparing his allies and getting the army ready for the campaign ahead.94 It was a question of reasserting his hold on power before he went off campaigning again, but naming Marie-Louise regent was also a way of flattering Austria, of emphasizing the bond of blood that now existed between the two houses.95 For a short time he seriously considered having a coronation ceremony for his wife, one that was initially fixed for 3 March and then postponed. The pope put paid to that idea. Napoleon arranged a meeting with him at Fontainebleau in the hope of mending broken bridges.96 It did not go well. Pius, mentally and physically exhausted, initially signed a provisional agreement that was intended to serve as the basis of a future concordat, but then almost immediately retracted it. An opportunity to placate the Church and Catholics of the Empire had been missed.
Napoleon acted to shore up support at home. All military and civil functionaries were obliged to swear a new oath of loyalty to the King of Rome as heir to the Empire (the ceremony took place on 20 March). Marie-Louise was meant to play a prominent role; Napoleon made a great show of having her by his side in the months after his return and before his departure, attending meetings of the Council of State and all official functions. She always looked bored, and much like her aunt before her, Marie-Antoinette, was incapable of arousing much affection among the people of Paris. She officially took the title of ‘Regent’ on 30 March and swore an oath at the Elysée Palace. Marie-Louise was not, at this young age, able to stand up to much older, more experienced men – she was only twenty
-two – but she performed her tasks in Napoleon’s absence well. However, she could never be anything more than a figurehead, who would ultimately have been subjected to the will of a dominant member of court.
Shortly before Napoleon left for Germany, he had an interview with the Austrian ambassador, Schwarzenberg. Schwarzenberg described Napoleon as someone who was less self-assured than he had been and afraid of losing his position; he even doubted whether he was the same man.97 During the interview, Napoleon asked the ambassador for a corps of 100,000 men to fight alongside him. If Napoleon had any doubts at this stage about Austria’s loyalty, they were not expressed. He simply assumed that Austria would increase its army and co-ordinate its efforts with him. The French ambassador in Vienna transmitted Napoleon’s demand on 7 April. The response said to have come from Metternich, if true, is telling. He told the Prussian chancellor, Hardenberg, that the request was proof Napoleon was ‘committed to a policy of illusion’.98 In fact, Napoleon entered the campaign with three illusions: that the Russo-Prussian alliance would disintegrate under a crushing blow; that he would be able to negotiate a separate peace with Russia; and that he could rely on Austria.99
The Austrians had not at this stage decided to fight Napoleon, but they had certainly decided to allow the Russian army, now advancing towards the Elbe, free passage into Galicia and Bohemia. There is some reason to believe that given the state of public opinion in Vienna at the time, and the depth of the Austrian people’s hatred for Napoleon, it would have been difficult if not impossible for Metternich to side with France. When a rumour did the rounds in Vienna at the beginning of 1813 that Metternich had just signed an alliance with France to commit 300,000 men, it caused a stir the likes of which had not been seen since 1809.100 Moreover, there were a number of Austrian officers who wanted to force the hand of their royal master in much the same way that the Prussian military had with Frederick William. Archduke John, for one, was working behind the scenes until, at the beginning of March 1813, the leaders of a conspiracy to assassinate Metternich were arrested by the Austrian secret police.101
Napoleon finally left Saint-Cloud on 15 April at four in the morning to take charge of the army in the field. There is disagreement about just how effective a fighting force was the Grande Armée of 1813 – one historian asserts that the training of reserve troops was much better in the Russian than in the French army102 – but it was certainly not the Grande Armée of 1805, let alone that of 1812.103 What are commonly referred to as the ‘Marie-Louise’ boys from the class of 1813, 1814 and even 1815 were recognizable, according to General Marmont, by the fact that they were badly trained and lacked complete uniforms.104 They do not appear to have been able to move as fast as recruits in previous years, as a result of which marches were kept short.105 Orders were given to spare them so that they marched no more than sixteen kilometres a day.106 This meant that Napoleon could no longer out-march or vigorously pursue the enemy. Nor were his troops well equipped.107 By the time he left Paris, though, he had managed to bring together over 200,000 troops, on paper at least, including contingents from the Confederation of the Rhine, and between 450 and 600 cannon.108 What he lacked, however, was cavalry, which meant that he could not reconnoitre and consequently could not know the enemy’s strength or movements with any certainty. At Erfurt ten days after leaving Paris, Napoleon looked worried by these developments.109 But he did enjoy two slight advantages – unity of command and numerical superiority in troops.
Despite most central European monarchs holding their cards close to their chests, the Confederation of the Rhine was still a precious resource in men, money and matériel. During the Empire, an estimated 80,000 men from the Rhineland served in the French armies.110 The call-up of men in Germany caused some unrest, and was notable too for the number of desertions.111 Revolts were put down here and there. The closer the Russians got to the states of the Confederation, the more the loyalty of the German states seemed to waver.112
Lützen and Bautzen
Napoleon took the field in the area of Dresden from where he planned to drive north into Prussia, and relieve the garrison holed up along the Oder and Vistula rivers.113 On 30 April 1813, he led 120,000 men in the direction of Leipzig where he hoped to confront an allied army under General Wittgenstein. Napoleon arrived two days later to find that Ney was already engaged with Wittgenstein near a farming village called Lützen, twenty kilometres south-west of Leipzig.
The battlefield of Lützen is much as it was 200 years ago. Here, on 2 May, the two armies clashed.114 It was not a planned battle, but one that developed as each side threw more and more troops into it. Napoleon, on his way to Leipzig, turned back surprised by the amount of cannon fire coming from Lützen, and was able to take control of the situation. He rallied the troops at some risk to his own personal safety,115 and effectively carried out a flanking movement against the allied commander, Wittgenstein. The French won but were unable to carry through their victory for lack of cavalry. By the end of the day, the losses on both sides were higher than was normal for this kind of battle: around 20,000–22,000 French casualties and between 11,500 and 20,000 for the allies.116 It was not much of a victory. The allies had learnt a few things over the years and were now much more formidable. Then Napoleon made an operational mistake, the first of many. He split his forces in two, sending 84,000 men north towards Berlin, while keeping the main army under his command.117
The allied retreat from the battlefield of Lützen was poorly carried out, but, far worse, the defeat was a heavy blow to morale, already low before the battle,118 and the Russians and Prussians started throwing recriminations and insults at each other.119 Things were not much better on the French side. After Lützen, soldiers were just waiting for an opportunity to leave their corps, to get admitted to a hospital or get as far away from any danger as they could. One witness reports that troops were beaten for the slightest misdemeanour, and that even those who fell sick were badly treated.120 There were complaints too about how badly supplied the army was so that three-quarters of the time men received no meat, which obliged officers to send off marauding parties.121 Desertion rates mounted as disgust with the army and the war increased. Thousands of soldiers presented with wounds to their hands that were more than suspect.122 In the ten days following Lützen, with the French pursuing the allies, more than 42,000 French troops deserted.123
The allies made a stand at Bautzen, about fifty kilometres east of Dresden, where, over two days on 20–21 May, Napoleon pulled off another pyrrhic victory. On the first day of battle, he enjoyed a slight numerical superiority – around 115,000 men facing 96,000 Russians and Prussians. The next day, however, another 85,000 men under Ney arrived to threaten the allied flank and rear. Under the circumstances, the allies fought remarkably well, but were forced to retreat. Once again figures vary, but the allies suffered 11,000–20,000 casualties compared to around 20,000 French, figures that hide the horror of battle. ‘The spectacle I had just witnessed’, wrote one survivor, ‘made a most painful impression on me.’124 Napoleon’s inability to inflict a crushing blow was in part due to Ney’s bungling of affairs.125 Napoleon realized that an opportunity had been missed. And yet, given the depleted state of the Russian army, if he had had the cavalry to pursue his enemy he might have crushed the Russians and brought the war to an end. Neither the Russian army, which still suffered from the interference of Alexander, nor the Prussian, which had not yet become an effective fighting machine, appeared capable of successfully concluding the war.
One of Napoleon’s closest companions in arms, Michel Duroc, was fatally wounded at Bautzen, his stomach ripped open by a cannon ball. Duroc had been with Napoleon since the beginning, in Toulon, and had followed him every step of the way, from Italy to Egypt, through Brumaire to the Tuileries. He was present at every battle, and was one of the few men in Napoleon’s entourage who addressed him with the familiar ‘tu’. If someone wanted to see Napoleon, they had to go through Duroc. ‘He loves me like a dog loves its ma
ster,’ Napoleon is reported to have once said.126 Duroc had, however, begun to tire of the constant campaigning and is reported to have confided to Marmont shortly before his death, perhaps foreseeing that the end was close, that Napoleon’s desire for battle was insatiable and that they would all be killed as a consequence.127 Now, dying, he was taken to the nearby house of a German pastor. The Guard was ordered to halt and set up camp.128 Napoleon spent some time sitting on a stool in front of his tent, his head down and his hands folded. His staff stood a few paces away, watching and waiting in mournful silence.129 Napoleon went to Duroc that evening; the conversation they supposedly had was reported in the Moniteur. It is entirely fabricated. Even though Napoleon was visibly upset – one witness describes Napoleon sobbing130 – he did not hesitate to use the deathbed scene to render a more humane portrait of himself. One account has Duroc counselling Napoleon to make peace, and then, tiring of him, saying, ‘In the name of God, go away and let me die in peace.’131 When Napoleon returned to his own camp he paced up and down in front of his tent, reflective, sombre.