by John Lynch
Conference in Guayaquil
Guayaquil, now independent of the enemy, was a focus of interest from its friends. To which of its larger neighbours did it belong? San Martín wanted it for Peru, though he acknowledged its right to decide its own political future. Bolívar claimed it for Colombia on the ground that the presidency of Quito had belonged to the viceroyalty of New Granada, and he did not regard the matter as negotiable. He made his position absolutely clear in January 1822 when he abandoned his plan to take the Guayaquil route to Quito but not his claim to sovereignty over Guayaquil. ‘I would have you know,’ he informed the president of Guayaquil, ‘that Guayaquil is part of the territory of Colombia; that a province does not have the right to leave a union to which it belongs.’15 Colombia wanted Quito, and Quito needed Guayaquil; economically the highlands had no other outlet to the sea. Bolívar had to use all his manipulative skills in dealing with petty politics and politicians in Guayaquil, divided into three factions, claimants for independence, for Peru, and for Colombia, but he also spoke frankly to them, playing on the need to save Guayaquil from mob rule: ‘Alone you find yourself in a false, ambiguous, and absurd position. You are threatened with anarchy. I bring you salvation.’ And on 13 July he decreed the formal incorporation of Guayaquil into Colombia, subsequently confirmed by ‘vote’ of the guayaquileños.16 Taking into his own hands the civil and military government of the province, Bolívar now awaited the arrival of San Martín.
San Martín was five years older than Bolívar and came from a different milieu.17 He was the son of Spanish parents, born in Yapeyú on 25 February 1778 in the remote Misiones province of the Río de la Plata, where his father was a military officer in the colonial service. His twenty–two years in the Spanish army, the last three on active service in the Peninsular War, gave him a combination of talents unique among all the liberators: military skill as a strategist and tactician, a knowledge of enlightened ideas, and an authority born of participation in some of the crucial events of modern history. But he was an American by birth and in 1812 he returned to Buenos Aires to join the struggle against Spain and, within a few years, to give that struggle a new strategy. This was based on the thesis that the South American revolution could not be secure until the heart of Spanish power in Peru had been destroyed, that Peru could not be invaded directly by land from northern Argentina, and that the way ahead was by a flanking movement across the Andes to Chile, then up the Pacific in a seaborne invasion of Peru. His Plan Continental was to establish a base in Mendoza, cross the Andes, defeat the Spaniards in Chile and then dispatch a further expedition to emancipate Peru. This he carried out with a genius for organization and planning, which perhaps only Bolívar could equal. San Martín went to Peru to wage a war not of conquest but of ideas, a war for the minds and hearts of Peruvians. Events seemed to vindicate his thesis of revolution without war. Lima and coastal Peru joined his cause, and on 28 July 1821 Peruvian independence was proclaimed. For the next year San Martín ruled as Protector, but he did not rule all Peru. In the sierra there was a powerful royalist army, and soon Peruvians began to dispute among themselves.
Political opposition to San Martín was growing. His closest associate, Bernardo de Monteagudo, was hated by many for his hard line against Spaniards. He also influenced the Protector’s monarchism, which appealed to some Peruvians such as the marquis of Torre Tagle, but alienated many others. The liberal wing of Peruvian politics had not spearheaded the independence movement, but now it sought to impose its views on the independent state. While they frustrated San Martín’s political plans, the Peruvians also withheld the military help that he needed to end the war; indeed they resented his unemployed army and the financial burden which it imposed. And the viceregal forces remained intact. How could San Martín escape from this stalemate? How could he solve his political problems and end the military impasse? Leaving his ally Torre Tagle in executive command, he went to Guayaquil to confer with the liberator of the north. Yet an approach to Bolívar raised more problems than it solved. Bolívar was approaching the peak of his career: he too had liberated more than his native land and, while not without problems, he had recent victories and a successful army behind him. San Martín, on the other hand, was conscious that his position in Peru was weak. He had not won sufficient territory, his forces seemed to be losing the war, and the Spaniards had turned stubborn over negotiations. He could count on no further support from the Chileans, and the leadership in Buenos Aires was frankly hostile. Moreover, to visit Bolívar brought into question the whole basis of military collaboration; it exacerbated the issue of monarchy versus republic and introduced a new problem, the status of Guayaquil.
Guayaquil was a naval base, a shipbuilding centre, and a major port. Strategically and commercially it was indispensable to the revolution. At the end of 1821 San Martín had some bargaining power, for Bolívar was held up on his approach to Quito and needed the help of the division seconded by San Martín under the command of Colonel Andrés Santa Cruz. But Bolívar continued to treat Guayaquil as his own, and after the decisive victory at Pichincha in May 1822, which won Quito for the northern revolution, he entered Guayaquil in person with his army behind him. Bolívar approached the interview with San Martín, therefore, from a position of superior strength, which he never allowed him to forget. In the euphoria of Carabobo he had offered collaboration to the liberator of the south with the double–edged remark: ‘I hope to heaven that the services of the Colombian army will not be necessary for the peoples of Peru.’18
Now, in June 1822, he offered to reciprocate the military help he had received from San Martín with ‘even stronger aid to the government of Peru’, and expressed his willingness to lead his army into Peru. But there was steel in his voice on the status of Guayaquil. He told the Protector that it was not for one part of a nation to dictate the national sovereignty but for the people as a whole: ‘The interests of a small province must not interrupt the onward march of all South America.’19 San Martín accepted the offer of assistance: ‘Peru will gladly and gratefully receive all the troops you can spare to forward the campaign and end the war in Peru.’20 He then made his way north. By now his position had been eroded. He had lost ground in Peru and he needed more from Bolívar than Bolívar needed from him. San Martín sought three things: the annexation of Guayaquil to Peru, the assistance of Colombian troops to bolster his own forces and defeat the Spaniards, and the acceptance of a monarchical constitution for the new states. As he approached Guayaquil it must have been obvious that he was the proposer, Bolívar the disposer. When his ship approached the harbour on the morning of 26 July, Bolívar was at first taken by surprise but then went on board and embraced his fellow liberator. It was the beginning of two days of public friendship.
The meetings were held on 26 and 27 July in private and there was no third person present.21 So the Bolivarian version of the interview came from Bolívar himself.22 This insisted that discussion was confined to political matters, that San Martín did not make an issue of the status of Guayaquil or request military aid, and that he did not procure Bolívar’s agreement for a monarchy in Peru. According to San Martín’s supporters, the Protector needed and requested the support of Bolívar’s army to complete the destruction of royalist power in Peru, and to procure this he offered to serve under Bolívar’s command. San Martín was deeply disappointed that Bolívar had pre–empted Guayaquil, but realist enough to see that nothing could be done to reverse the Colombian occupation. Bolívar also made it clear that there could be no European monarchy in America. So San Martín’s basic aim was reduced to securing Bolívar’s military support, in the form either of a large military force or of an army under Bolívar himself. But Bolívar rejected these proposals. He was ready to commit reinforcements but not his whole army, which he then needed for internal security in Colombia. So he regarded the offer and the request as excessive and he had serious doubts as to whether San Martín could deliver his side of the proposal. Would San Martín really take or
ders from a younger man and would San Martín’s army accept such an arrangement? Moreover, he regarded San Martín’s military policy as impractical and irresolute. So the interview was fruitless.
At the end of the meetings Guayaquil gave a ball for San Martín. While Bolívar was showing his prowess on the dance floor, San Martín remained aloof; he left at about two in the morning and returned to his ship to catch the tide, accompanied by Bolívar, who gave him a portrait of himself.23 Behind the courtesies, San Martín left Guayaquil disillusioned, convinced that Bolívar either doubted the sincerity of his offer or was embarrassed by his presence in the revolution.24 He believed that Bolívar was superficial, vain and ambitious, dominated by ‘la pasión de mando ‘.25 He also had the honesty to recognize that this was the man to win the war, a man who would crush anyone in his way, not only the Spaniards but if necessary San Martín himself.
The leader of the southern revolution decided to withdraw and leave the way open for Bolívar to conquer Peru for independence. As he said to his friend Tomás Guido, ‘There is not enough room in Peru for Bolívar and me.’26 His decision was confirmed when he returned to Peru to find his position further eroded, his influence with the Peruvian ruling class weakened and his authority over his own army fading. On 20 September he resigned his command. The same night he left Lima and sailed the next day to Chile, thence to Europe and a long exile until his death in 1850. He was generous in defeat. He acknowledged that Peru could only be liberated by external aid, and that only Bolívar could do it. In 1826, when the liberation of Peru was complete, he wrote that ‘the successes which I have gained in the war of independence are really inferior to those which General Bolívar has won for the general cause of America.’27
1 The Young Bolívar, anonymous artist, Madrid, c. 1802.
2 Simón Bolívar, engraved by W. Holt, from an engraving by M.N. Bate, London 1823–8.
3 Simón Bolívar, miniature on ivory of 1828, after a painting by Roulin.
4 Simón Bolívar by José Gil de Castro, Lima, 1825. ‘My portrait painted in Lima with great accuracy and likeness.’
5 Simón Bolívar, Libertador de Colombia, by José Gil de Castro, Lima 1827.
6 Daniel Florencio o’Leary by Antonio Meucci, nineteenth century.
7 Antonio José de Sucre.
8 Bolívar and the Patriot Forces crossing the Andes, 1819, by Tito Salas.
9 Francisco de Paula Santander.
10 Manuela Sáenz.
11 Antiguo camino colonial entre Caracas y La Guaira by Ferdinand Bellermann.
12 Chimborazo by Frederick Edwin Church, 1864.
The Guayaquil interview, at which Bolívar had assured San Martín that he could contribute to the good of South America, was less dramatic for the Liberator than for the Protector.28 Bolívar reported the meetings to Santander rather airily as ‘compliments, talk, and goodbye’. San Martín ‘did not mention any special purpose in coming, and he made no demands of Colombia’. He was not a democrat but favoured a monarchy imported from Europe. ‘He impresses me as being very military in character, and he appears to be energetic, quick, and by no means dull. He has the type of correct ideas that would please you; but he did not strike me as being subtle enough to rise to the sublime.’ Two put–downs for the price of one. Bolívar was satisfied with his success. ‘There is now nothing more for me to do, my dear general, except to store in a safe place the treasure of my success, hiding it out of sight where no one can take it from me.’29
Defence of the Revolution
Victor of three campaigns, liberator of three countries, legal president of Colombia, de facto dictator of Guayaquil, Bolívar held all the cards; the future was his, in the south as well as in the north. For the next year he remained in Ecuador, waiting and resting. But moments of rest were few. In September 1822 he left Guayaquil in the capable hands of General Salom to visit the provinces of Cuenca and Loja. The news from Peru was not good. The new government rejected Bolívar’s offer of assistance, and made life so difficult for the Colombian troops he had sent to Peru that they withdrew. Ecuador had a difficult neighbour to its south and needed protection; moreover, it still had to develop a sense of independent identity, and its military and bureaucracy were demanding to be paid. The budget of the new state was already a headache for him, and so were its politics: ‘Pasto, Quito, Cuenca and Guayaquil are four powers, enemies of each other, all wanting to dominate, yet lacking the strength to do so, for their own internal politics tear them apart.’30 Amidst these immediate preoccupations, the south was now reclaiming him and he had to resist calls to return home. ‘I now belong to the Colombian family and not to the family of Bolívar; I no longer belong to Caracas alone, but to the whole nation…. The people of the south of Colombia have at their back Peru, which seeks to tempt them, and the royal army which seeks to conquer them.’31 He could not abandon the south to its enemies within and without.
While he was in Loja news reached him of the rebellion of Pasto. A Spanish officer, Benito Boves, nephew of the infamous José Tomás Boves, escaped from Quito and in alliance with Agustín Agualongo, an Indian royalist officer, turned the area between the Guáitara and Juanambú rivers into a scene of rebellion and disorder. Bolívar ordered Sucre in with troops from the garrison in Quito. He was accompanied by José María Córdova, a young Colombian officer who was acquiring some notoriety in the wars of independence but whose bravery was flawed by an uncontrollable and capricious temper and more than a streak of cruelty. Nevertheless he appeared to enjoy the favour of the Liberator who overlooked his past violence and in Pasto promoted him to general of brigade.32 Sucre’s first action failed and he needed reinforcements before he could capture the rebel position at Taindala and turn the tide. He then advanced, overtook Boves at Yacuanquer, and routed the rebel forces. The next day he demanded the surrender of the city, but the pastusos refused to be defeated and stood their ground before finally giving way. Boves fled from the subsequent slaughter and the indiscriminate killing of soldiers and civilians. Agualongo and his Indian guerrillas continued to resist and to defy the republic until he was captured and shot in 1824.33 But Bolívar had still not heard the last of Pasto.
Bolívar, after a stay in Ibarra, arrived in Pasto on 2 January 1823, to silence from an obstinate people. He made himself clear. All the inhabitants, except for two who had been forced to flee, had embraced the insurrection and were now punished with confiscation of their property and its redistribution to the officers and soldiers of the occupying forces.34 He ordered General Salom to conscript into the army all the citizens of Pasto who had taken up arms against the republic. Then he appointed Colonel Juan José Flores governor of the province of Pasto and returned to Quito. Salom assembled the inhabitants in the public square and soldiers seized about a thousand of the men, who were immediately banished to Quito. Many perished on the way, many died in prison, and they all maintained a stubborn hatred of Colombia and were never reconciled to the cause of independence. Pasto itself was not pacified but left devastated and depopulated, ready for further rebellion, and in the mountains Indian guerrillas continued to resist. Bolívar saw the devotion to crown and Church in Pasto not merely as a local problem but as a running sore that could reinfect Colombia and attract the support of the Spaniards in Peru. Independence had to be indivisible. But within six months Pasto came back to haunt him and needed further punishment, this time five hundred deaths, but still the pastusos were there, challenging him to destroy them.
Colombia itself still caused the Liberator anxiety, and its fatal instinct towards division and federalism continued to repudiate his belief that large states were more effective than small states. There were many political permutations. Some liberals were centralists, convinced that strong government was needed to impose liberalism. Others were federalists, because they believed that federalism was more democratic. Some conservatives wanted maximum authority at the centre. Others backed regional interests against Santanderian liberalism in Bogotá. Bolívar was a law unt
o himself, at once liberal, conservative and centralist. ‘We have two and a half million inhabitants scattered over vast spaces. One part is savage, the other slave, both enemies among themselves, and all corrupted by superstition and despotism. A happy contrast to set itself against all the nations of the world! This is our situation, this is Colombia. And still they wish to divide it.’35 But he rejected Santander’s request that he return to restore morale and deal with congress: he was on the campaign trail and nothing would drag him back from glory. ‘You can tell everyone from me, I shall not keep the presidency if I am not allowed to exercise those extraordinary powers which congress voted me. I am absolutely convinced that the republic of Colombia cannot be governed with order and prosperity except by absolute power …. Colombia needs an army of occupation to keep it free.’36
On the way from Ibarra to Pasto he received ominous news from the government in Bogotá. The municipal authorities of Caracas had formally protested against the constitution, alleging that it did not represent the views of the electors chosen by the free will of the people. When the central government ordered the prosecution of those who had protested, the courts had declared that there was no case against them. Here were signs of an opposition party attacking the executive power of the centre, and duly reported by Santander who alleged that congress too was penetrated by these ideas of the Caracas faction, as he called the opposition. Bolívar, always alert to any threat from federalism, reacted strongly, voiced his disapproval of the innovators and urged the executive to prevent the legislators from making any changes in Colombia’s fundamental code of laws. He himself made it plain to congress that he would not tolerate any revision of the constitution: ‘The Constitution of Colombia is sacred for ten years and shall not be violated with impunity while I have any blood running through my veins and the liberators are under my orders.’ He regarded Colombia as his personal creation, the core of his achievement, the source of his military strength. To Santander, in one of his most memorable letters, he made a striking restatement of his political principles, recalling his record of total commitment to the integrity of Colombia and its welfare. ‘My policy has always been for stability, for strength, and for true liberty.’ He had explained his views on government to the congress of Angostura, which accepted them in part, as did the congress of Cúcuta; he had sworn to the constitution, which was unalterable for ten years, indeed for a whole generation, in accordance with the ‘social Contract’ of the world’s first republican [Rousseau].