When the campaign began the men carried three days’ rations, and seven more days of ‘biscuit’ – in other words the dried black bread which was the staple of Russian regiments on the march – were in the regimental carts. This was what the regulations required and Kutuzov insisted that they were fully complied with. Large extra supplies were in the army’s wagon train to the rear of the marching columns. On 17 October the army’s chief victualling officer reported that he had sufficient biscuit to feed 120,000 men for twenty days – in other words until 6 November – and 20,000 quarters of oats for the horses.39
Well before the start of the autumn campaign Kutuzov had attempted to create a large mobile magazine to support the army’s advance. On 27 September orders had gone out to twelve provincial governors to form mobile magazines and send them to the army immediately, stressing that ‘extreme speed’ was crucial. Each magazine was to consist of 408 two-horse carts packed in equal measure with biscuit and groats for the soldiers and oats for their horses. The provincial nobility was to provide most of the food and the carts, as well as the ‘inspectors’ who were to organize and lead the magazines. The governors went through the inevitable process of summoning the noble marshals. As one of them reported to headquarters, ‘without the full cooperation of the marshals of the nobility nothing effective can be done’.40
With few exceptions the marshals did everything possible and the nobles volunteered the food and transport needed but the enemy was time and distance. Napoleon would have had to stay in Moscow for an extra month at least for mobile magazines from far-off Penza, Simbirsk and Saratov to arrive in time for the autumn campaign. In fact, however, the autumn campaign started even before the mobile magazines from less distant provinces could arrive. The first half of the Riazan mobile magazine, for instance, set off on 29 October, the first echelon of the Tambov mobile magazine on 7 November. Even these mobile magazines had a considerable journey to the army. Moreover they soon found themselves marching in its wake, behind its vast artillery train and through areas eaten out by the men and horses which had already passed. Soon the supply train began to eat its own food in order to stop men and horses from starving. Stuck in the rear with the supply train was also much of the winter clothing which Kutuzov had ordered the governors of nearby provinces to requisition for the army.41
In principle the mobile magazines should have been directed along march-routes which would intersect the advance of Kutuzov’s columns. Kutuzov did actually order the intendant-general of the combined First and Second armies, Vasili Lanskoy, to send all supplies from Tula towards the army’s line of march through the southern districts of Smolensk province. Just possibly if Barclay de Tolly and Georg Kankrin had been masterminding supply operations rather than Kutuzov, Konovnitsyn and Lanskoy the arrangements might have been more efficient but the task was difficult. Until the last week of October no one could know along which route Napoleon would retreat or Kutuzov would pursue him. Mobile magazines wrongly directed could fall into enemy hands. Once the campaign had begun the armies never stopped moving. Together with the distances involved, the pre-modern communications and the total inexperience of the noble inspectors who led the mobile magazines, this made coordination of army and supply column movements very hard.42
By 5 November Kutuzov acknowledged that ‘the rapid movement of the army in pursuit of the fleeing enemy means that the transport with food for the troops is falling behind and therefore the army is beginning to suffer a shortage of victuals’. As a result he issued detailed orders on where and how much to requisition from the local population, threatening anyone failing to cooperate with field courts martial. The problem, however, was that as the army approached Smolensk in mid-November it was entering an area ravaged by war and previously occupied by the enemy, where part of the population had fled to the forests, very many farms had been destroyed and there was no friendly local administration to help levy supplies. When they reached the area around the city of Smolensk many of Kutuzov’s troops began to go hungry for the first time in the campaign.43
The only major clash between regular Russian troops and Napoleon’s retreating army occurred at Viazma on 3 November. The various corps of Napoleon’s army retreating down the Smolensk highway were strung out over 50 kilometres. Miloradovich therefore attempted to cut off the French rearguard, commanded by Marshal Davout. The attempt failed, above all because Miloradovich was tightly constrained by Kutuzov’s cautious orders and the field-marshal refused to move up in his support with the army’s main body. The corps of Eugène de Beauharnais, Poniatowski and Ney were still close enough to help Davout, and together they well outnumbered Miloradovich’s force. Most of Davout’s corps therefore escaped but since the day ended with the Russians storming into Viazma and driving the enemy off the battlefield the Russian soldiers saw themselves as clear victors, which was good for their morale.
The battle of Viazma showed that there was still plenty of fight left in many of Napoleon’s troops but it also revealed his army’s growing weakness. For the first time in 1812, a clash between Kutuzov and Napoleon’s infantry resulted in much heavier French than Russian losses. Lieutenant Ivan Radozhitsky’s battery was part of Miloradovich’s force and fought at Viazma. He wrote that ‘our superiority was clear: the enemy had almost no cavalry and in contrast to previous occasions his artillery was weak and ineffective…we rejoiced in our glorious victory, and in addition saw our superiority over the terrible enemy’. Eugen of Württemberg wrote that at any time after the battle of Viazma a determined attack by the whole Russian army would have destroyed Napoleon’s force. But Kutuzov preferred to leave the job to the winter, which put in its first appearance three days after the battle.44
Subsequently Napoleon himself and some of his admirers were much inclined to blame the unusually cold winter for the destruction of his army. This is mostly nonsense. Only in December, after most of the French army had already perished, did the winter become unusually and ferociously cold. October had been exceptionally warm, maybe lulling Napoleon into a false sense of security. As sometimes happens in Russia, winter then came suddenly. By 6 November Napoleon’s men were marching through heavy snow. All the Russian sources say, however, that November 1812 was cold but seldom exceptionally so for this time of year. The main ‘trick’ played on Napoleon in this month by the weather was in fact the milder spell in the second half of November, which thawed the ice on the river Berezina and thereby created a major obstacle to his retreat. The basic point, however, is that Russian Novembers are cold, especially for exhausted men who sleep in the open, without even a tent, with very inadequate clothing, and with little food.45
Ivan Radozhitsky’s battery pursued the enemy down the Smolensk highway from Viazma to Dorogobuzh. He wrote that a mass of prisoners were taken and led away under Cossack escort but they still included very few officers. Dead and dying men littered the road in large numbers. For the Russian troops the sight of French soldiers eating often semi-raw horsemeat was deeply disgusting. Radozhitsky recalls one particularly awful scene of a French soldier frozen in death at the very moment he was trying to rip the liver out of a fallen horse. The Russian soldiers had no love for their enemy but even so pity often became the dominant feeling amidst such dreadful scenes. Things were not easy for the Russians themselves, however, let alone for their horses. Radozhitsky writes that there was no hay, his battery had exhausted its supply of oats and the exhausted animals were surviving on whatever scraps of straw could be scrounged. His soldiers did at least have fur jackets and felt boots, which had been distributed to his battery at the camp in Tarutino before the campaign began, but they had nothing to eat save biscuit and a very thin gruel. A growing number of sick and exhausted men dropped out of the ranks and by the time it turned off the highway and joined Kutuzov’s main body on 11 November very few infantry companies had more than eighty men. Nevertheless, buoyed by victory, their morale was excellent.46
Napoleon himself arrived in Smolensk on 9 November and left
five days later. For the soldiers retreating down the highway the city offered the hope of warmth, food and security. In different circumstances it might have been just that. Its stores contained plentiful food and until recently the fresh corps of Marshal Victor, 30,000 strong, had been located in Smolensk. The advance of Peter Wittgenstein had forced Victor to march to the support of Saint-Cyr and Oudinot, however, leaving the city with a feeble garrison, far too weak to protect the food-stores or impose order on the arriving horde of desperate soldiers from Moscow. Even the day before the main body of the Grande Armée arrived a senior commissariat officer in Smolensk was predicting disaster. Marauders were already trying to storm the magazines and he had almost no troops to stop them. Subsequently he wrote that the ‘regiments’ entering the city looked like convicts or lunatics and had lost all traces of discipline. The Guards took far more than their share, whereas those corps which arrived last received a pittance. Amidst the chaos, food which could have lasted a week was devoured in a day. Stores of food and spirits were stormed and looted, with his own men overwhelmed and often deserting in droves.47 Napoleon’s advance guard left Smolensk on 12 November and began the retreat westwards. His army’s immediate goal was to cross the river Dnieper at Orsha.
The emperor’s lack of cavalry made reconnaissance impossible and meant that he did not know Kutuzov’s whereabouts. In fact Napoleon’s delay in Smolensk, however essential, had enabled the main Russian enemy to catch up and move around the city to the south. By 12 November it was within Kutuzov’s power to place his whole army across the road to Orsha and force Napoleon to fight his way back to the Dnieper. Most Russian generals longed for Kutuzov to do this. They included Karl von Toll, who later said that if Kutuzov had acted in this way the great majority of the enemy army would have been destroyed, though no doubt Napoleon himself and a picked escort would have sneaked away.48
Kutuzov, however, remained true to his system of offering Napoleon a ‘golden bridge’. He refused to commit the bulk of his army to battle, and certainly not until he was sure that Napoleon and his Guards were safely out of the way. The last thing he wanted was to wreck the core of the Russian army in the life-and-death struggle that the French Guards would undoubtedly wage to save their emperor and themselves. Kutuzov’s caution inevitably affected his subordinates. Vladimir Löwenstern recalls how Baron Korff, the commander of much of the main army’s cavalry, cited Kutuzov’s words about a ‘golden bridge’ as a reason not to allow his corps to become too closely engaged with the French. Miloradovich was more direct. His subordinate, Eugen of Württemberg, was furious at being ordered to let the enemy pass, as he had also been told to do once before at Viazma. Miloradovich responded that ‘the field-marshal has forbidden us to get involved in a battle’. He added: ‘The old man’s view is this: if we incite the enemy to desperation, that will cost us useless blood: but if we let him run and give him a decent escort he will destroy himself in the course of a few days. You know: people cannot live on air, snow doesn’t make a very homely bivouac and without horses he cannot move his food, munitions or guns.’49
Kutuzov’s strategy is the key to understanding what happened in the so-called battle at Krasnyi between 15 and 18 November. In reality this was less a battle than an uncoordinated succession of clashes as Napoleon’s corps passed one after the other around the Russians on the same ground where Neverovsky’s detachment had held off Murat three months before. Napoleon sent his corps out of Smolensk at one-day intervals, which could have had serious consequences if Kutuzov had made a serious effort to intercept the retreat. Instead the Russian commander-in-chief watched happily as the French Guards and the remnants of the Polish and Westphalian corps brushed past him down the road from Smolensk to Orsha. By the evening of 15 November they had reached the village of Krasnyi. They were followed by the corps of Beauharnais and Davout: any thought Kutuzov might have had of intervening to block their retreat ended when Napoleon threatened to move back with part of his Guard to their rescue. Eugène and Davout therefore both escaped though only after losing hordes of men and almost all their remaining baggage and guns as they struggled down the highroad and cross country under fire from Miloradovich’s infantry and guns, and harassed by his cavalry. Most of the senior officers and staffs survived but as fighting units the corps of Eugène and Davout no longer existed after Krasnyi.
There remained only Michel Ney’s rearguard, which Napoleon was forced to abandon to its fate. Ney evacuated Smolensk on 17 November with roughly 15,000 men, of whom almost half were still in the ranks and ready for battle. By now Miloradovich’s corps was deployed across the road westward. After a number of desperate efforts to break through the Russian lines on 18 November failed, Ney’s corps disintegrated, with the overwhelming majority of its men killed or captured. Thanks to Ney’s courageous and inspiring leadership a hard core of 800 men evaded the Russians by taking to the woods, crossing the river Dnieper and rejoining Napoleon at Orsha on 20 November.50
Once Napoleon’s army had passed Kutuzov and crossed the river Dnieper at Orsha the Russian main army ceased to play an active fighting role in the 1812 campaign. Even had Kutuzov wished to catch up with Napoleon, there was no way that he could match the speed of the French retreat without wrecking his army. The old field-marshal was very happy with this situation. He regarded the ‘battle’ of Krasnyi as a triumph and as a vindication of his strategy. Well over 20,000 prisoners and 200 guns had fallen into Russian hands, and a further 10,000 enemy troops had been killed, at a minimal cost in his own soldiers’ lives. Captain Pushchin of the Semenovskys recalled that when Kutuzov visited the regiment to tell them the results of the battle ‘his face shone with happiness’. Pushchin added that after hearing Kutuzov’s account of guns, flags and prisoners taken, ‘the universal joy was immeasurable and we even cried a bit from happiness. A huge cheer thundered out which moved our old general.’51
Many Russian commanders on the other hand were deeply dissatisfied with the results of the battle, among them Prince Eugen of Württemberg.
He recalled that he met Kutuzov for the first time since the camp at Tarutino in a little village between Krasnyi and Orsha. The commander-in-chief knew of Eugen’s unhappiness and tried to justify his strategy, saying: ‘You don’t realize that circumstances will in and of themselves achieve more than our troops. And we ourselves must not arrive on our borders as emaciated tramps.’52
Kutuzov’s concern for his troops was well justified. Although in the first half of the campaign the main body suffered less than Miloradovich’s advance guard, by mid-November it too was under great strain. Forced to move themselves, their baggage and artillery down country roads in deep snow, the men were becoming exhausted. Many of them did not have adequate winter clothing, since some provinces’ wagons with fur coats and felt boots only arrived when the army reached Vilna. Food supplies were facing an emergency, with mobile magazines well in the rear and requisitioning becoming more and more difficult as they advanced through Smolensk province. Their next destination, Belorussia, fought over and plundered for six months, was unlikely to prove easier in this respect. Worst of all were medical services, which had almost collapsed under the strain of constant movement and enormous numbers of sick and wounded. The army’s medical officials and doctors were scattered along the army’s line of march, attempting desperately to set up temporary hospitals and procure medicines in a desert where no civilian authorities existed to help them and most buildings suitable as hospitals had been ruined.53
It may well be, however, that when Kutuzov spoke to Eugen he was thinking of more than just his army’s immediate material needs. He did not believe that Russian interests could simply be reduced to the defeat of the French Empire. Britain and Austria were at least as ‘natural’ rivals as France. Moreover, even if the Russians captured Napoleon himself, which was possible though unlikely, this was no guarantee of peace and stability in Europe. It took no foresight to realize that if French dominion collapsed, the other European states wou
ld be in sharp competition to inherit the spoils. Nor was it easy to predict what kind of regime might replace Napoleon in France. From French prisoners Kutuzov had heard of the attempted coup by General Malet, aimed at replacing the Bonapartes by a republic. If the 1790s were anything to go by, a French republic might be anything but pacific or stable. In a very uncertain world, the one clear point was that the defence of Russian interests rested with its army, for whose survival Kutuzov was responsible.54
By early November another factor was also becoming important for Kutuzov. He had always known that, in accordance with Alexander’s plan, Admiral Chichagov’s army was supposed to be heading for Minsk and the river Berezina to block Napoleon’s retreat. An old soldier like Kutuzov also knew, however, that grandiose plans which looked brilliant on paper had a way of going wrong when faced with war’s reality. This was what Clausewitz meant when in his great work on war he wrote of ‘friction’, and never was there more of it than in the winter of 1812. Throughout October and in the first days of November Kutuzov had no clear idea of Chichagov’s movements but was frustrated by their seeming slowness. On the very day that Napoleon left Smolensk, however, the commander-in-chief received a letter from Chichagov written in Pruzhany twelve days before. This letter detailed how successful Chichagov’s recent advance had been and stated that the admiral expected to be in Minsk by 19 November. One key point about Minsk was that it was Napoleon’s main food magazine in Belorussia. Another was that it was only 75 kilometres from Borisov and the vital bridge over which Napoleon’s army would try to cross the river Berezina.55
Russia Against Napoleon Page 35