by Philip Dwyer
51. Aaslestad, Place and Politics, pp. 292–3; Katherine Aaslestad, ‘Republican Traditions: Patriotism, Gender, and War in Hamburg, 1770–1815’, European History Quarterly, 37 (2007), 592.
52. Hagemann, ‘Mannlicher Muth’, pp. 457–61.
53. Dufraisse, ‘A propos des guerres de délivrance allemandes’, 16; Dennis Showalter, ‘Prussia’s Army: Continuity and Change, 1715–1830’, in Dwyer (ed.), The Rise of Prussia, pp. 231–6; Clark, Iron Kingdom, p. 366.
54. Ibbeken, Preussen 1807–1813, pp. 393–439.
55. Ibbeken, Preussen 1807–1813, pp. 448–9.
56. Cited in Daniel Moran, ‘Arms and the Concert: The Nation in Arms and the Dilemmas of German Liberalism’, in Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron (eds), The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization since the French Revolution (Cambridge, 2003), p. 59.
57. On the emergence of ‘patriotism’ see Hagemann, ‘Mannlicher Muth’, pp. 222–42.
58. Regional influence was the case for Austria. See Hagemann, ‘Be Proud and Firm’, 51. On the role of religion in the wars against Napoleon see Nigel Aston, Christianity and Revolutionary Europe, 1750–1830 (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 291–4.
59. Aaslestad, Place and Politics, pp. 288–91; Karen Hagemann, ‘“Deutsche Heldinnen”: Patriotisch-nationales Frauenhandeln in der Zeit der antinapoleonischen Kriege’, in Ute Planert (ed.), Nation, Politik und Geschlecht: Frauenbewegungen und Nationalismus in der Moderne (Frankfurt, 2000), pp. 86–112; Karen Hagemann, ‘A Valorous Volk Family: The Nation, the Military, and the Gender Order in Prussia in the Time of the Anti-Napoleonic Wars, 1806–15’, in Ida Blom, Karen Hagemann and Catherine Hall (eds), Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 2000), pp. 179–205; Karen Hagemann, ‘Female Patriots: Women, War and the Nation in the Period of the Prussian–German Anti-Napoleonic Wars’, Gender & History, 16 (2004), 396–424; Dirk Alexander Reder, Frauenbewegung und Nation: Patriotische Frauenvereine in Deutschland im frühen 19. Jahrhundert (1813–1830) (Cologne, 1998), pp. 369–84, 423–31; Jean H. Quataert, Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813–1916 (Ann Arbor, 2001), pp. 29–39.
60. Aaslestad, ‘Republican Traditions’, 593.
61. The Austrian women’s associations have not yet been studied to the same extent as those of Prussia have been by Karen Hagemann or those of Germany by Reder and Quataert.
62. Adam Zamoyski, Rites of Peace: The Fall of Napoleon and the Congress of Vienna (London, 2007), p. 94.
63. Wertheimer, ‘Wien und das Kriegsjahr 1813’, 370, 393–5.
64. Karen Hagemann, ‘Of “Manly Valor” and “German Honor”: Nation, War and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon’, Central European History, 30:2 (1997), 187–220; Hagemann, ‘Mannlicher Muth’, pp. 271–349.
65. Historians have managed to document twenty-two cross-dressing women in the Prussian army although there were probably more. On women volunteers see Karen Hagemann, ‘Mannlicher Muth’, pp. 383–93; Karen Hagemann, ‘“Heroic Virgins” and “Bellicose Amazons”: Armed Women, the Gender Order and the German Public during and after the Anti-Napoleonic Wars’, European History Quarterly, 37 (2007), 507–27.
66. Semmel, Napoleon and the British, pp. 83–90; Beßlich, Der deutsche Napoleon-Mythos, pp. 92–7.
67. Hasko Zimmer, Auf dem Altar des Vaterlands: Religion und Patriotismus in der deutschen Kriegslyrik des 19. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 11–70; Erich Pelzer, ‘Die Widergeburt Deutschlands 1813 und die Dämonisierung Napoleon’, in Gerd Krumeich und Hartmut Lehmann (eds), ‘Gott mit uns’: Nation, Religion und Gewalt im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen, 2000), pp. 135–56; Planert, Der Mythos vom Befreiungskrieg, pp. 336–82.
68. Michael Simpson, Closet Performances: Political Exhibition and Prohibition in the Dramas of Byron and Shelley (Stanford, Calif., 1998), p. 251; and Leggiere, The Fall of Napoleon, p. 33.
69. See Paul Vulliaud, La fin du monde (Paris, 1952), pp. 169–76, for a bibliographical sketch. A summary of Napoleon as Antichrist can be found in Bernard McGinn, Antichrist: Two Thousand Years of the Human Fascination with Evil (New York, 1996), pp. 242–6. On the English discourse see William Hosking Oliver, Prophets and Millenialists: The Uses of Biblical Prophecy in England from the 1790s to the 1840s (Auckland, 1978), pp. 50–9; in Russia, Michael A. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia’, Russian Review, 65 (2006), 373–92; in Germany, Erich Mertens, ‘Jung-Stilling und der Kreis um Frau Krudener’, in Peter Wörster (ed.), Zwischen Straßburg und Petersburg (Siegen, 1992), pp. 41–89; in Guatemala, Robert M. Laughlin, Beware the Great Horned Serpent!: Chiapas under the Threat of Napoleon (Albany, NY, 2003).
70. Paul Trensky, ‘The Year 1812 in Russian Poetry’, Slavic and East European Journal, 10 (1966), 283–302. Napoleon was not the first head of state to be dubbed the Antichrist. That distinction goes to Frederick II (Hohenstaufen) who was deposed by Pope Gregory IX, and later excommunicated by Innocent IV, in the 1240s.
71. Semmel, Napoleon and the British, p. 76.
72. Cited in Semmel, Napoleon and the British, p. 83. Examples include texts such as Lewis Mayer’s Bonaparte, the Emperor of the French, considered as Lucifer and Gog (London, 1806), and The prophetic mirror or a hint of England, containing an explanation of the prophesy . . .proving Bonaparte to be the beast (London, 1806).
73. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse’, 377; Clarke Garrett, Respectable Folly: Millenarians and the French Revolution in France and England (Baltimore, 1975), pp. 211–12.
74. Eliza Gutch and Mabel Peacock, Examples of Printed Folklore Concerning Lincolnshire, vol. v of County Folk-Lore (London, 1908), pp. 383–4.
75. Peltzer, ‘Imagerie populaire et caricature’, 205.
76. For the following, Martin, Romantics, Reformers, Reactionaries, pp. 47, 48; Michael A. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse in Early Nineteenth-Century Russia’, Russian Review, 65 (2006), 382–92.
77. Martin, ‘The Russian Empire and the Napoleonic Wars’, pp. 255–6.
78. Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, p. 60.
79. Peltzer, ‘Imagerie populaire et caricature’, 205.
80. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse’, 374.
81. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse’, 385.
82. Richard S. Wortman, Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, 2 vols (Princeton, 1995–2000), i. pp. 215–31.
83. Martin, ‘The Response of the Population of Moscow’, pp. 479–80.
84. Pesenson, ‘Napoleon Bonaparte and Apocalyptic Discourse’, 381–3, 392.
85. My thanks to Alicia Laspra Rodriguez for allowing me to use her unpublished conference paper, ‘The Demonisation of Napoleon in Spain’.
86. An example of the catechism can be found in Joseph-Jacques de Naylies, Mémoires sur la guerre d’Espagne, pendant les années 1808, 1809, 1810 et 1811 (Paris, 1817), pp. 23–30.
87. Cited in Hughes, Goya, p. 267.
88. See Michael Jeismann, La patrie de l’ennemi: la notion d’ennemi national et la représentation de la nation en Allemagne et en France de 1792 à 1918, trans. Dominique Lassaigne (Paris, 1997), pp. 70–1. On the German image of Napoleon see Friedrich Stählin, Napoleons Glanz und Fall im deutschen Urteil: Wandlungen des deutschen Napoleonbildes (Brunswick, 1952), esp. pp. 40–64.
89. Ernst Moritz Arndt, Gedichte, 2 vols (Frankfurt am Rhein, 1818), ii. pp. 31–2.
90. Ernst Moritz Arndt cited in Brendan Simms, Struggle for Mastery in Germany (Basingstoke, 1998), pp. 92–3.
91. Hagemann, ‘Mannlicher Muth’, pp. 112–57; Hagemann, ‘Occupation, Mobilization, and Politics’, 603.
92. Fontaine, Journal, i. p. 408 (12 April 1814).
93. Lentz, Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire, ii. pp. 347–51.
94. Fain, Manuscrit de mil huit
cent treize, i. pp. 24–5.
95. René Tournès, La campagne de printemps en 1813: Lützen, étude d’une manoeuvre napoléonienne (Paris, 1931), p. 29.
96. Anderson, Pope Pius VII, pp. 127–40.
97. Oncken, Österreich und Preußen, ii. pp. 615–25 (26 March 1813).
98. Cited in Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–22 (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 64–5.
99. Kissinger, A World Restored, p. 71.
100. Wertheimer, ‘Wien und das Kriegsjahr 1813’, 365.
101. Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, Metternich (Paris, 1986), pp. 147–8.
102. Alexandre-Louis Andrault de Langeron, Mémoires de Langeron, général d’infanterie dans l’armée russe, campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814 (Paris, 1902), pp. 200–1; Dominic Lieven, ‘Russia and the Defeat of Napoleon (1812–14)’, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, 7 (2006), 303–5. As Lieven points out, there are no studies, in Russian or any other language, detailing the enormous effort put into training and supplying the thousands of troops and then transferring them from their camps in central Russia to the battlefields of Germany and France between 1812 and 1814.
103. Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, pp. 231–3; Scott, Birth of a Great Power System, p. 351, thinks it was poor. It was ‘the worst army Napoleon ever commanded’, according to Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, p. 255.
104. Marmont, Mémoires, vi. pp. 7–8. Historians differ about the age of these conscripts. Generally in their early twenties, according to Andrew Uffindell, Napoleon 1814: The Defence of France (Barnsley, 2009), p. 14. Two-thirds were teenagers, according to Robert M. Epstein, ‘Aspects of Military and Operational Efffectiveness of the Armies of France, Austria, Russia and Prussia in 1813’, in Frederick C. Schneid (ed.), The Projection and Limitations of Imperial Powers, 1618–1850 (Leiden, 2012), p. 124.
105. Marmont, Mémoires, v. p. 9. On the army’s weakness see Paul Foucart, Bautzen, une bataille de deux jours, 20–21 mai 1813 (Paris, 1897), p. 100; Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, p. 128.
106. Corr. xxvi. n. 20504 (2 September 1813).
107. See, for example, Corr. xxiv. n. 19602 (21 February 1813).
108. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 874–5; Leggiere, The Fall of Napoleon, p. 7.
109. Ernst Otto Innocenz, Freiherr von Odeleben, Relation circonstanciée de la campagne de 1813 en Saxe, trans. from the German by M. Aubert de Vitry, 2 vols (Paris, 1817), i. p. 34.
110. Rowe, ‘France, Prussia, or Germany?’, 622.
111. See, for example, Rowe, From Reich to State, p. 218.
112. Lentz, Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire, ii. p. 385.
113. Michael V. Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin: The Franco-Prussian War in North Germany, 1813 (Norman, 2002), pp. 49–51.
114. Tournès, La campagne de printemps en 1813, pp. 323–69; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 881–98.
115. Marmont, Mémoires, v. pp. 17–23; Odeleben, Relation circonstanciée, i. pp. 55–9; F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign in Germany, 1813 (London, 1912), pp. 66–90.
116. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 887.
117. Leggiere, ‘From Berlin to Leipzig’, 39–40; 120,000, according to Epstein, ‘Aspects of Military and Operational Efffectiveness’, p. 131.
118. Vionnet de Maringoné, Souvenirs, p. 118.
119. Louis-Victor-Léon de Rochechouart, Souvenirs sur la Révolution, l’Empire et la Restauration, par le général Cte de Rochechouart (Paris, 1933), pp. 261–4.
120. Vionnet de Maringoné, Souvenirs, p. 118.
121. Vionnet de Maringoné, Souvenirs, p. 120.
122. Lignereux, L’Empire des Français, pp. 211–12.
123. Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art, p. 124.
124. Faucheur, Souvenirs, p. 174.
125. On the battle of Bautzen see Müffling, Memoirs, pp. 35–43; Langeron, Mémoires, pp. 177–88; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 893–7; J. p. Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813: Lessons in Coalition Warfighting (London, 2000), pp. 94–106.
126. Metternich, Mémoires, i. p. 284.
127. Marmont, Mémoires, v. p. 109. On Duroc see Philip Dwyer, ‘Duroc diplomate: un militaire au service de la diplomatie napoléonienne’, Revue du Souvenir napoléonien, 399 (1995), 21–38; Martin, Napoleonic Friendship, pp. 47–9.
128. For the following, Coignet, Note-Books, p. 248; Marbot, Mémoires, iii. pp. 251–2, 264–81.
129. Odeleben, Relation circonstanciée, i. pp. 102–3.
130. Waresquiel (ed.), Lettres d’un lion, p. 128 (23 May 1813).
131. Dedem de Gelder, Un général hollandais, pp. 323–4.
132. Zamoyski, Rites of Peace, pp. 69, 72.
133. Wilson, Private Diary of Travels, ii. pp. 45–6; Zamoyski, Rites of Peace, p. 69.
134. Fain, Manuscrit de mil huit cent treize, i. pp. 430–5, 443–9.
135. Adams, Napoleon and Russia, pp. 443–4.
136. See Oskar Regele, Feldmarschall Radetzky: Leben/Leistung/Erbe (Vienna, 1957), pp. 121–8; Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon, p. 271.
137. Zamoyski, Rites of Peace, p. 94.
138. On the plan see Sked, Radetzky, pp. 40–4.
139. Friedrich Luckwaldt, Österreich und die Anfänge des Befreiungskriege von 1813 (Berlin, 1898), pp. 308–38; and Metternich’s somewhat romanticized account of the meeting in Metternich, Mémoires, i. pp. 147–53, 185–92; ii. pp. 538–41. For the French perspective see Jean Hanoteau, ‘Une nouvelle relation de l’entrevue de Napoléon et de Metternich à Dresde’, Revue d’histoire diplomatique, 67 (1933), 421–40; Fain, Manuscrit de mil huit cent treize, ii. pp. 36–44. A recent reappraisal of the meeting is Munro Price, ‘Napoleon and Metternich in 1813: Some New and Some Neglected Evidence’, French History, 26:4 (2012), 482–503.
140. Montholon, Récits, ii. pp. 493–8, here p. 497.
141. Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, pp. 357–8.
142. Metternich, Mémoires, i. pp. 143–4. At least one historian thinks so: Narocnickij, ‘Österreich zwischen Frankreich und Russland 1813’, p. 31.
143. Corr. xxv. n. 20175 (23 June 1813).
144. Tournès, La campagne de printemps en 1813, pp. 47–8.
145. Corr. xxv. n. 19820 (7 April 1813). It may have been nothing more than an attempt to reassure his collaborators.
146. Kraehe, Metternich’s German Policy, i. pp. 180–90; Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 47. Some historians, like Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 64, 70, have doubted Metternich’s sincerity, arguing that in the months leading to the Austrian declaration of war he was playing a double game, assuring Russia that Austria would declare war on France, and Napoleon that it would remain loyal, all the while inching closer to the allied camp.
147. Kissinger, A World Restored, pp. 75–6.
148. Schroeder, Transformation of European Politics, p. 467.
149. Vincent Haegele (ed.), Napoléon et Joseph Bonaparte: correspondance intégrale 1784–1818 (Paris, 2007), p. 746 (1 July 1813); Muir, Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, pp. 263–6; Esdaile, The Peninsular War, pp. 452–3.
150. See Maria Ullrichová (ed.), Clemens Metternich, Wilhelmine von Sagan: ein Briefwechsel, 1813–1815 (Graz, 1966).
151. Antoine d’Arjuzon, Caulaincourt: le confident de Napoléon (Paris, 2012), pp. 244–50.
152. Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, viii. pp. 159–60.
153. Charles Webster (ed.), British Diplomacy, 1813–1815: Select Documents Dealing with the Reconstruction of Europe (London, 1921), pp. 12–13 (13 July 1813).
154. Pierrelongue (ed.), Napoléon et Marie-Louise, p. 126 (15 August 1813).
22: The Deliverance of Europe
1. Figures are from Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 900–1; Leggiere, ‘From Berlin to Leipzig’, 64. For the Austrian figures see Sked, Radetzky, p. 35, who states that it was able to put 389,000 combat troops into the field by the end of 1813. Gunther E.
Rothenberg, The Napoleonic Wars (London, 1999), p. 178, gives slightly different figures: 570,000 allied troops against 410,000 French.
2. Gunther E. Rothenberg, ‘The Habsburg Army in the Napoleonic Wars’, Military Affairs, 37 (1973), 1–5, here 4; Craig, ‘Problems of Coalition Warfare’, p. 28. Archduke Charles was not given the job of commander-in-chief because Metternich feared he would be in the Tsar’s pocket.
3. Rothenberg, ‘The Habsburg Army’, 4.
4. Craig, ‘Problems of Coalition Warfare’, pp. 29–30.
5. Zamoyski, Rites of Peace, pp. 94–5; Llewellyn Cook, ‘Schwarzenberg at Dresden: Leadership and Command’, Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750–1850: Selected Papers (Tallahassee, Fla, 1994), p. 644.
6. Craig, ‘Problems of Coalition Warfare’, p. 30.
7. Cook, ‘Schwarzenberg at Dresden’, 644.
8. Especially over the best manner in which to invade France at the end of 1813. See Leggiere, The Fall of Napoleon, pp. 22, 28–40.
9. Parkinson, The Fox of the North, p. 233; Nabokov and de Lastours, Koutouzov, pp. 290–1.
10. Gates, The Napoleonic Wars, p. 235.
11. Craig, ‘Problems of Coalition Warfare’, p. 43.
12. Cited in Zamoyski, Rites of Peace, p. 75.
13. Cited in Chamberlain, Lord Aberdeen, p. 129.
14. Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, p. 395.
15. On the battle of Dresden see Petre, Napoleon’s Last Campaign, pp. 200–26; Riley, Napoleon and the World War of 1813, pp. 128–47; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 903–12.
16. Chevalier, Souvenirs, p. 269; Bellot de Kergorre, Journal, p. 107.
17. Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, p. 396.
18. The suggestion of Lieven, Russia against Napoleon, pp. 402, 417–18.
19. Oudinot was defeated at Groß Beeren by Bülow and another Prussian general, Friedrich Bogislav von Tauentzien (23 August) just outside Berlin (Leggiere, Napoleon and Berlin, pp. 160–76); General Girard’s division was defeated at Hagelberg by General-Major von Hirschfeld’s Landwehr brigade (27 August); Macdonald was defeated by Blücher while crossing the River Katzbach (26 August), losing 35,000 of 75,000 men; Ney was defeated at Dennewitz by a combined Prussian–Swedish army under Bülow (6 September); General Marie-Nicolas Pécheux was defeated by the allied commander Count Wallmoden in the forest of Göhrde (between Wittenberg and Lüneburg) (16 September); General Charles Lefebvre-Desnouettes was surprised and routed by the Saxon General Johann von Thielmann at Altenburg (28 September); Bertrand was defeated at Wartenburg by Yorck (3 October); and south of Leipzig, at Liebertwolkwitz on 14 October, the greatest cavalry battle up to that time took place, without issue, between Murat on the one hand and Wittgenstein on the other.