MCA’s tactics had affected its relationship with Warner Brothers, which was also in television production and had provided ABC with some of its top shows, including Maverick, Cheyenne, and Sugarfoot. Matters between the two companies had deteriorated so badly that the studio refused to permit MCA personnel on its lot. The dispute between MCA and Warner Brothers occurred during the early 1950s when Warners had offered a young, unknown stage actor named Charlton Heston a standard studio contract and wanted him to play the lead in Ethan Frome. However, MCA, Heston’s agent, persuaded him to do Dark City with producer Hal Wallis at Paramount instead. Warners executives were so angry that they declared war on MCA. In fact, the situation had become so intense that “William Morris was representing the talent for MCA on the Warner Brothers lot.”12 However, peace between MCA and Warners came about when MCA later negotiated for Heston to star in three Warner Brothers films.
MCA also allegedly used cash and gifts to induce prospective clients to sign an exclusive-representation contract. For example, Rock Hudson refused a home in Bel Air to leave the Henry Wilson Agency and sign with MCA. Jayne Mansfield did switch agencies after she was offered and accepted $50,000 in cash to do so. Another allegation was that Dean Martin and Jerry Lewis, before their split, were similarly offered money by MCA—if they would leave their agent, Abner Greshler, and become MCA clients.
In another case, MCA was overprotective of one of its top clients. Stanley Kramer was producing the Abby Mann classic Judgment at Nuremberg, a moving drama about the Nazi war crimes trial, and wanted Montgomery Clift to play a small part in the film. For this twelve-minute part, Kramer offered Clift $75,000 for one week of shooting. MCA refused the offer, saying that Kramer had to give Clift his usual $300,000 a movie. Kramer could not afford to pay that much and looked for someone else to play Clift’s part. But, soon after, Clift called Kramer and offered to do the part for no salary, asking for only travel and hotel expenses. Kramer happily agreed to Clift’s terms.
When Clift was asked why he was willing to work for free, he replied sarcastically, “So that when the picture is over, I can take a big, empty paper bag, tie a blue ribbon around it, and send it to MCA with a note saying, ‘Your commission is inside.’”13
Some of those interviewed defended MCA with enthusiasm. One recalled how a Hollywood uproar over the hiring of Dalton Trumbo—one of the blacklisted writers of the Hollywood Ten—to write the screenplay for Stanley Kubrick’s 1960 super-spectacular, Spartacus, was averted when Wasserman approved of and protected Trumbo.
Interviewed by the FBI, Ed Sullivan defended MCA, saying that he “never had any difficulty with regard to the acquisition of MCA talent.” He added that “MCA was an extremely efficient organization and that … many of the complaints [against MCA] were misunderstandings.”14
Another story revealed Cary Grant’s angry departure from MCA. With television still in its infancy, many of the top Hollywood stars simply refused to do television, thinking that it could compromise and tarnish their images in motion pictures. They preferred the public to pay to see them rather than get them for free. During a meeting with Grant, MCA executives told him, according to a Justice Department document, “that he should appear in a television series. Grant immediately became hostile. He asked again whether they really believed that he should appear on television and MCA replied in the affirmative. He asked who would produce the series. They replied, ‘MCA.’ Grant then stood up and said, ‘Our contract is over as of now,’ and he left MCA never to return.”15
Frank Sinatra, who had gone through so much to change talent agencies and come to MCA, also left angrily. According to another Justice Department report, “Sinatra has had a great deal of trouble with MCA.… Sinatra had climbed to heights and then his career had declined precipitously. Sinatra was at that very time very irritated at the way MCA was representing him.…” The rift between Sinatra and MCA eventually culminated in an open breach in 1952. Then MCA did something unparalleled in the industry: the talent agency took a full-page ad in The Hollywood Reporter and Daily Variety, stating that it was releasing Sinatra unconditionally.16
Sinatra then went to the William Morris Agency, as did several other MCA clients, including Gloria DeHaven, Jan Murray, and Eddie Fisher. Soon after, Sinatra won the part of Maggio in From Here to Eternity, for which he received the 1953 Oscar for Best Supporting Actor.
Ironically, according to FBI documents in 1962, “Sinatra’s crowd, [known as] the ‘Rat Pack,’ is reported to have boasted that they already have ‘killed’ the government’s antitrust investigation of MCA.”17
The “Rat Pack” had also come up the previous year—in an FBI electronic surveillance operation. Chicago Mafia boss Sam Giancana was having a conversation with Johnny Formosa, one of his lieutenants, about their feelings of betrayal at Sinatra’s inability to “deliver” favorable treatment from his friend President Kennedy. During this discussion, they also talked about the “Rat Pack.”
“Let’s show these fuckin’ Hollywood fruitcakes that they can’t get away with it as if nothing’s happened,” Formosa said. “Let’s hit Sinatra. Or I could whack out a couple of those other guys. [Peter] Lawford and that [Dean] Martin, and I could take the nigger [Sammy Davis, Jr.] and put his other eye out.”
“No …,” Giancana replied, “I’ve got other plans for them.”
Soon after this bugged conversation, Sinatra, Martin, and Davis performed at the Villa Venice, a nightclub in Chicago, adjoining an illegal gambling club operated by Giancana’s mob. The receipts for just one month, according to wiretaps, were $3 million. Although Sinatra admitted performing at the Villa Venice, he denied that he knew Giancana was in any way connected with the club. FBI agents later asked Davis why he had agreed to perform at the nightclub. “Baby, I have to say it’s for my man Francis.” And for Frank’s friends? “By all means.” Like Giancana? “By all means.”18
*The FBI also learned that MCA had fourteen U.S. subdivisions, two Canadian subdivisions, and twelve foreign subsidiaries, all of which were wholly owned.
*Edwards’s original Peter Gunn was produced as well, and ran for two years beginning in September of 1958.
CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE
John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president of the United States in January 1961 and had already appointed his brother, Robert F. Kennedy, as attorney general. Under Kennedy, the U.S. Justice Department pledged that among its top priorities would be prosecutions of the nation’s top Mafia leaders, their associates, and antitrust violators.
On March 8, 1961, the FCC subpoenaed Taft Schreiber once again to testify at its hearings. As before, Schreiber refused to testify except in a secret session. He was asked several preliminary questions, like which television programs MCA packaged, and again refused to answer, even after being directed to do so by the commission. According to a former top MCA executive, “There was something really awful about the whole FCC thing. Our total defiance was viewed by nearly everyone as nothing less than a reckless disregard for the process of government. You want to know something? We were scared. That’s right, scared. We were scared of that goddamn Antitrust Division. Whatever was said in front of the FCC was going right into the case file being built over at Justice. We knew they were starting to breathe down our necks; we could feel it.”
Two weeks later, Robert Kennedy was formally notified by Lee Loevinger, the head of the Antitrust Division in Washington, that “MCA is now being investigated by the General Litigation Section of the Antitrust Division. If the evidence warrants, a request will be made … for grand jury authority.… The investigation is expected to result in either a criminal or civil case, or both.”1
That same day, March 21, the chairman of the FCC sent Kennedy a letter, requesting a conference “on the possibility of bringing a criminal action against Taft Schreiber, vice-president of MCA.” Three days later, attorneys representing Schreiber charged that the FCC “has not shown that the information sought to be subpoenaed is necessary or appropriate
for the discharge of any statutory authority conferred upon it by Congress,” adding that the FCC “proceeding was illegal and beyond the authority of the commission.”
Meantime, on March 27, in a letter to an attorney friend who was outside the government and operated within the entertainment industry, Leonard Posner mentioned, almost in passing, “Incidentally, I am bemused by the fact that MCA was apparently the only talent agency which got a blanket waiver from the talent unions. Am I correct in stating that this is a fact? And, if so, do you know why this happened?” This was the first reference to either the American Federation of Musicians or the Screen Actors Guild since the official investigation began. And Posner would follow up.
But the federal government was faced with the problem of having too many investigations of MCA. While the Justice Department and the FCC determined what to do with the defiant Taft Schreiber, the Antitrust Division’s General Litigation Section was weighing the options of prosecuting Schreiber for either civil or criminal contempt. There would be major consequences if the government attempted to prosecute Schreiber at all. For instance, what would happen if Schreiber was again required to testify before the FCC hearing and then took the Fifth? Would he then be given immunity from prosecution and required to testify? Would such actions harm the Antitrust Division’s investigation of MCA?*
As another complication, Posner received a telephone call from Nicholas Zapple, special counsel to the U.S. Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, chaired by Senator Warren Magnuson. Zapple told Posner that the Senate panel had a subcommittee dealing exclusively with investigations into the television industry, and that several senators were interested in conducting a probe of MCA “if the Antitrust Division was not prepared to move effectively and promptly into the affairs of that organization.”
“I told Zapple,” Posner said, “that we were investigating MCA … [but] that there were difficult problems connected with the investigation: witnesses appeared to be frightened; there were reports that MCA had prepared special reports designed … to prove they were innocent of antitrust violations. In addition, it was anticipated that it would be a very difficult case because we would get no evidence from MCA, and it would hence be necessary to lay a firm foundation of evidence from other sources.”
Zapple said the senators would, thus, probably “not go into the matter themselves.”2
A week later, MCA attorney Albert Bickford, who had replaced Cyrus Vance, talked to Posner and asked “whether there was any connection between the FCC hearing and its actions against Schreiber and our investigation …,” Posner wrote. “I told Bickford that so far as I knew the FCC was primarily seeking something different from our interest in the matter.”3
Lee Loevinger called Posner on April 10 and demanded to know “where we stood on MCA.” After giving him some background information, Posner replied that it would be important “to try to have a grand jury in the MCA matter because the witnesses were frightened to death and we wouldn’t expect to be able to get any specific direct evidence without the cloak of secrecy of a grand jury.”4
The following month, Posner wrote a lengthy memorandum on the MCA investigation. In explaining the case, Posner wrote, in part: “Even more crucial is the fact that our theories depend on proof of conspiracies between MCA and two talent unions (SAG and AFM) and between MCA and NBC. We propose to learn more about these conspiracies in the next month or two in as quiet a way as possible. For example, we propose to accept SAG’s offer to examine their files while we are on the West Coast. We are very much afraid that if MCA and its alleged conspirators learn of our suspicions—which will be inevitable once the ‘large’ FBI investigation gets under way—this evidence will disappear and all information concerning these conspiracies will go underground. This, in itself, could mean loss of the case before we are fairly started.”5
On May 22, Nicholas Zapple from the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee met with Posner and told him that the members of his subcommittee on television wanted to move on MCA. Posner wrote, “We discussed fully with Zapple the reasons why the Antitrust Division would like two or three months in which quietly to conduct an investigation of MCA. Zapple said that he understood the problem. We did not, however, mention talent unions. We indicated to Zapple that we were afraid that if there were undue publicity on MCA, that MCA would attempt to contact potential witnesses and alter or suppress their testimony. We also indicated that it would be very difficult to obtain evidence on the case.”
That same day, further complications arose when Paul Laskin, counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency, chaired by Senator Estes Kefauver, wanted to explore how crime and violence were portrayed on television. In order to do so, Laskin said, according to Posner, there was a definite possibility that they might find themselves immersed in developing evidence on MCA directly. We told Laskin that this would definitely prejudice our case.… He promised to do all he could to try to avoid going into MCA directly.”6
The next day, the Antitrust Division formally requested from the IRS all of the income tax returns of MCA and all of its subsidiaries, including MCA Artists and Revue Productions.
On May 25, Posner began his investigation into the Justice Department’s “conspiracy theory,” involving NBC, SAG, and AFM. Posner’s first industry source told him that “[NBC’s Robert] Kintner could not possibly have been so dishonest as to have sold out his own company even though he had been given the job [as president of] NBC through influence exerted by MCA.” Instead, the source thought that “NBC had entered into some sort of exclusive arrangement with MCA whereby it [NBC] got the first pick or first refusal on a number of programs … [but] that such an arrangement would, of course, have required NBC to take the bad programs along with the good.”
Regarding the MCA-SAG relationship, the source said that he did not think the fact that MCA had been the only agency to receive a blanket waiver was significant. “MCA had foreseen this situation long before anyone else,” he said, “and had therefore anticipated [it] by moving in quickly and asking for a blanket waiver.”
Posner replied that he “considered this slightly far-fetched: any of the talent agencies would have realized that the biggest profits would come from program sales since they would have the opportunity to see the contracts that their actor-clients had signed. Furthermore, any talent agency which came across a script that looked like a promising deal for one of its clients would want to put together the package and produce it.… A blanket waiver was the only way that any company could effectively engage in continuous television production.”
The source later clarified himself, saying that he agreed that there was a conspiracy between MCA and AFM. “Furthermore,” Posner wrote, “on the basis of his knowledge of SAG, he thinks it only logical that exactly the same pattern is being repeated in television today. As soon as I began to describe the setup in radio days, [the source] exclaimed: ‘That’s it! That’s it! It’s exactly the same system that MCA used in radio days.’ He said that he had been very familiar with MCA’s radio and band practices, and he said, ‘Now you have it. They are doing the same damn thing in television today.’”
The source said that James Petrillo—who had finally been replaced as national president of AFM by Herman Kamin in 1958 but kept control of his Chicago local—had been “tied in with Willie Bioff and racketeers. He said that he has absolutely no doubt but that our theory of the AFM contributing to the rise of MCA is correct. This would be reflected by the minutes of AFM … that it was his recollection that no big-band leader ever won a dispute against MCA.… He said that Stein and Petrillo were great buddies and they were the closest of associates. They always spoke very highly of one another. He is sure that Petrillo did favors for Jules Stein. He was not surprised to learn that Petrillo acquired a block of MCA stock.”
Posner noted that his source “became quite excited as the interview progressed. He said he had had a vast amount of experience in the big-band field. He was sure we wer
e correct in suspecting that AFM had contributed to the rise of MCA and to its eventual ‘lock’ on big bands.” When asked to compare the ethics of AFM with those of SAG, the source replied that he felt that there were many dishonest people in leadership positions in SAG, and that he “had long believed they did not really try to represent the rank and file of actors in their union. He said that we would find that Ronald Reagan was president of SAG at the time that MCA was given the waiver.… He was absolutely convinced that the Screen Actors Guild blanket waiver had contributed to MCA’s achieving dominance in the field of television film production.”7
Other sources began to corroborate what Posner’s industry source had told him about AFM and SAG. On June 7, he interviewed another top industry source, whom he described as “completely honest.” Swearing the source to secrecy about their conversation, Posner asked about the MCA-SAG waiver. The source replied that “at least one other talent agency had asked for a blanket waiver and had been refused.” He agreed with Posner that no company could become involved in film production without such a waiver and “thought it strange that only MCA had been granted this.”
Posner asked about Ronald Reagan. “Ronald Reagan,” the source said, “is a complete slave of MCA who would do their bidding on anything.” He added that he “would not be surprised to find that some type of consideration had passed between the top people in SAG and MCA to [cement] the deal.”
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