by Paul Preston
Despite Galarza’s measure, the tempo of the repression in Madrid was about to increase. This was inevitable as the rebel columns drew nearer and the bombing of the city became more frequent. The danger was given a name by General Mola, who famously stated that there were four columns poised to attack Madrid but that the attack would be initiated by a fifth column already inside the city. The exact date on which Mola made the remark is not known but it was almost certainly in the first days of October.115 At this stage, there was no properly structured fifth column, but nocturnal snipers, saboteurs and agents provocateurs were active. As Geoffrey Cox, the British newspaper correspondent, wrote later: ‘Secret radio, couriers, men who slipped across the lines in darkness, saw to it that many of the Government’s closest secrets were revealed to the rebels.’116
Republican politicians started making references to the speech from early October. In popular parlance and political rhetoric, the term ‘fifth columnist’ came to denote any rebel supporter, real or potential, active or imprisoned. It was first used as a device to raise awareness and popular passion by Dolores Ibárruri ‘Pasionaria’, who wrote:
That traitor Mola said that he would launch ‘four columns’ against Madrid, but that only the ‘fifth column’ would begin the offensive. The ‘fifth column’ is the one which lurks within Madrid itself and which, despite all measures, continues to move in the darkness. We sense its feline movements; its dull voice is to be heard in rumours, stories and outright panic. This enemy must be crushed immediately while our heroic militia is fighting outside Madrid … The law of war is a brutal one, but we must adopt it without sentimentality, with neither aggressiveness nor weakness. We cannot sink to the sadism of the fascists. We will never torture prisoners. Nor will we humiliate the wives of traitors, nor murder their children. But we will inflict lawful retribution rapidly and impressively, so as to tear out the very roots of treachery.117
The diplomatic corps had long since been concerned about the situation and was now alarmed by the escalation implicit in Pasionaria’s article. The British Chargé d’Affaires in Madrid, George Ogilvie-Forbes, co-ordinated appeals to the Spanish Foreign Ministry for something to be done about the growing number of killings and the dangerous situation in the prisons. On 1 October, he reported that 125 had been murdered on the previous Saturday (26 September). He was convinced that the article was an incitement to murder because, in the twenty-four hours following its publication on Saturday 3 October, there were two hundred murders in Madrid. On 5 October, Ogilvie-Forbes visited the Foreign Minister, Julio Álvarez del Vayo, and told him that, two days earlier, he had been in the University City and seen the bodies of at least fifteen men and women. Although reluctant to believe that the authorities had anything to do with the killings, Ogilvie-Forbes protested that they were guilty of permitting them. Álvarez del Vayo ‘blushed to the roots of his hair’, assured him that the government would do everything possible to stop them and arranged for him to visit the Minister of the Interior.
The deleterious effect on Republican Spain’s international status caused by news of the killings was exacerbated by the fact that the British were convinced, or chose to believe, that ‘executions of civilians by the rebels have been relatively few and carried out with a certain show of justice’. On 6 October, Ogilvie-Forbes met Ángel Galarza, who told him that the constant killings and the situation in the prisons were the consequence of the fact that it had been necessary to use the bulk of the Assault Guards as front-line troops, leaving security in the hands of militia groups.118 Nevertheless, he responded to diplomatic concerns by issuing a decree imposing a curfew between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. on all those who did not belong to the official Rearguard Security Militias. Moreover, within three weeks of creating the MVR, Galarza was obliged to issue a statement prohibiting all house searches other than those specifically ordered by the Director General of Security, withdrawing all identity cards previously issued by the CPIP and requiring the left-wing organizations to give the names of the militiamen authorized to join the MVR.119
The difference in international perception of the repression in both zones was one of the most difficult problems faced by the Republic. There were plenty of diplomats and journalists in Republican cities to report what was happening. In contrast, so far, most of the atrocities were carried out by Franco’s columns in small country towns. Moreover, rebel commanders ensured that unsympathetic foreign newspaper correspondents were not present. Winston Churchill’s reaction to the situation in Republican Spain was representative of the perception of events in upper-class and official circles. When the new Spanish Ambassador, Pablo de Azcárate, arrived in London in early September 1936, he was introduced by his friend Lord David Cecil to Churchill. Although Azcárate arrived with a reputation as a highly respected functionary of the League of Nations, a red-faced Churchill angrily rejected his outstretched hand and stalked off muttering, ‘Blood, blood …’ In an article in the Evening Standard on 2 October 1936, entitled ‘Spain: Object Lesson for Radicals’, Churchill wrote:
The massacre of hostages falls to a definitely lower plane; and the systematic slaughter night after night of helpless and defenceless political opponents, dragged from their homes to execution for no other crime than that they belong to the classes opposed to Communism, and have enjoyed property and distinction under the Republican constitution, ranks with tortures and fiendish outrages in the lowest pit of human degradation. Although it seems to be the practice of the Nationalist [rebel] forces to shoot a proportion of their prisoners taken in arms, they cannot be accused of having fallen to the level of committing the atrocities which are the daily handiwork of the Communists, Anarchists, and the P.O.U.M., as the new and most extreme Trotskyist organization is called. It would be a mistake alike in truth and wisdom for British public opinion to rate both sides at the same level.120
Republican leaders were expected to maintain civilized social relations within Madrid despite seething popular resentment of those who bombed their city and despite the activities of snipers and saboteurs. Thus Julián Zugazagoitia, the faithful ally of Prieto, continued to use his position as editor of the daily El Socialista to campaign for discipline in the rearguard and for respect on the battlefield for the lives of opponents. Typical of the ethical tone adopted by the paper was his editorial of 3 October 1936, headed ‘Moral Obligations in War’. He wrote: ‘The life of an adversary who surrenders is unassailable; no combatant can dispose of that life. But that is not how the rebels behave. No matter. It is how we should behave.’121
However, such pleas for moderation paled in the context of the desperation that engulfed the city. The political commissar of the Communist Fifth Regiment, Comandante Carlos Contreras (the pseudonym of the Italian Communist, and Soviet agent, Vittorio Vidali), showed that he was more concerned with eliminating the enemy within than placating diplomats without. Five days after Pasionaria’s speech, he made an even more explicit analysis of Mola’s remarks for those who would take responsibility for eliminating the fifth column. ‘General Mola has been kind enough to point out to us where the enemy is to be found. The Government of the Popular Front has already taken a series of measures aimed at cleansing Madrid rapidly and energetically of all those doubtful and suspect elements who could, at a given moment, create difficulties for the defence of our city.’122 ‘Fifth column’ was soon the generalized term for rebel supporters who found themselves in the Republican zone.123 On 21 October, the united Socialist and Communist Youth, the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas, issued a declaration that ‘the extermination of the “fifth column” will be a huge step in the defence of Madrid’.124
As the circle closed around Madrid, bombing raids on the undefended city intensified and triggered popular fury. Appeals for the population to be mobilized in defence of the city were increasingly accompanied by demands for the elimination of fifth columnists. Given the intensity of the fear that stalked the streets, such appeals served to stoke up the fires of hatred against the pe
rceived enemy within.125 The sense of urgency was notable in the rearguard activities of the checas. The most feared of them all was the CPIP, which had come to be known popularly as ‘la Checa de Fomento’. This was because, on 26 August, the CPIP had moved its ever-growing operations out of the overcrowded Círculo de Bellas Artes to more spacious premises at Calle Fomento no. 9. From then until it was disbanded by Santiago Carrillo on 12 November, its activities against suspected fifth columnists reached a level of frenzy.126
In mid-September, it and several other checas had begun systematic sacas – the seizing and murder of detainees from the four main prisons. The first sacas, though frequent, were usually of relatively few prisoners at a time taken from the Cárcel de Ventas and San Antón and murdered in Aravaca. The Cárcel de Porlier was run by a group of four Communists whose abuses finally led to them being arrested in December. Nevertheless, on their watch, before November, there were frequent individual sacas but none of substantial numbers of prisoners. At the end of October, the scale increased dramatically and both anarchists and Communists were involved. On the 29th of that month, fifty rightists were taken from the Checa de Fomento and executed in Boadilla del Monte. In all the prisons, the militiamen usually arrived equipped with letters of authorization from the Comité Provincial de Investigación Pública. On 31 October, CPIP agents came to the Cárcel de Ventas with an order signed by Manuel Muñoz for the transfer of thirty-two prisoners to Chinchilla, far to the south-east in the province of Albacete. Twenty-four of them, including the right-wing thinker Ramiro de Maeztu and the founder of the JONS, Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, were shot in the cemetery of Aravaca on the outskirts of Madrid. On 1 and 2 November, over seventy more were taken from Ventas. About half reached Chinchilla and half were murdered in Aravaca cemetery. At least one of these sacas was carried out by militiamen from the Checa del Cine Europa led by Eduardo Val himself. On 4 November, a further fifty-six were killed in the prison at Carabanchel. Not all of those murdered in Aravaca and Boadilla were the victims of the anarchists. There was at least one Communist ‘radio’ involved as well.127
Paradoxically, as the sacas accelerated, the activities of one of the most famous checas began to wind down. The García Atadell Brigade had concealed many criminal acts behind their own much lauded fight against the fifth column. Since Atadell and many of his men came from the Socialist printing union, it had been easy for them to place articles about their exploits in the Republican press. This was particularly true of Informaciones, the newspaper now run by their fellow trade unionists. In any case, praise for the struggle against the enemy within was considered to be an important morale-booster.128 This could be deduced from an editorial in El Socialista which proudly declared García Atadell and his men to be Socialists with the vocation of policemen fighting for a common cause. Zugazagoitia, the editor, was unaware of the Brigada’s nefarious activities when he wrote: ‘Atadell should be judged not on his past – a limpid, transparent past as a righteous Socialist – but rather on his present. His work, more than useful, is necessary. Indispensable.’ The article went on to sing a hymn of praise for the detailed preparation and precision of his pre-dawn raids. It ended with a tone redolent of Zugazagoitia’s views: ‘Bad faith, resentment and envy all press to find expression in illegal activities which, for the honour of all and the prestige of the Republic, must be frustrated.’129
In fact, García Atadell’s brigade had carried out many legitimate activities on a daily basis. These included searching Franco’s Madrid apartment and finding there weapons, including a machine-pistol, and correspondence with other conspirators. More notably, his group was credited with the break-up of espionage rings, the capture of a clandestine radio station, the arrests of Falangists, saboteurs and snipers and the foiling of a plan to assassinate Azaña, Largo Caballero, Prieto and Pasionaria. Newspaper articles about these triumphs cannot be taken as official endorsement of García Atadell’s criminal activities. Press references to confiscated cash and valuables usually specified that they had been handed in at the Dirección General de Seguridad.130 García Atadell later reiterated to his interrogators that large amounts of money and jewellery were handed in as well as claiming to have saved many lives. One of the most curious cases was the ‘rescue’ of Lourdes Bueno Méndez, the missing daughter of a conservative Republican officer who, because of alleged links with the Nazis, had been arrested by Communists from a checa known as ‘Radio Oeste’. García Atadell located her at the end of September and took her to the Dirección General de Seguridad, where she was held for another two and a half months. His interest in the case was probably based on the payment of a reward by her family.131 García Atadell also claimed that he believed that, in recognition of his achievements, he would eventually have been made Director General of Security.132
However, in the second half of October, just when it might have been thought that his services would be in greatest demand, his group began to fade from public view. Questions were being asked about his activities and the whereabouts of confiscated valuables. Ironically, on 26 October, Ogilvie-Forbes had a conversation with García Atadell and explained the dreadful impact that news of the arrests, murders and robberies was having on the Republic’s international situation. Atadell, who was at the time about to flee with his own ill-gotten gains, agreed wholeheartedly and blamed the disorder exclusively on the anarchists.133 According to Rosario Queipo de Llano, the number of detainees brought to Atadell’s headquarters had begun to diminish greatly by the end of October.134 He was clearly already planning his get-away. On 27 October, he met with two of his closest cronies, Luis Ortuño and Pedro Penabad, and made plans for flight. He later claimed that this was because Madrid was about to fall to the rebels and also because his life had been threatened by the Communists and the FAI in revenge for his efforts to prevent their atrocities. The three gathered together several suitcases full of money and valuables and, accompanied by García Atadell’s wife, Piedad Domínguez Díaz, an ex-nun, headed for Alicante. There they acquired false Cuban passports and took ship for Marseilles. In Marseilles they bought tickets on a boat to La Habana on 19 November.135
Their plans backfired thanks to the film director Luis Buñuel. In his memoirs, he recalled García Atadell as illustrating ‘the complexity of the relations that we had at times with the fascists’. Buñuel was in Paris working for the Republican Embassy as part of the anti-rebel espionage network run by the artist Luis Quintanilla. A French trade unionist, who worked in a hotel, reported to him that a Spaniard was about to take ship for South America with a suitcase full of stolen valuables. Buñuel informed the Ambassador, Luis Araquistain, who told the government in Valencia. Attempts were made to extradite him, but it was too late. Accordingly, Araquistain was authorized by the government to pass the information, via a neutral embassy, to the rebel representation in the French capital. Since the ship carrying García Atadell and his cronies had to put in at Vigo and Santa Cruz de Tenerife, it was assumed that it would be possible for the rebel authorities to arrest them there.136
In fact, the rebel leadership at Burgos was unable to get the agreement of the French government to the arrest of a passenger on a French ship and so it left Vigo without incident. Since both Burgos and Valencia shared the desire to see García Atadell brought to justice, however, Paris agreed. In Las Palmas, García Atadell and Penabad were arrested. After initial interrogation in the Canary Islands, they were transferred to Seville for further interrogation.137 From 19 December, García Atadell was held for seven months in the maximum-security wing of Seville Provincial Prison until his execution by garrotte in July 1937. As García Atadell fled Madrid and headed to his eventual downfall, the most notorious period of the activities of the checas was about to begin.
PART FOUR
Madrid Besieged: The Threat and the Response
9
The Column of Death’s March on Madrid
Even before the bulk of his African troops arrived in Spain, either by sea, as part of the so-c
alled ‘victory convoy’, or in the airlift made possible by German and Italian aircraft, Franco had already, on 2 August 1936, flown to Seville. The march on Madrid was to begin that day with the first column sent northwards to Mérida in the province of Badajoz. Under the command of the tall, grey-haired and red-faced Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Asensio Cabanillas, a hardened Africanista, it consisted of two battalions of the Foreign Legion and two battalions of Moorish Regulares. In trucks provided by Queipo de Llano, it advanced fifty miles in the first two days. Asensio was followed on 3 August by Castejón’s column which advanced somewhat to the east and on 7 August by a third under Lieutenant Colonel Heli Rolando de Tella. Castejón travelled in the limousine of the Marqués de Nervión, a prominent landowner. The ultimate goal of these columns was Madrid. However, the use of three columns advancing on a wide front made it clear that an equally central objective was to destroy the left in towns and villages along the way.1
The unwritten orders were unambiguous: ‘to smash the cruel rabble with a great hammer blow that would paralyse them’.2 Accordingly, as the three columns moved rapidly north from Seville in early August, they used the techniques of terror which had been the regular practice of the Africanistas against the subject population of Morocco. After they crossed the Sierra Morena, word of their tactics spread a wave of fear before them. The labourers that opposed them, inexperienced and armed only with shotguns, ancient blunderbusses, knives and hatchets, hardly merited the label of ‘militiamen’. With the advantage of total air superiority provided by Savoia-81 flown by Italian air-force pilots and Junkers Ju-52 flown by Luftwaffe pilots, and equipped with artillery, the crack shock units of the Spanish colonial army took villages and towns in the provinces of Seville and Badajoz. The number of casualties among the Republican volunteers far exceeded those among the African columns. No prisoners were taken. Militiamen captured along the way were simply shot.