Politically much more delicate was the decision to summon the provincial estates without the king’s consent, and to call up 33,000 men for the army and militia. Fortunately, while this was in train Stein received a coded message from the Prussian chancellor, Prince Karl August von Hardenberg which had been slipped through the French lines. This conveyed Frederick William’s support and announced that a treaty of alliance with Russia would soon be signed. This was the crucial breakthrough. For all the enthusiasm of the East Prussian estates, the province had less than a million inhabitants. To have any chance of defeating Napoleon the resources of the whole kingdom needed to be mobilized. Only Frederick William could do this.17
The king received the news of the convention of Tauroggen on 2 January 1813 while taking his afternoon walk in his garden in Potsdam. Frederick William detested Napoleon and feared that the French emperor intended to carve up Prussia. He liked and admired Alexander, and he distrusted Russian ambitions much less than those of Napoleon. On the other hand Frederick William was a great pessimist: as Stein put it, ‘he lacks confidence both in himself and in his people. He believes that Russia will draw him into the abyss.’ The king also quite simply hated having to make decisions. His natural inclination was to ask for advice and to vacillate. In particular, he thoroughly disliked the idea of further wars. This was partly out of honourable concern for his people’s welfare, but it also reflected his own entirely disastrous experience of defeat and frustration in 1792–4 and 1806–7.18
To do the king justice, he had good reason for nervousness and equivocation in January 1813. When he heard the news of Tauroggen the Russian armies were still hundreds of kilometres away in Poland and Lithuania. French garrisons on the contrary were scattered across Prussia, including a large one in Berlin. This dictated that Frederick William’s first public reaction must be to denounce the convention and to send messages to Napoleon pledging his continued loyalty. The king took advantage of Napoleon’s request to contribute more troops to the Grande Armée by levying extra recruits and expanding his army. On 22 January he himself, his family and the Guards regiments decamped from Potsdam and Berlin to the Silesian capital, Breslau. By so doing he achieved independence from the French and secured himself against kidnap. Since Breslau was right in the path of Russian armies advancing through Poland the king could put forward the half-plausible excuse that he was preparing Silesia’s defence.
Ideally Frederick William would have preferred an alliance with Austria to secure Germany as a neutral zone and stop the French and Russians fighting on his territory. A Prusso-Austrian alliance could also attempt to mediate a continental peace settlement which would restore to Vienna and Berlin much of the territory they had lost in 1805–9. With this goal in mind, the king’s trusted military adviser, Colonel Karl von dem Knesebeck, was sent to Vienna. He arrived on 12 January and stayed for no less than eighteen days.
At one level Knesebeck’s mission was a failure. The Austrians made it clear that they could not abandon the French alliance overnight and attempt immediately to impose mediation on the warring sides. The emperor’s honour and the completely unready state of their armies dictated a longer period of disengagement from the alliance with Paris. The basic point was that the Austrians had much more time for manoeuvre than the Prussians: Russian troops were not crossing the Austrian border, nor were Austrian generals threatening disobedience unless their sovereign changed his foreign policy.
On another level, however, Knesebeck’s mission was of great service. Both Metternich and Francis II promised categorically that they would reject Napoleon’s efforts to buy Austrian support against Prussia by offering her Silesia. They stressed that the two Germanic great powers must on the contrary both be restored to their pre-1805 dimensions in order to hold their own against France and Russia, thereby securing the independence of central Europe and the overall European balance of power. Far from opposing the Russo-Prussian alliance, the Austrians hinted that it seemed Prussia’s best option in the circumstances. Meanwhile, once ready, Vienna would put forward its own ideas for peace. Knesebeck concluded optimistically, and in a sense that went to the core of Russo-Prussian strategy in the spring and summer of 1813, ‘sooner or later Austria will go to war with France because the peace terms which she wants to achieve by mediation are unobtainable without war’.19
After reporting to Frederick William at Breslau, Knesebeck was sent on to Alexander’s headquarters. Before he would commit himself to Russia, the king needed reassurance on a number of points. Most basically, the Russians had to commit themselves to an advance which would liberate all of Prussian territory and allow the mobilization of its resources. Unless this was achieved it would be useless and suicidal for Frederick William to fight on Russia’s side since victory would be impossible and Prussia would become the inevitable target of Napoleon’s wrath. The king also sought confirmation that Russia would guarantee Prussian territory and her status as a great power.
Inevitably these complicated diplomatic manoeuvres took time and in the winter of 1812–13 time was of the essence. To some extent the spring 1813 campaign was a race between Napoleon and his enemies as to who could mobilize reinforcements and get them to the German theatre of operations most quickly. In this competition Napoleon had all the advantages. He arrived back in Paris on 18 December 1812 and began immediately to form a new Grande Armée. Even the mobilization of East Prussian manpower could not begin before early February 1813 and it was to be yet another month before Berlin and the heart of the Prussian kingdom fell to the allies. The Russian situation was of course different. There the levy of new recruits was already under way in the late autumn. But Russia’s immense size meant that it would take far longer to concentrate recruits in depots and deployment areas than was the case in France. Even after they had gathered in their training camps in the Russian interior they still faced marches of 2,000 kilometres or more to reach the Saxon and Silesian battlefields. There was never any doubt that Napoleon was going to win the race to get reinforcements to the field armies. The only issues were how wide the gap was going to be and whether Napoleon would be able to use it to achieve a decisive victory.
Frederick William’s diplomacy also delayed Russian military operations. Until the king allied himself with Russia the 40,000 men of Yorck and Bülow’s corps could not go into action against the French. In their absence, in January 1813 the Russian forces in the northern theatre were too weak to advance into the Prussian heartland. The two main Russian concentrations were Wittgenstein’s corps in East Prussia and the much-diminished core of Chichagov’s army near Thorn and Bromberg in northwest Poland. Both these Russian forces had been greatly weakened by months of ceaseless campaigning. In addition, very many of their troops had to be detached to besiege or blockade French fortresses. In Wittgenstein’s case this above all meant Danzig, to which he had to send 13,000 good troops under Lieutenant-General von Loewis. Since Loewis’s men were much outnumbered by the French garrison and had to beat off a number of sorties this was not a man too many, but without Loewis Wittgenstein had only 25,000 soldiers at his disposal.
Meanwhile on 4 February Mikhail Barclay de Tolly re-emerged to replace Chichagov as commander of the army besieging Thorn. Almost all Barclay’s troops were committed to the siege since Thorn was a major fortress commanding a key crossing of the Vistula and blocking all use of the river for transporting supplies. The only men Barclay could spare in the short run for an advance were Mikhail Vorontsov’s 5,000-strong detachment. Napoleon is often condemned for leaving so many good troops behind as garrisons for the Polish and Prussian fortresses, and, later in 1813 when these fortresses were blockaded by Russian militia and recruits this mistake became clear. In January and February 1813, however, matters were not so obvious. The detachment of so many front-line Russian troops to watch French fortresses offered the new French commander in the east, Eugène de Beauharnais, an opportunity to block the Russian advance into the Prussian heartland.
On 22 Janua
ry 1813 Aleksandr Chernyshev wrote to Kutuzov suggesting the formation of three ‘flying detachments’ which would raid deep into the French rear up to and beyond the river Oder. These raiding parties ‘will both have an impact on the indecisive Berlin cabinet and cover the main army in its quarters, since the latter after its glorious but difficult campaign absolutely must get some rest having reached the Vistula’. Chernyshev told Kutuzov that reconnaissance showed that many routes to the Oder and Berlin were open. The French losses, especially of cavalry, had been huge and the garrisons in their rear were too small and too immobile to cope with Russian raiders. He added that ‘all the information I have received’ argued that only when Russian troops reached the Oder ‘will this force Prussia to declare itself decisively in our favour’. There was not a moment to be lost: the French must be harried while they were still shaken and bewildered; they must not be given the opportunity to regain their senses, reinforce or reorganize themselves.20
Kutuzov and Wittgenstein took up Chernyshev’s suggestion and three flying columns were dispatched. The most northerly column was commanded by Colonel Friedrich von Tettenborn, a former Austrian officer and a German patriot who dreamed of raising the population of northwest Germany against Napoleon. Shortly after Tettenborn had crossed the Oder north of Kustrin, a second raiding party under Alexander Benckendorff got across south of that town. Both then carried out a number of attacks on French units and supplies in the Berlin region. Meanwhile Chernyshev himself began his operations further to the east, in the rear of Eugène’s headquarters in Posen, in the hope of causing such chaos that the viceroy would abandon this key position and fall back on the Oder. Together the three raiding parties numbered fewer than 6,000 men. Most were Cossacks but they included some squadrons of regular cavalry since, in Chernyshev’s opinion, ‘however good Cossack units are, they act with much more confidence if they see regular cavalry in support behind them’. None of the three parties contained infantry and only Chernyshev had horse artillery, though even in his case this only amounted to two guns.21
The Russians were greatly helped by the small numbers, low quality and poor morale of the enemy cavalry. Whatever enemy horsemen they encountered they destroyed. Chernyshev annihilated 2,000 Lithuanian lancers near Zirche on the river Warthe behind Posen, whom he bamboozled and attacked simultaneously from front and rear. A few days later Wittgenstein reported to Kutuzov that Benckendorff, operating along the road from Frankfurt on the Oder to Berlin, had ambushed and ‘destroyed almost the last unit of enemy cavalry, which even without this was very weak’. The Russian cavalry caused confusion along the French lines of communication, attacking infantry and recruit parties, destroying supplies, and intercepting correspondence. Inevitably this increased the already existing fear and confusion among French commanders. The extraordinary mobility of the Russian horsemen meant that their numbers were greatly exaggerated. Because they captured so many French couriers, the Russians on the other hand were very well informed about French deployments, numbers, morale and plans.22 Eugène decided to pull back and defend the line of the river Oder, a decision for which he was castigated by Napoleon at the time and by a number of subsequent historians.23 They were correct to suggest that it made no sense to string troops along the line of the Oder, especially at a time when vastly superior Russian cavalry could so effectively impede communication and cooperation between them. Eugène believed that the ice on the rivers was now melting, which would make the Oder defensible. In fact, however, even Chernyshev, well informed about where the ice remained strongest, just succeeded in getting across the Oder in time. He commented that the ice was very thin and the operation extremely risky but his troops’ morale by this time was so high that they were convinced that they could achieve wonders.24
Once all three raiding parties were across the river they harassed Marshal Pierre Augereau’s garrison in Berlin ceaselessly, at one point actually breaking right into the city centre. By now the Russians had captured so many French couriers that the enemy’s intentions were an open book to them. Wittgenstein was told that the French would abandon Berlin and retire behind the Elbe the moment any body of Russian infantry approached. Armed with this information, Wittgenstein hurried forward his corps’s advance guard – only 5,000 strong – under Prince Repnin-Volkonsky. Benckendorff rebuilt a bridge over the Oder for Repnin’s men and the Russian forces entered Berlin on 4 March to a tremendous reception. Wittgenstein reported to Kutuzov in triumphant mood that very day: ‘The victorious standards of His Imperial Majesty are flying over Berlin.’25
The liberation of Berlin and the retreat of the French behind the Elbe were very important. The capital’s recapture raised morale and the resources of all of Prussia could now be mobilized for the allied cause. Large French forces were being gathered by Napoleon and had Eugène been able to hang on for just a few more weeks the 1813 campaign would have started on the Oder, within range of rebellious Poland and Napoleon’s fortresses on the Vistula. That in itself would have reduced the chances of Austrian intervention. Instead the campaign began well to the west of the Elbe, gaining for the allies a number of precious weeks in which Russian reinforcements could approach and Austria could gird itself for battle.
A number of factors explain the French retreat. Among them should not be forgotten the outstanding performance of the Russian light cavalry and Cossacks. In his journal Chernyshev commented that in previous wars ‘partisan’ units had raided behind enemy lines to capture supply trains and take prisoners in order to gather intelligence. They had also attacked small enemy units. He added that in the 1813 campaign his own partisans did much more than this. For considerable periods they had cut enemy operational lines and stopped all movement and communication. Operating sometimes hundreds of kilometres ahead of the main Russian forces, they had created a complete fog around enemy commanders and in some cases had actually forced fundamental changes in enemy plans. With typical modesty, Chernyshev concluded that the commander of a ‘flying detachment’ needed great energy, presence of mind, prudence and ability to grasp situations quickly. Chernyshev had a penchant for self-advertisement and self-promotion worthy of Nelson. To do him justice, he also had Nelson’s boldness, tactical skill, strategic insight and capacity for leadership.26
Just five days before the fall of Berlin Frederick William finally buried his doubts and consented to the treaty of alliance with Russia. An officer on Kutuzov’s staff wrote that ‘in our negotiations with them [i.e. the Prussians] the news we often received about the successes of our advance guards which were already approaching the Elbe gave us great weight’. Nevertheless, negotiations were difficult almost to the end. The main reason for this was disagreement on the fate of Poland. Prussia had been a key beneficiary of the Polish partitions. It wanted back the Polish lands which Napoleon had forced it to concede at Tilsit, and argued that without this territory Prussia could not possess the strength or security essential for a great power. On the other hand, the events of 1812 had further confirmed Alexander in his belief that the only way to square the demands of Polish nationhood and Russian security was to unite as many Poles as possible in an autonomous kingdom whose ruler would also be the Russian monarch. At a time when Russia was expending huge amounts of blood and money to restore large territories to Austria and Prussia, and when Britain had made a clean sweep of the French and Dutch colonial empires, the emperor no doubt also felt that his empire should have some reward for his efforts.27
Baron vom Stein helped to smooth over the difficulties by travelling to Breslau to win over Frederick William. Stein himself disliked Alexander’s plans for Poland, which he thought were dangerous for Russian internal stability and a threat to Austrian and Prussian security. He also wondered whether the Poles, ‘with their serfs and their Jews’, were capable of self-government. But Stein knew that on this issue Alexander was adamant and he helped to broker a Russo-Prussian compromise.
Russia would guarantee all existing Prussian possessions and it would ensure that E
ast Prussia and Silesia were linked by a substantial and strategically defensible band of territory taken from the Duchy of Warsaw. The Russians also promised that they would commit all their strength to the war in Germany and would not make peace until Prussia was restored to the same level of power, territory and population as it had possessed before 1806. Article I of the Treaty of Kalicz’s secret clauses promised that Prussia would be fully compensated in northern Germany for any Polish territory it lost to Russia in the east. Unlike Napoleon, the Russians could not bribe the Prussians with Hanoverian territory, since this belonged to their ally, the British king. The only likely source of compensation was therefore Saxony, whose weakening or dismemberment would go down badly in Vienna. The Treaty of Kalicz therefore in part remained strictly secret and was storing up problems for the future.
For the moment, however, it was a satisfactory basis for Russo-Prussian cooperation. The main thrust of the treaty was its commitment to restoring Prussia as a great power, above all so it could check France but also perhaps in order to balance Austrian power in Germany. On this all-important issue the Russians were just as committed as the Prussians. In addition, although the preamble to the treaty contained its share of sanctimonious hypocrisy, its call for ‘the repose and well-being of peoples exhausted by so many disturbances and so many sacrifices’ was genuine and heartfelt. Add this to the friendship which existed between Alexander and Frederick William and there are the ingredients of a strong and lasting bond between the two states. Indeed in one form or another the Russo-Prussian alliance of February 1813 was to survive until the 1890s, forming one of the most stable and enduring elements in European diplomacy.28
Article VII of the treaty bound both Prussia and Russia to give top priority to bringing Austria into their alliance. This priority was to dominate not just allied diplomacy but even to some extent military strategy in the next three months. Austria, however, was intent on playing hard to get, and with good reason. The Austrians believed that they had borne the biggest share of fighting the French since 1793 and that they had been let down by the Prussians and Russians on a number of occasions and taken for granted by the British. This time they would exploit all the potential leverage of their position and not be rushed into anything.
Russia Against Napoleon Page 39