by John Barron
As to industry, just some brief comments on some major problems. Because of rapid growth we have achieved a tremendous level of capital investment in industry. We need to supply all this new industry, and this is why the smallest lagging behind even in one industry, for example, the electrical, has its effects. Because of this tremendous growth, we always have problems. This growth means we need new scientific centers, cadre, etc. We have to be alert to science and technology in other countries. At the same time, we must train engineers and skilled workers for these new industries…
To build our industry, the idea came up to place new plants near the raw materials. As a result, there are new cities where the raw materials are located. This has created problems because it was necessary to build apartments, schools, airports, trollies, railways, stadiums, etc.; this is just another of our problems.
One of the most important problems is creating incentives for greater production and quality. Gradually, we have started to shift work to a five-day week. This again creates its own problems as to how to use equipment, which is idle on these [off] days, in the interest of society, and yet at the same time provide the worker with two days of rest.
In surveying the economy, Brezhnev was dispassionate; when he talked of China, his voice hardened with anger:
We have not lost [any of] our friends in the world except in China… China’s policy hinders our common effort and helps the U.S. aggressive position. The recent policy of China has been to try to influence Indonesia, other countries of Asia, events in Africa and even to interfere in Cuba. These policies as uttered by Chen Yi and Liu Shao-Chi ended in failure. In Indonesia, they resulted in the destruction of the Communist Party… The economic policies of China are a complete failure. All their leaps and communes accomplished was to throw their economy back to the year 1958. These are their figures.
We have no contact with the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. We have only a sketchy picture. In 1960, the Chinese were actively putting forward four points, 20 points, 40 points about banning nuclear weapons and other world issues. Now they are silent. During the past period, there was the impression held by some that if the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reached agreement with the Chinese Communist Party, everything would be all right. Some also felt that the situation between the Chinese Communist Party and Communist Party of the Soviet Union was from bad things done by the Soviet Communist Party. Now, everyone sees that is not merely a question between us and China. How they used to shout about “great power chauvinism.” But today things are much clearer and people understand. The Chinese would not mind unleashing a war provided others do the fighting. The Chinese work day and night to stir up conflicts between Parties. They are crude and vulgar.
In a laudatory evaluation of SOLO intelligence, the CIA wrote, “Whoever this source is, he obviously has back-room access.” While anything Brezhnev confided to Morris was interesting or important to American analysts, Morris’ private conversations with Suslov, Ponomarev, Mostovets, and others in “back rooms” frequently revealed more. Ponomarev two days later gave Morris an even better understanding of Soviet attitudes and intentions toward China:
We foresee no reconciliation with the Chinese… We are against a split in the communist movement; at the same time fear of a split will not cause us to give in on any matter of principle. We will continue to fight for our line… The Chinese Communist Party has its strategic plan to split all the communist parties and establish communist parties under its leadership. They seek to split off from five to ten people and then call them a Party. Already, we have examples of this in Brazil, Chile, Belgium, Switzerland and other countries. This action is worse than anything the Trotskyites ever did. That is why it is very important to expose them… There are some Parties that now agree with the Chinese. Some of these same Parties could not be bought or influenced by the bourgeoisie. Obviously, the Chinese succeeded where the bourgeoisie failed…
One argument of the enemy is that there are no national Parties. The Chinese Communist Party says that the Communist Party of the U.S.A. is an agent of Moscow. So if Moscow asks that polemics subside or stop and your Party automatically stops such polemics without consideration of principles, this would indicate to them that you were following the baton of Moscow. Besides, the Chinese Communist Party is acting in such a way that we may have to intensify our polemics…
The Chinese haven’t the slightest understanding as to what is happening in capitalist countries today but they are establishing closer relations with the capitalist countries and class. This is happening in Japan, England, France and West Germany. I want to point out to your Party that some U.S. monopolies are also establishing closer ties with the Chinese. They are doing this through establishments in Japan and other places…
George Picheau (phonetic), a representative of French business, was recently received by Premiere Chou En Lai and he was very attentive to the representative of French business. He told him France should not be worried about their recognition of Formosa. He then suggested perhaps the French not only might be interested in opening a trade mission in Peking but also possibly an embassy. If France was not ready for diplomatic relations, Chou En Lai noted that the trade mission could act with ambassadorial powers.
Now let me give you a little detail or story. As you know, information from China is not always complete or reliable.
Top Soviet leaders personally briefed Morris and allowed him to study top-secret documents for several reasons. They wanted to explain their problems, positions, and objectives; they wanted him to understand the rationale behind their orders to the American party so that he more effectively could implement them; and they sometimes wanted his advice. It was a given that he could make notes to aid his memory; he was not supposed to copy a document or reproduce a briefing verbatim in writing. Normally, he and Eva had a fallback or cover story, if by mischance the handwritten copies and overly voluminous notes were discovered: The writings were intended for Hall; they were concealed on their persons to avoid detection by Western customs inspectors; and, oh, he really did not realize there was a limit to how much he should write. On this mission (the twenty-first), such excuses would not be plausible because Hall was along, and as the contraband of Soviet secrets he put on paper grew, so did his apprehensions.
After writing until almost 4 A.M., he lay down exhausted, but anxiety and tension deprived him of sleep. In the morning his frail and ghostly appearance caused Ponomarev to propose that before flying home he rest at a Kremlin resort. Ponomarev even offered to go with him. “You know, we always worry about your health and we both work too much.” Morris thought that Ponomarev was sincere, that he was speaking as a real and considerate friend. However, the gesture left him utterly unmoved.
While outwardly accepting the friendship of Ponomarev, Suslov, Mostovets, Andropov, and Brezhnev, Morris regarded none of the Soviet oligarchs as a friend. In myriad conversations with the FBI, he made it a point of honor never to refer to any of them as a friend or comrade or by any other appellation connoting respect or goodwill. He once said to Boyle, “God may forgive them for what they have done; I can’t.” Eva recalls only one occasion during their long and loving marriage when Morris angrily lashed out at her. He was trying to decompress in Geneva, and they were walking along the lakeshore on a clear, cool evening. She remarked that a Politburo member who invited them to dinner at his dacha doted on his grandchildren. “Anyone who cares so much about children must be a nice man,” she said innocently.
“Never talk like that!” he shouted. “That man has the blood of hundreds of thousands of people on his hands and he never can wash it off. How do you think he got where he is? Never forget. We are dealing with mass murderers.”
Still, under other circumstances he would have gone off with Ponomarev, because during a few days with him on the Black Sea he could have learned a lot. However, two months in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the stress of stealing secrets while feigning indifference to
them, and the burden of toadying to the insufferable Hall had drained him physically and mentally. Besides, he already was surfeited with information he believed the U.S. government needed to know. So he told Ponomarev that he previously had booked reservations for a vacation in Florida and that Eva would be sorely disappointed if they had to cancel their plans and forfeit deposits.
Because the Soviets did not want Morris to be seen in public with Hall, who was listed on customs and immigration records throughout the West as an ex-felon and prominent communist, Morris was able to make the trip back to the United States alone. Hall always flew first class and insisted that Morris, his “Secretary of State,” and Eva do the same. Morris felt a little guilty whenever he settled into the spacious forward cabin of a Boeing 707 or 747. Considering his age, his physical condition, how often he flew, the distances he traveled, and the fact that Soviet money usually paid for his tickets, such feelings were unwarranted. Yet, he thought, Here is a country that can’t afford to give most of its children an orange or banana, and it’s spending money on first-class tickets.
In Switzerland, he sorted through all he had learned and formulated for the FBI an analysis of Soviet–Chinese relations.
By the mid-1960s, public demonstrations, published articles, and border clashes provided visible evidence of Chinese animus toward the Soviet Union. But there remained in the American intelligence community those who argued that these indicators were superficial shams devilishly concocted to dupe the West. Other analysts held that despite the obvious differences between China and the Soviet Union, there still was much more to unite them than divide them and that in their mutual interests the most powerful communist nations eventually would negotiate an end to their disputes.
This long had been the Soviet view and hope. The documents Morris saw and the statements Soviet leaders made to him revealed that it no longer was. Ponomarev unequivocally declared that there was no possibility of reconciliation. The Soviets were resolved not to modify their basic positions even if adherence to them meant widening the breach with the Chinese. They were contemplating intensifying their ideological counterattack on China and were urging foreign parties to do likewise.
Mao rudely had told the Soviets to their face that the Chinese had no desire to settle their differences, that they were determined to maintain the split, and that Chinese ideological assaults would continue for a hundred or a thousand years. The Chinese aspired to shatter the worldwide communist movement dominated by the Soviet Union and out of the shambles build a movement dominated by them. They were making subtle, covert diplomatic and trade overtures to the West, and they consciously were accepting clandestine commercial ties with the United States through third countries.
In the Chicago cover office, Morris undertook to explain to Boyle the thinking of both the Soviets and Chinese. The Soviets envied the economic and technological prowess of the United States and feared its military might. They would continue to be its enemy, to try to equal or surpass it militarily, and to outmaneuver it internationally. In the internal lexicon of the International Department, the KGB, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United States for years had been referred to as the “Main Enemy” (Glavny Vrag), and the lesser informed still used that term. But the Soviets believed that the United States would act rationally and that when necessary they could have logical talks with the American government. On the other hand, the Soviets now hated the Chinese and did not count upon them to behave rationally. Americans were not clawing at the Soviets’ borders or laying preposterous claims to large swaths of their territory, and anti-Soviet statements emanating from the United States sounded positively decorous compared to the vitriol spewing out of Peking and out of Chinese embassies around the world. If the Soviets launched a nuclear strike against any country, it would be China.
As for the Chinese, ideology and dogma committed them to public enmity toward the United States, and for the time being they would oppose American interests on many fronts, including Vietnam. But their assistance to North Vietnam would be measured and limited and would entail no action that might precipitate military conflict with the United States; hence their refusal to coordinate aid with the Soviets, allow Soviet aircraft to fly over Chinese territory, or permit Soviet ships to unload supplies for Vietnam in Chinese ports. The Chinese did not believe that the United States threatened their territory or sovereignty. Morris recalled that in 1958 or 1959 Chou En Lai said to him that, if political philosophies were set aside, China and the United States as nations were not natural enemies. The Chinese did feel threatened by the Soviets, and they looked upon Soviet rulers as traitors to communism, as naked imperialists who were greedier than the Europeans or Americans because they were needier. Daily, the Chinese party tried to indoctrinate the entire Chinese population with the conviction that the Soviet Union was the “Main Enemy.”
There was in the data and analysis Morris supplied an implicit and instructive message for American policymakers: When playing poker with the Soviets, play the China card; when dealing with the Chinese, play the Soviet card. Ultimately, the message was heard, comprehended, and acted upon.
After filing all the reports of a mission and answering consequent questions from Washington, Boyle and Morris customarily sat down and reviewed the mission again, dwelling upon incidents and details not incorporated into the reports. These reviews sometimes stimulated insights more enlightening than many of the specifics reported to headquarters, and, in going over the statements Brezhnev made to him and Hall, Morris articulated one of them: Ideology could blind the Kremlin to reality.
Brezhnev cited as a major advantage of Soviet agriculture the fact that it was “socialized”; however, this was the root cause of the chronic agricultural problems. That should have been obvious to Brezhnev and everybody else. Peasants were allowed to till tiny private plots as they judged best and sell for their own profit whatever they grew. While these plots constituted less than 1.5 percent of the land under cultivation in the Soviet Union, they yielded more than half the potatoes and eggs and a third of the vegetables produced in the entire country. The clear reality was that, left to their own devices and given incentives, Soviet farmers could produce prodigiously; the heavily regulated and bureaucratized collective and state farms could not, as they annually demonstrated. No amount of tinkering with this congenitally inefficient and irredeemable system could change this reality. Brezhnev really seemed to believe that by throwing out a few little sops he had brightened overnight the mood of peasants across the land. Indeed, he depicted them as being so overjoyed that by the millions they had taken to their desks, pen in hand, to compose letters of gratitude. The reality was that nothing had changed. The peasants still were enserfed in mean huts on primitive and frequently isolated collectives where almost nobody gave a damn about what was produced or whether machinery ever was repaired or whether crops rotted in open fields. However, ideology decreed that the system of state and collective farms was the best; ergo, it was the best and Brezhnev boasted of it as an “asset.”
“Some day that kind of thinking could be dangerous,” Boyle remarked.
“Yes, it could be,” Morris said. “Look at what it’s cost them already.”
nine
PLAYING WITH THE KGB
NIKOLAI TALANOV STOPPED HIS car at the edge of a deserted lane that wound through the woods and estates of Westchester County, raised the hood, and focused a flashlight on the engine as if trying to ascertain what was wrong. Another car approached and its headlights blinked a message. He is coming. As far as we can determine, you have not been followed. It was a given that the driver of the second car and his female companion would be watching and guarding from down the lane.
Jack parked behind Talanov, got out, and asked, “Do you need help?”
The FBI had difficulty making Jack pay attention to details he considered mundane or inconsequential. But if Jack sensed that he was to be a central actor in a grand scheme or scam, he acted out his role enthusiasticall
y, and that night he followed the FBI script flawlessly. The script was written to minimize potential threats to SOLO.
Because of atmospheric vagaries, the KGB in Manhattan sometimes could not hear radio transmissions from Moscow. The FBI, with the best equipment in the world, always received them and passed the decrypted contents to Jack. Why could Jack always hear the transmissions when the KGB could not? The KGB, the International Department in Moscow, and Gus Hall collectively were levying upon Jack more tasks than one man reasonably could be expected to perform. How could Jack do so much and do everything unerringly? How could he, upon doctors’ orders, periodically retreat to Florida in the winter and still get back to New York whenever something needed to be done? The FBI feared that sooner or later the KGB would ask such questions.
Having identified the problems, the FBI proposed a solution in the form of NY-4309S*, code named “Clip.” An American of Russian descent, Clip was an accomplished radioman and photographer. During the 1930s he served as a Comintern agent and throughout Western Europe taught members of the communist underground how to set up and use clandestine radio transmitters and receivers. After the United States entered World War II, he volunteered for the Marine Corps and served honorably. Morris once said of Walt Boyle, “You can take the boy out of the Marine Corps, but you can’t take the Marine Corps out of the boy,” and that was also true of Clip. After the war, Clip approached the FBI, reported his communist past, offered his services to the United States, and became a reliable, productive FBI asset.
If the KGB could be swindled into enlisting Clip as an assistant to Jack, his presence would largely answer the questions the FBI feared. He lived a considerable distance outside New York, and atmospheric conditions there well might differ from those around the KGB radio room in midtown Manhattan. If the Soviets asked Jack why he heard transmissions they could not hear, he could say that Clip picked them up. Soviet files would portray Clip as an experienced, skilled conspirator; the Comintern had trusted him with knowledge of much of the European underground before the war, and he had vindicated that trust; surely he now could be trusted to relay radio messages and service drops.