Confronted with the ‘considered and unanimous opinion of all those authorities’, Hutton executed a volte-face. He now cabled Auchinleck that India should undertake to provide troops for the strike force as well as Sabine. Auchinleck replied that he was ‘disturbed by this tendency to depart from the object which was decided after careful consideration’. Wavell’s proposals entailed a considerable expansion in India’s commitments, and these could not be met unless London supplied equipment and trained personnel. More importantly, he felt that the occupation of Basra was of fundamental importance because it would enable operations to be carried out in both Iraq and Iran. Clearly, there was a yawning gulf between the approaches advocated by Auchinleck and Wavell. Auchinleck asked Hutton to return to Delhi to discuss this ‘changed strategic conception’. By this time, Rashid Ali had staged his coup in Baghdad.
The regime change in Iraq came as rude shock to London. The British ambassador in Baghdad, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, laid out three options for his government: reinstate the regent by armed action; publicly reject the new government, hoping thereby to shake its standing; or recognize the regime and reach a modus vivendi. Cornwallis himself held that if Britain failed to stand up for the deposed regent, its standing in Iraq, as well as in the wider Arab world, would be gravely impaired. Churchill stood for a robust response and for the non-recognition of Rashid Ali’s new government. So did Linlithgow and Auchinleck. But Wavell had other ideas.
On 3 April 1941, the chiefs of staff asked Wavell what troops he could provide for a military intervention in Iraq. Two days later, intercepts of Italian cables from Tehran indicated that Germany was planning on sending arms to Iraq via Vichy-controlled Syria. And yet Wavell insisted that all he could spare was one British battalion based in Palestine: ‘any other action is impossible with existing resources’. The only alternative was to cow Rashid Ali’s clique by strong diplomatic action and an aerial ‘demonstration’ by the RAF units stationed in Iraq.10
On 8 April, Churchill wrote to Amery: ‘The situation in Iraq has turned sour. We must make sure of Basra … I am telling the Chiefs of Staff that you will look into these possibilities. General Auchinleck also had ideas that an additional force could be spared.’ Amery sent a personal cable to Linlithgow, explaining that it was imperative to demonstrate support to the regent – even if it was only to hold Basra and Shaiba. Prodded by Auchinleck, the viceroy promptly offered to divert to Basra a force – consisting of one infantry brigade and one artillery regiment – that was embarking for Malaya. He also proposed to airlift to Shaiba four companies of infantry with twelve light machine guns, six Vickers guns and two anti-tank rifles. The viceroy further suggested that the force in Basra should be reinforced at the soonest by two more infantry brigades and base units, bringing it up to a full division. As for Wavell’s plan of sending troops to Palestine, these could only be considered after a division was built up at Basra. Amery approved of these moves on 10 April.11
As the 10th Indian Infantry Division led by Major General William Fraser prepared to sail from Karachi on 12 April, London muddied the waters. Churchill and the chiefs insisted that while the 10th Division in Basra would be under the command of Auchinleck, northern Iraq including Baghdad would fall under Wavell’s operational sphere. Wavell had, in fact, persisted with his reluctance: ‘I am fully committed in Cyrenaica [Libya] and can spare nothing for Iraq.’12 In the teeth of Wavell’s protestations, the chiefs ordered him to send a sizeable force from Palestine to Habbaniya and take operational charge of northern Iraq.
What’s more, London wobbled on the despatch of the Indian force. On 11 April, Rashid Ali solemnly assured the Iraqi senate of his commitment to abide by the Anglo-Iraq treaty. This disingenuous statement led Ambassador Cornwallis to suggest to Whitehall that Rashid Ali be given the time to prove his bona fides and that the arrival of the Indian troops be delayed. By landing the force at Basra, they may actually strengthen Rashid Ali’s standing; for he could then rally the Iraqis by claiming that they were the victims of unprovoked aggression. And he could use this as an excuse to invite German intervention.
Auchinleck expressed ‘gravest misgivings’ about London’s proposal to ‘temporize and compromise’. He strongly felt that the ambassador’s advice ‘may very well result in our never getting to Basra at all’. Possession of a base in Basra would make all the difference to Britain’s prospects in the Middle East. Auchinleck argued that the ‘time for diplomatic parleying has passed’. Rashid Ali would use the reprieve not only to bolster his position, but to invoke German aid. The viceroy backed his commander-in-chief. Linlithgow wrote to Amery that the failure to secure Basra would at once imperil India’s security and undermine its influence in other Gulf and Arab states. ‘I have no doubt’, he emphasized, ‘that we must be prepared to take a strong line now.’13
On 13 April 1941, London finally decided that the force for Basra should proceed as planned. By this time, the convoy carrying the leading 20th Indian Infantry Brigade of the 10th Division was already at sea. The troops were not told of the change of mission from Malaya to Iraq until they had set sail. Lieutenant Satyen Basu, a medical officer, was on board one of the eight ships:
The officers gathered the men and gave them topographical lectures with map and diagram of the Middle East with Basra boldly marked on the black-board. We must be going to Basra then. But why was the ship going south-west? But was it? It had suddenly changed its course, and was now going north-west heading straight for the Persian Gulf.
The passage through the Arabian Sea was rough, but the troops were comfortable: ‘there was table rice and Indian curry at lunch daily and a delicious mango at the end’. The men were given lectures on hygiene and sanitation as well as tactics. The artillery at the stern boomed occasionally as the gunners warmed up for the campaign. On the morning of 17 April, Abadan swam into view: ‘a beautiful city with clean asphalt roads and nice buildings. There were hundreds of Aluminium painted cylindrical reservoirs which contained petrol.’ Four hours later, they touched the port of Basra.14
During the voyage, it was unclear if Rashid Ali would honour the terms of the treaty and allow the troops to land. The commander of the 20th Indian Brigade, Brigadier Donald Powell, prepared plans to land his troops in the face of opposition from Iraqi forces. Cornwallis was minded to give Rashid Ali advance notice of the arrival of the force and attempt to secure a peaceful landing. Delhi insisted that the warning should not be so early as to allow the Iraqis to effectively oppose the landing. So, Cornwallis informed Rashid Ali only on the evening of 16 April. The prime minister was surprised, but slickly offered to abide by the treaty. The British military mission in Baghdad simultaneously sounded out the Iraqi general staff and obtained their concurrence. The Indian force landed unopposed the next morning. At the same time, the first of the four infantry companies landed in Shaiba, having been airlifted from Karachi via Sharjah and Bahrain.15
The BBC immediately announced the landing, claiming for good measure that ‘a warm welcome had been given to the Imperial troops by the local population’.16 Yet Rashid Ali insisted that the terms of the treaty called on Iraq only to allow safe passage for troops through its territory. He asked Cornwallis to move the forces immediately to Palestine: ‘at no time should there be any large concentration of British troops in the country’. The ambassador was open to making some concessions to meet this legitimate demand. He proposed retaining just enough troops in Iraq to secure Basra and strengthen Habbaniya, and sending the rest of Force Sabine to Palestine.17
The Indian government scotched the idea. New Delhi informed London that it was preparing to send a second brigade in mid-May for deployment in the Baghdad–Habbaniya area and a third in mid-June to act as a reserve. India was intent on securing its hold on Iraq – not on opening the lines of communication to Palestine. Churchill endorsed India’s stance. He asked the foreign secretary to instruct Cornwallis that ‘Our position at Basra … does not rest solely on the treaty but also a new event
arising out of the war.’ They owed Rashid Ali no undertakings or explanations. As ever, once Churchill’s attention was fixed his impatience waxed. Mid-May seemed rather too late for the arrival of further reinforcements in Iraq. The prime minister urged the chiefs of staff to nudge the Indian government and expedite the departure of the rest of the 10th Indian Division. His wishes were anticipated by Auchinleck. On 29 April, a second convoy landed in Basra. The following day, the last part of the division decamped from India.18
Meanwhile, Rashid Ali was preparing for a showdown. On 19 April, two days after the first Indian units landed in Basra, he received a joint German and Italian message assuring him of their ‘greatest sympathy’, advising ‘armed resistance against England’, and asking him to spell out his requirements.19 Rashid Ali asked the Italian envoy if the Iraqi army could count on ‘support from the air force of the Axis powers’ and on ‘receiving rifles and ammunition by air transports’. When no reply was forthcoming, he told the Italians on 26 April that he intended to move shortly against the British forces. He now requested a loan to the tune of £1 million as well as ten squadrons of aircraft and fifty light tanks.20
By now, Germany had taken charge of the Axis policy towards the Middle East; Italy’s disastrous performance in the Mediterranean had pricked its pretensions to regional hegemony and several agencies of the Nazi regime had grown eager for active involvement in the region. The Abwehr (military intelligence) was already in touch with the mufti of Jerusalem and was keen to expand covert operations in Iraq. The German navy and generals such as Rommel also felt that the time was propitious for exploiting Arab nationalism in parallel with a military intervention in the Mediterranean.
On 3 May 1941, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop wrote to Hitler that ‘Germany had a big chance to build up in Iraq a centre of resistance for our fight against the British … an Arab revolt will spread out and thus be of greatest assistance to our decisive advance into Egypt.’ Hitler agreed that the ‘Arab Freedom movement is our natural ally against England in the Middle East. In this connection the rising in Iraq is particularly important.’ The Führer, however, was focused on the coming attack on the Soviet Union. Any large-scale intervention, he decreed, ‘to break the British position between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf is a question which will be decided only after BARBAROSSA’. Axis support for the Iraqi nationalists was thus restricted to two German and one Italian squadron of fighter planes.21 On 13 May, the first of these flew in through Syria and landed at Mosul.
Rashid Ali’s revolt against Britain was already underway. In the early hours of 30 April, two brigades of the Iraqi army had surrounded the RAF base at Habbaniya and a third occupied the nearby towns of Fallujah and Ramadi. Simultaneously, Iraqi troops had taken control of the oilfields at Mosul, shutting down the pipeline to Haifa and reactivating the connection to Syrian Tripoli. By so doing, Rashid Ali apparently sought to pressure the British to a negotiated settlement.
When the crisis erupted, the division of command and responsibility between India and MEC had not yet been sorted out. Auchinleck was all too aware of Wavell’s reluctance to embark on any substantial military campaign in Iraq. But the chiefs had not reckoned on the scale of Wavell’s recalcitrance. For one, he threw up his hands at their demand for a force to relieve Habbaniya: ‘My forces are stretched to the limit everywhere.’ Moreover, he would not accept responsibility for the force at Basra: ‘this must be controlled from India’. Above all, Wavell was set against escalating the conflict in Iraq and advised ‘negotiations with Iraqis on the basis of liquidation of a regrettable incident by mutual arrangement’. The chiefs bore down on him, insisting that a commitment to Iraq was ‘inevitable’ and operational responsibility ‘cannot be divided’.
Under pressure, Wavell scratched together a brigade-sized force that would move from Palestine towards Habbaniya. Yet he remained reluctant to despatch the ‘Habforce’, warning London ‘in gravest possible terms that … prolongation of fighting in Iraq will seriously endanger defence of Palestine and Egypt’. The same day, 5 May 1941, he sent a more conciliatory personal cable to the chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS): ‘Nice baby you have handed me on my fifty-eighth birthday. I hate babies and Iraqis, but will do my best for the little blighter.’ Churchill was ‘deeply disturbed’ by Wavell’s stance and felt that he was ‘tired out’. Wavell was told that there was no scope for negotiations and that there was ‘an excellent chance of restoring the situation by bold action if it is not delayed’.22
Auchinleck followed these exchanges with mounting disquiet. He felt that the strategy advocated by London too did not go far enough. On 9 May, he cabled the CIGS that ‘success or failure in Iraq [is] vital to the safety of India’. There was ‘only one policy’ that could prevent Axis penetration into Iraq and other parts of the region: ‘This policy is to establish ourselves with minimum delay in sufficient force at Baghdad and other key points such as Mosul and Kirkuk … and this must in our opinion lead from Basra.’ The viceroy agreed and informed Amery that ‘an immediate and bold movement of troops from Basra might well prove highly successful’.23
Wavell continued to disagree. On 7 May, the siege of Habbaniya was lifted by RAF action, and an advance column from Habforce began moving towards the base. Wavell was averse to further escalation. ‘Forces from India can secure Basra’, he wrote to Churchill the next day, ‘but cannot … advance northwards unless the co-operation of the local population and tribes is fully secured.’24 The appearance of German planes over Iraq lent credence and urgency to India’s approach, but the command was with Wavell. Moreover, General Quinan, who had taken over Force Sabine, felt that his first task was to secure the base at Basra. Any premature advance to the north would be dangerous. Quinan’s stance strengthened Wavell’s hand. And the triangular argument between Cairo, Delhi and London stretched on inconclusively.
The cycle of indecision and inaction was not broken until Wavell and Auchinleck met in Basra on 27 May 1941. The two commanders recognized that they saw Iraq from very different vantage points. Wavell felt that his main task of defending Egypt and Palestine would ‘not be greatly jeopardized by hostile control of Iraq’. Auchinleck regarded Iraq as an ‘absolutely vital outpost of their [India’s] defence … hostile Iraq would mean hostile Iran and Afghanistan and compromise whole defence of Indian Empire’. After much discussion, it was agreed that the 4,000-strong Habforce, which was now advancing towards Baghdad, should be allowed to occupy the capital. Further, the 10th Indian Division under Quinan’s command should move up from Basra towards Habbaniya. Finally, in light of India’s ‘greater interest and greater stake’ in Iraq, Delhi should resume control as soon as possible. Auchinleck insisted to London that ‘we must take and keep Baghdad … and having got it, we must … then secure key points in the north such as Mosul, Kirkuk, Erbil … this can be done by bluff and boldness … if we act now’. To support these operations, he was not only prepared to send more troops but also recall two Blenheim bomber squadrons lent by India to the Far Eastern Command: ‘the Iraqi demand is more urgent than the Malayan, for the moment’.25
The day after the Basra conference, Quinan ordered the commander of the 10th Indian Division to move up the Euphrates road to Baghdad. The division was now commanded by the recently promoted Major General William Slim. After being injured in the Eritrean theatre, Slim had been posted as director of military operations at the GHQ. When Force Sabine was being prepared, Auchinleck decided to appoint Slim as the senior staff officer for operations. He wrote to Quinan that Slim’s ‘recent war experience ought to be of great value to you’. No sooner had the 10th Division landed in Basra than General Fraser had requested to be relieved of his command. Auchinleck immediately appointed Slim to the job. ‘I have every reason to expect’, he informed the viceroy, ‘that Slim’s energy, determination and force of character will prove equal to the task.’26
In the event, Slim’s troops faced barely any resistance as they headed north towards Baghdad.
By 30 May, Habforce also stood at the outskirts of Baghdad. The RAF had destroyed the Axis planes on Iraqi territory. Rashid Ali, the Golden Square and the mufti of Jerusalem fled the country, while the Iraqi army sued for an armistice. On 1 June 1941, the regent returned to Baghdad and installed another pro-British regime.
After the fall of Baghdad and the opening up of communications from Basra, GHQ India took command of Iraq. The 10th Division was deployed in and around Baghdad and Mosul, while the freshly landed 8th Indian Division took control of southern Iraq. By 20 June 1941, the occupation of Iraq was completed. It was a victory, but not a glorious one. As Lieutenant Basu’s unit passed through Baghdad, he was struck by ‘how averse the Iraqis were to the presence of British and Indian troops there. Street urchins jeered at us and people were spitting on the ground at the sight of us.’27 Indian soldiers would remain in Iraq until the end of the war.
Even as the invasion of Iraq was underway, Britain’s sights were trained on Syria. The proximate cause of concern was the use of Syrian airfields by German and Italian planes while transiting to Iraq. Yet London’s aversion to the French regime in Syria ran altogether deeper. Days after the fall of France, the cabinet’s Middle East Committee had concluded that ‘the whole British position in the Middle East, including Egypt and Arabia, will probably be untenable unless Syria and Lebanon are under friendly control or failing that British control’.28 Britain initially sought to woo the French colonial government in Syria, but the latter accepted the armistice with Germany and fell in with Marshal Pétain’s Vichy regime back home.
Although Vichy Syria was ostensibly neutral in the war, its relations with Britain were fraught. Churchill’s decision to destroy the French fleet in North Africa had at once frightened and angered the French in Damascus. It stiffened the spine of the local Vichy authorities, who had at their disposal some 35,000 troops. London was clear that the regime in Syria ‘should be prevented from taking action hostile to our interests’. But a military occupation was deemed a measure of the last resort – only to be used if the Axis forces sought to advance through Syria into the Middle East. Short of this, there were several options to shape the regime’s behaviour. For one thing, economic and financial pressure could be used ‘to show that Syria is dependent on our goodwill’. For another, anti-Vichy officers in Syria could be encouraged ‘in the hope of an early coup d’etat’.29
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