Russia Against Napoleon

Home > Other > Russia Against Napoleon > Page 74
Russia Against Napoleon Page 74

by Dominic Lieven


  14 Much the best source on Barclay’s background, values and early life is Michael and Diana Josselson, The Commander: A Life of Barclay de Tolly, Oxford, 1980.

  15 See e.g. the comments of Eugen of Württemberg: Eugen, Memoiren, vol. 1, pp. 274–7.

  16 Josselson, Commander, pp. 81–2. V. P. Totfalushin, M. V. Barklai de Tolli v otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda, Saratov, 1991, ch. 1.

  17 The law is in PSZ, 31, no. 24975, 27 Jan. 1812 (OS), pp. 43–164. Gavrilov, Organizatsiia, pp. 61 ff. discusses it in detail.

  18 The amendment is PSZ, 31, no. 25035, 13 March 1812 (OS), pp. 228–9. On the law, see P. A. Geisman, Svita Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva po kvartirmeisterskoi chasti v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I, SVM, 4/2/1, SPB, 1902, pp. 284 ff.

  19 The law on forming the 13 new regiments is PSZ, 30, no. 24505, Jan. 1811, pp. 537–43; the law on internal security is vol. 30, no. 24704, pp. 783–802. On the new regiments’ quality, see e.g. F. G. Popov, Istoriia 48-go pekhotnago Odesskago polka, 2 vols., Moscow, 1911, vol. 1, pp. 7–52; S. A. Gulevich, Istoriia 8-go pekhotnago Estliandskago polka, SPB, 1911, pp. 117–21.

  20 A collection of documents on the internal security troops was published in Moscow in 2002: Vnutrenniaia i konvoinaia strazha Rossii: Dokumenty i materialy. For English-language readers John LeDonne provides a short guide in Absolutism and Ruling Class, Oxford, 1991, pp. 132–9. P. E. Shchegoleva (ed.), Zapiski grafa E. F. Komarovskgogo, SPB, 1914, pp. 183–7, is very revealing about the formation of the internal security troops and Alexander’s attitude towards them. For Alexander’s views on Balashev, see ‘Zapiski Iakova Ivanovicha de Sanglena: 1776–1831 gg.’, RS, 37, 1883, pp. 1–46, at pp. 20–25.

  21 See in particular Lobanov’s letter to Alexander of 8 May 1814 (OS): RGVIA, Fond 125, Opis 1/188a, Delo 153, fo. 65. It is only fair to add that Lobanov wrote that some of these officers were excellent.

  22 In this period all regiments had so-called chiefs. They might be anything from colonels to senior generals. They bore responsibility for their regiment’s training, finances and administration. If they had no other job, then chiefs would actually command the regiment. In all circumstances they exercised a strong influence on their subordinate officers’ behaviour.

  23 Colonel Markov, Istoriia leibgvardii kirasirskago Eia Velichestva polka, SPB, 1884, pp. 199–201; E. K. Wirtschafter, From Serf to Russian Soldier, Princeton, 1990, pp. 97–8.

  24 M. A. Rossiiskii, Ocherk istorii 3-go pekhotnago Narvskago general-fel’dmarshala kniazia Mikhaila Golitsyna polka, Moscow, 1904, pp. 291–302.

  25 P. Voronov and V. Butovskii, Istoriia leibgvardii Pavlovskago polka 1790–1890, SPB, 1890, pp. 46–73; Popov, Istoriia 48go, vol. 1, pp. 26–8. For another example of how poor leadership contributed to desertion in individual squadrons, see Lt. Krestovskii, Istoriia 14-go Ulanskago Iamburgskago E.I.V. velikoi kniagini Marii Aleksandrovny polka, SPB, 1873, pp. 327–33.

  26 The latest British work on Wellington’s 95th Regiment makes these points convincingly: see Mark Urban, Rifles, London, 2003.

  27 Hon. George Cathcart, Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813, London, 1850, p. 7.

  28 On the regulations for training jaegers and recruits, see A. I. Gippius, Obrazovanie (Obuchenie) voisk, SVM, 4/1, book 2, SPB, 1903, pp. 76–7, 81–2. On the history of the jaegers, see e.g. Rantsov, Istoriia 96-go, pp. 1–36. The three-volume history of the Russian infantry by I. Ulianov, Reguliarnaia pekhota 1801–1855, Moscow, 1995–8, is a very useful summary of regulations, uniforms, weaponry and tactics: fortunately, it includes the jaegers. Lange, Gneisenau, pp. 130–31.

  29 The two light infantry regiments of the Guard have excellent histories which tell one a great deal about jaegers in this era: Istoriia leibgvardii egerskago polka za sto let 1796– 1896, SPB, 1896, and S. Gulevich, Istoriia leib gvardii Finliandskago polka 1806–1906, SPB, 1906.

  30 Mémoires de Langeron, Général d’Infanterie dans l’Armée Russe: Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814, Paris, 1902, pp. 74–5. On the 2nd Jaegers, see Rantsov, Istoriia 96-go, pp. 81–3. On the 10th Jaegers, see N. Nevezhin, 112-i pekhotnyi Ural’skii polk: Istoriia polka 1797–1897, Vilna, 1899, pp. 35–8.

  31 Digby Smith, Napoleon against Russia: A Concise History of 1812, Barnsley, 2004, p. 92. M. I. Bogdanovich, Istoriia otechestvennoi voiny 1812 goda, 3 vols., SPB, 1859–60, vol. 2, p. 456.

  32 I read all the issues of Voennyi zhurnal for 1810–12. It is impossible to cite them all.

  33 The two key works on the origins of the general staff are Geisman, Svita, SVM, and N. Glinoetskii, ‘Russkii general’nyi shtab v tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I’, VS, 17/10, Oct. 1874, pp. 187–250 and 17/11, Nov. 1874, pp. 5–43.

  34 Volkonsky’s former subordinate, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, damns him with faint praise: A. I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Memuary 1814–1815, SPB, 2001, pp. 156–7.

  35 Glinoetskii, ‘Russkii general’nyi shtab’, VS, 17/11, Nov. 1874, p. 11.

  36 RGVIA, Fond 489, Opis 1, Ed. Khr. 1, fos. 215 ff.

  37 All these statistics are drawn from S. V. Shvedov, ‘Komplektovanie, chislennost’ i poteri russkoi armii v 1812 godu’, in K 175-letiiu Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 g., Moscow, 1987, pp. 120–39. The older statistics provided in Geisman, Vozniknovenie, SVM, p. 298, are higher. As Adam Czartoryski commented, ‘I have so often seen in Russia 100,000 men on paper represented only by 65,000 effectives’: A. Gielgud (ed.), Memoirs of Prince Adam Czartoryski, 2 vols., London, 1888, vol. 2, p. 221.

  38 The basic rules on the structure and wartime deployment of regiments are in PSZ, 31, nos. 24400 and 24526, pp. 420–24 and 553–8.

  39 The likeliest reason for this was that the Guards veterans companies, the marine regiments and the many other military units and institutions in Petersburg provided a more than sufficient rear cadre so there was no need to leave the second battalions behind.

  40 For Alexander’s view, see SIM, 1, no. 56, Alexander to Essen, 3 Aug. 1812 (OS), pp. 46–7. When he arrived in Riga, General von Steinhel supported Essen’s view: ‘The troops here are reserve battalions, weak in numbers and inferior in combat-readiness to front-line units’: SIM, 13, no. 3, Steinhel to Arakcheev, 7 Sept. 1812 (OS), pp. 205–7.

  41 For picking one’s way through the complicated changes in policy and nomenclature as regards recruit depots and reserve formations, the outstanding Entsiklopediia on 1812 is immensely useful.

  42 The key document on the distribution of the fourth battalions is a memorandum attached to a letter of Alexander to Wittgenstein dated 3 Aug. 1812 (OS): SIM, 1, no. 58, pp. 47–9.

  43 On the Noble Regiment, see M. Gol’mdorf, Materialy dlia istorii byvshego Dvorianskago polka, SPB, 1882: the statistics are from p. 137. On attracting officers, see also A. N. Andronikov and V. P. Fedorov, Prokhozhdenie sluzhby, SVM, 4/1/3, SPB, 1903, pp. 2–9, 100–182.

  44 N. Shil’der, Imperator Aleksandr pervyi: Ego zhizn’ i tsarstvovanie, 4 vols., SPB, 1897, vol. 3, pp. 98–102. This will be covered in more detail in Ch. 7. The instructions to Lobanov to form twelve new regiments on the basis of voluntary contributions were enclosed in a letter from Barclay of 10 May 1812 (OS): RGVIA, Fond 125, Opis 1/188a, Delo 15, fos. 2–10. Estimates of costs are contained in a letter from the governor of Voronezh to Balashev on 24 June 1812 (OS): RGVIA, Fond 125, Opis 1/188a, Delo 16, fos. 92–3.

  45 MVUA 1812, 1/2, no. 1, pp. 1–6.

  46 For Wolzogen’s view, see his memorandum of 13 Oct. 1811 (OS) in MVUA 1812, 5, no. 139, Wolzogen to Barclay, pp. 273–9. For the minister’s own view that an offensive strategy was the better option, see e.g. a memorandum by him of Jan. 1811: MVUA 1812, 7, no. 16 (additional), pp. 187–9.

  47 MVUA 1812, 2, no. 56, Plan of Military Operations, Feb. 1811, pp. 83–93.

  48 Alexander of Württemberg’s useful memorandum is in MVUA 1812, 10, no. 143, pp. 253–75; for Bagration, see e.g. MVUA 1812, 12, no. 103, Bagration to Barclay, 12 June 1812 (OS), pp. 107–9; for Volkonsky, MVUA 1812, 11, no. 260, 29 April 181
2 (OS), pp. 324–33.

  49 There are very many documents on the difficulties of feeding the troops but see e.g. a report from Barclay to Alexander of 4 April 1812 (OS) in which he states that food and particularly fodder is a great problem, the roads are impassable, he cannot requisition since a state of war has not yet been proclaimed but has no money to buy food, and is keeping sickness rates down so long as the units are well dispersed; MVUA 1812, 11, no. 41, 4 April 1812 (OS), pp. 54–5.

  50 Again, there are very many memorandums on this theme in MVUA but the best summary of the problem is in I. G. Fabritsius, Glavnoe inzhenernoe upravlenie, SVM, 7, SPB, 1902.

  51 For Wolzogen’s views, see his memorandum above (n. 6). Bogdanovich, Istoriia…1812 goda, vol. 1, pp. 407–11, describes the terrain well. Oppermann’s report to Barclay is dated 10 Aug 1811 (OS): MVUA 1812, 4, no. 56, pp. 207–9.

  52 The two key works on the Pfühl plan in particular and Russian planning in general are V. M. Bezotosnyi, Razvedka i plany storon v 1812 godu, Moscow, 2005, pp. 85–108, and V. V. Pugachev, ‘K voprosu o pervonachal’nom plane voiny 1812 goda’, in K stopiatidesiatiletiiu otechestvennoi voiny, Moscow, 1962, pp. 31–46. I owe a great deal to both works.

  53 ‘Analiticheskii proekt voennykh deistvii v 1812 P. A. Chuikevicha’, in Rossiiskii arkhiv, 7, 1996, pp. 41–57.

  54 Josselson, Commander, pp. 41–2; Correspondance de l’Empereur Alexandre, no. 73, Alexander to Catherine, 18 Sept. 1812 (OS), pp. 86–93; Comte de Rochechouart, Souvenirs de la Révolution, l’Empire et la Restauration, Paris, 1889, pp. 167–8. Rostopchin’s letter is quoted in A. G. Tartakovskii, Nerazgadannyi Barklai, Moscow, 1996, p. 73.

  55 F. von Schubert, Unter dem Doppeladler, Stuttgart, 1962, pp. 212–13: ‘Russia would have been irretrievably lost’. Metternich: The Autobiography 1773–1815, London, 2004, p. 153. MVUA 1812, 7, prilozheniia, no. 21, ‘Plan voennykh deistvii’, Johann Barclay de Tolly, 1811, pp. 217–42, at p. 218.

  56 It is impossible to cite all this correspondence: see e.g. a typical letter from Lieutenant-General Baggohufvudt to Barclay, dated 9 Feb. 1812 (OS): MVUA 1812, 9, no. 50, p. 128.

  57 Most of these retreats are too famous to require references, but see C. Esdaile, The Peninsular War, London, 2002, p. 412, for the impact on British discipline of the retreat from Burgos (‘many units went to pieces’). The quote comes from Gordon Corrigan, Wellington: A Military Life, London, 2001, p. 227. For Bagration, see his letter to Alexander of 6 June 1812 (OS): MVUA 1812, 13, no. 57, pp. 48–50.

  58 See e.g. the comments by the historian of the Iamburg Lancer Regiment: Lieutenant Krestovskii, Istoriia…Iamburgskago…polka, pp. 102–3. The English-speaking reader will get some sense of Suvorov’s ‘doctrine’ from P. Longworth, The Art of Victory, London, 1965. Christopher Duffy, Russia’s Military Way to the West, London, 1981, is a very good introduction to the eighteenth-century Russian army’s history, including the evolution of its ‘doctrine’.

  59 MVUA 1812, 1/2, no. 60, Diebitsch to Barclay, 9 May 1810 (OS), pp. 87–91; the anonymous report is not dated but clearly originates from the winter of 1811–12: see MVUA 1812, 7, no. 13, pp. 175–83.

  60 C. F. Adams (ed.), John Quincy Adams in Russia, New York, 1970, p. 426. Longinov’s letter to S. R. Vorontsov is dated 28 July 1812 (OS): RA, 4, 1912, pp. 481–547, at p. 490.

  61 MVUA 1812, 16, no. 2, Alexander to Barclay, 7 April 1812 (OS), pp. 180–81, on the significance of the alliance and the impossibility now of a preemptive strike; 13, no. 190, Arenschildt to Münster, 22 May (3 June) 1812, pp. 189–94.

  62 MVUA 1812, 12, no. 260, Memorandum by Volkonsky, 29 April 1812 (OS), pp. 324–33.

  63 MVUA 1812, 13, no. 65, Barclay to Bagration, 6 June 1812 (OS), p. 56.

  64 MVUA 1812, 13, no. 94, pp. 96–7, and no. 103, pp. 107–9: Bagration to Barclay.

  65 MVUA 1812, 13, no. 57, Bagration to Alexander, 6 June 1812 (OS), pp. 48–50.

  Chapter 5: The Retreat

  1 Statistics from S. V. Shvedov, ‘Komplektovanie, chislennost’ i poteri russkoi armii v 1812 godu’, in K 175-letiiu Otechestvennoi voiny 1812 g., Moscow, 1987, p. 125.

  2 See Appendix 1. The table is drawn from MVUA 1812, 17, pp. 51–4.

  3 See e.g. Paulucci’s letter to Alexander of 14 July 1812 (OS) in MVUA 1812, 14, no. 130, pp. 128–9.

  4 For biographical information on Toll, see D. N. Shilov, Gosudarstvennye deiateli Rossiiskoi imperii, SPB, 2001, pp. 671–4. The comments are drawn from N. Murav’ev, ‘Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muraveva’, RA, 3, 1885, pp. 5–84, at p. 81.

  5 P. Grabbe, Iz pamiatnykh zapisok: Otechestvennaia voina, Moscow, 1873, pp. 17–19, 60, 74–7.

  6 Murav’ev, ‘Zapiski’, p. 53. P. Pototskii, Istoriia gvardeiskoi artillerii, SPB, 1896, pp. 155–6.

  7 Ludwig von Wolzogen, Mémoires d’un Général d’Infanterie au service de la Prusse et de la Russie (1792–1836), Paris, 2002, pp. 106, 115. V. von Löwenstern, Mémoires du Général-Major Russe Baron de Löwenstern, 2 vols., Paris, 1903, vol. 1, pp. 217, 247–8.

  8 SIM, 5, nos. 1 and 2, Ermolov to Alexander, 1 and 10 Aug. 1812, pp. 411–17. V. Kharkevich (ed.), 1812 god v dnevnikakh, zapiskakh i vospominaniiakh sovremennikov, 4 vols., Vilna, 1900–1907, vol. 1, p. 183 (‘Iz zapisok Vistitskago’).

  9 S. N. Golubeva (ed.), General Bagration: Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Moscow, 1945, no. 102, Ermolov to Bagration, 30 June 1812 (12 July NS), pp. 189–90. There is a vast literature on the Decembrists, much of which discusses Ermolov: see e.g. M. A. Davydov, Oppozitsiia ego velichestva, Moscow, 1994. For Alexander’s comment: ‘Zapiski Iakova Ivanovicha de Sanglena: 1776–1831 gg.’, RS, 37, 1883, pp. 1–46, 539–56, at p. 551.

  10 See, above all, R. I. Sementkovskii, E. F. Kankrin: Ego zhizn’ i gosudarstvennaia deiatel’nost’, SPB, 1893.

  11 Correspondance de l’Empereur Alexandre, no. 73, Alexander to Catherine, 18 Sept. 1812 (OS), pp. 86–93. For Alexander’s key statement on the need to beware public opinion, see VS, 47/1, 1904, no. 19, Alexander to Barclay, 24 November 1812 (OS), pp. 231–3.

  12 On Wittgenstein, see MVUA 1812, 13, no. 173, Barclay to Alexander, 18 June 1812 (OS), pp. 183–4; Baggohufvudt’s letter is quoted in I. I. Shelengovskii, Istoriia 69-goRiazanskago polka, 3 vols., Lublin, 1911, vol. 2, p. 143.

  13 Mémoires du Général Bennigsen, 3 vols., Paris, n.d., vol. 3, p. 77; see Mémoires de Langeron, Général d’Infanterie dans l’Armée Russe: Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814, Paris, 1902, e.g. p. 35, for the view that Bennigsen was Russia’s best tactician.

  14 On Barclay’s frustrating efforts to create a mobile magazine, see e.g. V. P. Totfalushin, M. V. Barklai de Tolli v otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda, Saratov, 1991, pp. 29–31.

  15 See Pushchin’s diary: V. G. Bortnevskii (ed.), Dnevnik Pavla Pushchina: 1812–1814, Leningrad, 1987, pp. 46–7. Aleksei Nikitin, for instance, notes that most of the Polish Lancer Regiment deserted at Vitebsk: ‘Vospominaniia Nikitina’, in Kharkevich (ed.), 1812 god, vol. 2, pp. 140–41. This may be an exaggeration.

  16 M. M. Petrov, ‘Rasskazy sluzhivshego v 1-m egerskom polku polkovnika Mikhaila Petrova o voennoi sluzhbe i zhizni svoei’, in 1812 god: Vospominaniia voinov russkoi armii, Moscow, 1991, pp. 112–355, at pp. 176–7.

  17 N. E. Mitarevskii, Rasskazy ob otechestvennoi voine 1812 goda, Moscow, 1878, pp. 13–23. The story about the priests comes from the reminiscences of Ivan Liprandi, the quartermaster general of Sixth Corps: Kharkevich, 1812 god, vol. 2, p. 5: ‘ZamechaniiaI. P. Liprandi’. 18 MVUA 1812, 13, no. 203, Uvarov to Alexander, 19 June 1812 (OS), pp. 206–7.

  19 Armand de Caulaincourt, At Napoleon’s Side in Russia, New York, 2003, p. 43. V.M. Bezotosnyi, Razvedka i plany storon v 1812 godu, Moscow, 2005, pp. 58–9, 100–101.

  20 Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, 32 vols., Paris, 1858–70, vol. 24, no. 18925, Napoleon to Clarke, 8 July 1812, pp. 33–4.

  21 On Orlov’s mission, see e.g. the diary of Nikolai Durnovo for 21 and 22 June 1812 (OS), in A. G. Tartakovskii (ed.), Voennye dnevniki, Moscow
, 1990, pp. 79–80.

  22 Grabbe, Iz pamiatnikh, pp. 22–35.

  23 MVUA 1812, 13, no. 296, Barclay to Alexander, 25 June 1812 (OS), pp. 302–3 and no. 323, 27 June 1812 (OS), pp. 331–3.

  24 On the engineers, see I. G. Fabritsius, Glavnoe inzhenernoe upravlenie, SVM, 7, SPB, 1902, pp. 392–5.

  25 See the discussion in Bezotosnyi, Razvedka, pp. 112–13, where it is argued that the so-called Pfühl plan was a cunning ploy on Alexander’s part to avoid responsibility for a policy of strategic withdrawal which he considered necessary but did not want to acknowledge.

  26 Löwenstern, Mémoires, vol. 1, p. 208. MVUA 1812, 17, Alexander to Bagration, 5 July 1812 (OS), pp. 275–6. Shishkov reproduces the letter to Alexander in his memoirs and discusses the conversations between the three men: N. Kiselev and I. Iu. Samarin (eds.), Zapiski, mneniia i perepiska Admirala A. S. Shishkova, 2 vols., Berlin, 1870, vol. 1, pp. 141–8.

  27 For Bagration’s ‘system’, see e.g. his order of the day to his troops of 7 July 1812 and his earlier letter to Arakcheev: General Bagration, nos. 95, pp. 179–80, and 103, which is simply dated June 1812 and is on pp. 190–91. For his proposed diversion, see MVUA 1812, 13, no. 120, Bagration to Alexander, 26 June 1812, pp. 131–3.

  28 I. Radozhitskii, Pokhodnyia zapiski artillerista s 1812 po 1816 god, 3 vols., Moscow, 1835, vol. 1, p. 67.

  29 See e.g. Löwenstern, Mémoires, vol. 1, p. 209. In defence of Ostermann-Tolstoy, see I. I. Lazhechnikov, ‘Neskol’ko zametok i vospominanii po povodu stat’i “Materialy dlia biografii A. P. Ermolova”’, Russkii vestnik, 31/6, 1864, pp. 783–819. On Ostermann-Tolstoy’s appearance, see Serge Glinka, Pis’ma russkogo ofitsera, Moscow, 1987, p. 316.

  30 On the Ingermanland Dragoons, see V. I. Genishta and A. T. Borisovich, Istoriia 3-go dragunskago Ingermanlandskago polka 1704–1904, SPB, 1904, pp. 172–5, and prilozhenie 7. One cannot be absolutely sure that all five promoted NCOs were not nobles but they were certainly not junkers, in other words officer cadets. See G. P. Meshetich, ‘Istoricheskie zapiski voiny rossiian s frantsuzami i dvadtsat’iu plemenami 1812, 1813, 1814 i 1815 godov’, in Vospominaniia voinov russkoi armii: Iz Sobraniia otdela pis’mennykh istochnikov gosudarstvennogo istoricheskogo muzeia, Moscow, 1991, pp. 39–102, at pp. 42–3.

 

‹ Prev